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CATULLUS' 29th POEM.

In the 16th century Catullus, like most of the chief Latin classics, was corrected and illustrated with signal zeal and success: the editions of Avancius, Guarinus, Muretus, Statius and Scaliger do honour to the learning of Italy and France even in that age of erudition. Great is the contrast presented by the 250 years between 1577 and 1829, which offer nothing better than the wayward fancies of Vossius and the dull superficial labours of Vulpius, Doering and Sillig. A little learning makes one sceptical, and in this long interval of time much was forgotten or denied by editors and readers, that had been believed and demonstrated by the first-mentioned scholars. Since 1829 he has received ample amends: in that year Lachmann published his curt but memorable edition which first placed the textual criticism on a sound and rational basis and dispelled the illusions of four centuries of conjecture. During the next twelve years Haupt published first his Quaestiones Catullianae and next his Observationes criticae, in both of which much was done for the criticism of our author. But within the last few years the study of Catullus has advanced with unwonted strides. In 1862 Schwabe gave us his most elaborate Quaestiones Catullianae, where he has collected with great industry in several hundred pages all the ancient authorities for the history of our poet and every character mentioned in his poems. In 1866 he

published the text with an elaborate critical apparatus and a collation of the most important manuscripts. At this very time Mr Robinson Ellis had for years been engaged on a still more elaborate critical edition, founded on an independent collation of a yet larger number of manuscripts and published in 1867: a revision of the text had come out in the preceding year. If either of these thorough editors should feel aggrieved that part of the same work has been done twice over, the public at all events will not complain. My present design however is not to criticise either of these distinguished works: it is to examine at length and dissect a single poem of Catullus, the 29th, from a wish to abate some shameful scandals which have attached themselves to the fame of the greatest of the Romans, and at the same time to try to rescue from obloquy a humbler man, who yet appears to have been a most efficient servant to two of the first generals in history: perhaps also to mitigate our censure of Catullus himself who has propagated these scandals, by shewing that what looks like foul insult is three parts of it meant only in jest.

But first a word or two about the name and, what is of more importance for our immediate purpose, the date of the poet. The unadulterated testimony of manuscripts calls him merely Catullus Veronensis, but we know from Suetonius and others that his gentile name was Valerius. Though there has been more doubt about his praenomen, I thought that Schwabe had settled the question; but I see that Ellis regards it as still open. Jerome, copying Suetonius' words, names him Gaius Valerius Catullus, the word Gaius being written at full length, so as to preclude all possible error in the case of a writer whose Mss. are so very valuable and so independent as those of Jerome: a scarcely less weighty authority than Suetonius, Apuleius terms him in his Apologia C. Catullus: what is there to set against such overwhelming testimony? And yet Scaliger, Lachmann, Haupt, Mommsen and other distinguished scholars decide for Quintus, mainly on the authority of a passage of Pliny, XXXVII 6 § 81. But there the best Mss. and the latest editor have Catullus, not Q. Catullus; and the Q. I wager will never appear in any future critical edition. In the other four places

where he mentions the poet, Pliny calls him simply Catullus. But the important, though very late codex D designates him as Q. Catullus, and a few other less important Mss. have the Q.; but clearly D and the rest have taken this Q. from Pliny who was a most popular author when they were written; and the Q. got into the inferior codices of Pliny from a common confusion with Q. Catulus so often mentioned by him. As then Catullus was not at the same time both Gaius and Quintus, Scaliger's conjecture of *Quinte* for *qui te* in 67 12 can have no weight whatever against the convincing evidence of Suetonius and Apuleius, though it has been adopted by Lachmann, Haupt, Ellis and others: the poet always calls himself simply Catullus.

His age has to be decided by the testimony of Jerome, corrected by that offered by his own poems. Intense personal feeling, the *odi* or *amo* of the moment, characterises so many of Catullus' finest poems, that dates are of the greatest importance for rightly apprehending his meaning and allusions, much more so indeed than in the case of Horace's more artificial muse. Jerome under the year corresponding to B.C. 87 records his birth: 'Gaius Valerius Catullus scribtor lyricus Veronae nascitur': under that answering to B.C. 57 he says 'Catullus XXX aetatis anno Romae moritur'. Here I have little doubt that he has accurately taken down Suetonius' words in respect of the place of birth and death and of the poet's age when he died. But, as so often happens with him, he has blundered somewhat in transferring to his complicated era the consulships by which Suetonius would have dated; for it is certain that many of the poems, and among them the one we are about to consider, were written after B.C. 57. Lachmann hit upon an escape from the difficulty which once approved itself to many: in 52 3 we have 'Per consulatum peierat Vatinius': now Vatinius was consul for a few days at the end of B.C. 47; and hence Lachmann infers that Catullus at all events was then living. He supposes therefore that Jerome has confounded the Cn. Octavius who was consul in 87 with one of the same name who was consul in 76; and that Catullus was born in 76 and died in 46. This is ingenious, but hardly can be true. Schwabe, following in the track of more than one scholar, has shewn that it is by no

means necessary to assume that Catullus saw Vatinius consul. He has cited more than one most striking passage from Cicero to prove that this creature of Caesar and Pompey, marked out by them for future office, was in the habit of boasting of his consulship to come, as early as B.C. 56 or even 62: Catullus therefore in the line quoted need only mean that Vatinius used to say, 'as I hope to be consul, I swear it is so'; and the verse thus carries with it far more point. Again 76 is too late a date for his birth: it is plain that as early as 62, when he would thus be only 14 years old, he had become entangled with Lesbia, who was no other than the formidable Clodia, the Clytemnestra quadrantaria, the Medea of the Palatine. When the reference to Vatinius has been explained as above, we find that several of his most personal poems allude to events which took place in 55 and 54: this will be seen more in detail when we come to consider our 29th poem: but the latest event which can be dated is the allusion to his friend Calvus' famous denunciation of Vatinius which took place in August of 54. As the years then which immediately followed were full of momentous events which must have stirred the feelings of Catullus to their inmost depths, we can scarcely conceive him as writing after this period. We may well suppose then that towards the end of 54, feeling the approach of early death which his poems seem more than once to anticipate, he collected and published them with the dedication to Cornelius Nepos.

In a Greifswald index Scholarum published some months ago and transmitted to me by the courtesy of the writer, Mr F. Buecheler tries to prove, p. 15—17, that the two Ciceros had the poems of Catullus in their hands before June of this year 54 and that Catullus must therefore allude to some earlier speech of Calvus against Vatinius. Cicero ad Q. fratrem II 15 4 has these words 'tu, quemadmodum me censes oportere esse..., ita et esse et fore auricula infima scito molliorem': this, Buecheler says, is an allusion to the 25th poem of Catullus 'Thalle mollior...vel imula auricilla'. I am disposed to think both Cicero and Catullus are alluding to some common proverbial expression, as I have pointed out in my Lucretius that Cicero, who so often alludes to older poets Greek and Latin, never

quotes any contemporary verses except his own, never mentions the name of Catullus, and speaks of Calvus only as an orator, not as a poet. But granting that Cicero does allude here to Catullus, this will tell us nothing as to the time when he published his 'liber': it is plain from the dedication to Nepos, from such pieces as the 54th which alludes to the publication of the 29th, from the very nature of the case, that Catullus must have given many of his occasional pieces to the world at the time they were written and that Cicero may have had in his hands the piece in question years before the whole collection was made public. For what I now proceed to state will prove that the body of poems we now have could not have been completed very much before the end of 54: I have shewn in my note to Lucretius III 57 how often Catullus has imitated him in one section of his longest work, the marriage of Peleus and Thetis. Now the De Rerum Natura was not published before the commencement of 54; and Catullus must have studied it before he wrote the long episode of Theseus and Ariadne which, as I there observe, though beautiful in itself, singularly interrupts the thread of the narrative. Being then formally a follower of the Alexandrines, though so widely differing from them in genius, he must have thought his varied collection would be imperfect without an epyllion. He therefore wrote or completed, and inserted in the middle of his book this brilliant and exquisite, but unequal and ill-proportioned poem. A generation had yet to pass, before the heroic attained to its perfection; while he had already produced glyconics, phalaecians and iambics, each 'one entire and perfect chrysolite', 'cunningest patterns' of excellence, such as Latium never saw before or after, Alcaeus, Sappho and the rest then and only then having met their match.

If therefore he died in 54 at the age of 30, he was probably born in 84, the year of Cinna's 4th consulship, Jerome as Schwabe suggests having confounded it with 87, when Cinna was first consul: for him a very probable error. But Schwabe prefers to take 87 as the year of his birth and to make him 33 years old at the time of his death. The other alternative I much prefer, as it appears to me to fulfil every requisite con-

dition of the problem: he evidently died in youth: 'Obvius huic venias, hedera iuvenalia cinctus Tempora cum Calvo, docte Catulle, tuo'. He would thus be about 22, when he first met his fate in the ox-eyed Lesbia or Clodia, the *βοῶπις* of Cicero and Atticus. She was some ten years older; but her Juno-like beauty would then be in its prime; and those terrible lenocinia needed time for their full development; for she was a Juno to whom Aphrodite had lent her own cestus: *ἔνθ' ἔνι μὲν φιλότης, ἐν δ' ἵμερος, ἐν δ' ὀαριστὺς Πάρφασις, ἥτ' ἔκλεψε νόον πύκα περ φρονεόντων.* If such allurements made captive in a moment the Olympian himself, how were they to be resisted by a youth of twenty-two, that youth a poet, that poet Catullus? 'Haec bona non primae tribuit natura iuventae, Quae cito post septem lustra venire solent', says the teacher of the art of love; and Lesbia was then *in* her seventh lustrum. She was a fearful woman, but she has also been fearfully outraged and maligned. Seldom can an unfortunate lady have had the luck to incur the burning hatred of two such masters of sarcasm as Cicero and Catullus. She destroyed the luckless poet; yet we owe her some gratitude; for she gave us one of the great lyric poets of the world.

But at present I will dwell no longer on these matters: I will come at once to my more special subject, the 29th poem, of which I have so much to say that I shall probably tire out my readers' patience. And first I will print the piece at length, leaving the words spaced in the only four places where there is any doubt as to the reading: these I will discuss as I come to them in my dissection of the poem.

quis hoc potest videre, quis potest pati,
nisi impudicus et vorax et aleo,
Mamurram habere quod comata Gallia
habebat c u m t e et ultima Britannia?
cinaede Romule, haec videbis et feres?
et ille nunc superbus et superfluens
perambulabit omnium cubilia,
ut albulus columbus a u t ydoneus?
cinaede Romule, haec videbis et feres?

es impudicus et vorax et aleo.
eone nomine, imperator unice,
fuisti in ultima occidentis insula,
ut ista vostra defututa mentula
ducenties comesset aut trecenties?
quid est alid sinistra liberalitas?
parum expatravit an parum helluatus est?
paterna prima lancinata sunt bona:
secunda praeda Pontica: inde tertia
Hibera, quam scit amnis aurifer Tagus.
hunc Galliae timet et Britanniae
quid hunc malum fovetis? aut quid hic potest
nisi uncta devorare patrimonia?
eone nomine urbis o p u l e n t i s s i m e
socer generque, perdidistis omnia?

But before I begin to examine more minutely the poem itself, I must from love of Caesar and indeed of Catullus himself endeavour to shew that in their days, and indeed long before and after, the most offensive and indecent personalities meant something very different from what they would mean in the present day. Had it not been so, civilised society could hardly have gone on in ancient Greece and Rome during their most brilliant and energetic times, or in the Middle Ages down indeed to a quite recent period. Just think, to take two conspicuous and widely distant examples, of the appalling personalities of Aristophanes and Dante! Public opinion craved for and found such vents for the relief of its pent up feelings towards the great ones of the earth, whether demagogues, popes or kings. Coupled with this love of personality there was a tendency, which to us seems strange and almost incomprehensible, towards outrageous indecency and buffoonery. There was more in this than can be explained on any ordinary principles of human conduct. When in old Greece the majestic beauty of epic poetry came into being together with the erotic licence of lyric, elegiac and iambic poetry; when side by side with the august solemnity of tragedy was seen the old comedy rioting in a liberty which turned into ridicule gods and men

alike, the belief clearly was that gods and men alike dreaded Nemesis and wished by such sacrifices of dignity to appease that awful power. We must give a similar interpretation to the scenes witnessed in the cathedrals of Christendom during those ages when men had faith, if they ever had it, and yet at stated seasons of the year parodies went on, the most blasphemous and obscene, of all that was held most sacred. Apparently from long use and wont this curious love of indecency continued till quite recent times to infest the light literature of jest books and the embittered polemics of angry adversaries. In the middle of last century Voltaire's calumnies upon Frederick of Prussia are quite as revolting to our sense as those of Catullus against Caesar, or Calvus and Clodius against Pompey, and they were meant too more in earnest. Nay to come even nearer to our days, Prof. Sedgwick has told me that in 1815 he was present at a public dinner in Derby, presided over by a D.D. of local importance and dignity who had grown up sons at the table. After dinner this worthy gave out toasts which excited surprise then and now would be inconceivable, but which from the nature of the case must have been looked upon as provocatives of festive enjoyment when he himself had formed his social habits.

In ancient Italy the union of indecency with bitter personality was very rife, the latter being fostered as in Greece by the fierce struggles of party in the free communities, the former by curious religious superstition. As in Greece and throughout the East, so in Italy the evil eye, the fascinum, was believed to have an extraordinary influence, and this influence it was thought could best be averted by obscene symbols and obscene verses: thus 'fascinum' became a synonyme for 'veretrum'. The evil eye was most efficacious where human happiness appeared to be greatest: in three cases therefore it was especially guarded against, in the case of children, of a marriage, and of a triumph when man was supposed to stand on the highest pinnacle of glory and felicity. Therefore, as Varro tells us in the de ling. Lat. VII 97, 'puerulis turpicula res in collo quaedam suspenditur, ne quid obsit'; and there is a striking passage in Pliny XXVIII 4 § 39 'quamquam illos [infantes]

religione tutatur et fascinus, imperatorum quoque, non solum infantium custos, qui *deus* inter sacra Romana a Vestalibus colitur et currus triumphantium, sub his pendens, defendit medicus invidiae, iubetque eosdem respicere similis medicina linguae, ut sit exorata a tergo Fortuna gloriae carnifex'. A similar protection against Fortune, the executioner of glory and happiness, was afforded from the earliest times by the Fescennine songs, connected in meaning and origin with this fascinum: the indecent ridicule thrown thereby on the great or the fortunate was believed to turn aside the evil eye. While patrimi and matrimi were addressing the gods in pure and lofty strains, with regard to other religious solemnities we have Ovid in the fasti III 675 saying 'Nunc mihi cur cantent superest obscena puellae Dicere: nam coeunt certaque probra canunt'; and 695 'Inde ioci veteres obscenaque dicta canuntur, Et iuvat hanc magno verba dedisse deo'. In marriage as might be expected the evil eye was greatly dreaded; and therefore the fescennine verses were a vital part of the ceremony, as important as the invocation of Hymen Hymenaeus. Look at the long episode of the 'fescennina iocatio' which comes in the midst of the epithalamium, and mars so rudely to our feeling the exquisite grace and delicacy of Catullus' 61st poem. It is strange but true that this address to the 'concubinus' was meant as a compliment to the beautiful Aurunculeia and the highborn and accomplished Torquatus: it was not meant to be taken seriously, but was only a sacrifice to Fortune the carnifex. If this be doubted, I would appeal to the toasts of our Derby D.D. and to Seneca's Medea 107 foll. where the chorus, celebrating Iason's marriage with Creusa, says 'Concesso, iuvenes, ludite iurgio.... Rara est in dominos iusta licentia....Festa dicax fundat convitia fescenninus: Solvat turba iocos. tacitis eat illa tenebris, Siqua peregrino nubit fugitiva marito': meaner mortals like the runaway Medea may marry in quiet; but a Creusa or an Aurunculeia has a claim to be honoured in being thus degraded by the fescennine licence. When Cato and Marcia married for the second time amid the gloom of civil war, after the death of Hortensius to whom she had been made over, Lucan mentions among the signs of mourning that 'Non soliti lusere sales, nec more

Sabino Excepit tristis convitia festa maritus'. But on their first marriage doubtless the fescennina iocatio had sounded as loudly as Hymen Hymenaee in honour of the then youthful Cato.

The car of the conqueror could not escape, and we know from Livy and others that on every triumph the victorious commander was followed by his legions singing ridiculous fescennine verses. The greater he was and the more adored by his soldiers, the greater would be the sacrifice demanded by Fortuna and the more ribald the fun in honour of their much-loved general. Caesar, as we shall see, has suffered grievously by this; he has suffered also as well as his successor in another way. During their reigns the licence of invective was quite unrestrained, as we may learn from the well-known speech of Cremutius Cordus in Tacitus: 'sed ipse divus Iulius, ipse divus Augustus et tulere ista et reliquere': but the consequence he draws was hardly true in the case of Julius. Tiberius however in old age, wearied with the burden of redressing the world and driven wild by the treachery of his most trusted friends, resolved to put a stop to this limitless 'scandalum magnatum'. Though its open display was thus checked, it went on in secret with more rancour than ever. He himself has bitterly paid for this; and so has Julius, as in the days of Suetonius and Dion Cassius people had forgotten that in his time the abuse meant little or nothing; and these two writers have taken literally, what soldiers said in boisterous good-humour, or Catullus and the like from temporary pique or some equally frivolous motive.

But with the cessation of virulent personalities the custom of writing light licentious verses did not come to an end: Catullus had said in thorough good faith 'Nam castum esse decet pium poetam Ipsum, versiculos nihil necesse est, Qui tum denique habent salem ac leporem, Si sunt molliculi ac parum pudici'. These lines the younger Pliny, a man of sterling worth and indefatigable industry, repeats with approbation; and in another place, epist. v 3, he reckons the writing such poems among 'innoxiae remissionis genera', for which 'Homo sum' is all the defence needed; and he draws up a formidable list of predecessors who have indulged in this pardonable recreation: among others Tully, Calvus, Pollio, Messala, Hortensius,

M. Brutus, Sulla, Catulus, Scaevola, Varro, the Torquati, Gaius Memmius, Lentulus Gaetulicus, Seneca; divus Julius, divus Augustus, divus Nerva, Titus: a Nero could not degrade this noble art which had been practised by Virgil and Nepos, and before them by Ennius and Accius. Apuleius quotes the same words of Catullus, and to Pliny's list adds the name of divus Hadrianus who composed many such trifles and wrote for a friend this epitaph 'Lascivus versu, mente pudicus eras'. Catullus therefore had once a goodly band of brothers to keep him in countenance, though he is now almost the sole representative of them left.

At last I turn to our special poem, which is certainly one of the most powerful and brilliant of our author's satirical pieces. For fully understanding the allusions, it is of importance to know the time when it was written, and this is not difficult to determine. Some of the older editors, Scaliger among them, have gone absurdly wrong, referring for instance the 'praeda Pontica' and 'Hibera' to Caesar's latest conquests, after the death of Pompey; though the poem (see vss. 13, 21—24) plainly speaks of the latter joining with Caesar in pampering their unworthy favourite Mamurra. It was written after Caesar's invasion of Britain, as the poem itself plainly declares, probably therefore at the end of 55 or beginning of 54, when Caesar was in Cisalpine Gaul, having returned from his first invasion late in the preceding summer; hardly after the second invasion which took place in the summer and autumn of 54, as the poet, we saw, appears to have died by the end of that year. In the latter case there would scarcely have been room for the events which must have occurred afterwards, Catullus too, as Jerome informs us, having died in Rome. Clearly therefore our poem, together perhaps with the less important, though more offensive 57th, is what Suetonius alludes to in the well-known passage, Iulius 73 'Valerium Catullum, a quo sibi versiculis de Mamurra perpetua stigmata imposita non dissimulaverat, satisfacientem eadem die adhibuit cenae hospitioque patris, sicut consuerat, uti perseveravit'. At Verona therefore where Catullus' father resided Caesar must have asked the poet

to dinner, and in the winter of 55—54; for after the reconciliation Catullus for some reason, perhaps mere wantonness, must have again declared war, as appears by the obscure but offensive attack of the 54th piece, the concluding lines 'Irascere iterum meis iambis Immerentibus, unice imperator' plainly referring to the 'imperator unice' of our poem. Angry no doubt he was at the repetition of such waspish and ludicrously unfounded insults; but of his many imperial qualities none was more glorious to himself or more salutary to the world than his practice of the art not to be angry overmuch: his clemency cost him his life; yet made his memory what it is. But the 'perpetua stigmata' meant both to Caesar and Catullus something very different from what Suetonius seems to imply: Catullus could not have dared so to beard the irresponsible proconsul in his own province, who with a breath could have swept from off the earth 'te cum tota gente, Catulle, tua'. What such insults really implied will I trust be presently shewn. Though I feel no doubt that our poem was written at this time, I see no weight in the argument of Haupt and Schwabe that it must have been composed in the lifetime of Julia who died during Caesar's second expedition to Britain, as otherwise the 'socer generque' of the last line could not have been used. Whatever the legal meaning of these terms, Caesar and Pompey in history were always 'socer generque': those eminent scholars refute themselves by Virgil's 'Aggeribus socer Alpinis atque arce Monoeci Descendens, gener adversis instructus eois'. Recollect too Cicero's reply to Pompey's question 'Where is your son-in-law?' 'with your father-in-law': Lucan a dozen times over plays with this favourite antithesis, as in 'socerum depellere regno Decretum genero est'.

At the time our poem was written the league between Caesar and Pompey had lasted about five years, since the consulship of Caesar in 59, and had given them absolute power in Rome and throughout the empire, whenever they chose to exert it; for what could the constitutionalists or 'boni' do against the masters of 20 legions or more? Crassus had just started on his disastrous expedition and was otherwise of small account. It was a despotism, tempered only by their own moderation

and by epigrams, such as these poems of Catullus and the confidential letters of Cicero: in his public speeches he had to praise without stint. Notwithstanding Caesar's unprecedented successes in Gaul Pompey with the vulgar was still the greater; but acute observers like Catullus and Cicero saw that the other had already got 'the start of the majestic world', though he did not yet 'bear the palm alone'. Pompey could be thwarted and bullied even by a Clodius; before Caesar's will all must bend. The letters to Atticus, which may be looked on as soliloquies by an impassioned nature of more than Italian fervour of temperament, give a singular picture of Cicero's feelings towards Caesar. Caesar behaved to him as an enemy with a kinder courtesy than Pompey shewed him as a friend; he forgave him every offence before he had time to ask forgiveness; compelled his subordinates Antony, Balbus and the rest to treat him when a declared opponent with punctilious deference. Yet for all this, perhaps because of all this, admiring as he could not but do Caesar's social and personal qualities, he felt all his aspirations so nipped and kept under by the other's commanding genius, that hatred the most intense took possession of his mind: 'hoc τέρας horribili est vigilantia, celeritate, diligentia' was his constant feeling. Yet he, thinking and speaking in earnest, never dreamed of fastening on Caesar any of these ridiculous scandals of Catullus. Read the letters written to Atticus after those ides of March on which he received his own death-warrant: he glories in that day; but soon finds that he has got nothing 'praeter laetitiam quam oculis cepi iusto interitu tyranni'; that the tyrant dead is worse than the tyrant living; that he could speak with less danger 'vivo tyranno quam mortuo; ille enim nescio quo pacto ferebat me quidem mirabiliter: nunc—'. At last in xv 4 we have this outbreak: 'if things go on thus, I like not the ides of March. For he should never have come back after death, nor fear compelled us to ratify his acts; or else—heaven's curse light upon him, dead though he be—so high was I in his favour that, seeing the master is slain and we are not free, he was a master not to be rejected at my time of life. I blush, believe me: but I have written, and will not blot it out'. For these awful words nei-

ther Cicero nor Caesar is to blame, but the fortune of Rome: they must express the feeling of the 'boni' generally who could not see that old things had passed away.

But though Catullus would take advantage of such feelings, with him it was always as I have said the *odi* or *amo* of the moment that constrained him to write and made him the poet he was; and his unabashed candour and cynical effrontery lay bare to us the motives which impelled him to this attack on Caesar and Mamurra. The 41st and 43rd poems shew us that the latter had by his wealth supplanted him in the affections of a provincial beauty, 'Decoctoris amica Formiani', a phrase repeated for effect in both the poems just mentioned. This Formian spendthrift is our Mamurra of whom I will now speak more at length. Though he was a man of some mark in his day, he would have passed into oblivion but for the unenviable notoriety Catullus has given him. Owing solely to this notoriety he is spoken of by Pliny in XXXVI 6 § 48, a passage to which we shall recur more than once: he tells us on the authority of Cornelius Nepos that Mamurra was born at Formiae, was a Roman knight and was praefectus fabrum to C. Caesar in Gaul. Horace as we know denotes Formiae by the name of 'urbs Mamurrarum', whether with reference to Catullus or because the family was really very important there. Caesar, it may be on account of his annoyance at such attacks, never once mentions his name, which twice occurs in Cicero; once in the well-known account which he gives Atticus of Caesar's dining with him in December 45, where he says that Caesar 'de Mamurra audivit' without changing countenance. This is perhaps rightly now explained to mean that he heard of Mamurra's death; but, as 'vultum' is omitted in the best Ms., perhaps Manutius' interpretation is right, that a sentence against Mamurra for transgressing the sumptuary law, which Caesar strictly enforced, was read to him; and he let it stand as it was: nothing else is known as to the time when Mamurra died. The other passage is more important for our purpose: Cicero is writing to Atticus, VII 7, in the year 50: he is greatly disgusted with the state of affairs, with Caesar's ever-growing power and resistless energy, and thus quotes and replies to a

question of his correspondent: 'Annorum enim decem imperium et ita latum placet?' placet igitur etiam me expulsum et agrum Campanum perisse et adoptatum patricium a plebeio, Gaditanum a Mytilenaeo, et Labieni divitiae et Mamurrae placent et Balbi horti et Tusculanum. Here Cicero is alluding to things most obnoxious to him, carried by the joint power of Caesar, Pompey and Crassus during late years. You ask me whether I like the imperium given to Caesar for ten years and in such a way. Why, if I like that, then I like my own banishment, the loss to the state of the revenue from the Campanian ager, the adoption of the patrician Clodius by a plebeian, of a Gaditane by a Mytilenaean; the riches of Labienus and of Mamurra; Balbus' gardens and Tusculan villa. The first four of these obnoxious measures were carried conjointly by the three dynasts, Varro's Τρικάρανος: the adoption of the bland Phoenician L. Cornelius Balbus by Pompey's trusted friend and client Theophanes of Mytilene must have been solely Pompey's doing, as he gave to both of them citizenship and wealth and influence: the riches of Labienus would come of course from Caesar alone; those of Mamurra, as we shall see presently from Catullus, from both Pompey and Caesar: the gardens and villa of Balbus probably from Pompey alone, as he was long his patron, and it was late that Balbus, when forced to choose sides, took that of Caesar who nobly allowed him to nurse Pompey's property during the civil war.

Catullus himself I repeat tells us that Mamurra got his riches from Pompey as well as Caesar: with reference to this I will examine vss. 17—19 of our poem. In the offensive 13th line *vostra* alludes to the two: he goes on to say that first of all he squandered his patrimony, that of a Roman knight as Pliny tells us in the passage I quoted: next the booty of Pontus: this beyond all question was the spoil gained by Pompey in the Mithridatic war, as Haupt and others have seen. I cannot conceive how Mommsen in his history (bk. 5 ch. 8 near the end) can maintain that this was the booty taken at the capture of Mytilene in 80 or 79, where Caesar then a youth distinguished himself under the praetor M. Thermus. Next was wasted the Iberian booty which the Tagus knows: this was

the spoil gained in 60 by Caesar as propraetor in Spain from the Lusitani. And now says the poet he is to have the wealth of Gaul and Britain; and was it to pamper a profligate like this, father- and son-in-law, that you have ruined between you the world? From all this, coupled with what Pliny tells us, we learn that Mamurra was a man of good birth; that he was Caesar's chief engineer officer in Gaul where operations were on so gigantic a scale; he must therefore have been a man of distinguished professional merit; high too in Caesar's confidence, as he had served years before under him in Spain; nay years before that he had served in some similar capacity under Rome's other great general Pompey, when engineering works must have been on an equally great scale; and, as Pompey had the whole of Lucullus' army handed over to him, it is more than probable that Mamurra was with Lucullus before. From all this it follows necessarily that in the year 54 he was a man of mature age and of high professional distinction. It would appear that in Rome, as in some other countries, members of the scientific corps of the army had a difficulty in emerging from under the cold shade of the aristocracy; but one who had been so long the trusted officer of Caesar and Pompey must have had eminent merit, though he would not readily attain to the social consideration of a Labienus or Antony. It is likely enough from what Catullus and Pliny tell us, that he was fond of display and enjoyment, and that his riches lightly came and lightly went. But what Catullus says in other pieces of his success with women would seem to contradict the most offensive things in our poem, which on all considerations are incredible. Nay it is clear that by this fescennine-like raillery the poet simply means 'you have cheated me, my fine fellow, out of my mistress, and you and your two mighty patrons, who have given you the means to do it, shall bitterly smart for this'.

And now I will turn to other such-like charges which can be shewn I believe to be as utterly baseless as this Mamurran banter: Catullus, though he will not let Pompey escape, directs the main force of his invective against Caesar as Mamurra's more immediate patron: in vv. 2 and 10 he calls him 'impu-

dicus', which in Latin has a peculiarly offensive meaning, being a synonyme of the 'cinaede' which he applies to him in 5 and 9; and in the brief but yet more impudent 57th poem he begins with 'Pulcre convenit improbis cinaedis, Mamurrae pathicoque Caesarique' and goes on in the like insulting strain. Suetonius was an indefatigable collector of anecdotes and facts concerning the early Caesars; but, removed from them a century and a half in time and still further in feeling, for reasons some of which we have touched upon above, and perhaps from the Boswell-like character of his mind, he is often unable to distinguish between what was meant in earnest and mere joking or conventional invective. Yet, while in a passage we have already referred to he gives as one instance of Caesar's exceeding placability his ready forgiveness of Catullus, though he avowed that these verses about Mamurra had set upon him a perpetual brand, in ch. 49 he proves that these very verses meant little or nothing. For there he tells us 'pudicitiae eius famam *nihil quidem praeter* Nicomedis contubernium laesit, gravi tamen et perenni obprobrio et ad omnium convitia exposito': he then gives a list of these 'omnes' to which I shall presently refer. But first for the story itself: Caesar when a boy shewed that in Sulla's words he had many Marii in him; when he was but eighteen he refused to divorce his wife Cornelia, by whom he was already father of Julia, and preferred to wander about a proscribed fugitive in hourly peril of his life, though Pompey had at once obeyed the dictator's commands. He then escaped to Asia and served under M. Minucius Thermus, was sent by him on a confidential mission to Nicomedes of Bithynia, successfully performed it, returned and took part in the capture of Mytilene and received a civic crown for saving the life of a soldier. It was in consequence of this visit to Nicomedes that the absurd and scandalous story took its rise at some time or other. From a long list of angry opponents or bantering jesters who 20 or 30 years later taunted Caesar about this matter Suetonius singles out Gaius Memmius as making the charge in a definite shape: 'C. Memmius etiam ad cyathum et vinum Nicomedi stetisse obicit cum reliquis exoletis pleno convivio, accubantibus nonnullis urbicis negotiatoribus quorum refert nomina'. This

then Memmius must have learnt or pretended to learn more than twenty years after the event when he was praetor in Bithynia. But supposing the memories of these merchants of the place did not play them false, what does the story mean? A young noble of the highest birth, of distinguished bravery, energy and talent, the representative of Rome at a king's court, first foully disgraces himself with that king and then gratuitously parades his degradation before a large company. A circumstantial lie is often the most self-convicting of lies. It is possible enough that the story may have arisen from the handsome and accomplished youth having taken part in some court pageant or frolic: a guilty secret would have stood in the way of such condescension. It may be asked how would so many eminent orators and others make a charge they knew to be unfounded? Why, every Greek and Roman orator, as a part of his art, made charges against an antagonist which he knew to be false as well as the opponent himself did. Such attacks on Caesar meant no more than the terms of abuse or endearment used by a cabman or coalheaver in the streets of London or Paris; than the toasts whatever they were of our Derby D.D.; or than the threats of Catullus towards his Furius and Aurelius. The poet, to shew his contempt for his would-be patron Memmius, in two pieces makes meaningless imputations on him, more foul than this of Memmius upon Caesar. But Caesar, whose self-respect would suffer by this one foolish story turning up so often a generation after its fictitious date, must have been enraged by the acrimonious turn given to it by the foul-mouthed Memmius; for Suetonius tells us that he replied in writing to his virulent speeches 'non minore acerbitate'. But he soon forgave him, as he knew his scurrility was a mere fashion of speech.

To confirm my view of the case I will adduce the evidence of Pompey and Augustus. Pompey, left by the coalition to coerce the city, by his unskilful management at once irritates the 'boni' and exposes himself to their contempt. How do they avenge themselves? Calvus, as an orator second only to Cicero, as a poet only to Catullus, at once indites this epigram, 'Magnus quem metuunt omnes digito caput uno Scalpit: quid

credas hunc sibi velle? virum': this is more offensive even than the attacks on Caesar. Clodius next quarrels with Pompey, takes his troop of ruffians with him, and standing in a conspicuous spot asks, as Pompey is passing, *τίς ἐστιν αὐτοκράτωρ ἀκόλαστος* (imperator impudicus); *τίς ἀνὴρ ἄνδρα ζητεῖ; τίς ἐνὶ δακτύλῳ κνᾶται τὴν κεφαλήν*; And they answer in chorus to each question 'Pompey to be sure'. Now this is the very wantonness of insult, as Pompey by universal consent was acknowledged as a man of simple and exemplary domestic habits, so attached to his family and his successive wives as to be quizzed for uxoriousness; while at the same time his conversation and manners are said by Plutarch to have been most attractive to clever women. Cicero, out of humour with himself, with Pompey and with the world, in his very curt comment on his death to Atticus (XI 6 5) remarks 'non possum eius casum non dolere; hominem enim integrum et castum et gravem cognovi': this is what Cicero thinks of, not his deeds in war or peace. But if Suetonius had written his life, we should have had all these assaults on his 'pudicitia' enumerated at length, as we have in the case of Augustus: in the 68th chapter of his life he gives a set of most fatuous and ribald charges made by his fiercest antagonists, Sextus Pompey and the two Antonies: 'pudicitiam delibatam a Caesare, Aulo etiam Hirtio in Hispania trecentis milibus nummum substraverit'!!—worthy parallels to the Nicomedes and Mamurra tales; but gravely narrated by the biographer, who solemnly records how the people in the theatre pointed at Augustus when this verse was recited of a gallus with his tambourine, 'videsne ut cinaedus orbem digito temperat'. But as Cremutius Cordus says, 'ipse divus Iulius, ipse divus Augustus et tulere ista et reliquere'.

When Caesar triumphed, Fortuna had to be propitiated by an unwonted display of the 'fescennina iocatio'. Some joker of jokes hit of course upon Nicomedes and composed for his soldiers the famous 'Gallias Caesar subegit, Nicomedes Caesarem' and the rest; as well as the 'Urbani, servate uxores moechum calvom adducimus': but nothing about Mamurra who doubtless was in the conqueror's suite. Dion Cassius, who has about as lively a sense of a joke as Suetonius, tells us (43, 20) how Caesar was

gratified by the freedoms of his soldiers, because it shewed they knew he would take them in good part; but expressed annoyance at the Nicomedes chaunt and swore the story was a lie; upon which the soldiers laughed the louder. That laugh merely meant to say, 'General, we only wished to shew our love to you and avert the ten thousand envious eyes, fixed on you and us as we passed through the streets'. I have yet a word to say of the twice recurring 'Cinaede Romule' and the 'imperator unice' repeated in another poem. Up to Caesar's conquest the Gauls were looked upon as a standing menace to Italy and the empire: from Cicero's laudatory speech 'de provinciis consularibus' spoken more than a year before our poem was written we see what boundless enthusiasm his exploits had caused; Gauls, Helvetii, Germans had been crushed; nations not known from books or even rumour, 'has noster imperator nosterque exercitus et populi Romani arma peragrarunt'; Providence had placed the Alps between Gaul and Italy, else Rome had never become the seat of empire; but now these Alps may sink down, for there is nothing between them and the ocean that Italy need dread. And now the invasion of Britain had added to the enthusiasm, and the unprecedented honour was decreed of a thanksgiving of twenty days. It is probable that, like other saviours of their country, he had been styled in the official announcement of this a second Romulus, a 'unicus imperator'; to which Catullus gives this malicious turn, though mingling with the banter is a half-betrayed admiration for the 'Caesaris monimenta magni'. In the bitter and powerful speech of the consul Lepidus, preserved among the fragments of Sallust, Sulla with like irony is styled 'scaevus iste Romulus'; and Quintilian (IX 3 89) records that Sallust thus addressed Cicero, 'O Romule Arpinas': in Livy we find 'unicus imperator', 'dux', 'consul' or the like a dozen times, and more than once said with bitter irony.

The words 'et vorax' which follow in both lines the 'impudicus' afford me a welcome opportunity to repel another scandal which has fixed on Caesar's memory an ignominious vice; a scandal however of quite modern origin which has arisen through misapprehending two words of Cicero. The charge so often made I find thus stated in Macmillan's Magazine, vol. 17 p. 526,

by Goldwin Smith in his able and sympathising, yet moderate defence of 'the last Republicans of Rome' against the unmeasured scorn and abuse which have been recently heaped upon them: 'We find the great man, when he is the guest of Cicero, preparing himself for the pleasures of the table in the Roman fashion by taking an emetic. These be thy Gods!' The writer alludes to the dinner which Cicero gave to Caesar, and describes to Atticus in the last letter of the 13th book. The dinner took place it would appear on the 21st of December 45, in Cicero's Formian villa, a few months before Caesar's murder. It was the 3rd day of the Saturnalia, a time of universal relaxation and feasting. How was it spent by the heavy-laden master of the world? He had come the evening before to the house of Philippus with a large retinue: there he spent the day working hard at his accounts with Balbus till one o'clock; then he walked on the shore; at two he took a bath; then he heard of Mamurra without changing countenance; was anointed, sat down to dinner; and as he intended that night to take an emetic (ἐμετικὴν or rather ἐμετικὸν agebat), he ate and drank without fear and in good spirits. The dinner, Cicero tells us, was sumptuous and served in good style; and not only that but, in the words of Lucilius, 'with good talk well dressed, well seasoned, and, if you would know, to his heart's content. . . I shewed myself a man: yet he is not a guest to whom you would say, Pray let me see you when you come again this way: once is enough. No politics in the conversation, much literary talk. In short he was delighted and thoroughly enjoyed himself'. The two words I have cited in the original admit I believe no sense but that which I have given them: the paraphrase in Macmillan is plainly untenable. Medical practice appears in old times to have gone through much the same phases as in our days. A generation ago the taking of emetics before going to bed was an infliction which many had to submit to: it is now I fancy out of fashion and superseded by homoeopathy, the cold water cure and the like, whether rightly so or not, I don't know. In Caesar's time the 'vomitus' was a common prescription: by and bye Antonius Musa cured Augustus by means of cold water or with the help of nature, and made the former all the rage.

Horace had to shiver for it in the depth of winter; but soon to the gain of invalids tho' to the world's loss Musa killed off Marcellus the heir of the empire and extinguished the new fashion. Celsus (I 3) approves of an emetic in certain cases: it is of more use in winter he says than in summer; and Caesar was with Cicero in midwinter. The latter himself speaks of it on this occasion and also in the pro Deiotaro, addressed to Caesar, as quite an ordinary matter. Celsus tells you, if the emetic is taken at night, not to eat much at the meal preceding, to take yesterday's bread, rough dry unmixed wine, roast meat 'cibisque omnibus quam siccissimis'. I daresay Caesar followed these rules as far as Cicero's cook would let him; for all accounts represent him as utterly indifferent to the pleasures of the table. Even his enemies, says Suetonius ch. 53, did not deny that he was most sparing in his use of wine; and his confidential friend Gaius Oppius relates that he was so utterly careless as to what he ate 'ut quondam ab hospite conditum oleum pro viridi adpositum, aspernantibus ceteris, solum etiam largius appetisse scribat, ne hospitem aut neglegentiae aut rusticitatis videretur arguere'. Well does Velleius (II 41) say of him 'Magno illi Alexandro, sed sobrio neque iracundo, simillimus'. He was indeed the high-bred and kindly gentleman, the same Suetonius telling us that he sent his baker to prison, because he had dared to put before him a finer bread than he had given to his guests. 'These be thy Gods!' I would echo in a different sense; for Mr Smith a few pages later says most justly of Cicero, that 'his vast intellectual industry implies a temperate life'. But how much greater even than Cicero's was the industry of Caesar during the last 15 years of his life, who during that time went through an amount of work physical and intellectual, taking quantity and quality together, such as mortal man probably never performed before or since! Emperor, minister, generalissimo, lawgiver, censor, restorer of lost rights and creator of new ideas, he was at the same time destroying with his right hand the world that was and building up in his mind the world that was to be. Any excess in any direction must have destroyed his delicate organisation. Marlborough began his great career after middle life, and his letters to his wife shew how

soon his work began to tell on his head and to sow probably the seeds of that sad disease which afterwards overtook him. Suetonius in ch. 86 tells us that some of Caesar's friends were persuaded that he did not want to live longer and therefore despised all omens and the warnings of his friends. Perhaps the huge strain upon his brain had destroyed the buoyancy of feeling and enthusiasm of spirit which alone would make life worth having to such a man.

Of Catullus' next words 'et aleo' I will just say that the same term was applied to Augustus, because he used to give the members of his family small sums of money and then play with them for shilling points during the Saturnalia and on other feast-days, as we learn from Suetonius who in ch. 71 quotes two interesting letters of Augustus to Tiberius on this subject. Cicero throughout his confidential correspondence with Atticus puts the worst construction he can on every public act of Caesar and will not be persuaded that he is not going to prove in the end a Sulla or Cinna; but he never breathes a whisper against his private life, either before or after his death, never hints he was 'impudicus' 'vorax' or 'aleo'; while throughout these letters and in his philippics he charges on Antony over and over again such like enormities. Surely this is of importance: the prodigy's sleepless vigilance and industry appal him; Antony's licentious habits disgust him.

A few remarks have now to be made on the only four places in our poem where there is any critical difficulty: the first in v. 4 will not detain us long: for the 'Habebat cum te' of Mss. many editors including Sillig, Doering, Heyse, and both Schwabe and Ellis adopt Faernus' emendation 'Habebat uncti': Lachmann, Haupt and Mommsen read after Statius 'Habebat ante', which I am disposed to prefer for the following reasons: it comes at least as near to the Ms. reading; for I observe that some original of all our Mss. often put *co* for *a*: thus in 48 4 we find 'inde cor' for 'uidear'; 64 212 'moenico' for 'moenia'; 67 42 'conciliis' for 'ancillis'; 75 3 'velleque tot' for 'velle queat', *c* and *t* being continually confused; and on the other hand 36 14 'alcos' for 'Golgos'; 66 45 'atque' for 'cumque

(conque)': thus *ante* might at once become *con te* = cum te. Again I prefer it for the sense; as 'quod uncti' strikes me as somewhat affected and not quite like 'uncta patrimonia' and 'unctius caput', in both of which cases the metaphor is very obvious. Lastly the passage of Pliny, XXXVI 6 48, already referred to, 'Mamurra—quem, ut res est, domus ipsius clarius quam Catullus dixit habere *quidquid habuisset* comata Gallia', gives no intimation of any *uncti*; and 'quidquid habuisset' quite expresses 'quod habebat ante'.

In v. 8 'Ut albulus columbus aut ydoneus (or, idoneus)' Statius and Scaliger read 'aut Adoneus' and are followed by Lachmann, Doering, Haupt, Mommsen, and Ellis among others. I have some doubt whether Catullus, a technical pupil of the Greeks, would have said *Adoneus* for *Adonis*: it is true Plautus has it; but in the same line he has *Catameitus* for *Ganymedes*, which Catullus would hardly have used, any more than Melerpanta or Patricoles for Bellerophontes or Patroclus: I should not demur, if the Mss. gave us that form, but they do not. Again I should like to know any Latin writer who assigns to Adonis, born of the wood and bred in the woods, the character which a modern hairdresser connects with him and which would suit Catullus' picture of Mamurra: the ancient conception of him seems rather to be Shakespeare's: 'Hunting he loved, but love he laughed to scorn': thus Ovid, ars I 509, 'Forma viros neglecta decet: Minoida Thesea Abstulit, a nulla tempora comptus acu: Hippolytum Phaedra, nec erat bene cultus, amavit: Cura deae silvis aptus Adonis erat': and certainly you could not couple Theseus or Hippolytus with an 'albulus columbus'. Mamurra is effeminate and worn out by debauchery: Adonis is a beautiful boy, the very reverse of effeminate: in Bion he is mourned for by his hounds and the mountain-nymphs, by the hills themselves, the woods and waters; while Theocritus mates him with Agamemnon and Ajax, Hector, Patroclus and Pyrrhus, and yet older and rougher heroes. I would therefore with Heyse and Schwabe follow Sillig in adopting what is really the Ms. reading 'haut idoneus'; with which might be compared Horace's 'Vixi puellis nuper idoneus' and 'Si torrere iecur quaeris idoneum', though probably it has in Catullus a

more offensive sense illustrated by v. 13. It is virtually I repeat the Ms. reading; for most Mss. have 'idoneus'; and, as here 'ydoneus', so in 41 8 G has 'ymaginosum'. But if the archetype gave 'ydoneus', that is the same thing; for not only had it continually *i* for *y*, like all similar codices; but often *y* for *i*, 'ydri' for 'Idri', 'ythomi' for 'Itoni', 'phytie' for 'Thiae', 'yde' for 'Idae', 'ydoneosne' for 'Idomeneosne'. Again 'aut' and 'haut' are the same; for not only do all our Mss. and therefore their archetype omit or wrongly prefix the initial *h* in so many cases that it would be idle to enumerate them; but in the two or three places where Catullus uses *haut* (haud), we find 66 35 *aut* in all Mss.; 64 339 *aut* in one half of them, *haut* in the other half: and ib. 16, if any of the corrections, Illaque haut alia, Illa atque haut alia, Illaque hautque alia, Illac hautque alia, of various editors be right, *haut* probably passed into *aut* in the process of corruption; but for the 'Illa atque alia' of Mss. I propose 'Illac (quaque alia?) viderunt luce' as a better rhythm and an easy correction, *t* and *c* so perpetually interchanging in our Mss. and one syllable of a word like *quaque* being so often suppressed in all Mss. alike: 36 14 we find 'Colisque' for 'Colis quaeque'.

We now come to the very corrupt v. 20, though the sense required is plain enough. Is Mamurra to have what long-haired Gaul and farthest Britain had? Was it to feed his lust, O general without peer, you the other day were in the outmost island of the west? He then in his increasing wrath joins with Caesar his brother-tyrant Pompey who first pampered the wretch: 'Ut ista *vostra* cet.': his gormandising and wantonness nothing can appease: first went his own patrimony; next the spoils taken from Mithridates by Pompey; thirdly the booty got by Caesar in Further Spain: what next? he will now have the riches of Gaul and Britain, opened up only yesterday.—But many and various have been the methods tried to get the required pure iambic, as may be seen in the critical notes of Schwabe and Ellis: Time Britannia, hunc timete Galliae: Timete Galliae, hunc time Britannia: etc. etc. None of them satisfying in sense or keeping near to the Ms. reading. And Schwabe with reason remarks that no convincing emendations

have been made in Catullus, where this has not been closely adhered to. He admits himself that a pure iambic verse would be very far preferable to any other, if a satisfactory one could be devised; but despairing of this he gives us one which suits the sense and context excellently: Nunc Galliae timetur (timet') et Britanniae. But a pure iambic appears to me not only desirable, but necessary: in the old Journal vol. 4 p. 290 I suggested what I now reject, yet still think better than the readings of Lachmann and Haupt recorded above: Et hunce Galliae et timent Britanniae [read rather 'Gallia et timet Britannia']; but I see from Schwabe that Spengel had proposed this as long ago as 1828. Ellis too requiring a pure Iambic reads 'Neque una Gallia aut timent Britanniae': I will state my objections to this: it departs rather widely from the Mss.; nor do I think the plural Britanniae could have been used by Catullus, as he is alluding to the one island, a corner of which was invaded a few months before: Pliny IV 16 § 102 says 'Britannia insula clara Graecis nostrisque monimentis. . . . Albion ipsi nomen fuit, cum Britanniae vocarentur omnes de quibus mox paulo dicemus': and then he names a large number of islands, 40 Orcades, 7 Acmodae, 30 Hebudes, Mona, Vectis, etc. etc.: a curious passage, but it will not I think support the plural in Catullus, any more than his own 'Mavult quam Syrias Britanniasque', which means of course 'prefers to Syrias and Britains', as we say 'to whole worlds': Ellis might of course read 'timet Britannia'; but then with 'Gallia' and 'Britannia' it is difficult to see how the *ae* of all Mss. could have come into both words: of course, if it were in one, by attraction it could get into the other. The sense too he gives the verse seems to me very unsuitable: Neque enim Gallia tantummodo aut Britanniae Mamurram timent; quod post commemoratas ex Ponto atque Hiberia praedas iure videtur additum. But surely Catullus does not mean to say that Pontus and Hiberia fear they are going to be plundered, because Gaul and Britain fear it: they, if they ever feared him, must like his own patrimony have long ceased to do so; as he had long ago spent all that could be gotten from them. The poet plainly means that the new gotten lands, Gaul and Britain, seeing he has already spent his own

means and the spoil of Pontus and Hiberia, are now going to be drained to satisfy his greed; or something like it.

And, while on this subject, I would say that Ellis in another passage, 11 11, appears to me to have done our island scant justice by reading 'Gallicum Rhenum, horribilem insulam ultimosque Britannos', for the 'horribiles' or 'horribilesque ultimosque' of Mss.: Caesar a few months before had opened Britain up to the expectant Romans: what they then dreamt of, as we see from Cicero and others, was nothing more dreadful than gold, pearls, captives, etc. though they were soon undeceived. And surely the landscape would not have looked horrible in English August weather, any more than Cuba or Jamaica to the first Spanish invaders. But what would and did look horrible was the stormy channel, the 'beluosus oceanus', between the Gallic Rhine and the Britons: if then 'horribilesque' of half the Mss. represents the archetype, then Haupt's 'horribile aequor' is excellent: if, as seems probable, *que* is a clumsy interpolation to help the metre (else why should half the Mss. choose to omit it?) I do not surrender my former conjecture in the old Journal, vol. 4 p. 289, 'horribilem salum': that is, as there explained, for 'horribilesultimosque', 'horribilēsalūultimosque', Ennius having 'undantem salum' and the Greek word being *σάλος*. Ellis similarly explains his reading as a corruption from 'horribilē īsulā ultimosque', 'quum excidissent litterae *ulā* propter insequentes *ul*': but long before this contraction and corruption could have taken place in Mss., the form 'horribileis' was utterly unknown and could not mediate between two readings. The 'horrible swell' to a Roman would as I said well express the nature of the English Channel.

And now I will try to recommend my own later correction of v. 20: Ellis having postponed it to his own put me somewhat out of conceit with it, when I was again encouraged by a flattering sentence in a paper read by Dr W. Wagner before the philological society on Dec. 20, 1867: he says 'I am convinced Mr Munro's emendation as mentioned by Mr R. Ellis obviates all difficulties'. If we are to have a pure iambic, it seems pretty clear, unless very violent changes be made, that *Hunc* represents a lost amphibrachys (⏑–⏑): leaving this for a

moment, I divide into words in a different way from our Mss. and therefore their lost archetype the continuous letters of some original, immediate or not, of that archetype: this original had I assume 'galliaetmetetbritannia' i.e. 'Gallia et metet Britannia': our Mss. after their archetype give 'Galliae timet et Britanniae': *Britanniae* from the attraction of *Galliae*. I have collected from our Mss. a hundred instances of absurd corruptions owing to a wrong arrangement of undivided syllables: a few that seem to apply to the present case I will give here: 28 9 Omnem mi (*for* O Memmi), 44 7 expulsus sim (expuli tussim), 44 19 Sestire cepso (Sesti recepso), 54 5 seniore cocto (seni recocto), 93 2 si salvus (sis albus), 98 1 inquam quam (in quemquam), 108 1 Sic homini (Si Comini), 14 9 si illa (Sulla), 17 24 potest olidum (pote stolidum), 57 5 nece luentur (nec eluentur), 61 198 Pulcre res (Pulcer es), 63 23 menade sui (maenades vi), 63 47 estuanter usum (aestuante rusum), 65 3 dulcissimus harum (dulcis musarum), 66 8 Ebore niceo (E Beroniceo), 66 11 Quare ex (Qua rex), 69 3 Nos illa mare (Non si illam rarae), 79 1 quid inquam (quidni quem): many even more absurd, 36 1 and 20 Annuale suo lusicacata (Annales Volusi cacata), 77 10 famuloque tanus (fama loquetur anus), 3 16 bonus ille (io miselle), 6 12 ni ista prevalet (nil stupra valet), 17 1 Oculo in aque (O colonia quae), 58 5 magna admiremini (magnanimi Remi), 64 55 seseque sui tui se credit (sese quae visit visere credit), 72 6 Multo ita me nec (Multo mi tamen es): but enough. Now that we have so much of our verse, the rest will soon follow: out of *Hunc* we have to get a dative referring to Mamurra and a connecting particle: the particle shall be *et* which so often comes into or falls out of the beginning of a verse; thus in 61 211 we have 'Et ludite' for 'Ludite'; and in 54 2 Schwabe seems rightly to read 'Heri' for 'Et heri': that obscure little poem he has most ingeniously explained; but in v. 1 I would retain the Ms. reading 'Othonis caput (oppido est pusillum), Heri cet.': the parenthesis gives liveliness to the narrative: comp. Seneca Phaedr. 37 'At Spartanos (genus est audax avidumque ferae) Nodo cautus cet.'. The dative shall be *huicne*: 'Et huicne Gallia et metet Britannia?' 'and now shall Gaul and Britain

reap for him?': 'Et huicne' exactly as in v. 6 'Et ille'. Plautus, so different in some respects, is Catullus' own brother in love of familiar idiom; and he shall illustrate our metaphor: mercat. 71 'Tibi aras, tibi occas, tibi seris: tibi item metes, Tibi denique iste pariet laetitiam labos'; mostell. 799 'Sibi quisque ruri metit'; epid. II 2 80 'Mihi istic nec seritur nec metitur, nisi ea quae tu vis volo'. *Huicne* I prefer to *Huice* which I am not sure Catullus would have used: 'hicne, haecne, hocne, huncne, hacne, hasne', one or the other, I have met with not only in Cicero and the Fronto palimpsest; but in Propertius, Statius, and again and again in Seneca's tragedies, where the metre confirms them; and *huicne* is nearer the *hunc* of Mss.

And now for our final critical difficulty: I may mention by the way that all recent editors in v. 21 make *malum* agree with *hunc*: though I should hesitate to contradict them, I must say that I have always thought it more emphatic as an interjection: 'why, the mischief, do you pamper him, both of you?' his wrath ever rising and now involving in it Pompey. In interrogative sentences this use of 'malum' is very common in Plautus, not uncommon in Cicero and the most idiomatic writers: 'qui, malum, bella aut faceta es?' 'quae haec, malum, impudentia est?' and the like. Then in v. 23 for the corrupt 'opulentissime' many conjectures have been made which may be seen in Schwabe and Ellis; but since Lachmann most have adopted his correction 'o piissime', as completed that is to say by Haupt who reads 'orbis, o piissimei Socer generque, p. o.': This has never seemed to me quite convincing, though I hesitate to reject what so many great scholars have sanctioned: but it is the united force of several different objections that weighs with me: 'o piissimei' is not very wide of, and yet not so very near the Ms. reading; then it involves a second alteration of 'urbis' to 'orbis', slight enough in itself; but thus we have two changes, one in a word which seems genuine: then I must say the 'Socer generque' is to my mind much weakened by having an epithet attached; still more is the force of 'perdidistis omnia' impaired by 'orbis' being joined with it: we can see from the letters to Atticus that this was a favourite phrase of the 'boni' during the three-headed tyranny: thus II 21 1 'iracundiam atque in-

temperantiam illorum sumus experti, qui Catoni irati omnia perdiderunt'; I 1 65 'vel perire maluerint quam perdere omnia'; XIV 1 1 'quid quaeris? perisse omnia aiebat'; 14 3 'nonne meministi clamare te omnia perire, si ille funere elatus esset'. How greatly the moral emphasis of these words 'perdidistis omnia' is weakened by the addition of *orbis*, may be seen from such a passage as this of Livy, praefat. 12, where he is contrasting the present with the good old times: 'nuper divitiae avaritiam, et abundantes voluptates desiderium per luxum atque libidinem pereundi perdendique omnia invexere': by Martial too 'Omnia perdiderant' is employed with much effect. Moreover we cannot, to say the least, be sure that Catullus would have ventured to use 'piissimus', when ten years later Cicero can say in philip. XIII 43 'tu porro ne pios quidem, sed piissimos quaeris, et quod verbum omnino nullum in lingua Latina est, id propter tuam divinam pietatem novum inducis': later it came more into use, and indeed Pompeius comm. Donat. ap. Keil V p. 154 says that Caper 'elaboravit vehementissime et de epistulis Ciceronis collegit haec verba, ubi dixerat ipse Cicero *piissimus*'; but this is very indirect evidence, and Pompeius seems to blunder about this philippic, and the word is not now found in Cicero's letters. Lastly the allusion in the Catalecta 3 5 'Ut iste versus usquequaque pertinet, Gener socerque, perdidistis omnia' seems to me to speak strongly for the absence of an epithet in Catullus. Ellis, whether for such reasons or others I do not know, does not accept this reading and gives us '(urbis o pudet meae)'. By this he means I presume Rome, not Verona, though Caesar probably was in Verona at this time: Catullus speaks of 'Veronae meae', and he would naturally so term what was, to use Cicero's phrase, his *patria naturae* or *loci*; but for the poet to speak of Rome, his *patria civitatis* or *iuris*, thus familiarly, strikes me as at least strange.

What I propose to read is this: 'Eone nomine, urbis ob luem ipsimae (issimae), Socer generque, perdidistis omnia?' When *ipsimae* became *issimae*, as I shall presently shew it would be likely to do in Mss. such as those of Catullus, it is manifest how readily *obluemissimae* would pass into *opulentissime*: we have already given in p. 28 examples more than

enough of words perversely divided in our Mss.: just as common is it either to divide one word into two or more: so 29 3 Nam murram (Mamurram); 41 1 A me an a (Ameana), 12 13 nemo sinum (mnemosynum), 90 6 Omne tum (Omentum), 7 5 Ora dum (Oraclum), 63 23 ei derigere (hederigerae), 61 220 Sed mihi ante (Semihiante), etc. etc.: or, as I assume here, to make two or more words into one: 21 5 exiocaris (es iocaris), 44 11 minantium (in Antium), 45 17 sinistravit (sinistra ut), 68 139 quotidiana (concoquit iram), 68 124 Suscitata (Suscitat a), 68 129 tuorum (tu horum), 76 11 instinctoque (istinc teque), 76 26 proprietate (pro pietate), 116 4 mitteremusque (mittere in usque), etc.: we might compare too 65 3 dulcissimus harum (dulcis musarum). The prose Catullus, Petronius, who like him at one and the same time carries the language to the highest pitch of grace and refinement and riots in the utmost licence of popular idiom, will illustrate our *ipsimae*: ch. 63 'ipsimi nostri delicatus decessit'; and 75 'tamen ad delicias femina ipsimi annos quattuordecim fui: .. ego tamen et ipsimae satis faciebam. scitis quid dicam: taceo, quia non sum de gloriosis. ceterum, quemadmodum di volunt, dominus in domo factus sum, et ecce cepi ipsimi cerebellum': *ipsimus ipsima* therefore = dominus domina. Buecheler illustrates it with much learning: his note, p. 74, I will here give the substance of: *ipsa* is thus used by Catullus of Lesbia's sparrow 'suamque norat Ipsam' = dominam; and in the Casina of Plautus the *serva* says 'ego eo quo me *ipsa* misit'; and Buecheler believes with much reason that in Catullus' 'mea dulcis Ipsitilla, Meae deliciae' the name is a diminutive of *Ipsa,* to express fondness. As *ipse* is a pyrrhic in the old scenic writers, the *p* seems to have been scarcely sounded, as in *volŭptate,* and the vulgar pronunciation appears to have been *isse*; for Augustus superseded a legatus consularis 'ut rudi et indocto' for writing *issi* for *ipsi*: Martial 1 109 has an epigram on a lapdog *Issa,* where seven times over the inferior Mss. read *ipsa*; and Martial plays on the similarity of sound: 'Hanc .. Picta Publius exprimit tabella, In qua tam similem videbis *Issam,* Ut sit tam similis sibi nec *ipsa*': and on the walls of Pompeii and on funeral urns are found 'euge Issa', 'Aprodite issa', 'issa have', 'issae suae', 'issulo et delicio suo', terms all of

familiar endearment. That Catullus would have hesitated to use such a familiar expression, as *ipsimae* or *issimae* I cannot think, when we find 50 expressions like, 'charta loquatur anus', 'fama loquetur anus', 'sacer alarum hircus', 'ut decuit cinaedi-orem', 'inepta crura ponticuli', 'suppernata securi', 'iste meus stupor', 'pater essuritionum', 'tuis ab unguibus reglutina', 'cum isto Vappa', 'quidquid est domi cachinnorum', 'cacata charta', 'scabies famesque mundi', 'vetuli Falerni', 'salaputium disertum'; and in our poem 'ista vostra defututa mentula', 'lancinata sunt bona', 'uncta devorare patrimonia'.

'Urbis ipsimae' then = dominae urbis or dominae Romae: Ovid has 'dominae conditor urbis', 'domina retinebit in urbe', 'dominam venietis in urbem'; Martial 'domina in urbe' and 'domina ab urbe'; Horace 'dominaeque Romae', Martial 'dominae fastidia Romae', 'Moenia dominae pulcherrima Romae', 'septem dominos montes': for *luem* compare Seneca's 'luem tantam Troïae atque Achivis', 'Helena pestis exitium lues Utriusque populi', 'ista generis infandi lues', 'sacra Thebarum lues', 'iste nostri generis exitium ac lues': Catullus therefore means 'ob Mamurram, istam pestem dominae urbis': after shewing that he has ruined or is ruining one province after another, he finishes with this bitterest of his taunts: 'Was it then on his account, for this plague-sore of the mistress Town, O father- and son-in-law, that ye have ruined all'. It now remains to point out what Catullus probably alludes to, and, tedious as I have been, I must quote at length the passage of Pliny twice before spoken of: XXXVI 6 § 48 'primum Romae parietes crusta marmoris operuisse totos domus suae in Caelio monte Cornelius Nepos tradit Mamurram Formiis natum, equitem Romanum, praefectum fabrum C. Caesaris in Gallia, ne quid indignitati desit, tali auctore inventa re; hic namque est Mamurra Catulli Veronensis carminibus proscissus quem, ut res est, domus ipsius clarius quam Catullus dixit habere quidquid habuisset comata Gallia. namque adicit idem Nepos primum totis aedibus nullam nisi e marmore columnam habuisse, et omnis solidas e Carystio aut Lunensi': in these words Pliny, who dearly loved a scandal and was like his nephew a great admirer of their 'conterraneus' Catullus, makes

up his story by uniting with the poet's abuse Nepos' narrative of facts. It is natural enough that Mamurra's wealth and extravagance, combining with that scientific and mechanical skill which Caesar's chief engineer officer must have possessed, would induce him to indulge in architectural display and in the invention of new forms of construction and ornament; and, as Catullus' very abuse proves him to have been many years in the enjoyment of great wealth, that already he had begun the house which Nepos and Pliny speak of. Other kinds of extravagance or pretension may have joined to rouse the jealous and supercilious feelings of Catullus' coterie towards the newly enriched upstart, as they might regard him in their antagonism to Caesar and Pompey: this would explain and point Catullus' last and bitterest taunt, that he was the 'lues' of the mistress town. The last I say; for to my taste the force and beauty of the poem are greatly impaired by placing either with Mommsen the four, or with Schwabe the two concluding verses after v. 10, or by changing with Ribbeck the order throughout; nor do I agree with Schwabe that the position which the last verse has in the poem of the Catalecta, is no argument whatever that it had the same place in our piece: the force and point of the parody surely in some measure depend upon that.

This paper is already too long; or else our argument might have been illustrated by an examination of other poems directed against Caesar or Mamurra or both. I have referred above to the obscure 54th, the close of which is a manifest allusion to our poem: the 93rd, consisting of only two lines, is written in a defiant tone towards Caesar, probably much about the same time as our 29th. Towards the end there are four obscure, unimportant and uninteresting, but most insulting elegiac epigrams, addressed to Mamurra under the name of Mentula which the 13th line of our poem must have fastened upon him among the 'boni': these four with some other of the later elegiac pieces the world would willingly have let die. To one only of them shall I refer in conjunction with the 57th: the latter attacks both Caesar and Mamurra in a tone that would be even more offensive than that of our 29th, if its very excess of ribaldry did not loudly attest that it was only meant for

petulant banter, one part of it flatly contradicting the other if taken in earnest: I shall condescend to say a word on two verses only, 6 and 7, 'Morbosi pariter, gemelli utrique, Uno in lectulo, erudituli ambo': these words, illustrated by what we know of Caesar, we shall thus interpret: he and his first scientific officer, at the end of the year 55 and beginning of 54 used to be closeted together for hours every day in Verona, mapping out Gaul and arranging the march of the legions and the movements of the fleet, so that all should be assembled at the right moment in the Portus Itius for the second invasion of Britain; relaxing themselves at times by sketching out plans for draining the Pomptine marshes and enlarging Rome by changing the course of the Tiber. The 105th poem is as follows: 'Mentula conatur Pipleum scandere montem: Musae furcillis praecipitem eiciunt'; which rightly interpreted would mean that Mamurra not only possessed the special acquirements befitting Caesar's chief engineer; but had a taste for general literature and poetry as well; and perhaps retorted the insults of Catullus with less success, but equal goodwill, and let him know what 'Ameana puella' thought of *him*. But enough.

H. A. J. MUNRO.

SOME VARIOUS READINGS OF THE EPISTLES TO THE THESSALONIANS.

From a collation of about 30 cursive[1] mss of these epistles at Paris Oxford London and Cambridge I have selected (1) such various readings as may help us to determine the text. This of course is not often the case: but there are passages where the evidence of the better cursives may be of substantial use in confirming a good reading, or in deciding us between two of nearly equal merit to place one in the text and assign the other to the margin. (2) such as may afford a fair test of the comparative value of mss. Many men who have opportunities of spending spare hours usefully in public libraries will I am sure from my own experience welcome any hint on this point. Of the mss seen by me after 17 "the queen of cursives" 6, 23, 31, 39, 47, 137 and (though very careless) 154 are the most worthy of careful collation. (3) such as seem to indicate affinity. The likeness of 47 to A has been already[2] noticed: 39 as far as I have hitherto collated it reminds me more than any other cursive of 17: Brit. Mus. Addl. 11836 and 221 (Scriveners *o*) are undoubtedly near akin[3]: and in the same group with the pair from Athos 20 and 23 we probably ought to include some of the other cursives which have the same curious variation at the end of the fourth chapter. Other resemblances will occur to a collator: but where the evidence is very slight it is better not to risk any unsafe suggestion.

[1] All these cursives are noticed in Scriveners Introduction. Those which have *Pauline numbers* (pp. 200—207) are cited by them. To the Bodleian ms Canonici Gk. 110 (p. 199) and to Brit. Mus. Addl. 7142 (p. 207) and 11836 (p. 186) I have assigned the numbers 501, 714 and 836: taking care not to make the confusion of our nomenclature worse confounded by choosing numbers which had already represented the whole or part of any other manuscript.

[2] Scrivener, p. 201.

[3] This point I hope hereafter to make clearer in some select various readings of the epistle to the Hebrews.

Along with these various readings from cursives collated by myself I have given the readings of those uncial MSS which have been publisht at full length. For comparison this was necessary: it may otherwise be useful to readers. For many readers will not have at hand the text of ℵ: the readings of A, as far as we can judge from these eight chapters, are not always accurately given by recent editors: not many possess Tischendorfs edition of the Codex Vaticanus: few can afford to buy the sumptuous volume which contains the text of the Catholic and Pauline Epistles from his late palimpsest P. May not a student of textual criticism fairly grumble that the tools of his trade are often so needlessly cumbrous and costly? For a so-called facsimile type multiplies the price of a reprint but subtracts hardly anything from the chance of mistakes: whereas such a book as Scriveners Codex Bezae satisfies all the demands of accuracy and is at the same time far preferable to any folio.

To quote no reading which had not been verified either in the original or in a full reprint seemed the only safe way of avoiding the numerous mistakes which arise from readings inferred *e silentio*. This rule obliges me not without reluctance to omit all notice of K and L; as also of the trustworthy collations of 37 and other mss appended by Mr Scrivener to his Codex Augiensis.

Let me end by expressing my regret that Mr Scrivener seems to have abandoned a pursuit in which he so decidedly excels. To carry out his original design of collating all the mss of the Greek Testament deposited in England may be unfortunately now impossible. But by examining and describing at least all the more accessible English manuscripts, and by printing a full collation of some portion of each, on which we could rely as a means of estimating their comparative value, he would materially assist all who are engaged in these studies.

1 Thess. i. 2. *υμων* after *μνειαν* is omitted by ℵ¹AB 6, 17, 137.
—— *ποιουμενοσ* C (corr. 1ª m.) 17, 39.
—— 4. *του* before *θῡ* is found in ℵACP 31, 47, 154, 221, 836.

1 Thess. i. 5. *εν* before *πληροφορια* omitted by ℵB 17, 155.
—— *εν* before *υμιν* omitted by ℵACP 6, 17, 31, (in 39 it seemed to me by a later hand) 157 (where however the commentary has it.)
—— 7. *τυπον* is the reading of BD¹ 6, 17, 31, 47.
—— 8. *εν τη* before *Αχαια* is omitted by B 6, 17, 27 (but supp. later), 47, 62, 139, 154, 157, 158, 501, 714. *τη Αχαια* without *εν* is the reading of 134, 221, 836. A which omits from the beginning of the verse down to *Ἀχαίᾳ* cannot of course be quoted as an authority on either side.
—— *αλλ εν* is the reading of ABCD¹FGP 17, 137. *αλλα εν* is found in ℵ (but the original reading is doubtful: see Tischendorfs note) 154.
—— *εχειν ημασ* ℵACDFGP 31, 39, 137, 154. *εχειν υμασ* B 17. *εχειν* only 158.
—— 10. *εκ της οργης* ℵABP 17. In some commentaries I find *τὴν ἀνταπόδοσιν, ἣν ἡμέραν ὀργῆσ καλεῖ· αὐτὸσ γὰρ ἐρρύσατο ἡμᾶσ ἐξ αὐτῆσ.*
—— ii. 3. *ουδε* before *εν* ℵABCD¹FGP 6, 17, 39, 47.
—— 4. *τω* is found after *θῶ* but not before in ℵ¹BCD¹P 20, 23: before but not after in 157, 159.
—— 5. *κολακιασ* ℵACD¹FGP 17, 39, 47.
—— om. *εν* before *προφασει* B 17, 39, 47, 137, 154.
—— 6. *απ αλλων* ℵABC 17 (*υπ* may possibly have been written at first: but if so the correction is prima manu) 39, 47, 134.
—— 7. *νηπιοι* ℵ¹BC¹D¹FG 31 (*ν* erased later) 137.
—— *εαν* BCD¹FGP 31, 47, 137.
—— 8. *εγενηθητε* ℵABCD (FGP *-ται*) 17, 31, 39, 47, 137.
—— 8 and 9. *χῡ* for *θῡ* in both verses 221, 836.
—— 9. *των κοπων ημων και των μοχθων* P 139, 244.
—— *γαρ* after *νυκτοσ* omitted by ℵABD 6, 17, 39, 47, 137.
—— 11. For *ωσ* before *ενα* 221 has *εἱσ*, 836 *εἱσ*.
—— 12. *περιπατειν* ℵABD¹FGP 17, 31, 39, 137.
—— For *θῡ* 20, 23, 140, 157, 244 read *χῡ*: 154
—— *καλεσαντοσ* ℵA 31, 39, 154.

1 Thess. ii. 13. *και* before *δια τουτο* is found in ℵAB 6.
—— *αληθως* before *εστιν* in B 17, 39: in ℵ it is omitted but supplied in this place.
—— 15. *ιδιουσ* is omitted by ℵABD¹FGP 6, 17, 137.
—— 16. BD¹ 31 (and comm. of 154) read *εφθακεν*: 137 *εφθακε*.
—— 18. *διοτι* ℵABD¹FGP 6, 17, 39, 137.
iii. 1. *ηυδοκησαμεν* ℵBP 137.
—— 2. *συνεργον* B: *συνεργον του θυ* D¹ 17: *διακονον του θυ* ℵAP 6, 137, 154.
—— *παρακαλεσαι υπερ* ℵABD¹FGP 17, 31, 47, 137, 154: *παρακαλεσαι περι* 6, 39.
—— 7. *αναγκη και θλιψει* ℵABD (FG -ψι) 17, 31, 39, 47, 137. P def. here and till after verse 17.
—— 11. $\overline{\chi\sigma}$ is omitted by ℵABD¹ 17, 154.
—— 13. *αμεμπτωσ* B 17, 31, 47, 137.
iv. 1. *ινα* before *καθωσ* is found in BFG 17, 137.
—— *καθωσ και περιπατειτε* in ℵABD¹FG 17, 31, 39, 137.
—— 2. *δεδωκαμεν* ℵ 6, 137.
—— 6. om. *ο* after *εκδικοσ* ℵ¹ABD¹ 6, 17.
—— om. *και* after *καθωσ* A 6, 137, 154.
—— 8. *και διδοντα* ℵ¹D¹FG 23, 62, 154, 155, 501, 714: *διδοντα* B: *δοντα* A 17, 137, 157, 221, 246, 836.
—— 11. om. *ιδιαισ* BD¹FG 6, 31, 47 (but comm. has it) 137, 154.
—— 12. om. *χρειαν* 221, 836.
—— 13. *κοιμωμενων* ℵAB 11, 17, 39, 41, 140, 153, 244.
—— *ωσ* for *καθωσ* D¹FG 6, 47, 154.
—— 18. *του* $\overline{\pi\nu\sigma}$ for *τουτοισ* 20, 23, 140, 157, 158, 244.
v. 2. om. *η* before *ημέρα* ℵBDFGP 6, 11, 17.
—— 3. *γαρ* is omitted by ℵ¹AFG 17, 47: and by BD 6, 31, 154 who read *οταν δε λεγωσιν*.
—— *εφνιδιοσ* AD¹FG 31, 137, 139, 158.
—— *επισταται* ℵB 17, 39, 137.
—— 4. *ουκετι* for *ουκ* 221, 836.
—— 5. *γαρ* after *παντεσ* is found in ℵABDFGP 17, 31, 39, 47, 137.

1 Thess. v. 6. om. *και* after *ωσ* ℵ¹AB 17, 137.
—— 9. *αλλα εισ* ℵB 6, 17, 246.
—— 10. *περι ημων* ℵ¹B 17.
—— 15. om. *και* after *διωκετε* ℵ¹AFG 6, 17.
—— 21. *παντα δοκιμαζετε* ℵ¹A (17 *-ται*) 31: *π. δοκιμαζετε και* 20, 23, 157: *π. δε δοκιμαζετε και* 158: *π. δοκιμαζοντεσ* 27, 501, 714: *π. δε δοκιμαζοντεσ* 6, 139, 154, 221, 836.
—— 25. *και* after *προσευχεσθε* is found in BD¹ 6, 17, 31, 39.
—— 26. *αγιω φιληματι* 47, 154.
—— 27. *ενορκιζω* ABD¹ 6, 17. (The *ὑποθέσεισ* of 23, 27, 104, 139, 140 and 714 contain *ἐνορκίζων*: for which that of 17 has *ἐνεργῶσ ὁρκίζων*: in many mss I neglected to examine this point).
—— 28. BD¹FG 6, 17, 221, 836 om. *αμην*.
2 Thess. i. 2. BDP 17 om. *ημων*.
—— 4. *αυτουσ ημασ* ℵB 17: *αυτουσ υμασ* P.
—— *ενκαυχασθαι* AB 17: *εγκαυχασθαι* ℵP: *και καυχασθαι* 6.
—— 5. *δικαιοκρισιασ* 20, 23, 157: and I have noticed this word in the commentaries of these MSS and of 47, 155, and 158.
—— 6. *τω* is inserted before *θω̄* in A 31, 41, and 137.
—— 8. *φλογι πυροσ* BDFG 47, 154, with several commentaries. *ἐν φλογὶ πυρόσ᾽ ἐν πυρὶ φλογὸσ* is the reading of 137.
—— 9. *ολεθριον* A 17, 47, 62, 137, 154 (17 and 154 *ὁλ-*).
—— *του* before *κῡ* is omitted by DFG 6, 154, and 244.
—— 10. *πιστευουσιν* 9, 17, 27, 62, 139, 155, 158, 501 and I think 20 prima manu.
—— ii. 2. *μηδε* (after *νοοσ*) ℵABD¹FG 6, 47, 137, 154: *μηποτε* 17.
—— *κῡ* ℵABD¹FGP 6, 31, 39, 47, 137, 154, 836: *κῡ ιῡ* 17.
—— 3. *ανομιασ* ℵB 6, 31, 39, 137: 17 seemed illegible.
—— 4. om *ωσ θν̄* ℵABD¹P 6, 17, 31, 62, 137.
—— 8. I*σ̄* is found in ℵADFGP 17, 31, and 47.

2 Thess. ii. 8. BP 31 and 137 *ανελει* : ℵ¹ *αναλοι* : FG 17 *ανελοι* : D¹ *ανελει* or *ανελοι* : A *αναιλει*.

—— 10. om. *τησ* before *αδικιασ* ℵ¹ABFG 6, 17, 31.

—— om. *εν* after *αδικιασ* ℵ¹ABD¹FG 17.

—— 11. *πεμπει* ℵ¹ABD¹FG 6, 17.

—— 12. *απαντεσ* ℵAFG 17, 31.

—— om. *εν* after *ευδοκησαντεσ* ℵ¹BD¹FG 17, 104, 154. *εὐδόκησαν ἐν* is the reading of 23 : but the comm. of this ms favours the omission of *εν*. 62 has *ἐν* superscr., I think 1ª m.

—— 13. *του* after *υπο* is found in ℵA 39, 154, 158.

—— *ειλατο* ℵABDP 17, 39, 47, 137 : F *ιδατο* : G *ιλατο*.

—— *απαρχην* BFGP 17, 39, 47, 137 : in A (which is sometimes quoted in favour of *ἀπ' ἀρχῆσ* by those who have not consulted Woide) the corner piece containing the last five letters of the word has been torn off.

—— 14. *και* after *ο* is found in ℵ (A hiat) FGP 47, 137.

—— 16. *θσ̄ ο πηρ* BD¹ 17.

—— 17. om. *υμασ* ℵABD¹FGP 6, 17, 31, 47, 137, 154.

—— *εργω και λογω* ℵABDP 31, 39, 47, 137, 154, 158 : and this order is preserved in the commentaries of 20, 23, 27, 155, 157, 158 : in 17 *και λογω* is omitted.

—— iii. 4. *υμιν* is omitted by ℵBD¹ 6, 17.

και ποιειτε 12, 41, 62, 139 and (but see comm.) 155 : *και ποιησετε* 20 (but see comm.) 714 (but corr. I think 1ª m) : *ποιειτε και ποιησετε* ℵ¹A (D¹ *-σατε*) (6 *-σεται*) 9 : *και ποιητε* (sic 1ª m) *και ποιησητε* 17 : *και εποιησαται και ποιειται* FG : *και εποιησατε και ποιειτε και ποιησετε* B.

—— 8. *νυκτοσ και ημερασ* ℵBFG 17, 31, 47, 137.

—— 12. *εν κω̃ ιῡ χω̃* ℵ¹ABD¹FG 17, 31, 137 : *εν κω̃ ιῡ* P.

—— 13. *εγκακησητε* ℵA 39, 47 : *ενκακησητε* B¹. *ενκακειτε* D¹.

—— 14. om. *και* ℵAB 17.

—— 16. *θσ̄* for *κσ̄* before *τησ ειρηνησ* FG 9, 139.

—— 18. om. *αμην* ℵ¹B 6, 17.

This paper was in the printers hands before I received Part IV. of Dr Tregelles' Greek Testament. What I have said about carelessness in quoting the readings of A was certainly not meant for this careful edition.—In 1 Thess. i. 4 and 2 Thess. iii. 8 a gentleman who has compared this paper with the Oxford mss referred to in it informs me that I have given the readings of 47 correctly.—Where first-rate uncials are so scarce one could wish Dr Tregelles had given more cursive readings. Of the cursive mss which I have mentioned as most worthy of careful collation some are I think fit to be bracketed with 47 and all good enough to stand in the same class.—Let me earnestly beg him to reconsider his intention of designating the Basilian MS in the Vatican by the letter L. If it is bad to use one letter for two MSS is it not worse to use one for three? L already stands in the Gospels for one first-rate and in the Acts and Epistles for another second- or third-rate MS. If B^{as} needs relettering would not Ω be suitable for a MS which is chiefly valuable in the Apocalypse?

A. A. VANSITTART.

THE PRONUNCIATION OF ANCIENT GREEK ILLUSTRATED BY THAT OF MODERN BOHEMIAN.

It is a remarkable fact, that the relation in point of pronunciation between the mother and daughter languages of Ancient and Modern Greece is identical with that at present existing between the sister languages of Bohemia and Poland. Just as Æolus, Dorus, and Xuthus, the father of Ion, are represented as the sons of Hellen, so the original identity of the Poles and Bohemians is indicated by the mythical statement that Czech (the Bohemian) and Lech (the Pole) were two brothers. If any one wishes to hear "the distinction between accent and quantity, between the height and length of syllables[1]" strictly observed, he need only visit Prague and pay close attention to the conversation of Bohemians in their own tongue. For my own part I have always found the difficulty of keeping up the distinction between quantity and accent to stand more than anything else in the way of acquiring a good pronunciation of the Bohemian language. If I was careful in observing the rules of quantity, I was asked what had become of my accents? if I laid my stresses correctly, I was soon reminded of the confusion in my quantities.

The great difference in pronunciation between ancient Greek and modern Bohemian appears to be this, that in Greek the accent was continually varying, e. g. *ἄνθρωπος*, *ἀνθρώπου*, &c., while in Bohemian it remains nearly always upon the first syllable of every word. In modern Greek the accent varies as in ancient Greek, while in Polish, with few exceptions, it rests upon the penultimate of words of more than one syllable.

[1] I am using the words of Mr W. G. Clark in p. 106 of the last Number of this *Journal*.

Konecný in his *Einleitung zur Erlernung der Czechisch-slavischen Sprache* (Vienna 1849), notices the distinction between accent and quantity as follows:

"The quantity is distinguished from the accent of words. By the former is understood the distinction between long and short syllables. In all languages we find, with respect to the accentuation of syllables, the rule, that several syllables are never accented at once in the same word. With respect to the lengthening of syllables languages fall into two classes. To the first belong those in which only the vowels of certain accented syllables are lengthened, while short vowels appear in unaccented syllables. Among these are reckoned (1) the daughter languages of the Latin tongue, i. e. the French, Spanish and Italian, (2) the Germanic languages, as the German and English, and (3) two principal dialects of the Slavonic language, the Polish and the Russian. To the second class belong those languages in which we are not tied to the accent in lengthening vowels. In this are counted (1) the Ancient Greek, (2) the Latin, and (3) two principal dialects of the Slavonians, the Bohemian and the Illyrico-Servian. Whilst then in the languages of the first class only some accented syllables, of which no word can have more than one, are wont to be lengthened, those of the second class possess, independently of the accent, words, some of which lengthen one, others two, and others three or even more than three syllables.'

An extract from pp. 14 and 15 of J. P. Tomiczek's *Lehrbuch der böhmischen Sprache für Deutsche* (Prague 1851), will complete and explain the statements of Konecný.

"The tone of words (*prizvuk*, 'accent') lies in the Bohemian language always on the first syllable. In the German word *Vater*, the *a* is always pronounced long, especially in the connexion *Vater unser;* in the domestic and familiar sense the same *a*, especially in the vocative, is almost always used short, and yet in both cases the tone lies on the *a*. Hence it follows manifestly, that the tone and lengthening of syllables must not be interchanged. In the word *Hühnerhof* the tone lies on the lengthened *ü*, although the *o* in *hof* is also long. Thus too in the word *dráha*, 'a way,' the tone lies on the long *á*, while

in the word *drahá*, 'a dear one' (fem.), it lies on the sharpened *a*, although the second *á* is long.

"Stress (*dúraz*) is distinguished from tone by the fact, that it rather gives prominence to the idea, and therewith to the whole word: '*Was* he in the garden?' '*byl* v zahrade?' 'He was in the *garden*,' '*v zahrade* byl.' In the word uttered with stress the tone remains in its usual place.

"In Bohemian then the tone remains on the first syllable, although all the rest are pronounced long. In *dostává*, 'he is wont to obtain,' the short *o* has the tone, the following two *á*s have length; in *chválívá*, 'he is wont to praise,' the first *á* has the tone and length, the remaining syllables merely length.

'Prepositions (*predlozky*) draw the tone to themselves. *Zahrada* has the tone on the first syllable, but in '*do zahrady*,' 'into the garden,' the tone lies on *do*, and the syllable *za* loses it. In substantives compounded with prepositions not only does the tone rest upon the preposition, but even the next, originally long, syllable is often sharpened, e. g. *chvála*, 'praise;' *pochvala*, 'eulogy;' *krása*, 'beauty;' *okrasa*, 'adornment.' But it is only monosyllabic prepositions that draw the tone to themselves; dissyllabic and polysyllabic ones keep their own accent, and do not interfere with that of the substantive."

Thus far with regard to prose. As regards poetry it appears pretty plain, that little or no regard was paid by the ancient Bohemians to *quantity* and that their earliest poetry was purely *accentual*, accented monosyllables however having nearly as great power as prepositions in drawing the accent of the following word to themselves. I give as an example the commencement of 'Libussa's Judgment,' one of the oldest known poems in the Bohemian language, the MS. of which is dated towards the end of the ninth century of the Christian era. The metre is Trochaic, and consists of five feet[1]. In fact it is two syllables or one foot longer than the metre of Hiawatha, which is identical with that of 'Ludise and Lubor,' a poem in the Queen's Court Manuscript ascribed to the 13th century.

[1] N.B. Long vowels are usually marked in Bohemian by an acute accent, all unmarked vowels are short by nature.

"Aj Vletavo, ce mútísi vodu?
ce mútísi vodu strebropenú?
za te lutá rozvlajase búra
sesypavsi tucu sira neba,
oplakavsi glavy gor zelenych,
vyplakavsi zlatopieskú glinu?"

"Why, Veltava, troublest thou thy water?
Troublest thou thy silver-foamy water?
Hath a tempest wild disquietèd thee,
In the wide sky scattering streaming storm-clouds,
Washing o'er the tops of the green mountains,
Washing out the loam, whose sand is golden[1]?"

If we proceed to the attempts made at the revival of classical learning to appropriate the classical metres in modern languages, we cannot but admit that the Bohemian language, possessing true spondees, exhibits far more favourable specimens of versification than any other modern tongue. Still there appears something wanting even in it, and this I apprehend to be, that, although the Greek and Latin rules about long and short vowels and diphthongs are exactly applicable to it, yet those relating to the lengthening of naturally short vowels by position are not altogether so. It is true that the Greek and Latin rules are somewhat modified by different writers, the most successful of whom are certainly the most modern, yet I cannot think that poetry written upon the principle of *quantity* will ever be more to the Bohemians than an exercise of skill and ingenuity.

Josef Jirecek, in a republication of a number of the Psalms of David versified mainly in imitation of the Latin translation of Buchanan, tells us, in the excellent essay prefixed to the work[2], that "the ancient Slavonic method, which we find in the Grünberger and Königinhofer MSS., and which still lives in the national songs, has its basis in the relation of the sound of

[1] Any one wishing to peruse the whole poem will find it translated at the end of my translation of the *Queen's Court Manuscript* (p. 96, sqq.) published by Messrs Deighton and Bell.

[2] Vienna 1861. For this work I am indebted to the kindness of Dr F. Palacký.

the words to the melody and in the mutual harmony of the sounds." "But," continues he, "in the 16th century those precious manuscripts had not come to light, and no one had any idea of them; neither did it occur to the alumni of the Latin schools even in their dreams to appropriate the national songs and deduce prosodiacal rules from them. The result of this was, that the composers of verses did not proceed beyond the merest counting of syllables, almost entirely, for the sake of rhyme, forgetting the necessity of emphasis in their verses. How could artistic poetry be composed when its principal formal condition was wanting?"

Hexameters were first written in the second half of the 13th century, and the Sapphic stanza appears in use in the years 1510 and 1533, but none of these attempts were very successful. Brother Jan Blahoslav (1561) was the first who endeavoured to give regular prosodiacal rules for writing the classical metres in the Bohemian language, but he was so terrible a violator of his own rules, that he cannot be considered as having done much more than give an impulse to the attempt. But a Slovak, Magister Vavrinec Benedikt Nudozerský, translated, not unsuccessfully, a number of the Psalms into classical metres in imitation of the Latin translation of Buchanan, prefixing a prosodiacal dissertation, which occupies five closely printed 8vo pages in M. Jirecek's preface. But the most successful writer of this kind of poetry was the author of a fragment of a translation of the Psalter preserved in the University library at Prague, consisting of four sheets, the prosodiacal rules observed in which vary a good deal from those given by Benedikt. The author is supposed to have been Jan Amos Komenský, the author of the well-known children's book, *The world in pictures.* After the battle of the White Mountain in 1620 Bohemian prose and poetry were alike prohibited arts for many years.

In 1795 Dobrovský propounded an accentual prosody, and the poets of that day immediately proceeded to convert their quantitative poems in classical metres into accentual ones. But in 1818 a joint work by Safarik, Palacký, Benedikt and Jungmann, apeared at Presburg, which completely demolished Dobrovsky's theory, and since that time the accentual and quantita-

tive methods of versification have been kept completely apart. Those who have written in the classical metres have paid no regard to accent, and those who have written in modern metres have paid but litttle regard to quantity.

The most successful writers on the quantitative system are Vinarický, Holý, Susil, Celakowský and Skultetý, but, so far as I am myself acquainted with their performances, I am inclined to give the palm to Vinarický. Still, as I have already observed, from some reason or other, although perfect spondees can be obtained in abundance, yet the classical metres do not seem likely to find a permanent home in Bohemia. But as a mere illustration of the classical system of writing verses by quantity without regard to accent, I do not think that any thing better can be wished for.

I give a few hexameter lines from Vinarický, in which the rules of prosody are strictly observed.

Libe zefíry vanou, ledová reky pouta netízí.
Pádící dolinou jecivý se potúcek ozívá;
Jíva novou naletá mízou; zelené pole, louky
Sou oko vábící poseté lepotou; rozevíjí
Poupe a vúni dychá; veselou si na láne pocíná,
Písen orác, a malý na palouky husácek uvádí
Housata; tóny milé rozesílá hejno letící.
Jásání po celém okolí zase hájek opácí.

A. H. WRATISLAW.

ON A PASSAGE OF ANDOCIDES.

In the first number of the *Journal of Philology* I discussed a passage of Andocides (*De Myst.* §§ 106—8), which has been considered by some modern writers as proving that his testimony is worthless in regard to the earlier history of Attica. My object was to inquire whether the passage would not bear a less severe interpretation. Three charges against Andocides have been founded upon it: (1) that he has given an account of the expulsion of the Peisistratidæ irreconcileable with that of Herodotus, and improbable: (2) that he has represented their exiled adherents as recalled to Athens at a time when such a recal would have been dangerous: (3) and that he has confused the events of the two great Persian invasions. The last charge has been lightly made; and, as I endeavonred to show, attention to the orator's words disproves it. As regards (1) and (2) I inquired whether it was not possible that Andocides and Herodotus were speaking of different events. To this hypothesis there was one objection, of which I expressly recognised the force, and which must, as I now think, be considered final; namely, that it supposed the term 'tyranny' to have been applied by Andocides to the political supremacy of Lycurgus and Megacles during the second exile of Peisistratus; whereas there is no evidence that it was ever applied, in connexion with Athenian history, except to the Peisistratidæ or to the Thirty Tyrants. The last number of this Journal contained a review of my paper by Professor Rawlinson; who decided against this part of the view suggested in it, chiefly on the ground which I had myself indicated as supplying the principal objection. I have read his article with much interest, and value an opportunity of learning how the passage is understood by so high an authority. In two points, however, I find myself unable to

agree with him. On these I wish to say a few words; and to consider in conclusion what answer must be given to the question originally proposed;—whether, in this instance, the historical credit of Andocides has, or has not, been unduly depreciated.

1. Andoc. *de Myst.* § 106, *νικήσαντες μαχόμενοι τοὺς τυράννους ἐπὶ Παλληνίῳ.* Following Mr Grote (c. xxx, Appendix), Dr Wordsworth (*Athens and Attica*, p. 198, 3rd edit.), and Canon Blakesley (Her. v. 62), I take *Παλλήνιον* to mean the temple of Athene at Pallene, a place about ten miles E.N.E. of Athens. Professor Rawlinson remarks:—'I do not mean to question that this *may* be the true meaning of the words; but I think it is a little too hastily assumed that it *must* be their meaning. The temple of Athene Pallenis is mentioned by several other writers; but nowhere else, so far as I know, is it called "the Pallenium." Its proper name was "the Pallenis." Under this title Themison wrote a description of it. By this title it was known to Polemon (ap. Athen. *Deipn.* vi. p. 234 D), to Polyænus (*Strat.* I. 21), to Photius (*Λέξ. συναγ.* p. 592, ed. Porson), and to Suidas (vol. II. col. 3583 C, ed. Gaisford). This was its title in a phrase so common in the mouths of the Greeks that it grew into a proverb, *τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς Παλληνίδος*, meaning what was alarming. (See Photius and Suidas).'

Now I think that it is extremely doubtful, to say the least, whether the 'proper' name of this temple was 'the Pallenis.' If it was so, it is a solitary exception to the rule that the names of all Greek temples known to us end in *-ειον* or *-ιον*. The case of the Parthenon is not to the purpose; it is merely a term borrowed from house architecture, and applied figuratively to the dwelling of the Virgin Goddess. But *Παλληνίς*, as the name of a temple, would be contrary, not only to analogy, but to common sense. There is no substantive that can be understood with it, except *οἰκία*: and *οἰκία* will not do. Let us now examine the evidence of the passages quoted by Professor Rawlinson, reserving Athenæus to the last. (i) Polyæn. *Strat.* I. 21, *Πεισίστρατος ἀπ' Εὐβοίας ἐστράτευσεν ἐς Ἀττικὴν ἐπὶ Παλληνίδος· καὶ τοῖς πρώτοις τῶν πολεμίων προσπεσών, κ.τ.λ.* Professor Rawlinson appears to have taken *ἐπὶ*

Παλληνίδος as meaning 'to the Pallenis.' But it is clear, I think, that there is the ordinary ellipse of ἱερόν, and that ἐπὶ Παλληνίδος is short for what Herodotus (I. 62) expresses by ἐπὶ Παλληνίδος Ἀθηναίης ἱρόν[1]. Cf. Eur. *Her.* 1031, δίας πάροιθε παρθένου Παλληνίδος, i.e. πάροιθεν (ἱεροῦ) δίας παρθένου Παλληνίδος (see Mr Paley's note): and so ἐν (or εἰς) Ἀπόλλωνος, Διονύσου, passim. (ii) Photius *Lex.* p. 592 ed. Pors. τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς Παλλαινίδος· τὸ φοβερόν· ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπὶ Παλλαινίδι μάχης, ἐν ᾗ ἡττήθησαν Ἀθηναῖοι. The proverb τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς Παλληνίδος would naturally mean 'that which comes from the goddess of Pallene:' then, because Peisistratus came upon Athens from that quarter, any danger in the suddenness of which a supernatural agency is recognised,—any θεόσυτον κακόν. The proverb loses half its force if Παλληνίς is taken to mean, not the goddess, but the building. Even if it could be shown that Photius (circ. 850 A.D.) had so taken the word, his authority would not suffice to establish an unexampled usage. But by τῆς ἐπὶ Παλληνίδι μάχης Photius probably meant 'the battle fought near the Pallenian Athene'; using that phrase, instead of ἐπὶ Παλλήνῃ or Παλληνίῳ, for the sake of symmetry with the form of the proverb which he was explaining. The name of the divinity is often put for that of the temple: *e.g.* Eur. *Helen.* 245, τὰν χαλκίοικον ὡς μόλοιμι,—*i.e.* τὸ ἱερὸν τῆς χαλκιοίκου (Thuc. I. 134): Verg. *Aen.* 3. 551, *Hinc sinus Herculei...Tarenti Cernitur: attollit se diva Lacinia contra:* where Prof. Conington compares *Aen.* 3. 275, *et formidatus nautis aperitur Apollo.* (iii) The passage in Suidas, vol. II. col. 3583 C, is a transcript of Photius. (iv) Athenæus VI. p. 234 F (Dind.) ἐν δὲ Παλληνίδι τοῖς ἀναθήμασιν ἐπιγέγραπται τάδε. These words occur in a quotation from Polemon, who lived in the reign of Ptolemy Epiphanes (205—

[1] This view is confirmed by the fact that ἐπί with the accusative ('to') rather than with the genitive ('towards') is required by the context in Polyænus. 'He marched into Attica to (the temple) of the Pallenian Athene; and falling on the van of the enemy, &c.' Substitute 'towards' for 'to' in this sentence, and it will imply that the battle was fought on the way to, not at, Pallene. In Her. v. 64, I notice that Professor Rawlinson renders ἀπαλλάσσοντο ἰθὺς ἐπὶ Θεσσαλίης, 'fled strait to Thessaly.' This implies that they got there: the Greek does not. A more exact version would have been, 'straight for Thessaly.'

181 B.C.), and wrote a book *περὶ τῶν κατὰ πόλεις ἐπιγραμμάτων*. If the reading is correct, we certainly have his testimony for a form without parallel in extant classical writers, and otherwise unsupported. But it seems probable that the true reading is *ἐν δὲ Παλληνίδος*, and that the dative was the mistake of a copyist, misled by the neighbouring datives, *ἐν τοῖς κύρβεσιν, ἐν τῷ Δηλίῳ*, and especially by *ἐν Παλληνίδι* a few lines below, p. 235 A, where 'the Pallenis' is the name of a book. (v) This brings me to the last authority cited by Professor Rawlinson which it remains to consider. He states that the book just mentioned was a special treatise on the temple at Pallene; and argues from the fact of the treatise being entitled 'the Pallenis' that this was the proper name of the temple. The passage in Athenæus, beyond which nothing (so far as I can discover), is known of the book or its author, is as follows: *Κλείδημος δ' ἐν τῇ Ἀτθίδι φησί· Καὶ παράσιτοι δ' ἠρέθησαν τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ. Καὶ Θεμίσων δ' ἐν Παλληνίδι, Ἐπιμελεῖσθαι δὲ τὸν βασιλέα τὸν ἀεὶ βασιλεύοντα, κ.τ.λ.* If Cleidemus is the same whom Plutarch quotes as an authority for early Attic legends (*Thes.* 17, 27), the *Ἀτθίς* mentioned here was probably a work on the antiquities of Attica. The *Παλληνίς*, in like manner, was probably a work on the local antiquities of Pallene. Among these the temple would of course be prominent. But the notice in Athenæus affords no ground for assuming that the temple was the special subject of the book; and none, therefore, for assuming that the name of the book and of the temple were the same.

2. Supposing that Andocides is speaking of the expulsion of the Peisistratidæ, can his account be reconciled with that of Herodotus? Herodotus says:—'Afterwards the Lacedæmonians equipped a larger expedition, and sent it against Athens, appointing the king Cleomenes, son of Anaxandridas, commander of the force, and sending it, not by sea as before, but by land. On invading Attica they were first encountered by the Thessalian cavalry, which was shortly routed, losing more than forty men; the remainder at once made off straight for Thessaly. Cleomenes arrived at the city, and, aided by those Athenians who wished to be free, proceeded to besiege the tyrants, who had shut themselves up in the Pelasgic fortress.'

I certainly concur in the opinion of Mr Grote that this account cannot possibly be reconciled with the passage in Andocides. Professor Rawlinson, on the other hand, believes that it can. Herodotus, he thinks, 'has not told us all the facts'; and he considers that this is 'almost certain,' both (*a*) from anterior probability, and (*b*) from Herodotus' own words.

(*a*) The 'anterior probability' is thus explained by Professor Rawlinson. 'The Alcmæonidæ, with a large party of exiles, had shortly before taken up a position in Attica on the outskirts of Parnes, at a place called Leipsydrium, had fortified the post, and from it kept up a long though unsuccessful struggle against the tyrants. It is probable that they were still at this place when the Spartans, at the instance of the Delphic oracle, determined to expel Hippias'; and the invading army, marching thither to join them, might thus (it is argued) have come into the neighbourhood of Pallene. Now it appears to me more probable that, according to Herodotus, the Alcmæonidæ were not any longer at Leipsydrium when Cleomenes invaded Attica. Her. v. 62:—*Ἀλκμαιωνίδαι, γένος ἐόντες Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ φεύγοντες Πεισιστρατίδας, ἐπεί τε σφι ἅμα τοῖσι ἄλλοισι Ἀθηναίων φυγάσι πειρωμένοισι κατὰ τὸ ἰσχυρὸν οὐ προεχώρεε κάτοδος, ἀλλὰ προσέπταιον μεγάλως, πειρώμενοι κατιέναι τε καὶ ἐλευθεροῦν τὰς Ἀθήνας, Λειψύδριον τὸ ὑπὲρ Παιονίης τειχίσαντες· ἐνθαῦτα οἱ Ἀλκμαιωνίδαι πᾶν ἐπὶ τοῖσι Πεισιστρατίδῃσι μηχανώμενοι παρ' Ἀμφικτυόνων τὸν νηὸν μισθοῦνται τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖσι, κ.τ.λ.* The occupation of Leipsydrium is here spoken of as an experiment which had been tried, and had failed. The next move (*ἐνθαῦτα*) of the Alcmæonidæ was to establish themselves at Delphi. In the following chapter (63) they are spoken of as 'settled' there: *ἐν Δελφοῖσι κατήμενοι.* If Leipsydrium and its garrison had figured prominently in the triumphant conclusion of the war against the tyrants, would the name of the place have been ultimately associated in a popular *σκολιόν* with memories of utter failure and disaster? Athen. xv. 15:—*αἶαι, Λειψύδριον προδωσέταιρον, | οἵους ἄνδρας ἀπώλεσας, μάχεσθαι | ἀγαθούς τε καὶ εὐπατρίδας, | οἳ τότ' ἔδειξαν οἷων πατέρων ἔσαν.*

(*b*) 'Further,' Professor Rawlinson says, 'the words of Herodotus show that he has not intended to give a full account

of the campaign. For he tells us that, when Cleomenes entered Attica near Eleusis, "his *first* engagement was with the Thessalian cavalry" (ἡ τῶν Θεσσαλῶν ἵππος πρώτη προσέμιξε, v. 64)—an expression which implies, at the least, one more engagement, of which he has made no express mention. In fact the engagement with the Thessalians was a mere cavalry fight, of little moment, except that it left the Spartan infantry free to act. The main fight must have been one between this infantry and that of Hippias...' That is to say, Herodotus has given us a particular account of a cavalry skirmish 'of little moment'; but has 'intentionally' omitted to say anything about the 'main fight' by which the war was decided! The necessity of supposing him to have made so singular a demand on the penetration of his readers will, I think, be obviated by attention to the sense of the words πρώτη προσέμιξε. They mean that, in this battle, the Thessalian cavalry was the part of the tyrant's force which first came into action; προσμῖξαι having its usual sense of 'coming to close quarters.' They do not mean that this was a first battle, as distinguished from a second fought at another time and place.

If, then, Andocides is alluding to the expulsion of the Peisistratidæ, I conclude with Mr Grote that his account cannot be reconciled with that of Herodotus. Could it be shown that they were reconcileable, then one of Mr Grote's grounds for suspecting the authority of Andocides would have been removed. I should have welcomed such unexpected aid; but I am compelled to doubt, for the reasons I have given, whether Professor Rawlinson has established this point.

As regards another inference drawn by Valckenär from the passage under discussion,—viz. that the burning of Athens in the second Persian invasion is placed by Andocides in the first,—I endeavoured to show that it is not only unwarrantable, but opposed to the natural meaning of the words. I regret that Professor Rawlinson did not find space to discuss this point. The case, then, against Andocides, on the most unfavourable supposition, amounts to this: he has given an account of the expulsion of the Peisistratidæ different from that given by Herodotus; and has spoken of the amnesty granted to exiles

and to the disenfranchised in 480 B.C. as a general amnesty; whereas it is probable (though not certain) that the adherents of the family of Hippias would have been specially excepted from it. This is hardly sufficient, as I conceive, to warrant the statement that he is 'a witness of no value' for the earlier history of his own city. My object was to inquire whether the severity of this judgment would not fairly admit of some abatement. Enough has been said, I think, to show that, though it may sometimes be difficult or impossible to decide between Andocides and other authorities, the charges against him as 'loose,' 'confused,' 'unscrupulous,' require proof; and that, though his evidence may in some points be perplexing without fuller information than we possess, a modern historian is scarcely justified in putting him out of court.

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ON A LOST DIALOGUE OF ARISTOTLE.

THE Hortensius of Cicero is said by Trebellius Pollio (*Vita Salonini Gallieni*, c. 2) to have been written on the model of the *Protrepticus*, i.e. the Aristotelian Dialogue entitled the 'Exhortation to Philosophy.' This statement, to be understood doubtless with many limitations, is confirmed in the main by the scattered fragments of Cicero's work which have come down to us from the wreck of Classical literature. The analogy of the Hortensius, therefore, puts us even now in a position to form some idea, however inadequate, of the original Protrepticus: in the first place Aristotle may be supposed to have shewn that the very opponents of philosophy establish their point by philosophizing, in other words, by refuting themselves: in the second place the exceeding blessedness of a speculative life was maintained by a line of argument not unlike that in the Tenth Book of the *Ethics*. Guided by such hints as these Prof. Bernays of Bonn has reconstructed the Aristotelian Dialogue (*Dialoge des Arist.* pp. 116—122) with the critical tact and poetical insight into the mind of antiquity by virtue of which he stands so completely alone among living scholars.

'Exhortations to philosophy' were a favourite theme with the ancients. A contemporary of Constantine the Great, the Syrian Iamblichus was the author of a Protrepticus which we still possess in a complete form. It would perhaps be difficult to imagine a book more singularly devoid of any literary or philosophic merit of its own; it is the most shameless of centos, about one-third of it being a plagiarism from Plato, while for another third the compiler is manifestly indebted to some Peripatetic archetype. I hope in the following pages to suggest some reasons for the belief that this Peripatetic arche-

type was a writing by Aristotle himself, and indeed no other than the long-lost Protrepticus which Cicero is said to have taken as the model for his own Hortensius. For the present I assume that the original Dialogue was a genuine work of its reputed author.

Iamblichus makes no secret of the composite origin of his book (comp. p. 12, ed. Kiessling). The more recent elements in it are easily distinguished from the older by their Neoplatonism, the character of the quotations introduced (from pseudo-Pythagorean literature) and a certain want of style, a defect in Iamblichus which is acknowledged even by his admiring biographer Eunapius. The first four chapters are of this Neoplatonic kind. At the beginning of the fifth there is a sudden change of manner which the writer is at no pains to conceal: he proclaims his intention henceforth to adopt a more scientific and consecutive tone, an Aristotelian one, as we should term it, interpreting his words by the light of the actual performance which ensues. Here then he starts *de novo* with the statement of a sort of axiom: 'We men all of us desire happiness'—language which at once reminds us of the broad and pregnant assumptions which serve as introduction to more than one well-known treatise of Aristotle:—

πάντες ἄνθρωποι τοῦ εἰδέναι ὀρέγονται φύσει (*Metaph.* I. 1).

πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος ὁμοίως δὲ πρᾶξίς τε καὶ προαίρεσις ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐφίεσθαι δοκεῖ (*Eth. Nic.* I. 1).

πᾶσα διδασκαλία καὶ πᾶσα μάθησις διανοητικὴ ἐκ προϋπαρχούσης γίνεται γνώσεως (*Anal. Post.* I. 1).

Can it have been a mere accident that in Cicero's Hortensius also, the Defence of Philosophy commenced with what would naturally seem to be a literal translation of the above words in Iamblichus?

Iamblichus.	Cicero's *Hortensius*.
πάντες ἄνθρωποι βουλόμεθα εὖ πράττειν (p. 64, ed. Kiessl.).	Beati certe omnes esse volumus[1].

[1] Cicero cum vellet in Hortensio dialogo ab aliqua re certa de qua nullus ambigeret sumere suae disputationis exordium, 'Beati certe,' inquit, 'om-

Thus at the outset we are led to a very significant result (1) that the Peripatetic section in Iamblichus opens in perfectly Aristotelian fashion, and further (2) that the opening verbally coincides with the exordium of the part of the Hortensius which went over the same ground.

Plato is next laid under contribution for a few pages, after which the thread of the argument is thus resumed in Ch. VI. Nature, it is said, produces nothing in vain; the body exists for the soul, the soul for the rational faculty in it, the rational faculty in its turn for the philosophic reason (*νοῦς*, p. 94). The full manifestation of this highest and final element in us is contemplation (*θεωρία*), a form of intellectual activity rightly termed *free*[1], because it exists and is chosen for the sake of nothing beyond itself. 'Man deprived of sense and reason together is reduced to the condition of a plant; deprived of reason alone he is turned into a brute; deprived of irrationality but still remaining in the possession of reason he becomes like a God[2].' Do we not recognize the hand of Aristotle here as visibly as in any part of the *Ethics* themselves?

In Ch. VII. the writer continues: Philosophy, however, has a practical use also, since without it we should lack the practical judgment with its unerring imperative (*τὴν ἀναμάρτητον ἐπιτακτικὴν φρόνησιν*, p. 104: comp. *Eth. Nic.* VI. 11); and it is not so difficult of acquisition as we are in the habit of supposing. The knowledge of principles (*αἰτιῶν καὶ στοιχείων*, p. 108) comes first in the order of nature[3], and no other

nes esse volumus.' *Augustin. de Trinit.* XIII. c. 4 (Vol. VIII. 659 ed. Bened. Antw., 1700). I conceive that Nobbe has misplaced the Fragment and that it would come properly at the beginning of the *second* or constructive part of the Dialogue.

[1] *Iambl. Protrept.* p. 94: *τῶν διανοήσεων ἐλεύθεραι μὲν ἦσαν ὅσαι δι' αὐτὰς αἱρεταί, δούλαις δὲ ἐοικυῖαι αἱ τὴν ἄλλην γνῶσιν ἀπερείδουσαι.* Comp. *Metaph.* I. 2 p. 982 *b* 25 Bekk.: *ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπός φαμεν ἐλεύθερος ὁ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα καὶ μὴ ἄλλου ὤν, οὕτω καὶ αὐτὴ* (sc. *σοφία*) *μόνη ἐλευθέρα οὖσα τῶν ἐπιστημῶν· μόνη γὰρ αὐτὴ αὐτῆς ἕνεκέν ἐστιν.*

[2] *Iambl. Protrept.* p. 96: *αἰσθήσεως μὲν οὖν καὶ νοῦ ἀφαιρεθεὶς ὁ ἄνθρωπος φυτῷ γίγνεται παραπλήσιος, νοῦ δὲ μόνου ἀφῃρημένος ἐκθηριοῦται· ἀλογίας δὲ ἀφαιρεθεὶς μένων δ' ἐν τῷ νῷ ὁμοιοῦται θεῷ.* Comp. *De Anima*, II. 2; *Eth. Nic.* I. 6, p. 1097 *b* 35; X. 8, p. 1178 *b* 21.

[3] *Iambl. Protrept.* p. 106: *ἀεὶ γὰρ γνωριμώτερα τὰ πρότερα τῶν ὑστέρων καὶ τὰ βελτίω τὴν φύσιν τῶν χειρόνων· τῶν γὰρ ὡρισμένων καὶ τεταγμένων ἐπιστήμη*

kind of knowledge is possible without it. Law is the expression of the *φρόνησις* of the philosopher, who is consequently the measure and standard whereby the rule of human life is determined[1]. But knowledge is still more precious when viewed on its purely theoretical side: contemplation is, like the exercise of sight, a thing admirable and desirable in itself, and the universal love of knowledge is only a higher phase of men's instinctive love of life. It may be worth while to quote a specimen of the original here, in order to shew how in both matter and form it exhibits every mark of Aristotelian authorship (comp. *Metaph.* I. 1; *Eth. Nic.* IX. 9):—

*ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε ζῆν τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι διακρίνεται τοῦ μὴ ζῆν, καὶ ταύτης παρουσίᾳ καὶ δυνάμει τὸ ζῆν διώρισται, καὶ ταύτης ἐξαιρουμένης οὐκ ἔστιν ἄξιον [ἀξίως?] ζῆν * * * οὐκοῦν εἰ τὸ ζῆν μέν ἐστιν αἱρετὸν διὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν, ἡ δὲ αἴσθησις γνῶσίς τις καὶ διὰ τὸ γνωρίζειν αὐτῇ δύνασθαι τὴν ψυχὴν αἱρούμεθα, πάλαι δὲ εἴπομεν, ὥσπερ δυοῖν ἀεὶ μᾶλλον αἱρετὸν ᾧ μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει ταὐτό, τῶν μὲν αἰσθήσεων τὴν ὄψιν ἀνάγκη μάλιστα αἱρετὴν εἶναι καὶ τιμίαν, ταύτης δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπασῶν [οὖσα?] αἱρετωτέρα, καὶ τοῦ ζῆν ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις κυριωτέρα [καὶ?] τῆς ἀληθείας, ὥστε πάντες ἄνθρωποι τὸ φρονεῖν μάλιστα διώκουσι· τὸ γὰρ ζῆν ἀγαπῶντες τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ γνωρίζειν ἀγαπῶσι· διὰ οὐδὲν γὰρ ἕτερον αὐτὸ τιμῶσιν ἢ διὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ μάλιστα διὰ τὴν ὄψιν· ταύτην γὰρ τὴν δύναμιν ὑπερβαλλόντως φαίνονται φιλοῦντες· αὐτὴ γὰρ πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας αἰσθήσεις ὥσπερ ἐπιστήμη τις ἀτεχνῶς ἐστίν* (p. 124).

*μᾶλλόν ἐστιν ἢ τῶν ἐναντίων, ἔτι δὲ τῶν αἰτιῶν ἢ τῶν ἀποβαινόντων. ἔστι δ' ὡρισμένα καὶ τεταγμένα τἀγαθὰ τῶν κακῶν μᾶλλον ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπος ἐπιεικὴς ἀνθρώπου φαύλου * * * αἰτιά τε μᾶλλον τὰ πρότερα τῶν ὑστέρων· ἐκείνων γὰρ ἀναιρουμένων ἀναιρεῖται τὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ἐξ ἐκείνων ἔχοντα.* Comp. *Eth. Nic.* IX. 9, p. 1170 *a* 20, and *Pol.* I. 2, p. 1253 *a* 19.

[1] *Iambl. Protrept.* p. 108: *πάντες γὰρ ὁμολογοῦμεν ὅτι δεῖ μὲν τὸν σπουδαιότατον ἄρχειν καὶ τὸν κατὰ φύσιν κράτιστον, τὸν δὲ νόμον ἄρχοντα καὶ κύριον εἶναι μόνον· οὗτος δὲ φρόνησίς τις καὶ λόγος ἀπὸ φρονήσεώς ἐστιν. ἔτι δὲ τίς ἡμῖν κανών, ἢ τίς ὅρος ἀκριβέστερος τῶν ἀγαθῶν πλὴν ὁ φρόνιμος; ὅσα γὰρ ἂν οὗτος ἕλοιτο κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην αἱρούμενος ταῦτ' ἔστιν ἀγαθά, καὶ κακὰ τὰ ἐναντία τούτοις.* Comp. *Pol.* III. 16, and *Eth. Nic.* III. 6, p. 1113 *a* 31; X. 10, p. 1180 *a* 21.

Ch. VIII. is in a more popular strain. The author, wishing to confirm his previous conclusions by an appeal to common experience (*ἀπὸ τῶν ἐναργῶν πᾶσι φαινομένων*, p. 126), proceeds to tell us that life without philosophy is poor and valueless[1]. 'Strength and stature and beauty are ridiculous and nothing worth, and beauty seems such only because we see nothing as it exactly is. For were any one as sharpsighted as according to the story Lynceus was, who saw through walls and trees, how could he think any one tolerable in appearance, seeing the base materials of which he is made?' (p. 132). If Aristotle did not say this, he must have certainly said something extremely like it, to judge from a quotation preserved in Boethius, *de Consolatione*, III. 15:—

IAMBLICHUS.	BOETHIUS.
εἰ γάρ τις ἐδύνατο βλέπειν ὀξύ, καθάπερ τὸν Λυγκέα φασίν, ὃς διὰ τῶν τοίχων ἑώρα καὶ τῶν δένδρων, πῶς ἂν ἔδοξεν εἶναί τινα τὴν ὄψιν ἀνεκτὸν ὁρῶν ἐξ οἵων συνέστηκεν κακῶν;	Quod si, ut *Aristoteles* ait, lynceis oculis homines uterentur, ut eorum visus obstantia quaeque penetrarent, nonne introspectis visceribus illud Alcibiadis superficie pulcerrimum corpus turpissimum videretur?

Prof. Heitz, to whose excellent book on the 'Lost writings of Aristotle' (p. 305) I am indebted for the above reference to Boethius, has hazarded the conjecture that the Aristotelian quotation came in the last resort from a Dialogue. The place in Iamblichus seems to put the question in a wholly new light. Boethius treating of the 'Consolations of Philosophy' may well be supposed to have borrowed from Aristotle's 'Exhortation to Philosophy,' or rather from some later work of similar import like the Hortensius of Cicero. In its Latin form indeed we have only a distant echo of the original, and it is not

[1] Here I cannot refrain from quoting a remark worthy of Aristotle even when Aristotle is at his best: *τοῖς μὲν οὖν πολλοῖς πολλὴ συγγνώμη τοῦτο πράττειν· εὔχονται μὲν γὰρ εὐδαιμονεῖν, ἀγαπῶσι δὲ κἂν μόνον δύνωνται ζῆν* (p. 132)—a remark which in felicity of expression is on a par with the famous saying about the state (*Pol.* I. 2): *γινομένη μὲν τοῦ ζῆν ἕνεκεν, οὖσα δὲ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν.*

difficult to surmise that even Iamblichus may possibly have modified it in the process of transcription[1].

A little further on we read as follows:—'Who could think himself happy and blessed, looking at the evils in which we are every one of us involved from the very first, by way of punishment as it were, as the interpreters of the mysteries tell us. For this indeed the ancients deem a divine saying, that the soul is now paying a penalty, and that our present life is the chastisement of some great offences. Now the union of soul and body is precisely of this kind. Just as they say that the Tyrrhenians frequently torture their prisoners by binding dead bodies to living men so as to be in front of them face to face and limb to limb: so the soul seems to be similarly stretched out and made fast to all the sensitive members of the body.' Here the parallel in the Hortensius leaves no doubt that we have been translating the *ipsissima verba* of Aristotle himself:—

IAMBLICHUS.

τίς ἂν οὖν εἰς ταῦτα βλέπων οἴοιτο εὐδαίμων εἶναι καὶ μακάριος, οἷς πρῶτον εὐθὺς φύσει συνίσταμεν, καθάπερ φασὶν οἱ τὰς τελετὰς λέγοντες, ὥσπερ ἂν ἐπὶ τιμωρίᾳ πάντες. τοῦτο γὰρ θεῖον οἱ ἀρχαιότεροι λέγουσι, τὸ φάναι διδόναι τὴν ψυχὴν τιμωρίαν καὶ ζῆν ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ κολάσει μεγάλων τινῶν ἁμαρτημάτων· πάνυ γὰρ ἡ σύζευξις τοιούτῳ τινὶ ἔοικε πρὸς τὸ σῶμα τῆς ψυχῆς. ὥσπερ γὰρ τοὺς ἐν τῇ Τυρρηνίᾳ φασὶ βασανίζειν πολλάκις τοὺς ἁλισκομένους προσδεσμεύοντας κατ' ἀντικρὺ τοῖς ζῶσι νεκροὺς

CICERO'S *Hortensius*.

Ex quibus humanae vitae erroribus et aerumnis fit ut interdum veteres illi sive vates sive in sacris initiisque tradendis divinae mentis interpretes, qui nos ob aliqua scelera suscepta in vita superiore poenarum luendarum causa natos esse dixerunt, aliquid vidisse videantur, verumque sit illud quod est apud *Aristotelem*, simili nos adfectos esse supplicio atque eos qui quondam, cum in praedonum Etruscorum manus incidissent, crudelitate excogitata necabantur, quorum corpora viva cum mor-

[1] *πῶς ἂν ἔδοξεν εἶναί τινα* may perhaps represent *πῶς ἂν ἔδοξεν εἶναι καὶ τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην* in the original Greek of Aristotle.

Iamblichus.	Cicero's *Hortensius*.
ἀντιπροσώπους ἕκαστον πρὸς ἕκαστον μέρος προσαρμόττοντας, οὕτως ἔοικε ἡ ψυχὴ διατετάσθαι καὶ προσκεκολλῆσθαι πᾶσι τοῖς αἰσθητικοῖς τοῦ σώματος μέλεσιν (pp. 134—6).	tuis, adversa adversis accommodata quam aptissime colligabantur; sic nostros animos cum corporibus copulatos ut vivos cum mortuis esse coniunctos (Cic. ap. Augustin. contra Iul. Pelag. IV. 15; Vol. X. 411, ed. Bened. Antw., 1700).

To pass over the obvious points of coincidence, a word or two may be said about the points of divergence. (1) The allusion to Plato's Cratylus (400 c) is more marked in the Greek than in the Latin parallel. (2) The note of time is significant: Cicero naturally enough represents the barbarity of the Etruscans as a thing of the past, whereas the Greek writer speaks of it as something still existing in his day, and moreover with the reserve which characterizes Aristotle's references to the manners of comparatively unknown nations[1]. (3) Through defective appreciation of philosophic subtleties Cicero has failed to catch the full meaning of the original: the details of the illustration are clearly out of place, unless the soul is conceived as being, to use the energetic language of the Greek writer, 'stretched out,' 'tied and bound to *all* the organs of sense.' We are now able to discern also that Cicero's debt to Aristotle begins earlier than we should imagine if we had only the light of nature to guide us in the discovery of the latent and unacknowledged part of the citation. The ancients are perpetually imitating before they seem to imitate, but it is not always in the power of criticism to determine the exact area of the imitation by a purely positive and external test, as Iamblichus enables us to do in the present instance. I need not stop to discuss the conjecture, adopted by V. Rose and Bernays, that it was from the Eudemus rather than the Protrepticus that Cicero translated the quotation in the Hortensius: both of

[1] Comp. *Eth. Nic.* III. 10, p. 1115 *b* 28: *καθάπερ φασὶ τοὺς Κελτούς.* VII. 6, p. 1148 *b* 21: *οἷοις χαίρειν φασὶν ἐνίους τῶν ἀπηγριωμένων περὶ τὸν Πόντον.*

these scholars appear to have overlooked the corresponding place in Iamblichus, nothwithstanding the fact that the careful Fabricius (*Bibl. Graec.* v. p. 767, ed. Harl.) long ago indicated it as containing a citation from some lost work of Aristotle's.

In Ch. IX. the writer retraces his steps (*ἄνωθεν δὲ ἀρχόμενοι*, p. 138) in order to adduce a new array of arguments on behalf of Philosophy. In nature, as in art, everything has an end or purpose. The end of human life being knowledge, it is a logical absurdity to ask what knowledge itself is good for. 'Most assuredly, could any one, as the saying is, transport us in thought to the Islands of the Blessed, as it were—for there we should have no material wants, nothing but knowledge would be of use, the sole thing left for us consequently being a life of thought and contemplation, that which even now we esteem a *free* life—in a case like this, I say, how could a man help feeling ashamed on finding himself through some fault of his own unable to accept an offer of dwelling in the Islands of the Blessed?' The gain of Philosophy is great irrespective of results, just as we spend money to see the Olympic festival or the Dionysia, for the mere pleasure of the spectacle, without hope of profit or reward.

Prof. Bernays, on the strength of a Fragment of the Hortensius, has divined thus much as to the contents of the lost Protrepticus: Aristotle must have argued in it that there would be no room for justice and the active virtues in the Islands of the Blessed, in the same way as we are told in the *Ethics* (X. 8) that they form no part of the life of the Gods. This conjecture is sufficiently probable in itself, but it seems to become something more than probable as soon as we read Iamblichus and Cicero side by side:—

Iamblichus.	Cicero's *Hortensius*.
ὡς ἀληθῶς γάρ, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, εἴ τις ἡμᾶς οἷον εἰς μακάρων νήσους τῇ διανοίᾳ κομίσειεν· ἐκεῖ γὰρ οὐδενὸς χρεία οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων τινὸς ὄφελος ἂν γένοιτο, μόνον δὲ καταλεί-	Si nobis, cum ex hac vita migrassemus, in beatorum insulis immortale aevum, ut fabulae ferunt, degere liceret, quid opus esset eloquentiae, cum iudicia nulla fierent, aut ipsis etiam

IAMBLICHUS.

πεται τὸ διανοεῖσθαι καὶ θεωρεῖν, ὅνπερ καὶ νῦν ἐλεύθερόν φαμεν βίον εἶναι· εἰ δὲ [read δὴ] ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ, πῶς οὐκ ἂν αἰσχύνοιτο δικαίως ὅστις ἡμῶν ἐξουσίας γενομένης ἐν μακάρων οἰκῆσαι νήσοις ἀδύνατος εἴη δι' ἑαυτόν; (p. 150).

CICERO'S *Hortensius.*

virtutibus? nec enim fortitudine egeremus, nullo proposito aut labore aut periculo, nec iustitia * * * una igitur essemus beati cognitione naturae et scientia, qua sola etiam deorum est vita laudanda. ex quo intellegi potest cetera necessitatis esse, unum hoc voluptatis (Cic. ap. Augustin. *de Trinit.* XIV. 9, Vol. VIII. 677, ed. Bened. Antw., 1700).

We see here how the rhetorical instinct of the Latin writer has led him to amplify the original, and in the process miss some portion of the sense. Cicero indeed seems to strike a wrong note in starting: the one circumstance to be brought into prominence in connection with the proverbial *μακάρων νῆσοι* (comp. Plato, *Rep.* VI. p. 519 C) was not the immortality of the Blessed, but rather their general exemption from the material conditions which make the utilitarian virtues possible. It is clear also that *ut fabulae ferunt* is not the exact equivalent of the Greek *ὥσπερ λέγομεν*, although it is apparently intended to represent it.

After a digression in which Philosophy is lauded for its usefulness to the legislator, the writer reverts to his first line of argument, and dwells on the supreme and transcendent delight which the philosophic life (*τὸν κατὰ νοῦν βίον*, p. 160) brings with it. Such a life is affirmed to be existence in its highest and most intense form; it is a real as opposed to a merely potential existence, a waking life as opposed to a sleep, and the pleasure which belongs to it is an integral element in its nature. And finally, by way of appendix, as it were, the last of these Peripatetic chapters (XII.) establishes that Philosophy is something more than happiness or pleasure; it is said to be our moral perfection also (*τὸ σπουδαῖον εἶναι*, p. 170) or at any rate the chief constituent in such perfection.

The preceding analysis is sufficient to shew the Aristotelian character of a well-defined section in the Protrepticus of Iamblichus. A comparison of isolated passages with Aristotle's received works discloses a series of minute but apparently 'undesigned' coincidences of language,—a fact which seems to admit of but one explanation: the entire section must emanate from a writer to whom it comes natural to use Aristotelian formulas and turns of expression, who is consequently, judged by this criterion, an original writer or at least one very far removed from being a late imitator or paraphrast. I subjoin a few crucial instances in order to illustrate this assertion:—

Iamblichus.	Aristotle.
p. 104: *ἄλλαι μὲν αἱ ὑπηρετοῦσαι* (sc. *ἐπιστῆμαι*) *ἕτεραι δὲ αἱ ἐπιτάττουσαι* * * *εἰ τοίνυν μόνη ἡ τοῦ κρίνειν ἔχουσα τὴν ὀρθότητα καὶ ἡ τῷ λόγῳ χρωμένη καὶ ἡ τὸ ὅλον ἀγαθὸν θεωροῦσα, ἥτις ἐστὶ φιλοσοφία, χρῆσθαι πᾶσι καὶ ἐπιτάττειν κατὰ φύσιν δύναται, φιλοσοφητέον ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου.*	*Metaph.* I. 2, p. 982 *b* 4: *ἀρχικωτάτη τῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ μᾶλλον ἀρχικὴ τῆς ὑπηρετούσης ἡ γνωρίζουσα τίνος ἕνεκέν ἐστι πρακτέον ἕκαστον. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τἀγαθὸν ἐν ἑκάστοις, ὅλως δὲ τὸ ἄριστον ἐν τῇ φύσει πάσῃ.* p. 982 *a* 18: *οὐ δεῖν ἐπιτάττεσθαι τὸν σοφὸν ἀλλ' ἐπιτάττειν.*
p. 110: *πάντες αἱροῦνται μάλιστα τὰ κατὰ τὰς οἰκείας ἕξεις· τὸ μὲν γὰρ δικαίως ζῆν ὁ δίκαιος, τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν ὁ τὴν ἀνδρείαν ἔχων, ὁ δὲ σώφρων τὸ σωφρονεῖν.*	*Eth. Nic.* X. 6, p. 1176 *b* 26: *ἑκάστῳ δὲ ἡ κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἕξιν αἱρετωτάτη ἐνέργεια, καὶ τῷ σπουδαίῳ δὲ ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετήν.*
p. 116: *πᾶν δὲ εὖ διάκειται κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετήν* * *τοῦ βελτίονος ἄρα φύσει βελτίων ἐστὶν ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ἀρετή.*	*Eth. Nic.* I. 7, p. 1098 *a* 15: *ἕκαστον εὖ κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν ἀποτελεῖται.* —— X. 6, p. 1177 *a* 5: *τοῦ βελτίονος ἀεὶ καὶ μορίου καὶ ἀνθρώπου σπουδαιοτέραν τὴν ἐνέργειαν* (sc. *λέγομεν*).

IAMBLICHUS.	ARISTOTLE.
p. 116: *καὶ γὰρ ἂν τοῦτο, οἶμαι, θείη τις ὡς ἤτοι μόνον ἢ μάλιστα ἐσμὲν τὸ μόριον τοῦτο* (sc. *τὸ λόγον ἔχον*).	*Eth. Nic.* IX. 8, p. 1169 *a* 2: *ὅτι μὲν οὖν τοῦθ'* (sc. *ὁ νοῦς*) *ἕκαστός ἐστιν ἢ μάλιστα, οὐκ ἄδηλον.*
p. 118: *τοῦ μὲν οὖν συνθέτου καὶ μεριστοῦ πλείους καὶ διάφοροι ἐνέργειαι, τοῦ δὲ τὴν φύσιν ἁπλοῦ καὶ μὴ πρός τι τὴν οὐσίαν ἔχοντος μίαν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὴν καθ' αὑτὸ κυρίως ἀρετήν. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἁπλοῦν τι ζῷόν ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος κ.τ.λ.*	*Eth. Nic.* X. 7, p. 1177 *b* 27: *οὐ γὰρ ᾗ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν οὕτω βιώσεται, ἀλλ' ᾗ θεῖόν τι ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει· ὅσῳ δὲ διαφέρει τοῦτο τοῦ συνθέτου, τοσούτῳ καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετήν.* —— VII. 15, p. 1154 *b* 25: *εἴ του ἡ φύσις ἁπλῆ εἴη, ἀεὶ ἡ αὐτὴ πρᾶξις ἡδίστη ἔσται· διὸ ὁ θεὸς ἀεὶ μίαν καὶ ἁπλῆν χαίρει ἡδονήν.*
p. 120: *τοῦτο δὲ δρᾷ κατ' ἐπιστήμην ἁπλῶς, μᾶλλον δὲ κατὰ τὴν μᾶλλον ἐπιστήμην.*	*Metaph.* I. 2, p. 982 *a* 32: *ὁ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι δι' ἑαυτὸ αἱρούμενος τὴν μάλιστα ἐπιστήμην μάλιστα αἱρήσεται.*
p. 150: *οὐ γὰρ δὴ τόδε μὲν αἱρετὸν διὰ τόδε, τόδε δὲ δι' ἄλλο, τοῦτο δ' εἰς ἄπειρον οἴχεται προϊόν· ἀλλ' ἵσταταί που.*	*Metaph.* II. 4, p. 1000 *b* 26: *ὥστε συμβαίνει τῶν ἀρχῶν ἑτέρας ἀρχὰς εἶναι προτέρας· τοῦτο δ' ἀδύνατον καὶ εἰ ἵσταται καὶ εἰ βαδίζει εἰς ἄπειρον.*
p. 166: *ἀλλὰ μὴν ἥ γε τελεία ἐνέργεια καὶ ἀκώλυτος ἐν ἑαυτῇ ἔχει τὸ χαίρειν, ὥστε ἀεὶ [ἂν ?] εἴη ἡ θεωρητικὴ ἐνέργεια πάσης ἡδίστη.*	*Eth. Nic.* X. 4, p. 1174 *b* 19: *αὕτη* (sc. *ἡ ἐνέργεια*) *δ' ἂν τελειοτάτη εἴη καὶ ἡδίστη· κατὰ πᾶσαν γὰρ αἴσθησίν ἐστιν ἡδονή, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ διάνοιαν καὶ θεωρίαν, ἡδίστη δ' ἡ τελειοτάτη.* —— VII. 13: *ἐνέργεια ἀνεμπόδιστος.*

There now arises a further question, and one of an infinitely finer order, To what 'formative pressure' has Iamblichus sub-

jected his borrowed materials? How far, that is, has he supplemented the original by alien additions, and how much of it has he omitted to embody in his own work? That he has done this to some extent, is indeed pretty evident; he interpolates a whole string of Platonic quotations, and an occasional word or two of his own is worked in with a clumsiness which sets the literary sense jarring and renders detection an easy matter[1]. And yet it is not enough to say that we have only to eliminate the modifying touches thus introduced in order to reconstitute the Aristotelian archetype with the help of the residuum. Not to speak of the difficulty of discovering a final residuum, reconstruction, we must remember, is at best an entirely hypothetical procedure; it cannot lead to results worth having unless controlled by a delicate sense of what is historically possible, and verified at every step by that felicity of illustration which makes Bernays' 'Theophrastus' a model in its way. With some reserve, however, we may acquiesce in a provisional result: the Fragment incorporated by Iamblichus would seem to be substantially homogeneous and consecutive, Aristotelian in its contents and with the Aristotelian manner everywhere visible in the style; at times, too, there is a vigour, a refinement, in other words, an originality about the expression which precludes the idea that we are reading a compilation by some inferior hand. So far, then, we are justified in considering it part of an independent work of Aristotle's—a work which on external grounds I have endeavoured to identify with the Dialogue called the Protrepticus. This hypothesis will also serve to explain the contrasts which we find on comparison of the Fragment with the more formal and scientific treatises

[1] Here are two instances: (1) *οὐκοῦν εἰ γεγόναμεν, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἐσμὲν ἕνεκα τοῦ φρονῆσαί τι καὶ μαθεῖν* [*καλῶς ἄρα κατά γε τοῦτον τὸν λόγον Πυθαγόρας εἴρηκεν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ γνῶναί τε καὶ θεωρῆσαι πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ συνέστηκεν.*] p. 148. (2) *οὕτως ᾠκονόμηται χαριέντως* (sc. *ὁ βίος*) *ὥστε δοκεῖν πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα θεὸν εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον. ὁ νοῦς γὰρ ἡμῶν ὁ θεός* [*εἴτε Ἑρμότιμος εἴτε Ἀναξαγόρας εἶπε τοῦτο*] p. 138. The words in brackets seem to be marginal notes of his own, which Iamblichus has transcribed along with the original text: any one else would have known that "*ὁ νοῦς γὰρ ἡμῶν ὁ θεός*" was part of a line of Euripides (comp. Wyttenbach's Bibl. Crit. part 9, p. 18) whom Aristotle is so fond of quoting.

of Aristotle. The style is less disjointed and more human; the thought also not unfrequently descends to a popular level, as we might expect in a book destined not for the few but for the many. The writer seems now and then to forget his scholasticism: practical and speculative knowledge are again merged into one another; Philosophy is said to 'reveal nature' and on this account to be indispensable to the legislator whose function is to organize society after the pattern of nature. And it is interesting to observe how the ascetic tendencies of the age are here reflected with a distinctness not usual with Aristotle in his more 'esoteric' productions: Philosophy, for instance, is commended to us as a sort of refuge from the evils and 'unutterable vanity' of our material life. Concessions of this kind to popular or Platonic notions would probably have found a legitimate place in any dialogue, *a fortiori* in one purporting to be a 'Serious call to a philosophic Life,' if we may adopt a sufficiently obvious rendering of the Greek title. The general argument, therefore, stands thus: if the Peripatetic section in Iamblichus is worthy of Aristotle, there are some positive grounds for believing it to have been part of his lost Protrepticus. The concurrence of evidence may be exhibited in the following synopsis:—

(1) The thought and style of the Fragment remind one at every turn of the writer of the *Ethics*.

(2) At least one place in it must be Aristotle's, because it is quoted as his by Cicero.

(3) A certain coincidence of language is apparent, when we compare it with the Fragments of the Hortensius in which, according to tradition, Cicero took the Protrepticus as his model.

(4) The identity of name has some weight: an author of the stamp of Iamblichus would naturally borrow the materials for his own Protrepticus from an older work of the same name and character, especially if the latter was as rare as the Aristotelian Dialogue must have become by the end of the third century.

Such, then, are the data: it is for others to judge as to the validity of my inferences from them. I am aware that the Fragment may turn out to be more composite in origin than my own impressions lead me to think; it may too be an exaggeration to attribute the authorship of it directly to Aristotle, seeing that the learned world has not quite settled the question whether he ever wrote Dialogues at all. If not Aristotle's however, it is at least Aristotelian, and what we should expect in one of the Dialogues rightly or wrongly bearing his name, and accepted as his not only by Cicero, but also, in the case of some, by Zeno and Chrysippus. The most that we can allege against the genuineness of these writings is that they may perhaps have been early productions of the Peripatetic school instead of what they professed to be: to classify them with manifestly spurious books like the treatise *περὶ τῶν Πυθαγορείων*, for instance, is to betray a barbarous indifference to *nuances*, and to forget that negative criticism has limits by transgressing which it degenerates into a senseless and unprofitable exercise of logic. The Dialogues were Aristotelian, and passed in antiquity as the work of Aristotle himself: are we warranted in affirming much more than this of even the *De Anima* or the *Ethics?*

An outline of the original Protrepticus may be given in few words. By way of preface it opened with a dedication to Themison, one of the petty kings of Cyprus, who was gently admonished that neglect of philosophy would be without excuse with him, possessing as he did all the external advantages necessary to the philosophic life (Rose, *Arist. Pseudep.*, p. 71). The Dialogue itself was doubtless devoid of the dramatic interest which we are in the habit of associating with the name. There was perhaps some short prelude, after which the chief interlocutor proceeded in oratorical fashion to divide his discourse into two sharply contrasted sections, the first controversial, the second constructive. The vulgar objections to Philosophy were shewn to prove that even the objectors were philosophers in spite of themselves: 'We must philosophize whether we say that we must philosophize or that we must not' (Rose, p. 71). The ground being thus cleared, the speaker discarded contro-

versy in the second part, and sought henceforth to establish the more positive conclusion that the conditions of human life make Philosophy the one thing needful for us. 'We must philosophize'—*φιλοσοφητέον ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου* (Iamblich. passim) —must have been the perpetually recurring moral of this stage of the discourse, as we know that it was the general result of the earlier one. The first of these two sections Iamblichus seems to have ignored for a sufficiently simple reason: it could not have edified his readers, and his own sympathies were with thaumaturgy and asceticism rather than the subtleties of Aristotelian dialectic. The second section, however, was probably of a different character; and if I am right in my view that Iamblichus has made free use of it in his own Protrepticus, his plagiarism has certainly been a clear gain to the world.

INGRAM BYWATER.

NOTES ON THE PHILOCTETES.

348—353] Neoptolemus is explaining the motives with which he left his home at Scyros for the camp at Troy. Odysseus and Phœnix had come to summon him thither. They had told him that his father Achilles was dead, and that the destiny of taking Troy was now his. Two feelings were moved in him by this statement; the desire to see his father before burial; and ambition: he sailed—

> *μάλιστα μὲν δὴ τοῦ θανόντος ἱμέρῳ,*
> *ὅπως ἴδοιμ' ἄθαπτον· οὐ γὰρ εἰδόμην·*
> *ἔπειτα μέντοι χὠ λόγος καλὸς προσῆν,*
> *εἰ τἀπὶ Τροίᾳ πέργαμ' αἱρήσοιμ' ἰὼν.*

The meaning of *οὐ γὰρ εἰδόμην*, on which the mss. agree, is obscure. Hermann and W. Dindorf supply *ζῶντα*: 'that I might see him (at least) before burial; for I had never seen him (alive).' But, that this statement may be intelligible, *ζῶντα* is not the only qualification which it needs. We must understand Neoptolemus to mean: 'I had never seen my father alive; that is, since I was about six or seven years old.' For, if Achilles had gone to Troy before Neoptolemus was born, the young hero would be now of the age of ten. Hermann was sensitive, but resigned, to this difficulty: 'De temporum computatione quaeri poterat. Nam si statim e Lycomedis domo ad Troiam profectus est Achilles, nondum nato filio, Neoptolemus puer esset vix decennis. Verum in huiusmodi rebus non argutandum.'

Seyffert conjectures, *οὐδ' ἄρ' εἰδόμην*: 'but, as it proved, I did *not* see him (unburied);' (I arrived at Troy too late.) A still simpler emendation is, I think, possible; but Seyffert probably gives the right sense. The parenthesis, whatever

was exactly its original form, probably signified that the wish expressed in ὅπως ἴδοιμι was not fulfilled. In connection with this point it is necessary to examine a part of the context, which might seem at first sight to bear an adverse interpretation. Neoptolemus goes on to say that, after two days' voyage from Scyros, he came into harbour at Sigeum:

κεῖνος μὲν οὖν ἔκειτ'· ἐγὼ δ' ὁ δύσμορος,
ἐπεὶ 'δάκρυσα κεῖνον, οὐ μακρῷ χρόνῳ
ἐλθὼν 'Ατρείδας πρὸς φίλους, ὡς εἰκὸς ἦν,
τά θ' ὅπλ' ἀπῄτουν τοῦ πατρὸς τά τ' ἄλλ' ὅσ' ἦν.

Now, what is the meaning of ἔκειτο? If it is used for the technical προέκειτο, 'lay on his bier,' then Seyffert's view is untenable. If it means simply 'lay low in death,' it is consistent with his view. For my own part, I have no hesitation in preferring the latter and simpler meaning. How commonly κεῖσθαι (like *iacere*) means 'to lie dead,' the lexicons will show. Simon., *frag.* 60, (Bergk, *Poet. Lyr.* p. 891) ὤνθρωπε, κεῖσαι ζῶν ἔτι μᾶλλον τῶν ὑπὸ γᾶς ἐκείνων: *i. e.* 'though still alive, you are more dead than the dead themselves:' where κεῖσθαι is directly opposed to ζῆν. Nor do the words ἐπεὶ 'δάκρυσα κεῖνον make against the inference that Achilles was already buried. If the son's tears could not now be shed at his dead father's side, it was not strange that they should be shed at his grave. To that grave Neoptolemus would first hasten on landing; and thence presently (οὐ μακρῷ χρόνῳ) go to make his claim before the Atreidæ. If the funeral rites had been still unperformed, we should have expected at least some passing allusion to the due discharge of them, — a sacred duty in which Neoptolemus himself would have borne the leading part. The very words οὐ μακρῷ χρόνῳ well express the turning away from a sorrow which had now no definite task to practical and urgent cares.

I believe, then, that Seyffert has seen the true sense: Neoptolemus wished to see his father before burial, but was disappointed. The correction of οὐ γάρ into οὐδ' ἄρ' is not violent. But a still easier one seems possible, and, as far as I know, has not been suggested. Read

ὅπως ἴδοιμ' ἄθαπτον· εἰ γὰρ εἰδόμην·

'(I came), moved first and chiefly by desire for the dead, that I might see him before burial,—(would that I *had* seen him!)—then in the next place there was a charm in their promise, and in the hope of going to take Troy's towers.' The passionate parenthesis, *εἰ γὰρ εἰδόμην*, suggested by the mention of his vain wish, seems to suit well with the tone of strong emotion, bitter sorrow, bitter disappointment and anger, which animates the whole speech. *εἰ* would be corrupted into *οὐ* even more easily than *δ' ἄρ'* into *γάρ*. In v. 1407 the Laur. ms. has '*ει* ex *ου* factum a m. ant.' (Dind.): and in v. 47, 'La. *ἔλοιτό μ'* · sed alterum *ο* ex *ε* factum.'

426, 7] *οἴμοι, δύ' αὖ τώδ' ἐξέδειξας, οἷν ἐγὼ*
ἥκιστ' ἂν ἠθέλησ' ὀλωλότοιν κλύειν.

The Laur. has *δύ' αὖτως δείν' ἔλεξας*. The schol. says, *γρ. δύ' αὐτὼ δ' ἐξέδειξας*. Hence Porson, *δύ' αὖ τώδ' ἐξέδειξας*. The first part of his correction appears certain. But the scholiast's *ἐξέδειξας* is very suspicious; it is a strangely inappropriate word: 'you have pointed out,' instead of the simple 'you have named.' It can hardly be doubted that the *ἔλεξας* of the best mss. is right. And the rest of the true reading may, I think, be traced. The Laur. has '*δείν. ἔλεξας, cum duarum literarum litura,* quasi *δειναν* fuerit.' Now *α* and *ει* are occasionally interchanged, so that this *δειν* may once have been *δαν*. What, then, are the two letters which have been erased? Suppose that they were *δρ*, and we have

οἴμοι, δύ' αὖ τώδ' ἄνδρ' ἔλεξας.

533—5] *ἴωμεν, ὦ παῖ, προσκύσαντε τὴν ἔσω*
ἄοικον εἰσοίκησιν, ὥς με καὶ μάθῃς
ἀφ' ὧν διέζων ὥς τ' ἔφυν εὐκάρδιος.
(Dind. 1860).

Neoptolemus has just consented to take Philoctetes as his passenger. Before they set out for the ship, Philoctetes invites the other to enter his cave, and to judge with his own eyes of the misery of that 'homeless home.' Agreeing with Seyffert that the *ἅπαξ λεγόμ. εἰσοίκησις* is a *vox nihili*, and that we must

read *εἰς οἴκησιν*, I yet cannot accept his emendation. He proposes

ἴωμεν, ὦ παῖ, προσκύσοντ' ἐμὴν ἔσω
ἄοικον εἰς οἴκησιν,

i. e. ἴωμεν εἰς οἴκησιν, προσκύσοντε. Now it seems clear that by *ἴωμεν* Philoctetes means, 'let us be going.' The word is spoken with joyful spirit and emphasis: it expresses that eager desire to start at once of which his whole mind is full. We must not, I think, join *ἴωμεν* with *εἰς οἴκησιν*. Perhaps we ought to read:—

ἴωμεν, ὦ παῖ, τήνδε προσκύψαντ' ἔσω
ἄοικον εἰς οἴκησιν.

'Let us be going, my son, *after one look* into the homeless home within.'

684] *ὃς οὔτ' ἔρξας τιν' οὔτε νοσφίσας.*

This, the reading of the mss., must be rendered: 'having done (no wrong) to any man, nor defrauded.' But as *ἔρξας τινά* could not possibly stand for *κακόν τι ἔρξας τινά*, various remedies have been attempted. (1) Hermann,—noticing that Eustath. p. 763. 2 quotes from the *Philoctetes* *οὔτε τι ῥέξας· κακὸν δηλαδή*·—proposes *ὃς οὔτι ῥέξας τιν' οὔτε νοσφίσας*. He is thus forced to conjecture that a syllable has been lost in the antistr., v. 699, *κατευνάσειεν, εἴ τις ἐμπέσοι* (Seyff. *εἴ τι συμπέσοι*). (2) Schneidewin: *ὃς οὔτ' ἔρξας τιν', οὔ τι νοσφίσας*: the *τι* being governed by *ἔρξας* as well as by *νοσφίσας*. But *οὔτε—οὐ*, instead of *οὔτε—οὔτε*, though not unexampled, is, in so short a sentence, too harsh. Better than this would be *ὃς οὔτι ῥέξας, οὔτι νοσφίσας*, the accus. of the person being rendered less necessary by the words which immediately follow—*ἀλλ' ἴσος ὢν ἴσοις ἀνήρ*. But I should prefer, with the change of two letters only,

ὃς οὐ πέρσας τιν' οὔτε νοσφίσας.

849—854] *ἀλλ' ὅ τι δύνᾳ μάκιστον,*
κεῖνό μοι, κεῖνο λάθρα

ἐξιδοῦ ὅπως πράξεις.
οἶσθα γὰρ ὧν αὐδῶμαι,
εἰ ταύταν τούτων γνώμαν ἴσχεις,
μάλα τοι ἄπορα πυκινοῖς ἐνιδεῖν πάθη.
(Dind. 1860).

As Dindorf reads these lines, they may be rendered :—'But survey, I pray you, with your utmost foresight, the means to gain that end, that great end, by stealth. For if you hold to your present view of these things—you know what things I speak of (*τούτων ὧν αὐδῶμαι = τούτων ἃ αὐδῶμαι*)—verily there are desperate troubles for shrewd men to infer.' The view which Dindorf takes of the meaning can only be guessed from his notes. It appears to be virtually the same as Seyffert's, whose slightly different reading will be noticed presently. In this view, *κεῖνο* (v. 850) is the plan of carrying off the bow while Philoctetes is asleep, and leaving him behind: *γνώμη* (v. 853) is the intention of Neoptolemus to stay by the sick man until he awakes.

Odysseus and Neoptolemus came to Lemnos to gain two allies; the bow, and its master. Both are indispensable. One is already theirs; the bow is in the hands of Neoptolemus. Philoctetes, worn out with agony, has given it into the keeping of his supposed friend; has made him promise to stay; and has fallen into a deep sleep.

A lyric dialogue ensues (vv. 827 ff.) between the Chorus and Neoptolemus. The Chorus invoke the Sleep-god to hold Philoctetes his firm prisoner; and hint (v. 836) that now is the time to decamp with the bow. Neoptolemus answers (vv. 839 ff.), 'Well, it is true that *he* hears nothing; but *I* see that we have won this prize of the bow in vain, if we sail without him. *His* must be the wreath of victory; *him* the god bade us bring.' The Chorus reply,—'Well, my son, the god will see to that; but' speak low, 'for the half-sleep of sickness has ever a quick eye:'—*i. e.* if he must be taken with us, he must: only, whatever you do, do not awaken him. And then :—

ἀλλ' ὅ τι δύνᾳ μάκιστον,
κεῖνό μοι, κεῖνο λάθρα
ἐξιδοῦ ὅπως πράξεις·

'but survey, I pray you, with your best foresight the means of gaining that end, that great end, by stealth.' Here κεῖνο is evidently the object on which Neoptolemus himself has just been insisting; viz., the necessity of carrying off Philoctetes as well as the bow. The emphasis is on λάθρα. 'If he must be taken,' say the Chorus, 'take him while he is asleep.' The usual explanation refers κεῖνο to the plan originally recommended by the Chorus, —to depart with the bow, and forsake its owner. The point which has been overlooked (as far as I know) by all the commentators, is that the decisive words of Neoptolemus (839—841) have (naturally enough) altered the mind of the Chorus. *Before* they proposed to abandon Philoctetes. *Now* they are ready to take him, if so it must be. The one thing on which they insist is the folly of waiting till he awakes. Carry him off at once, asleep and unconscious. In v. 850, for κεῖνό μοι, κεῖνο λάθρα, we ought probably to read κεῖνό μοι κείνου λάθρα, 'without his knowledge.' In the strophe, (v. 834) the Laur. ms. has ποῖ δὲ βάσει, πῶς δέ μοι τἀντεῦθεν, which Dindorf leaves, without attempting to amend metre or sense. Seyffert's remedy is ποῖ δὲ βάσει μοι τάγ' ἔνθεν, regarding πῶς δέ as 'ortum ex dittographia:' and he inserts σύ in v. 850 (κεῖνό μοι σὺ, κεῖνο λάθρα). Agreeing with him that πῶς δέ may have come in by mistake, I should prefer the τἀντεῦθεν of the mss. to his τά γ' ἔνθεν. And it seems more probable that μοι in v. 134 had crept in (perhaps from 832) than that σύ had dropped out in v. 850. But whether we read πῶς δὲ βάσει μοι τἀντεῦθεν, corresponding to κεῖνό μοι σὺ κείνου λάθρα: or πῶς δὲ βάσει τἀντεῦθεν, corresponding to κεῖνό μοι κείνου λάθρα:—in either case the long first syllable of τἀντεῦθεν (the ms. reading) seems to favour κείνου, instead of κεῖνο, in the antistrophe.

We now come to the chief difficulty of the passage (vv. 852—4). Here the Laur., as reported by Dindorf from Dübner's collation, has

οἶσθα γὰρ ὧν (ον) αὐδῶμαι
εἰ ταὐτὰν τούτωι γνώμαν ἔχεις [ἴσχεις]
μάλα τοι ἄπορα πυκινοῖσιν ἐνιδεῖν πάθη.

ον, written over ὧν, is in the hand of the reviser whom Dindorf

calls the 'diorthotes.' All the apographa have ὅν, except two (Dind. does not say which they are), which read ὧν. The marginal ἴσχεις is also in the hand of the diorthotes, without the usual γρ. by which he marks a variant. Of the apographa, Laur. γ alone has ἔχεις. All but two agree with the Laur. on ταὐτάν: but Laur. γ has ταύταν, and another τὴν αὐτάν. Then in the Laur. 'post τοι tres quattuorve literae erasae, punctis, quae supersunt, notatae.'

Dindorf's reading of the passage is printed at the head of this paper, and is there translated and explained. Seyffert reads:—

οἶσθα γὰρ, ὧν αὐδῶμαι,
εἰ ταὐτὸν τούτῳ γνώμαν ἴσχεις,
μάλα τοι ἄπορα πυκινῶς ἂν ἰδεῖν πάθη:

'For you know that, if you think with this man about the things which I speak of, (i.e. if you agree with Philoctetes that he as well as the bow should be taken), you will often ('*frequenter*'—πυκινῶς) see desperate troubles.' The genitive ὧν (= τούτων ἅ) depending on γνώμαν, and Wunder's ταὐτὸν γνώμαν ἴσχεις for ταὐτὸν γιγνώσκεις, are excessively harsh. Then πυκινῶς in the sense of 'frequently'—which Seyffert endeavours to support by the Homeric πυκινῶς ἀκάχημαι—is probably unexampled in Attic: the contracted neuter πυκνά being always used for this meaning[1].

Schneidewin gives:—

οἶσθα γὰρ ὧν αὐδῶμαι·
εἰ ταὐτὸν τούτῳ γνώμαν ἴσχεις
μάλα τοι ἄπορα πυκινοῖς ἐνιδεῖν πάθη:

'You know whose I am called:' *i.e.* 'you know'—the Chorus say apologetically—'that we are your humble servants; but still we are obliged to differ from you;' an explanation more ingenious than probable.

When we look for some comparatively firm ground on which to base a criticism of the text, two points seem to stand out more clearly than the rest. (1) Every account which can be

[1] Xen. *Cyn.* 6. 22 has πυκνῶς = 'in a dense pack.'

given of the genitive *ὧν* involves a syntax or a sense too harsh and forced for Sophocles. *ὅν*, the correction of the 'diorthotes,' —which was read by the scholiast, and is in all the apographa but one,—seems more probable. Erfurdt's correction of *μενοῦμεν* to *μένομεν* in the strophe (836) is easy. The confusion of *ου* and *ο* is not uncommon: *e.g.* the Laur. had in *Philoct.* 57 *τουδ* for *τόδ*: v. 92, *τουσούσδε*: v. 701, *ἄλλουτ ἄλλαι* for *ἄλλοτ ἄλλαι*: v. 1347, *κλέους* for *κλέος*. (2) *ταὐτὸν τοίτῳ*, from the *ταὐτὰν τούτῳ* of the Laur., is probably right. *ταὐτάν* is found in all the apographa but two, of which one has *ταύταν*, the other *τὴν αὐτάν*. *τὴν αὐτήν* was also the reading of the scholiast. The dative *τούτῳ* points in the same direction: Dindorf's *τούτων* is merely conjectural.

If, then, *ὅν* and *ταὐτόν*—supported both by authority and by the context—may be safely adopted, I believe that two slight emendations will restore grammar and coherence to the passage. (1) For *γνώμαν* read *γνώμας*, gen. sing. (2) For *αὐδῶμαι* read *αἰδοῦμαι*.

οἶσθα γὰρ ὃν αἰδοῦμαι·
εἰ ταὐτὸν τούτῳ γνώμας ἴσχεις,
μάλα τοι ἄπορα πυκινοῖς ἐνιδεῖν πάθη.

'You know of whom I stand in fear (Odysseus); if you are of the same mind with Philoctetes, verily there are desperate troubles for the shrewd to infer.' Odysseus, after going back to the ship, had sent the pretended *ἔμπορος* to aid and hasten the movements of Neoptolemus. The Chorus hint at the displeasure of Odysseus, if Neoptolemus complies with the request of Philoctetes, and stays for his awakening. They anticipate *ἄπορα πάθη*—the anger of Odysseus,—the horror and despair of Philoctetes when he learns his real destination—and the possible effect of this despair on Neoptolemus, who had already (vv. 755, 760, 806) shown clear signs of relenting. In fact these lines foreshadow the rupture which actually takes place soon after (vv. 974 ff.) between Odysseus and his more merciful colleague. All these dangers, the Chorus insist, may be avoided by carrying off Philoctetes *now*, while he is asleep. Compare vv. 863, ff., where the Chorus say

τὸ δ' ἁλώσιμον ἀμᾷ
φροντίδι, παῖ, πόνος
ὁ μὴ φοβῶν κράτιστος.

'to my mind that plan of action is best which does not scare the prey:' τὸ ἁλώσιμον meaning Philoctetes, who lies unconscious, and at their mercy—οὐκ ἔχων ἀρωγάν, v. 856. The commentators, assuming that the Chorus wish to leave Philoctetes behind, have been driven to construe τὸ ἁλώσιμον in a strangely forced way: '*as far as my mind can grasp*, (τὸ ἁλώσιμον ἀμᾷ φροντίδι), the plan which does not scare (Philoctetes) is best.' No one, I think, can fail to see that this is a most arbitrary distortion of plain words, and utterly foreign to the manner of Sophocles.

A word in conclusion on the two alterations which I have suggested. (1) γνώμας for γνώμαν. The construction ταὐτὸν γνώμαν ἴσχειν for ταὐτὸν γιγνώσκειν would be a harsh instance of a rare construction; far too harsh, as I think, for Sophocles. Bergk's γνῶμ' ἴσχεις is tempting, though in the only place of Sophocles (*Trach.* 592) where γνῶμα occurs it has rather the sense of 'criterion.' But this would involve changing γνώμαν ἴσχων also, in v. 837, to γνῶμ' ἴσχων, and is too hazardous. γνώμας, the genitive depending on ταὐτόν, appears more probable. When ταὐτόν became ταὐτάν, γνώμας, mistaken for acc. plur., would have been altered to γνώμαν. (2) αἰδοῦμαι for αὐδῶμαι. The confusion of ι and υ is common: *e.g.* *Ant.* 645, Laur. φῦτεύει for φῑτεύει: *ib.* 509, ἰπίλλουσιν for ὑπίλλουσιν. Of ου and ω confused *Ai.* 98 is an instance, where the Laur. had ἀτιμάσωσ' for ἀτιμάσουσ', 'ου ex ω facto a m. rec.' Thus αἰδοῦμαι might, in this ms., have become αὐδῶμαι.

1097—1100] εὖτέ γε παρὸν φρονῆσαι
τοῦ λῴονος δαίμονος εἵλου τὸ κάκιον ἑλεῖν.

This is the reading of the Laur. manuscript. Hermann and W. Dindorf have adopted τοῦ πλέονος from a scholium: though, as Seyffert observes, ὁ πλείων δαίμων is an unintelligible phrase, and the ω of λῴονος, constantly shortened in dactylic or dochmiac verse (Seidler de vers. Dochm., p. 100) might equally

well be shortened in choriambic. Dindorf gives *ἀντί*, which is condemned by its position; but most other editors have adopted Hermann's *αἰνεῖν*. The point which remains obscure is the government of the genitive *δαίμονος*. The explanation which makes it depend on the notion of comparison or preference involved in *αἰνεῖν* is an example of the tortures to which the language is sometimes put on the strength of its reputation for elasticity. The fault is probably to be sought in *φρονῆσαι*. Can this be an old corruption of *κυρῆσαι*?

1149, 50]. *φυγᾷ μ' οὐκέτ' ἀπ' αὐλίων*
πελᾶτ'·

These words occur where Philoctetes, desperate at the loss of his bow, cries to the wild creatures on whom he has preyed—*πταναὶ θῆραι χαροπῶν τ' ἔθνη θηρῶν*—that they have nothing more to fear from him,—that the time for their revenge has come. The reading of the Laur. ms. has been rendered in two ways: (1) 'No longer will ye draw me after you in your flight.' There is no other example of the future *πελῶ* used transitively. Nor does it appear why a man who has been crippled for years should exclaim that he can 'no longer' enjoy the chase. (2) 'No longer will ye approach me from your hiding-places, only to fly:' the dative *φυγᾷ* denoting a circumstance, or rather an immediate consequence, of the approach, (*ita ut me fugiatis*). This use of the dative seems quite impossible, and is not supported by quoting *O. T.* 51, *ἀλλ' ἀσφαλείᾳ τήνδ' ἀνόρθωσον πόλιν*. Again *πελάζειν τινά* (Eur. *Andr.* 1167), instead of *πελάζειν τινί*, is extremely rare.

Seyffert proposes

φυγεῖν μ' οὐκέτ' ἀπ' αὐλίων
πελᾶτ'·

i. e. οὐκέτι πελᾶτε ἀπ' αὐλίων, ὥστε φυγεῖν με: ut me fugiatis, non iam de cubilibus vestris appropinquabitis. He compares *Il.* XIII. 515, *τρέσσαι δ' οὐκέτι ῥίμφα πόδες φέρον ἐκ πολέμοιο.* If, instead of *ἐκ πολέμοιο*, it were *εἰς πολέμον*, the cases would be more nearly parallel. As it is, I believe that such an ex-

pression as *φυγεῖν πελᾶτε*, 'ye will draw near in order to run away,' is absolutely unique.

I venture to propose:—

φυγᾷ μηκέτ' ἀπ' αὐλίων
πηδᾶτ'·

For *ου* and *η* interchanged in the Laur. ms. (*μηκέτι, μ' οὐκέτι*) cf. v. 1443, rejected by Dindorf as spurious, but which, as Seyffert shows, is vindicated by Dawes's restoration of *οὐ γὰρ ηὐσέβεια* from *ἡ γὰρ εὐσέβεια*. In v. 1462 Seyffert believes *ἤδη* to be a corruption of *οὐ δή*. For *ε* and *η* interchanged (*πηδᾶτε, πελᾶτε*) cf. v. 828, Laur. *εὐαής* for *εὐαές*: *Ai.* 316, *ἐξεπιστάμην* for *ἐξηπιστάμην*: *ib.* 782, *ἀπεστηρήμεθα* for *ἀπεστερήμεθα*. For *δ* and *λ* interchanged, cf. v. 1392, Laur. *ἑλεῖν* for *ἰδεῖν*: *Ai.* 241, *ἱπποπλέτην* for *ἱπποδέτην*. The verse in the strophe (v. 1127) answering to v. 1150 begins with a long syllable: *τὰν οὐδείς ποτ' ἐβάστασεν.*

1153—5] *ἀλλ' ἀνέδην ὅδε χῶρος ἐρύκεται,*
οὐκέτι φοβητὸς ὑμῖν.
ἕρπετε,—

(Dind. 1860.)

'But this place is remissly guarded, and no longer to be feared by you: come on.' As the words stand, they are plainly corrupt. For (1) *ἐρύκεται* could not mean 'is guarded,' but only, 'is detained,' or 'is kept off.' Hermann says—'diligenter hic locus arcetur, i.e. ab hoc loco arcemini:' but how, in Greek any more than in English, could 'this place is kept off' stand for 'you are kept off from this place'? (2) *ἀνέδην* obviously belongs to *ἕρπετε*. It means 'unrestrainedly'—*immissis habenis,*—with the rein loose on the neck, (*ἀνίημι*): e.g. Aesch. *Suppl.* 14, *φεύγειν ἀνέδην διὰ κῦμ' ἅλιον.* Porson proposed

ἀλλ' ἀνέδην—ὅδε χωλὸς ἐρύκεται
οὐκέτι φοβητὸς ὑμῖν—
ἕρπετε.

'Range at large: this man is detained by lameness, so as to be no longer dreadful to you.' The objection to this is that

Philoctetes had *newly* lost the power, not of walking, but of shooting. He was lame before. χωλός and ἐρύκεται have therefore little point. I would suggest:—

> ἀλλ᾽ ἀνέδην, ὁ δὲ χῶρος ἄρ᾽ οὐκέτι,
> οὐκέτι φοβητὸς ὑμῖν,
> ἕρπετε.

ἄρ᾽ οὐκέτι would easily pass into ἐρούκεται, ἐρύκεται, and the mistake would be confirmed by the apparent want of a verb for χῶρος. The whole of this κομμός is full of repetitions, like that of οὐκέτι here: v. 1095, σύ τοι, σύ τοι κατηξίωσας: 1102, ὦ τλάμων, τλάμων ἄρ᾽ ἐγώ: 1116, πότμος, πότμος σε δαιμόνων: 1128, ὦ τόξον φίλον, ὦ φίλων κ.τ.λ.: 1165, ἀλλὰ γνῶθ᾽, εὖ γνῶθ᾽.

R. C. JEBB.

THE EXCAVATIONS ON THE PALATINE HILL.

THE Orti Farnesiani which occupy nearly the whole of the north-western part of the Palatine Hill were sold in 1861 by the King of Naples to the French Emperor, who immediately commissioned Cavaliere Pietro Rosa, the well-known Roman archæologist, to commence a series of excavations in order to ascertain, first, the original configuration of the hill and the situation of the various sites connected with regal and republican Roman history, and secondly, to trace as far as possible the plan and limits of the north-western part of the Cæsarean palace and the adjoining buildings. Cav. Rosa's conclusions on the former of these two points were stated and discussed in a previous article in this Journal[1]. I now propose to give an account of the extent to which the second object has been realized, and to describe the state of the excavations up to the present time[2]. In the eight years which have elapsed since their commencement, these works have been so skilfully and successfully conducted, that we can now form a tolerably correct idea of the various parts of the north-western wing of the imperial mansion, and their relative position as they stood during the times of the later Empire.

The buildings occupying the space in question divide themselves into three groups. The first of these, standing upon the central portion of the hill, contains a magnificent series of courts and chambers arranged somewhat on the plan of

[1] Vol. I. p. 146.

[2] The substance of the present article is derived from two papers in the *Annali dell' Instituto* for 1862 and 1865, from actual visits to the ruins in the winter vacations of 1866 and 1869 and from conversations held on the spot with the learned and ingenious conductor of the excavations, of whose kindness and affability I shall always have the most grateful recollection.

an ordinary Roman dwelling house on a very large scale; the second, upon the northern angle of the hill, consists of several vast systems of private apartments; and the third group, lying along the western and south-western sides of the hill, consists of two of the most venerable and ancient relics of primæval Rome.

I. The rubbish has been removed to a depth of at least twenty feet in that part of the gardens which lies to the right of the road leading to S. Bonaventura, and thus the front of the first of the above-mentioned ranges of building has been disclosed. All traces of the outer gate of the palace have disappeared, but it must have stood close to the substructions marked on the plan as belonging to the temple of Juppiter Stator[1]. After passing the site of this gate a large area is entered, along the south side of which stand the remains of foundations supporting a portico and three projecting balconies (*a.a.a*).

A considerable part of this area in front of the palace has been excavated, and below its level have been found two more ancient pavements at depths of from seven to eight feet apart. The lower of these is skirted by a fragment of a wall of tufa blocks (opus quadratum) (*b*) apparently of the regal period of Rome, which may be taken to stand upon the most ancient level of the ground in this quarter of the hill. The upper level lies seven or eight feet above it, and may perhaps have been laid down during the Augustan or Neronian Epoch.

It seems evident that the above-mentioned open area served as the approach to the palace on this side, and that the projecting balconies were constructed for the purpose of overlooking this space, and enabling the emperor or the officers of the imperial household to present themselves to a crowd standing below.

Corresponding to these three balconies and extending behind them we find a portico, and the remains of three separate buildings. Of these the central one consists of a

[1] See Ovid, *Trist.* III. 1, 31.

Inde petens dextram (from the Via S. Bonaventura) porta est ait ista Palati.
Hic Stator, hoc primum condita Roma loco est.

For further proof that this was the temple of Juppiter Stator, see Liv. I. 41. Plut. *Cic.* 16. Ovid, *Fast.* VI. 793. Schwegler, *R. G.* I. p. 463.

spacious chamber (*c. c. c*), surrounded with deep niches for statues, and has at the further end a semicircular tribune. It presents all the appearance of an audience-chamber or throne-room, and was decorated, as may be seen by the fragments still remaining, with the most gorgeous marbles.

The right hand balcony stands in front of a building arranged as a *Basilica* or court of justice (*d. d. d*), in which the raised semicircular tribunal for the judges, railed off by marble cancelli, and the usual rows of columns along each side can be plainly traced. Behind the left hand balcony is a room (*e. e. e*) of smaller dimensions than the basilica. From its position and size and from the offices attached to it, this room has been supposed with reason to have been used as the *Chapel of the Lares* in which the emperor sacrificed and consulted the Gods before entering upon any important duties in the adjoining apartments[1]. Under some of the later emperors the lararium was a place of great importance in the palace. Statues not only of the Lares, but also of a select number of other deities and great men were placed in it. Thus Alexander Severus had the image of Christ, together with those of Apollonius, Orpheus, and Alexander the Great in his principal lararium, and in the second lararium those of Virgil and Cicero[2].

The large hall between this lararium and the basilica is called by Cav. Rosa the *tablinum,* because he thinks that it occupies the position of the tablinum in the arrangement of an ordinary Roman house[3]. The public entrance to it was not however as usual in front, but from a court at the right hand side (*F*) which was entered from the area already described. It is probable that while the public had free access to the area in front of the balconies, only those who had business with the Emperor or his private friends were admitted to the inner court (*f*). It may have been here that Aulus Gellius describes himself as waiting and chatting with his literary friends.

[1] The lararium is in this position in the house of the painted columns at Pompeii. See Becker's *Gallus* II. s. 229.

[2] *Hist. Aug.* Lamprid. *vit. Alex. Sev.* c. 29, 31.

[3] Vitruv. VI. 3. 5. Festus, p. 356, 357. Müller. It is not quite correct to call this room the tablinum. The first court in a Roman house was most frequently called the atrium. See Becker's *Gallus,* Theil II. s. 172.

"Forte in Area Palatina cum salutationem Cæsaris opperiremur philosophus Favorinus accessit conlocutusque est nobis multisque aliis præsentibus[1]."

At the back of the rooms already described and connected with the so called tablinum by two wide entrances, we find the ruins of a magnificent cloistered court, resembling the *peristylium* of a Roman dwelling house (*g*). Unfortunately a great part, marked on the plan by the dark shading, of this court lies outside the limits of the French property and therefore cannot be explored, but enough of it has been laid bare to shew that in extent and grandeur it was proportioned to the surrounding rooms[2]. The traces of the cloister surrounding it are clearly marked, and many fragments of the columns which were all of Carian or Porta Santa marble have been discovered in situ. Some parts of the richly inlaid marble floor and of the bases of the columns in costly Numidian marble and giallo antico have also been found still remaining, but the greater part of the valuable marbles were removed from these ruins when they were first excavated in 1720[3]. Bianchini who in 1738 wrote an account of the discoveries then made represents the amount of exquisitely carved stone lavished on this part of the palace as beyond belief. Two colossal statues of basalt were found here, a Dionysus supported by a Satyr, and a young Hercules both of which are now in the museum at Naples[4].

To the right and left of this spacious peristylium are the ruins of several rooms, probably serving as exedræ for private interviews or for discussion in severe weather, when the cloisters were too cold or damp, or as picture galleries[5] (*g. g. g*).

From the side opposite to the room which we have called the tablinum, an open pillared corridor led to the *Triclinium* or banquet Hall (*h. h. h*). This has the form and arrangements

[1] Gell. *N. A.* xx. 1, 2.

[2] When it becomes possible to excavate under the Villa Mills which occupies the centre of the hill and is now a Nunnery, important results may be expected which will possibly to some extent modify the views here expressed.

[3] See the splendid engravings in Piranesi of carved work in marble found here. Piranesi, *de Rom. magn.* tab. xiv. xv. xix.

[4] Bianchini, Verona, 1738, p. 48 sq. quoted by Reber, *Ruinen Roms.* p. 382.

[5] Vitruv. vi. 5. 2, v. 11. Schneider.

described by Vitruvius[1] as suited for state dining rooms. He says that such rooms should face the north for coolness, that they should contain space for two ranges of tables, and should have wide windows on each side so situated that the guests while at table can see through them into the flower gardens (viridaria) outside. Accordingly we here find a space sufficient not only for two long tables, but also for a semicircular high table at the southern end which is terminated by an apse, and ornamented with a splendid porphyry pavement. At the sides, in accordance with the description of Vitruvius are the viridaria, or nymphæa (*i. i. i*). Each of these consists of a central marble structure, in the shape of an ellipse and with two or three ledges planted with flowers and shrubs and ornamented with statuettes. Round these ran a channel of the purest polished white marble filled with water which gushed from various points in the central structure. At the side of the western nymphæum was a room apparently serving as an entrance hall with large doors, and leading to the back of the temple of Juppiter Victor. A curious nook is to be observed behind the apse of the triclinium (*k*). This was possibly intended for those gourmands who indulged in the disgusting practice alluded to by Cicero in a wellknown passage of the second Philippic. Ab hora tertia bibebatur, ludebatur, vomebatur[2]!

Along each of the principal sides of this grand series of apartments, ran an open portico serving the same purpose as the fauces in a Roman mansion, for the passage of slaves and attendants from the front rooms to the back without going through the central parts of the house (*l. l. l*).

Proceeding still further southwards towards the edge of the hill which overlooks the Circus Maximus, we find at the back of the triclinium the ruins of a portico (*m*) built over some large chambers of an earlier period deeply buried beneath the present level. Just beyond these and evidently connected with the suite of rooms we have been describing are the traces of two buildings (*n. n*), from the shape and arrangement of which Cav. Rosa has conjectured that they served the purpose of a

[1] Vitruv. VI. 3. § 10. Schneider.

[2] Cic. *Phil.* II. 41. 104. For a detailed account of the public dinners given by the Roman Emperors see Friedländer's *Sittengeschichte Roms.* II. b.

library and a *recitation or lecture room.* In the southern of these we find remains of semicircular ranges of seats and of a stage or platform. It is possible that here the discussions and recitations mentioned by Pliny may have taken place. Pliny says in one of his letters, alluding apparently to the imperial palace, that during the whole month of April hardly a day had passed without the recitation of a poem, and that he had seldom omitted to attend[1].

It is plain from the above description that these various rooms formed a distinct and systematically arranged suite, and it seems most probable that they were all planned and built at the same time and for the same purpose. Positive evidence as to their date and intended use is not obtainable. It has however been generally agreed by archæologists, following the opinion originally expressed by Bianchini, that they were built by the Flavian emperors as reception rooms for various state occasions and for the levees and imperial banquets which the popular policy of Vespasian and Titus required. Although the arrangement of the rooms is generally that of a Roman dwelling-house on a large scale, yet there is apparently no provision for domestic life, and all the parts of the building seem to have been public, audience, or banqueting rooms, or their adjuncts. The surrounding portico also gives the character of a public building to the exterior. Cav. Rosa adds to these arguments for supposing that we have here a suite of public reception rooms, the fact that the style of brickwork and the stamps impressed upon the bricks point to the reign of Domitian as the time when the building was finished[2].

If this conjecture be well founded we have in these ruins the remains of the great banqueting hall, described in such glowing colours by Statius in his account of the imperial dinner-party at which he was a guest:

> Æmulus illic
> Mons Libys Iliacusque nitent, et multa Syene,
> Et Chios, et glauca certantia Doride saxa,
> Lunaque portandis tantum suffecta columnis.
>
> STAT. *Sylv.* IV. 2.

[1] Plin. *Ep.* I. 13.

[2] *Annali dell' Instituto*, vol. XXXVII. p. 356.

An interesting illustration of this passage of Statius is to be found in the Museum attached to the excavations. Upwards of a hundred marble slabs of the most varied and beautiful colours and shades, all of which were collected in the ruins are there to be seen arranged and polished. In the same Museum a few exquisitely designed patterns in coloured stones polished and set in frames which served as wall decorations have been carefully restored, and shew what costly magnificence and artistic taste the imperial apartments displayed. Some notion of the lavish expenditure of marble ornament bestowed on this palace of Domitian may perhaps be gained from the marbles in the church of S. Paolo fuori le mura at Rome, or in the chapel of the Certosa at Pavia, or in that of the convent of S. Martin at Naples.

From the following epigram of Martial we learn that Rabirius, the architect usually employed by Domitian, was the designer of the new buildings erected by that emperor[1], and that there was previously no banqueting hall on the Palatine.

Qui Palatinæ caperet convivia mensæ
Ambrosiasque dapes, non erat ante locus.
Hic haurire decet sacrum, Germanice, nectar
Et Ganymedeâ pocula mixta manu.
Esse velis, oro, serus conviva Tonantis
At tu si properas, Juppiter, ipse veni.

MARTIAL, VIII. 39.

The magnificence of the decorations lavished by Domitian on the palace is spoken of by Plutarch, who applies to the emperor the saying of Epicharmus: *Οὐκ εὐσεβὴς οὐδὲ φιλότιμος τύ γ' ἐσσί, ἔχεις νόσον, χαίρεις κατοικοδομῶν, ὥσπερ ὁ Μίδας ἐκεῖνος ἅπαντά σοι χρυσᾶ καὶ λίθινα βουλόμενος γενέσθαι*[2].

One of the rooms was called the hall of Adonis, and decorated with shells filled with earth containing flowers planted in the earth (*κῆποι Ἀδωνίδος*)[3]. The corridors and passages where Domitian was in the habit of walking were veneered with slabs of polished Cappadocian stone (lapis phengitis) which

[1] Martial, VII. 56, VIII. 36.
[2] Plutarch, *Publicola* 15. See also Statius, *Silv.* III. 4. 47.
[3] Philostratus, *Vit. Apollon. Tyan.* VII. 32.

answered the purpose of mirrors and enabled him to see any one approaching him from behind. This precaution was taken at the end of his life when his dread of assassination grew into a horrible monomania[1].

It may be objected that if this part of the palace had been built by Domitian his name would have been attached to it in the same way in which other quarters of the palace were named after the emperors who built them, as the Domus Tiberiana and Domus Commodiana[2]. A reason for the absence of any distinctive name may be found in the wish shewn by the Flavian emperors to re-establish a paternal government, in which the emperor should be once more, as in the Augustan age, the father of his country, and should live in constant intercourse with his fellow citizens. This policy, though interrupted by Domitian's reign, was taken up and carried out by Nerva and Trajan.

We find Pliny addressing Trajan in the following strain: "Your father, Nerva, shewed himself to be a man of true imperial spirit when he inscribed upon the palace, which had previously been the citadel of a despot, the name, Ædes Publicæ. Yet there would have been no advantage in doing this, had he not adopted one who could live there in public. What forum or temple is now so accessible as the palace? Even the capitol itself is not more public and open to every person of whatever rank[3]." The name, Ædes Publicæ, here mentioned as inscribed over the door of the palace by Trajan, may afterwards have been altered by less patriotic emperors into the designations we find in Lampridius as existing in the time of Commodus, Ædes Imperatoriæ, and Ædes Aulicæ[4].

If the supposition above stated be correct that this was the part of the palace most frequented in the time of the middle empire, it is probable that the names of *Sicilia* and *Jovis cœnatio*, found in the Augustan history, belonged to some one of these rooms[5].

[1] Sueton. *Domit.* 14. Plin. *Nat. Hist.* xxxvi. 22.

[2] Suet. *Vit.* 15. Tac. *Hist.* i. 27. Lamprid. *Comm.* 12. A Domus Augustana is also mentioned in the *Curiosum Urbis Reg.* x.

[3] Plin. *Panegyr.* 47.

[4] Lamprid. *Heliogabalus* 3. 8.

[5] Jul. Capit. *Pertinax.* cap. ii.

II. Passing now to the second group of ruins, which occupies the greater part of the northern and north-western side of the Farnesiani Gardens, we find upon the slope of the hill overlooking the forum, and especially at the northern corner near the church of S. Maria Liberatrice, an enormous mass of brick-work chambers. These seem to belong to four separate systems, as will be seen by a glance at the plan (*o. p. q. r*), and it is not improbable that the palace was here raised upon the lower walls of four separate houses by which the space had been previously occupied, until Caligula extended his additions to the palace as far as the forum and the temple of Castor[1]. We know that the houses of Clodius and Cicero stood upon this side of the Palatine[2]. The house of Catulus adjoined that of Cicero[3], and probably other large mansions of the Roman nobility occupied the south side of the street which ran along this part of the hill. Either Nero or Caligula probably gained possession of these and built upon their sites, retaining the lower rooms as cellars or slaves' apartments. The latter emperor, in his insane conceit, converted the temple of Castor and Pollux into a vestibule to this part of the palace, and used often to stand between the statues of the twin gods to receive the worship of those who visited the temple[4].

The excavations have not brought to light anything worthy of special remark in these tangled masses of ruins which skirt the northern side of the hill. They seem to consist mainly of the lower rooms and substructions formed by the ground floors of ancient Roman mansions upon which Caligula's palace stood. The upper part of the palace has been demolished and its ruins got rid of by breaking holes in the vaulted roofs of these chambers and filling them with the rubbish from above.

At the northern corner an interesting discovery has been made. A lofty ancient gateway (*s*) the arch of which is still perfect, has there been cleared from rubbish, and under it a street, paved with the usual basaltic slabs, leads through the ruins towards the temple of Juppiter Stator. This street was

[1] Suet. *Calig.* 22.

[2] Cic. *ad Att.* II. 24. *Har. Resp.* XV. 43. § 33.

[3] Val. Max. VI. 3. 1. Cic. *pro Dom.*

[4] Suet. *Calig.* 22.

probably bridged over by lofty arches for a considerable distance, as it still is at the lower end, in the way in which the streets which passed through Nero's Aurea Domus were bridged. Over these archways the new palace of Caligula communicated with the older palace, and his extensions probably lay principally to the north of this street.

Cav. Rosa calls the gateway here discovered the Porta Romanula and the sloping street the clivus Victoriæ, both mentioned by Festus and Varro as situated on this part of the Palatine[1]. It is, however, not impossible that we may here have the Via Nova, which certainly ran round this corner of the hill[2]. Several suites of rooms have been cleared in the neighbourhood of this gateway (*t. t. t*). They apparently belonged to the extensions made by Caligula, and, being easily accessible from the gate by a private staircase, may have served the infamous purpose to which that disgusting monster appropriated a part of his palace[3]. The paintings now found in some of the rooms render such a supposition not improbable. Enormous parallel or slightly diverging walls of brickwork still stand at this corner near the gateway. They were no doubt built in connection with the great viaduct which Caligula here threw over the valley between the Capitoline and Palatine hills, in order to make himself the contubernalis of the Capitoline Juppiter. Few ruins even in Rome convey a more striking idea of the vast solidity which characterises the buildings of the early emperors than these lofty piers of masonry which jut out from the northern corner of the Palatine.

To the long corridors and porticoes of this part of the building may perhaps be referred the famous passage of Suetonius, in which he describes Caligula as pacing the vast halls and passages of the palace during his sleepless nights, crying and praying aloud for the return of daylight[4].

In the space called the *jardins supérieurs*, which lies between the western side of the hill and the range of buildings first described as the Ædes Publicæ, we can trace the outlines of

[1] Festus, p. 262, ed. Müller.

[2] Varro, *L. L.* v. § 164, vi. § 24, ed. Müller.

[3] See Suet. *Calig.* 41.

[4] Suet. *Calig.* 50.

several large courts (*v. v. v*). These were connected with the Ædes Publicæ by a subterranean gallery, lately discovered by Cav. Rosa (*x. x. x*), which enabled the emperor to pass from his private apartments in this quarter to the public reception rooms without encountering the danger and annoyance of passing through the crowd of loungers in the Area Palatina. The principal gate of this quarter of the palace was at the point marked *y* in the plan[1], and the range of small rooms (*z. z. z*), which extend in a westerly direction across the hill from this gate, was probably for the use of the cohort of prætorian guards on duty at the palace. A number of curious inscriptions and scribblings are still visible upon the plastered walls of these rooms, representing ships, combats of gladiators, soldiers in armour, Roman standards and eagles, and a variety of proper names both Greek and Latin.

A great part if not the whole of that division of the palace, to which these rooms form the back, was known by the name of the *Domus Tiberiana*. Several passages of the Roman historians lead us to this conclusion. Suetonius tells us that Vitellius surveyed the engagement at the capitol between his troops and the Flavian party under Sabinus, when the temple of Juppiter was burnt, from the Domus Tiberiana, which must therefore have stood on the west side of the hill towards the Capitol[2]. Tacitus and Plutarch describe Otho as having passed on the day when he was proclaimed emperor from the temple of Apollo, where Galba was sacrificing, through the Domus Tiberiana to the Velabrum, and thence to the milliarium aureum in the forum[3]. He must have descended into the Velabrum by the stairs at the western corner of the hill after leaving the palace by the gate just described. During the reign of Augustus, Tiberius had lived first in Pompey's house in the Carinæ and afterwards in the house of Mæcenas on the Esquiline[4]. His father, Claudius Nero, had a house on the Palatine, which Tiberius may have converted

[1] I have not noticed the piscina lately uncovered here, because it does not seem to me to be of the same date as the neighbouring ruins but to belong to a much later time.

[2] Suet. *Vit.* 15.

[3] Tac. *Hist.* 1. 27. Plut. *Galb.* 24.

[4] Suet. *Tib.* 5. 15.

into the imperial residence after he became sole emperor. In the Antonine age the Domus Tiberiana was the favourite residence of Antoninus Pius and Marcus Aurelius[1], and it was possibly during their reigns that the library, which we find mentioned in the Augustan history, was established there[2].

III. The remaining part of the north-western end of the Palatine, which overlooks the Circus Maximus, was not, as has been made clear by the late excavations, occupied by any portion of the imperial palace. The temples and other buildings which stood there were so highly venerated, as the incunabula of the Roman nation, that even a Nero or a Domitian in their wholesale evictions did not venture to displace them. Two considerable ruins among others have been here discovered. The first stands close to the Nymphæum before described, and consists of several massive platforms of tufa blocks (opus quadratum), indicating a date not later than the fifth century of the city, and probably much earlier. The front of the building, as can be seen from the steps leading up to it, was turned towards the south, and overlooked the Circus Maximus and the Aventine. The plan is evidently that of a temple raised upon a basement with high flights of steps alternating with terraces. These terraces probably extended to some depth down the side of the hill towards the Circus Maximus, just as we find in the case of the ancient Latin temples of Hercules Victor at Tivoli and of Castor and Pollux at Tusculum that the approach was formed by high flights of steps alternating with terraces and gradually ascending the side of the hill on which the temple stood[3]. Cav. Rosa has conjectured that this ruin is the remains of the temple of Juppiter Victor, vowed by Q. Fabius Rullianus in the first Samnite war, B.C. 295, and mentioned by Ovid as having been first dedicated on the Ides of April[4]. That the temple of Juppiter Victor was upon the Palatine is certain, from the catalogue of places in the tenth Region as given in the Notitia[5].

[1] Jul. Cap. *Ant. Pius* 10. *Ant. Phil.* 6. *Verus* 2.

[2] Flav. Vopisc. *Probus* 2. *Gellius* XIII. 20.

[3] *Annali dell' Inst.* 1865, p. 363.

[4] Liv. X. 29. Ov. *Fast.* IV. 621.

[5] See Preller, *Regionen*, p. 186.

The same authority names it in conjunction with the Area Palatina, which, as we have seen, was probably close to the ruin in question. A temple of such antiquity would most probably be preserved intact in its original form, which later restorers would not venture to alter, and its venerated precincts would be carefully respected by Augustus and the Flavian emperors in accordance with their policy of reviving the old national patriotic spirit of Rome. We find therefore that the line of the palace walls is made to conform to the basement of the temple, and not suffered to encroach upon the consecrated limits. The reverence with which it was regarded even in later times may be inferred from the special mention made of all omens and portents which occurred there[1].

The other remarkable ruin in this part of the hill, which has been carefully investigated by Cavaliere Rosa, consists of a high rectangular terrace, approached by a broad flight of steps. At the back of this terrace is a still higher terrace, from which a projection in the form of an ambo or pulpit stands out. The building is situated upon the western corner of the hill looking towards the Aventine, and commanding a wide prospect over the Tiber valley. It faces nearly due south. Close to it must have stood the Tugurium Faustuli and the Scalæ Caci, and others of the most venerated sites of ancient Rome[2]. From the neighbourhood of this peculiar ruin to these ancient sites, and also from its peculiar shape and orientation, it has been conjectured that this is the building called Auguratorium in the Catalogues of the Notitia and Curiosum Urbis. The story of the vultures seen by Romulus would naturally attach itself to some spot in this part of the hill with which the other legends of early Rome were associated. Liv. I. 6: Quoniam gemini essent, nec ætatis verecundia discrimen facere posset: ut Di, quorum tutelæ ea loca essent, auguriis legerent, qui nomen novæ urbi daret, qui conditam imperio regeret, Palatium Romulus, Remus Aventinum ad inaugurandum templa capiunt.

Uncertain as some of the above names assigned to various parts of the palace which have been disclosed by the excavations

[1] Dion Cassius, XLVII. 40, LX. 35. [2] Selin. I. 18, p. 9, ed. Mommsen.

must be considered, yet there can be no doubt that the general conclusions rest on tolerably good evidence, and that we can now form a fair notion of the ground-plan of the north-western part of the Cæsarean palace, as it stood after the time of Domitian, and also of the position of some of the most venerable sites of the Palatine hill.

There may be few students who take a sufficiently vivid interest in the history of the middle Roman Empire, to consider the topographical details relating to the Ædes Publicæ worth much attention. But the determination of the sites of the Domus Caligulæ and of the Domus Tiberiana will not be without interest to the readers of Tacitus and Suetonius; the poems of Statius aud Martial will receive considerable illustration from the discovery of the Flavian suite of reception rooms, and if any one now reads the Augustan history, he will be assisted in realising the localities described in many of the profligate and bloody scenes there narrated.

R. BURN.

ON A PASSAGE IN PLATO, REPUBLIC, B. VI.

THE well-known passage at the end of the sixth book of Plato's Republic, where the universe is compared to a quadripartite line, has much occupied the attention of commentators. Still its precise meaning remains in some respects obscure: and therefore I have ventured to offer the following remarks, with a view less to solve the difficulties of the passage, than to define them more clearly than has yet been done.

For convenience' sake, I prefix a translation of the sentences which I mean to discuss, italicizing a few words to which I wish to call special attention.

"You know that the students of geometry, arithmetic, "and the like, *suppose* the odd, and the even, and figures, and "those kinds of angles, and other things of the kind, according "to the study: then, as though they knew about these, having "taken them as *suppositions*, they do not think proper to give "to themselves or to others any further account of them, as "being obvious to everybody: but starting with these they go "through the remaining steps, and come at last with general "assent to whatever they may have proposed to investigate.

"Certainly, he said, of this I am aware.

"Then you know too that they call to their aid visible "forms and talk about them, though it is not of them they "think but of their originals, as what they say is said with a "view to the absolute square, diagonal, &c. not to that they "draw: for while they use as images the actual things which "they *mould and draw* (which again have their shadows and "images in water) they are trying to see those absolute things "which one cannot see otherwise than by the intellect.

"True, said he.

"It was this class of things then that I called intelligible, "adding however that the soul was forced to employ supposi-

"tions in investigating it, without getting to a first principle, "as it is unable to mount above its suppositions: *while it uses* "*as copies the things which are themselves copied by the things* "*below them* [in the scale], *as even they, in comparison with* "*those others, have been esteemed distinct and* {*divided* / ranked *accord-* "*ingly.*

"I understand, he said: you mean the subject-matter of "geometry and kindred arts.

"Well then, understand that by the other division of the "intelligible I mean that which Thought itself apprehends "through the power of Discourse, taking its suppositions not "as first principles, but as really suppositions, a sort of steps "and starting-points, that it may *get out of the region of sup-* "*positions,* and reach the first principle of the whole: and hav- "ing grasped it, may then, laying hold of what depends on it, "descend again to a conclusion, aiding itself with no sensible "object at all, but using only ideas in its processes and results, "and concluding with ideas."

Notes.

1. *ὑπόθεσις, τὸ ἀνυπόθετον.*

In considering the general meaning of the passage I shall have to define more precisely the signification of these terms: but it may be as well here to notice a rendering which has been lately introduced by writers of some authority. Zeller and Mansel (*Philosophy of the Conditioned*) both translate *τὸ ἀνυπόθετον* "the unconditioned," and the latter actually goes so far as to claim Plato's authority for the modern philosophic term. Neither of these writers however translate *ὑποθέσις* in a corresponding way: which Müller does, rendering it "Bedingungs-Satz."

Now the meaning of *ὑπόθεσις*, in every passage of Plato in which it occurs (except three or four, where, with a cognate meaning it denotes a practical principle) is, as the compiler of the "Οροι gives it, *ἀρχὴ ἀναπόδεικτος*, [at the same time needing

ἀπόδειξις.] Every hypothesis is, in relation to what depends on it a condition, Bedingungs-Satz. But the name principally denotes, in Greek as in English, not the relation of the notion or judgment "supposed" to other notions or jugdments, but its origin and manner of acceptance by the mind. It is assumed, not proved: and therefore is or ought to be provisionally not absolutely accepted. Accordingly τὸ ἀνυπόθετον can only denote notions or principles of which the apprehension is complete and the acceptance absolute. If it is in this sense that it is rendered "unconditioned" I have no objection, except that it is difficult to strip the word of modern associations, dangerously misleading in Platonic exegesis.

2. πλάττουσι καὶ γράφουσι: "soit en relief, soit en dessin" as Cousin gives it. But we do not elsewhere hear of geometricians using figures 'en relief.' No doubt they might use them: but Plato has probably slipped them in here to make his analogy run better on all fours. Diagrams drawn or graven are not easily made to throw shadows; which figures in relief, of course, do throw.

3. καὶ ἐκείνοις, &c.: *i. e.* the material things whose figure copies the ideal figures, while they are themselves copied by shadows and reflections: being more distinct than these (though imperfect copies of the ideal figures) they are ranked above them.

This is so obviously the right interpretation, that I should not have drawn attention to it, but for the fact that no one seems to have hit on it before Schneider, that Stallbaum with Schneider's translation before him deliberately rejects it, and that other translations that have appeared since Schneider have not adopted it. The latter takes the old reading τετμημένοις, "placed in a separate division:" which makes good enough sense but seems less natural than τετιμημένοις.

There is some difficulty in the words καὶ ἐκείνοις πρὸς ἔκεινα. The demonstrative force is to be understood, I think, as implying that we (as the geometer) have the ideal figures first in view. They are "these" to us: to their material embodiments we turn as "those:" the shadows, &c. (further off still) are "those others;" a distinction which in the Greek is

left to gesture or intonation. But is *καὶ* "even" or "and"? "and" is more natural; but then I cannot read *ἐκείνοις* so that it does not seem superfluous.

I will now try to define the characteristics which distinguish the two mental processes here contrasted, and their objects.

It is easier to begin with the processes. The characteristics of the inferior process (of which geometry and arithmetic are instances) are two.

1. It starts from hypotheses.

2. It cannot dispense with sensible representations of its objects.

But are these two characteristics equally essential and necessarily connected? On the one hand, the way in which Plato mentions them side by side would lead us to suppose such a connexion though it is not expressly asserted. And he has been so understood (and "hypotheses" explained accordingly) by many of his interpreters[1].

On the other hand, not only is the second characteristic absent from Arithmetic as practised by us, but it is hard to conceive that even in Plato's time Addition, &c. could not be ordinarily performed without reference to a particular example. It is true that he tells us (*Phileb.* 56 D) that in "the Arithmetic of the multitude" the units are unequal (oxen, men, &c.), while the Arithmetic whose units are equal he confines to "philosophers." Still even this—which has since become a possession of the vulgar—would not be a branch of Dialectic, but still an exercise of *διάνοια*: the arithmetician would still start from hypotheses which he never rose above. In fact it is

[1] Some of these are vague: Mr Grote, who is never vague, boldly identifies the *ὑποθέσεις* with the *εἰκόνες*. Cf. c. XXXIII. p. 61, 62. "He [the geometer] is forced to *assume the visible figure* as the point of departure and cannot ascend above it;" accordingly Mr Grote thinks that "the second portion of the conceivable or intelligible region will be.....*particular images or embodiments* of the Ideas of Conception or Intellect." Whereas these, as I understand Plato, would belong to the first portion of the visible.

obviously this arithmetic (not ἡ τῶν πολλῶν) which he recommends afterwards in B. VII. as a part of the propædeutic of Dialectic.

I think then that we must keep the two characteristics distinct, and that there is even some confusion or carelessness of thought in Plato's statement as applied to Arithmetic.

The second characteristic requires no further illustration. The imperfect squares &c. of any diagram, and the unequal units of applied arithmetic obviously and adequately exemplify it. But with regard to the first it may be asked, what precisely are these hypotheses? what is it that the inferior method supposes? Plato says "the odd, even, &c." But is it the existence of objects corresponding to these terms, or the definitions of these notions that we suppose[1]?

Aristotle (*Post. Anal.* I. cx.) says that both existence and definition (τί μὲν οὖν σημαίνει...ὅτι δ' ἔστι.....) are *assumed* (λαμβάνεται) in the case of elementary notions (τὰ πρῶτα): but that the definition, which is admitted when its terms are understood, cannot be called "supposition" (ὑπόθεσις)—εἰ μὴ καὶ τὸ ἀκούειν ὑπόθεσίν τις φήσειεν εἶναι, he adds rather impatiently.

I am inclined to think that Plato hardly made the distinction: and that when he says that geometers *suppose* "the odd, even, figures &c." he means that they suppose both the existence of objects corresponding to these terms, and the truth of their definitions. These suppositions a mathematician does not make provisionally or tentatively, but definitively: he cannot, keeping within the limits of his own study, examine them. The case of Dialectic is different: here hypotheses are only made provisionally with the view of substituting for them more certain knowledge afterwards.

Inquiring further how these hypotheses are used in Dialectic, we observe first that Dialectic here seems to combine two methods which Plato elsewhere gives separately: the method of Hypotheses, and the method of Definition and Division. The latter method is discussed and exemplified in the Phædrus, Philebus, Sophistes and Politicus. It seems there regarded (under the name of dialectic) as a universal method, applied to

[1] The phrase in B. VII.—ᾧ ἀρχὴ μὲν ὃ μὴ οἶδε—does not help us.

any subject-matter, rather than an architectonic science, such as our present passage seems to indicate. Whereas the method of Hypotheses is almost confined to strictly ontological enquiry, and where it is especially enforced and exemplified, as in Parmenides and Phædo, the term Dialectic is not used.

Again in the Republic the signification of Dialectic implies the Ideal Theory in its final form. Whereas in Phædrus, Sophistes and Politicus, as Mr Grote has observed, there seems no such complete separation between the sensible and intelligible worlds: the εἴδη are contemplated as immanent, not χωριστά. In Philebus, indeed the metaphysics (which appear quite separately from the account of dialectic) are with difficulty harmonized with the conceptual ontology (cf. infr.).

It would seem that Plato in preceding dialogues had been working out two separate lines of speculation—an eclectic examination of the older ontologies, and a development and extension of the Socratic induction—which meet and blend in the Dialectic of the Republic.

However this may be, it is easy to understand how hypotheses were introduced to complete the first part of the dialectical process—Definition: to ensure the right apprehension of the general notion, which the Socratic induction was felt to obtain in too random a way, from surveying casual examples. But there is some difficulty in precisely understanding the way they are to be used in the dialectic here described. Equating the two parts of this process to definition and division, we might have conceived that the summum genus here (the Ens Realissimum of the conceptual ontology) was to be investigated as Plato elsewhere investigates general notions, by starting hypothetical definitions one after another and examining their consequences. In this way we should arrive μεχρὶ τοῦ ἀνυποθέτου when after going through many hypotheses we convince ourselves that we have come at last to the true account of the notion and have perfectly apprehended it. But thus we should not conceive the ascent up to the summum genus and descent from it as similar: rather the former would be made by tentative leaps, the latter by gradual steps. Here however Plato seems to consider both as gradual. Perhaps he thought that the

absolutely highest genus could not be apprehended by means of directly tentative hypotheses: that we must rather start hypotheses about less comprehensive notions, examine the consequences of these and so get at last a hypothesis suiting the facts, then proceed to a more comprehensive principle, and so on till we get to an *ἀρχὴ* which we somehow accept as certain, and from which we can draw by deduction final certainty as to the less comprehensive principles. This process, it will be seen, resembles neither the method of Definition as illustrated in the Philebus, &c., nor the method of hypotheses as illustrated in the Parmenides, where the interlocutors begin at once to discuss the highest principles of ontology. It does however seem to correspond to the process indicated in *Phædo*, c. XLIX: only there Plato's ontology is obviously in a different phase, as *τὸ ἀγαθὸν* (here placed at the summit) is ranked indiscriminately with other *εἴδη* that Socrates supposes (*ὑποτίθεται*).

Let us now compare the objects of the two mental processes which we have been considering. The objects of Dialectic are of course *τὰ ὄντως ὄντα*, the entities corresponding to general notions.

But what are the objects of the inferior method? are they something intermediate between *τὰ ὄντως ὄντα* and *τὰ αἰσθητά*?

Apart from the actual language of the passage, everything would incline us to think so. First the symmetry of the theory requires it. We have (omitting the fourth segment as of no metaphysical importance) three processes of apprehension carefully distinguished: and corresponding to the first and third two sets of objects, material things and *εἴδη*. We naturally expect therefore a set of objects intermediate between the two corresponding to the intermediate process. Then Aristotle in a summary of Plato's metaphysical views (*Met.* I. c. 6) offers exactly what we want.

ἔτι δὲ παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ καὶ τὰ εἴδη τὰ μαθηματικὰ τῶν πραγμάτων εἶναί φησι μεταξύ, διαφέροντα τῶν μὲν αἰσθητῶν τῷ ἀΐδια καὶ ἀκίνητα εἶναι, τῶν δ' εἰδῶν τῷ τὰ μὲν πόλλ' ἄττα ὅμοια εἶναι τὸ δὲ εἶδος αὐτὸ ἓν ἕκαστον μόνον.

In the case of geometry it is not difficult to realize these intermediaries. Take for instance a square. On the one hand

we have the abstract notion of square, on the other the imperfect squares of our diagrams. Between these two we can imagine and suppose the geometer to contemplate ideal squares, numerically different and so infinite in number whereas the concept is one, but perfect and so distinguishable from the squares we draw[1].

At the same time the language of the passage in no way supports this interpolation of intermediate objects: Plato speaks of the square which the geometer contemplates as *αὐτὸ τὸ τετράγωνον*, and does not hint that it is to be distinguished from an *εἶδος*. This applies still more strongly to the discussion in B. VII.

It seems best to suppose that Aristotle alludes to a later development of the theory propounded in this passage, one that made the theory more symmetrical, but was not worked out at the time of writing this. But if we suppose this we must give up a plausible interpretation of the ontology of the Philebus. In the Philebus the Universe is analyzed into four elements *πέρας*, *ἄπειρον*, *μικτὸν*, and *αἰτία τῆς μίξεως*. Now at first sight this analysis seems to have no connexion with the Theory of Ideas. But it has been proposed to harmonize the two by equating *αἰτία τῆς μίξεως* with the dialectical object (the whole system of ideas or hypostasized concepts), *πέρας* with the mathematical object (form and number), *τὸ μικτὸν* with the sensible world, and *τὸ ἄπειρον* with that incognizable element whose presence makes the sensible world but partially cognizable. As, however, the Philebus is plainly earlier than the Republic, we should have to suppose that Plato when he wrote the Republic had clearly separated in his mind the mathematical from the dialectical object, which is just what the wording of this passage leads me to doubt.

[1] In the case of numbers a distinction between the mathematical numbers and the concepts of the different numbers is harder to realize: but that Plato gave himself some trouble to draw it out, in developing the later or Pythagoreanizing, form of the Theory of Ideas, we learn from Aristotle's polemic. (Cf. *Met.* B. XIII.)

HENRY SIDGWICK.

M. VALERII MARTIALIS EPIGRAMMATA SELECTA. With English Notes by F. A. Paley, M.A., and the late W. H. Stone, B.A. 1868 (Whittaker and Bell).

I have no special title to offer any remarks on the subject of Martial: but as in looking through my friend Mr Paley's interesting school edition of selected Epigrams, I have observed a number of places in which I am unable to agree with the interpretation given by him or his colleague, I venture to submit the questions at issue between us to the readers of this Journal.

For the sake of convenience, I follow the numeration of the ordinary editions.

Book I. 26 (27). 5.

Non haec Pelignis agitur vindemia praelis.

'This is not the common vintage squeezed in the presses of the Peligni'. Paley, and so the Delphin editor. Is there any other instance of this use of 'agitur'? If not, may it not be worth considering whether 'agitur' does not mean 'is in question', 'Pelignis praelis' being a sort of ablative of origin, constructed with 'vindemia'?

I. 55. 14.

Vivat et urbanis albus in officiis.

'*Albus*, as white as his own toga, viz., from paleness and ill-health or over fatigue. This seems to be the sense of *albus* also in Pers. I. 16'. I have always taken 'albus' in the passage of Persius as denoting no more than the spruce get up of the holiday reciter, and I think it would spoil the passage to give it any other sense. So here Martial, speaking of the blessings of a country life, imprecates a comic curse on his enemies, that they may always live in full dress.

I. 70 (71). 15.

Nec propior quam Phoebus amet doctaeque sorores.

'*Propior*, more familiar as a friend, or one nearer and dearer to Phoebus, lit. for Phoebus to love'. The Delphin editor gives a choice between this interpretation and another, connecting 'propior' with 'Phoebus'. Failing a precise parallel to the former, I should prefer the latter, taking 'propior amet' as nearly = 'propius amet', or, more strictly, 'amet ut propior amicus'.

I. 76 (77). 6.

Haec sapit, haec omnes fenerat una deos.

'*Fenerat deos*, lends money on security to the Gods, like the *feneratores* or usurers. The construction is remarkable'. So remarkable, that I cannot believe it possible. The instances which Mr Paley goes on to cite of 'fenerare' used absolutely do not help us in the least. So far as I see, 'fenerat deos' can only mean 'lends you the gods on interest'. Martial doubtless means to say, as Gronovius explains it, Minerva is the only god worth paying court to; get her, you get all the rest: and as money is in question, he expresses this by saying not that she gives you all the other gods, but that she lends you them all at so much per cent.

I. 78 (79). 2.

Inque suos voltus serperet atra lues.

'*Suos*, of which it had taken possession'. I cannot think this likely. The word must refer to Festus, who is the main subject of the sentence, though he has not yet been mentioned. There is a rival reading 'ipsos', which, from Schneidewin's apparatus criticus appears to have considerable authority.

I. 81.

Sportula, Cane, tibi suprema nocte petita est:
Occidit, puto, te, Cane, quod una fuit.

'On one Canus, who was so eager to obtain the client's *sportula* that he sent to ask for it when *in extremis*, and died of vexation for thinking it might be his last'. Surely this is not the meaning of 'una'. Canus, as the Delphin editor rightly says, wanted more shares than one, and died of vexation when

he got only one. I suppose the case mentioned by Juvenal, I. 123 foll., of a man asking for a second allowance for his absent wife, may throw some light on the matter.

III. 23.

Omnia cum retro pueris opsonia tradas,
Cur non mensa tibi ponitur a pedibus?

'*A pedibus*, for the servants in attendance on their masters. This is severe irony: for if the host would not feed the masters, still less would he feed their slaves. . . . . As the language has no article, *a pedibus* stands for *τοῖς πρὸς πόδας*'. This is certainly not the natural interpretation of the words; and I do not see why it should be the true one. The entertainer is constantly handing back dishes to the slaves behind him, to be carried away. Martial asks, would it not be simpler for him to have the table put behind the guests instead of before them, as that appears to be the destination of the dishes? It is a poor joke enough: but such as it is, it seems an obvious one. There is however another view of the epigram suggested by a parallel which Salmasius (note in Delph. and Var. edition of Martial) quotes from the Anthology (Anth. Pal. II. 11). The point of that epigram appears to be that a certain Epicrates, invited by the epigrammatist to supper, brought with him a number of actors and dancers, to whom he handed the dishes from his host's table, *πάντα διδοὺς ὀπίσω*: whereupon the Epigrammatist remarks, *εἰ δ' οὕτω τοῦτ' ἐστί, σὺ τοὺς δούλους κατάκλινον, Ἡμεῖς δ' αὐτοῦ σοὶ πρὸς πόδας ἐρχόμεθα*, meaning, I suppose that the host and other guests would like to change places with Epicrates' followers, so as to get the lion's share of the meal. Lucilius, the author of the epigram, lived in the time of Nero, so that Martial's may be an imitation intended to be taken in the same sense; though certainly no one on reading it would suppose it to be addressed to any but the giver of the entertainment. So understood, the epigram would coincide partially with Mr Paley's view, though his conception of the irony is different, and in any case there is nothing to necessitate his construction of 'a pedibus'.

III. 46. 5.

In turbam incideris, cuneos umbone repellet.

'*Umbone*, keeping up the metaphor, but meaning really *cubito*. . . . As Juvenal, III. 243, says, "ferit hic cubito", so the sharp thrust of the elbow is here compared to the boss on the shield. Similarly Stat. Theb. II. 671, "clypeum nec sustinet umbo", and perhaps Suet. Cæsar, § 68'. Whether this sense of 'umbo' can be supported, I do not feel sure: but the reading in the passage of Statius is far too uncertain to make it admissible as a parallel. Mr Paley seems to waver between two opinions, one regarding the sense of 'elbow' as a technical one, the other supposing it to exist *pro hac vice* as part of a military metaphor.

Ib. v. 6.

Invalidum est nobis ingenuumque latus.

'*Ingenuumque*: this is wittily added as if in disparagement, whereas it was the very thing that Candidus valued. Cf. 544. 6'. On 544. 6 (X. 47. 6) we find '*Vires ingenuae*, constitutional strength, *ἰσχὺς ἐγγενής, σύμφυτος*'. It is not easy to make out from a comparison of these two notes what is Mr Paley's meaning here. The present line, as my friend Mr Pinder has pointed out to me, is closely copied from Ovid, Tristia, I. 5. 72, 'Invalidae vires ingenuaeque mihi': and these various passages, taken together with Martial VI. 11. 6, 'Non minus ingenua est et mihi, Marce, gula', show that 'ingenuus' has a special sense of 'delicate' as opposed to rude or robust.

Ib. vv. 11, 12.

Ergo nihil nobis, inquis, praestabis amicus?
Quidquid libertus, Candide, non poterit.

'*Quidquid*, &c. I will give you (i.e., if you are deserving of it) what a libertus cannot, mutual friendship, and the immortality of verse, he perhaps means to add'. 'The immortality of verse', which I see is a notion also of the Delphin editor, appears to me to spoil the humour of the epigram. Martial complains that his friend exacts of him physical exertions which have nothing to do with friendship: and so he jocosely defines the

duties of a friend as exclusive of those which might be performed by a friend's freedman.

III. 61.

Esse nihil dicis quidquid petis, improbe Cinna:
Si nil, Cinna, petis, nil tibi, Cinna, nego.

'A rebuke to one who was always asking some favour as a mere trifle. You say it is nothing at all. Very well, then, I will give you just what you ask'. Surely this misses the point of the last line. Martial says, 'If what you ask is nothing, in refusing it I refuse you nothing'.

III. 63. 13.

Quid narras? hoc est, hoc est homo, Cotile, bellus?

'*Hoc*, &c. "Is this, and this also, a *bellus homo?*" So τόσα καὶ τόσα is used of varied numbers or qualities'. In τόσα καὶ τόσα, the καί is surely an important element. We do not say 'such, such', but 'such and such'. Is it not safer to regard the repeated 'hoc est' as simply denoting impatience?

IV. 44. 7, 8.

Cuncta iacent flammis et tristi mersa favilla:
Nec superi vellent hoc licuisse sibi.

'*Nec*, &c. Not even the gods would wish that they had the power to do this, viz., which some infernal agency has done'. This is plausible enough: but I am not sure that there is not greater probability in the Delphin explanation: 'hyperbolικῶς innuit poeta deos ipsos huius incendii poenituisse'.

V. 16. 1, 2.

Seria cum possim, quod delectantia malo
Scribere, tu causa es, lector amice, mihi.

'*Delectantia*, viz. meipsum. In the preceding epigram he had said, "Non prosint sane, nec tamen ista iuvant".' Both expression and context seem to show that 'delectantia' means 'giving pleasure to others'. Comp. the well-known line of Horace (A. P. 333), 'Aut prodesse volunt aut delectare poetae'.

v. 18. 8.

Avidum vorato decipi scarum musco.

'*Scarum*, some unknown but highly-prized fish (Hor. S. II. 2. 22), which was caught by an inferior one used as a bait'. Are these last words intended as part of the explanation of the line? If so, is 'muscus' understood to be a fish? or is the implication that the 'scarus' swallows moss or sea-weed, supposing it to be a fish? I find no authority in the dictionary for calling 'muscus' a fish: and Brodaeus, whose conjecture 'musco' is, defends it by a reference to Athenaeus, where *φύκια* are spoken of as a bait. The MSS. reading is 'vorata...musca': but 'musca' does not seem to mean a fish either.

v. 25. 11.

O frustra locuples, o dissimulator amici.

'*Amici*, perhaps *amice*. . . . The genitive seems to mean who disguise the character of a friend, i.e., its true character. *Simulator*, one who feigns it, would suit the sense better: or perhaps, you who cheat your friend'. It appears to me better than all these to understand the words 'you who ignore your friend', 'who pretend that he is not your friend'.

v. 36.

Laudatus nostro quidam, Faustine, libello
Dissimulat, quasi nil debeat: imposuit.

'On one whom the poet professes to have praised in his verses on purpose to get a legacy: but the man, he says, has deceived him, and pretends he was under no obligation'. What is there about a legacy here? Surely a present would be enough for the requirements of the epigram.

v. 38. 7, 8.

Unus cum sitis, duo, Calliodore, sedetis:
Surge: *σολοικισμόν*, Calliodore, facis.

'*Σολοικισμόν*, a solecism in language, viz. "unus sumus".' It can hardly be said that Calliodorus is responsible for 'unus sumus'. 'Unus sitis' is Martial's way of saying that the two brothers together only make up one 'eques'. I suppose he

must mean that Calliodorus by his conduct practically says 'unus sedemus', which would be grammatically objectionable, a thing by the way which 'unus sumus' or 'sitis' is not. I may add that the editor's conjecture in v. 3, 'Quadringenta seca qui dicit, *σῦκα μερίζει*' ('seca' after Rutgers), seems a happy one.

v. 39. 'A satire on fortune-hunters, such as Martial figures himself to be'. Surely the satire is intended to fall rather on the man who is always inspiring hopes in fortune-hunters by making fresh wills.

v. 62. 4.

Nam mea jam digitum sustulit hospitibus.

'*Digitum sustulit:* has been sold to my guests: i.e., my guests have used it up just as if they had bought it at an auction. "Tollere digitum" means to make a bid.' This is one of two interpretations mentioned by the earlier commentators: but neither its original proposers nor Mr Paley explain how the thing sold at an auction comes to be spoken of as the person who bids at an auction. I do not know whether there is sufficient authority for the other interpretation, which explains 'digitum tollere' of a gladiator confessing himself beaten, on the strength of a passage in Sidonius Apollinaris, Ep. v. 7, supported to some degree by the Scholiast on Persius v. 119: but it has at any rate the advantage of giving a consistent image.

v. 79. 6.

Frigus enim magnum synthesis una facit.

'*Frigus*, a chill to my genial feelings...The sense is, my *one* synthesis keeps me cool, and that in a double sense: I have no fuss in changing, and no one cares about me'. This appears to me quite to miss the point of the epigram. Zoilus changes his dress eleven times in a single meal, nominally because it is so hot, really to shew how many dresses he has. Martial answers the question why he, who is Zoilus' guest, does not feel the heat equally: because he has only one dress, and so has no object in changing.

VI. 1. 3.

Quem si terseris aure diligenti.

'*Terseris aure:* this is shortly put for "Quem si diligenter audieris dum legitur, et terseris (spongia, i.e. calamo)".' This is very involved. The allusion may be to a sponge: but the sponge is a metaphorical one, viz. the ear itself. The words read pass through the ear, and Martial supposes that they are refined as it were by the physical process of so passing. Lucretius, VI. 119, has 'aridus unde aures terget sonus' (comp. Persius, I. 107, where 'radere auriculas' is similarly used): Martial speaks of the reciprocal action of the ear on that which rubs against it.

VII. 27. 9, 10.

Ad dominum redeas: noster te non capit ignis,
Conturbator aper: vilius esurio.

'*Vilius*, &c., it costs me less to starve at home, i.e. to fare poorly and cheaply, than to accept a present involving so much cost. Cf. 269 (v. 78). 2'. In spite of the parallel, the words seem more naturally to mean 'my hunger will be satisfied at a cheaper rate', I wish to eat at a cheaper rate. Comp. Ovid, ex Ponto, I. 10. 10, 'Nil ibi quod nobis esuriatur erit', there will be nothing to tempt my appetite.

VII. 44. 5.

Aequora per Scyllae magnus comes exulis isti.

'*Isti*, amico tuo'. This is a natural but unquestionable oversight. 'Isti' is for 'ivisti'. 'Percepsti' occurs a page or two later (VII. 56. 1), and Catullus has 'tristi'.

VII. 63. 5, 6.

Sacra cothurnati non attigit ante Maronis
Implevit magni quam Ciceronis opus.

'*Sacra*, &c. Silius did not take to writing poetry before he had read through Cicero, viz. to learn eloquence'. The meaning surely is that he did not imitate Virgil as a poet before he had performed the part of Cicero as a pleader. Silius' forensic triumphs are referred to in the following lines.

VIII. 37.

Quod Caietano reddis, Polycharme, tabellas,
Milia te centum num tribuisse putas?
Debuit haec, inquis. Tibi habe, Polycharme, tabellas,
Et Caietano milia crede duo.

'Polycharmus wished to gain a great reputation for liberality by returning Caietanus his bond for 1000 sesterces, when he found he could not pay the money. Martial says, that is nothing: if you want to be liberal really, keep your old bond, and lend him, which is as much as giving him, another 1000. Cf. Ep. 65 and 506'. The general sense seems rightly explained, but the point of 'milia duo' appears to be missed. Polycharmus had lent 100,000, and now makes a merit of cancelling the bond. Martial says, it will be a far greater kindness, to lend Caietanus 2000 more, a fiftieth part of the sum which you profess to give him. It is curious that in the notes to Ep. 506 (9. 102), to which we are referred as a parallel, the sense of 'reddere tabellas', if not mistaken, is so obscurely expressed that it could hardly have been discovered from the words used, while in the present note it is explained clearly enough. This is probably one of the inconveniences of divided authorship, traces of which occasionally appear in the volume. The latter epigram, by the way, throws light on that now before us, as there Martial says that instead of having a bond for 400 cancelled, he should like 100 as a loan.

VIII. 70. 7, 8.

Sed tamen hunc nostri scit temporis esse Tibullum
Carmina qui docti nota Neronis habet.

'*Neronis:* compared with Nero's verses, which are keenly ridiculed by Persius, Sat. I., Nerva was the Tibullus of our times'. A different, and doubtless the true interpretation, is given in a note to a later epigram, IX. 26. 9, 10, 'Even young Nero, when he wrote verses, is said to have hesitated to recite them to one whom he called *his Tibullus,* Ep. 437 (8. 70). 7'. No disparagement of Nero seems to be intended in either epigram. That Persius ridicules Nero's verses in his first Satire is not a certain fact, but a conjecture founded on a state-

ment in the Scholiast, which is balanced by a later statement that some in the Scholiast's day said the lines were Persius' own.

XI. 3 (4). 13.

Expectes et sustineas, Auguste, necesse est:
Nam tibi quod solvat non habet arca Iovis.

'*Expectes:* You, Augustus, must wait for a time and forbear: for after paying Domitian, Jupiter will have nothing left for you'. Surely Domitian himself is the Augustus spoken of.

IX. 31 (32).

Cum comes Arctois, &c.

I do not pretend to understand this epigram: but I would suggest that the goose had been a live one, that Velius had fixed on it as a victim before the war began, and had made it swallow a silver coin for each month, the eighth having already been swallowed before the news came that the war was over, and that the bird was then killed and perhaps stuffed, the coins being taken out and fastened to its beak. Vv. 5, 6 could hardly be understood except of a living bird: and 'extis condita' can surely have but one meaning: while 'argento' would naturally refer to the silver coin, in which the real value of the offering might be considered to consist. By the way, has Mr Paley given the exact point of Vibius Crispus' famous answer to the question whether any one was with Domitian, 'ne musca quidem', 'i.e., to be transfixed with a pin'? I had always supposed it to be 'He is quite alone: not even a fly with him, for he has killed them all'.

IX. 51 (52). 7, 8.

Et si iam nitidis alternus venit ab astris,
Pro Polluce mones Castora ne redeat.

'*Et si iam*, &c., and if now, by a compact like that between Castor and Pollux, he has come from the stars to take his turn with you on earth that you may take his in the sky, you act like a Pollux advising Castor not to return. You beg him to stay wholly on earth, declaring your readiness to resign life here for ever in his behalf'. I do not think this can be right. It assumes that Lucanus' brother has come down to the shades,

whereas the point of the epigram lies in his being still alive: it talks of him as coming from the stars, whereas he would be coming from the earth: and it gives an unnatural sense to 'redeat'. The early commentators seem substantially right in their explanation. Lucanus is in the shades: Pollux has just arrived there to take the turn of Castor: Lucanus presents to Castor a higher ideal of brotherly devotion, and urges him not to go back to the sky in his brother's place, but remain where he is, as he himself is ready to do on *his* brother's account. Or 'alternus' may be Castor, who has just arrived, Pollux having gone at once: Lucanus seizes an early opportunity of impressing on him that when the next opportunity of change comes, he ought not to take advantage of it. In any case 'pro Polluce' goes with 'redeat'. A similar contrast between the affection of these two brothers and that of Castor and Pollux had already been drawn, Book I. Ep. 36.

IX. 52 (53). 1—3.

Si credis mihi, Quinte, quod mereris,
Natales, Ovidi, tuas Apriles
Ut nostras amo Martias Kalendas.

'*Quod mereris:* this clause follows *amo tuas Apriles Kalendas*'. Is there any difficulty in taking the words, as the natural order suggests, after 'Si credis mihi', 'if you believe an assertion which your desert warrants'?

IX. 64 (65). 8.

Illi securus vota minora facit.

'*Illi:* to the original Hercules he offers prayers of less importance, when indifferent as to the result; or perhaps, without feeling anxious lest it should be refused'. The Delphin explanation seems better: 'quia Hercules non aegre feret a se minori deo peti minora quam a Domitiano deo maiori'.

9. 74 (75).

'On a *cerea imago*, or bust of a young man, which the father had represented as an infant, lest the real likeness should awaken too keen regrets. Ep. 487 (IX. 76 or 77) is on the same subject'. This appears to be the ordinary interpretation: but I see nothing in either epigram to necessitate the supposi-

tion which it involves. The most natural meaning would seem to be that a picture (why are we to suppose it to be a 'cerea imago'?) had been painted of the youth while he was an infant, but that after his death the father declined to have one drawn of him as he had appeared in later years. 'Pictura' in both epigrams I take not as a painting but as the art of painting. Comp. Book x. 33, where, as Mr Paley rightly says, we hear of a picture taken of Antonius as a youth, which continued to be the only likeness of him, though he lived long after.

IX. 98 (99).

> Vindemiarum non ubique proventus
> Cessavit, Ovidi: pluvia profuit grandis:
> Centum Coranus amphoras aquae fecit.

'Water is so much more valuable, in a season of drought, than wine that Coranus, a shrewd old vintner, has made a hundred gallons of it'. Can this be the meaning? Martial is not speaking of a dry, but of a wet season, and his meaning seems to be that the rain has not been altogether bad for the wine trade, as it has enabled the vintners to adulterate their wine more freely. The joke is not unlike one which is sometimes made in dry seasons, that you can get no milk because the cows and the pumps are both dry. Book I. 56, which Mr Paley compares, is, as he says, on the same subject, but the point is different, the season being described as so wet that the vintners could not sell unadulterated wine if they would: Book III. 56 and 57, to which we are also referred, are not parallel at all.

X. 17. 6.

> Appia, quid facies, si legit ista Macer?

'*Ista* seems incorrect: it should rather be *haec*, these epigrams of mine. *Ista* should refer to *via Appia*, and then it would mean the *libelli mensorum*, which is against the sense'. There can be no doubt, I think, that 'iste' is repeatedly used by Martial when there is no reference to any person supposed to be addressed. See Book I. 40 (41). 1; ib. 70 (71). 18 (where the explanation in Mr Paley's note, that the book is speaking to the poet, cannot be true); IV. 49. 1, 10; VI. 76. 4. In all these

places 'hic' might be substituted without altering the sense. In later Latin I believe it is used without scruple for 'hic'; and so we may suppose that the change in its meaning came in gradually. At the same time there are passages in Augustan writers where it is exceedingly difficult to give it its usual force: Horace, Epist. I. 6. 67, 'Si quid novisti rectius istis Candidus imperti; si non his utere mecum': Virg. Aen. XI. 537, 'Neque enim novus iste Dianae Venit amor': where to render 'iste' 'this of which I am telling *you*' is simply to confess that the word is used improperly. There is a later note in this edition, on Book XI. 2. 8, where Mr Paley says 'iste' is virtually equivalent to 'hic', and appeals to the medieval usage, though he still tries to bring out the reference to a second person.

X. 57.

Argenti libram mittebas: facta selibra est,
Sed piperis. Tanti non emo, Sexte, piper.

'The patron's annual gift to his client has come down to half a pound (not of silver but) of pepper. That, says the poet *παρὰ προσδοκίαν*, is not enough to buy—pepper with'. Surely the point is that Martial pretends to regard the half pound of pepper as intended to be an equivalent to the pound of silver, and says, 'I would rather have the silver, for I am not accustomed to give so much for my pepper as that'.

X. 58. 3.

Et quod inhumanae Cancro fervente cicadae
Non novere nemus.

'*Inhumanae*, sulky, unlike others of their kind'. Is it not rather meant as a constant epithet of the cicadas, which make themselves troublesome by their noise wherever they are found? (And so I see the Variorum Commentary takes it.)

X. 65. 11.

Nobis fistula fortius loquetur.

'*Fistula*, a doubtful reading. The MSS. have *filia*....The sense may be, I cannot imitate such a squeaking voice: my reed pipe could do that better than I'. I do not know whose conjecture 'fistula' may be, as it is not mentioned either in

Schneidewin's Apparatus Criticus or in the Delphin and Variorum edition: but I should imagine the author of it must have meant 'my windpipe will utter louder sounds than that'.

x. 70. 5.

Non resalutantes video nocturnus amicos.

'The sense is, at night I have to see friends who do not come to return me the morning's call'. The reading is not certain, the MSS. having 'nunc', and 'non' being a correction of Schneider's. If 'non' is right, the sense seems to be 'I get up at night to salute friends who pay me no visit in return', referring to the early hour at which the morning 'salutatio' was made, like the well-known lines of Juvenal, Sat. v. 19 foll. (comp. Book x. 82. 2). This then will be Martial's account of the beginning of his day. The seventh line 'Nunc ad luciferam signat mea gemma Dianam' seems to refer to an engagement between the early 'salutatio' and the 'prima hora'; but whether it simply means 'I sign a document by moonlight', or 'I go at morning twilight to sign at Diana's temple' I do not venture to decide.

x. 73. 7, 8.

A te missa venit: possem nisi munus amare,
Marce, tuum, poteram nomen amare meum.

'If I could not regard the gift, I could have regarded the name of the donor, Marcus, which he holds in common with myself'. So apparently the commentators: but the sense scarcely seems inherent in the words. Can Antonius have had the name of Martial embroidered on the toga?

x. 77.

Nequius a Caro nihil unquam, Maxime, factum est,
Quam quod febre perit: fecit et illa nefas.
Saeva nocens febris saltem quartana fuisses!
Servari medico debuit illa suo.

'The worst thing Dr Carus ever did was that dying of a fever. The fever too was greatly to blame: it should at least have been an acute and painful quartan attack, that the patient might have been reserved for his own doctoring'. 'De Caro

Medico' is the heading in the ordinary editions. But what evidence is there that he was a doctor at all? The natural sense is that he ought not to have died so rapidly, but to have had a quartan ague, that so he might have been killed by his doctor. The notion that the patient was himself a doctor seems to have depended on the reading 'illa' in v. 4, which would make no proper sense with 'servari'. To understand 'medico suo' 'his own doctoring' seems impossible. With this exception I agree with Mr Paley against Mr Mayor, who supposes the poet to have wished that Carus' fever, if not cured altogether, had been changed into a quartan. If it could be established that Carus was himself a curer of quartans, which is the view of the Delphin and Variorum commentators, we might restore 'illa', which has the merit of answering to 'illa' v. 2, change 'servari' into 'sanari', and take the epigram as an expression of genuine complimentary regret.

XI. 3. 7.

At quam victuras poteramus pangere chartas,
Quantaque Pieria praelia flare tuba,
Cum pia reddiderint Augustum numina terris,
Et Maecenatem si tibi, Roma, darent!

'More properly he should have said "quanta pangeremus si darent," or "poteramus pangere si dedissent", in which latter case "reddidissent", an unmetrical form, would have been required'. 'Poteramus pangere' is like 'poteras requiescere', Virg. E. I. 80, 'poteras scribere', Hor. Sat. II. 1. 16, denoting a contingency not really past, so that there is nothing incongruous in its being followed by 'darent'. 'Reddiderint' is perhaps less regular: if so, I suppose it is to be accounted for as an aoristic use of the perfect.

XI. 49. 4.

Silius et vatem non minus ipse tulit.

'The reading *tulit* is obscure. Lipsius proposed *colit*. It seems to mean *sustulit*, raised, exalted'. I am surprised that Mr Paley has not mentioned Barth's very plausible conjecture 'aetatem' for 'et vatem'. 'Aetatem' or 'vetustatem ferre' is a phrase for having a permanent value, the metaphor being appa-

rently derived from wines. Thus the sense would be, Silius has earned immortality no less than Virgil. 'Colit' on the other hand requires the reading 'minor', which has little or no MS. authority. Whether 'optatae', v. 3, can stand in the sense of 'desideratae', I do not know; nor yet whether 'numina', the reading of one early and three late MSS. is worth substituting for 'nomina', v. 2.

XI. 65. 6.

Sexcentis hodie, cras mihi natus eris.

'The point is not very clear: either the absurdity of keeping *two* birthdays is meant, or the poet implies that he will keep it in his own peculiar way, i.e. with anything but good wishes, such as the others offer. Or thus: your second day's birth-day will do for your humble friends'. He seems rather to mean that he shall regard being asked alone as a compliment, which I see is Gruter's view.

XI. 79. 1, 2.

Ad primum decima lapidem quod venimus hora,
Arguimur lentae crimine pigritiae.

'He means, by a hyperbole, that he has been ten hours coming one mile'. Is there any occasion for so startling an assumption? May not the host simply have complained that though he only lived a mile out of town, Martial was an hour behind time?

XII. 92.

Saepe rogare soles qualis sim, Prisce, futurus,
Si fiam locuples, simque repente potens.
Quemquam posse putas mores narrare futuros?
Dic mihi, si fias tu leo, qualis eris?

'*Leo:* if you were to turn into a lion, you would devour the weaker. Possibly I might act like other *potentes* and *tyranni*, who do the same to their subjects'. Is not this treating a joke too seriously? Does Martial mean more than to ridicule the practice of asking what a person would do under such and such circumstances which are not his nor likely to be his?

JOHN CONINGTON.

ON THE CHINESE SIGNS OF CASE AND NUMBER.

STUDENTS of the science of language appear to incline to the conclusion that of all known languages none is more archaic in its forms than Chinese; and that a knowledge of Chinese is therefore highly important as contributing by analogy to the discovery of the primitive condition of other languages.

Chinese however presents in its essential characteristics obstacles in the way of grammatical observation from which Sanskrit, for instance, is free.

Sanskrit reached many centuries ago so organized and articulate a condition, that long before European scholars commenced their investigations, Indian students had brought to a high degree of completeness the analysis and classification of the phenomena of language which had been familiar to them from their childhood. But it is otherwise with Chinese; its constructions, to adopt Prof. Müller's comparison, are rather the adjustment of blocks in cyclopean masonry, than the clamps or the cement with which the more modern builder binds his materials. The orthography of his complicated characters—the blocks of which the edifice he studies has been reared—and their collocation in rhythmical sentences, rather than enquiry into the parts of speech or the framing of grammatical rules, have been the literary exercise of the philological Chinaman.

He has observed indeed the flux of language by which words have passed from their original office as names of things,

NOTE. The orthography of Chinese words, except in quotations and in the illustrations from the Ningpo Dialect, is that of Morrison's Dictionary, Part II. 1st ed.

The numerals in brackets are those prefixed to the several words in that Dictionary.

Morrison professed to give the southern, or Nanking, Mandarin pronunciation; and to use letters of the alphabet with nearly their *English* force.

to a subordinate duty as hinges or pivots of phraseology[1]. He knows the division of words into the 'living' (verbs), the 'dead' (nouns) and 'auxiliaries' (particles of all kinds); or by another kind of distinction into the 'solid' and the 'empty' or nouns and particles. But declension, case, number, tense, &c., are ideas wholly foreign to China; and there exists, in the proper sense of the word *no native Grammar* of so ancient and so cultivated a language.

Another obstacle to correct observation is the *unalphabetic character of Chinese.* Sanskrit spells every shade of varying grammatical form. Form and pronunciation become thus identical. In Chinese orthography pronunciation[2] is nothing; and grammatical form has no adequate written representation.

The absence of native grammars and of any historical system of phonetic writing, to do for the 'sinologue' what the *nagari* orthography does for the Sanskrit student and for the student of the science of language, accounts perhaps for the occasional[3] inaccuracy of the illustrations drawn from Chinese by English philologists.

Europeans, missionaries and others, have it is true published Chinese grammars. But some of them have aimed only at guiding the studies of persons in China; and others have apparently been tempted to generalize on inadequate data, and to assimilate Chinese to the usages of more developed languages. Scientific

[1] Morrison's Dictionary, Pt. I. vol. i. p. 34, sub voce *che.*

[2] Callery (Systema Phoneticum) hardly proves the contrary.

[3] See the interesting Article in this Journal, Vol. I. Part ii. on 'the Growth and Development of Language;' in which, for example, *Tsan*$_{(258)}$ *mau*$_{(7533)}$ *li*$_{(6944)}$ *hai*$_{(3088)}$, rendered by Mr Farrar 'Women are timid,' must mean rather 'The Taiping rebels'—commonly called 'the long-haired'—'are formidable.' *Li hai* cannot mean 'timid;' nor are women even in China ever called 'shaggy' or 'unkempt' which is the idiomatic force of *tsan* (*ch'ang*) *mau.* Again, in p. 8, of the Essay, highly composite phrases, which occur no doubt *in certain connections* for 'happiness,' 'virtue,' and the like, are given as though they were the regular, if not the only, terms for those ideas. Whereas 'happiness' is commonly expressed in *writing* by the single term *fuh*$_{(2622)}$, and *orally* by *fuh-ke*, where *ke*$_{(5311)}$ is the 'breath' or 'spirit' of happiness; and 'virtue,' in the same way by *tih*$_{(10202)}$ and *tih-ke.* And *lin*$_{(7236)}$, *lin-keu*$_{(6063)}$, or *lin-shay*$_{(9129)}$ etc. are preferable substitutes in most instances for what Mr F. appears to regard as the *only* word for 'neighbours,' *kyai-fan-lin-se.*

philologists appear sometimes to have yielded still further to the generalizing tendency, and sometimes to have been misled as to the authenticity of the information on which they relied. And the manifold systems of European orthography, from the nature of the case, have led persons not skilled in Chinese to forget the ideographic representation of its words, and to draw their conclusions from the similarity or otherwise of groups of Roman letters, the representatives, by a very arbitrary convention, of the unspelt Chinese words.

Chinese is monosyllabic; its different *vocables* numbering less than five hundred. The well-known system of tones, (*accentus.* Prémare), modifies these so as to give an apparatus of thirteen or fourteen hundred sounds distinguishable by a practised and tolerably delicate ear. And although even this number is inadequate to the purposes of general conversation, yet the connection of thought and combinations of words of similar or contrasted meanings serve to discriminate among the words of like sound, so that whilst the *chances* of confusion are greater in Chinese than in English, the former *in practice* is hardly less precise than the latter; in which, for example, we distinguish without difficulty between *hare* and *hair*, between *air* and *heir*, among the three or four meanings of the word *lime*, and so forth.

On *paper* the distinctions are made with perfect accuracy by means of the multiform ideographic character alluded to already. But these distinctions are between *word* and *word;* there is no distinction of *form* between *verbs, nouns,* and *adjectives.*

In this latter respect English very much resembles Chinese. But English still possesses, especially in the verb, some few *inflexions,* using the word in its strict sense, in which it is inapplicable to the corresponding phenomena in Chinese. Chinese never possessed inflexions, though certain words in it may possibly, as some philologists appear to think, be tending towards a condition in which they will cease to be words, and, remaining mere appendages to other words to indicate their case, number, or time, will deserve the name of inflexions.

The intention of this paper is to exhibit the Chinese usage

in respect of what in other languages are the *genitive case* of nouns and pronouns, and the *plural number* of pronouns. These are the most remarkable of the idioms in which the tendency just referred to is seen. It will appear however that the words in question are still very far from that degree of degeneracy which belongs to the inflexional syllables of other languages.

I shall give examples both of the classical Chinese, or language of written composition, and of the colloquial. Under the latter head there are two main subdivisions, the court or mandarin colloquial, which possesses some small literature, and the provincial dialects[1], which have hardly ever been reduced to writing except by Missionaries, who, sometimes with Chinese characters, sometimes with Roman letters, have printed the New Testament and several other books in two or three of these dialects.

The mandarin, properly the dialect of the gentry of Peking, but said to be current with some variation throughout the provinces north and west of the river Yang-tsze, is the spoken language of the whole *official class*. A mandarin is legally unable to hold office in his own province, and hence he naturally abandons the local dialect of his home for that which is indispensable whenever his rank brings him into the presence of the emperor, and which forms a convenient common medium of intercourse with every other member of his class, including attachés and menial attendants. The provinces just now mentioned and the official class everywhere are thus the limits within which mandarin is spoken. The classes unconnected with civil office in all other parts of China speak, scholar and artizan alike, their own 'ground-speech,' the dialect of their department, with more or less of refinement, but always with idioms essentially different from those of the court and the tribunals.

[1] A very large majority of all the words in any colloquial dialect belong also to the literary language, and can of course be written. But in the provincial varieties there are a few very common words, verbs, nouns, and particles, which have no place in the classical lexicon; and for which new symbols have to be devised or existing ones adapted. This has been done for the mandarin in half-a-dozen different popular works, but not for the other dialects.

Of the many hundred provincial or local dialects, that of Ningpo has become familiar to me in the course of seven or eight years' residence within the capital city of the department of that name. And as its usages differ widely from those of the mandarin, it has seemed to me worth the while to place some of the former side by side with those of the latter.

I. The *Genitive Case* of nouns and pronouns is formed
in Classical Chinese, by the enclitic *che*$_{(526)}$;
in the Mandarin Colloquial, by the enclitic *te*$_{(9958)}$, or *teih*$_{(10159)}$;
in the Ningpo Colloquial, by the enclitic *go* (*ko*$_{6424}$).

Thus *e.g.* "a lord's grace" is
in the Classical, Choo$_{(1219)}$ che gan$_{(2886)}$;
in the Mandarin, Choo te (or teih) gan;
in the Ningpo, Chü go eng;
where *chü* and *eng* are identical with *choo* and *gan*.

Of these enclitics *che* is a word serving in different contexts as a *verb* (to go to), a *pronoun* without nom. case (him, her, it), and a *particle*, whose written symbol is analysed by Morrison[1] after the Chinese lexicographers, thus: "The lower stroke (*i.e.* in the archaic form of the character) represents the ground, the middle one the stem of a plant, those on the side leaves or shoots...from the stem. Hence it is borrowed to denote the possessive case of nouns." The analysis such as it is may at least suggest the process of thought which led to the adoption of *che* as an enclitic to indicate the 'genitive.'

In the colloquial dialects this process is harder to conjecture. In the *mandarin* the older usage is *te*, a verb and a noun (subst. and adj.) as well as an enclitic. As a verb[2] it means 'to dwell at the foot of a mountain,' also 'to arrive at and to stop;' as a substantive, 'the bottom;' and as an adjective, 'low, menial.' Is it possible that *te* was adopted as the enclitic to connect a possessor with his possession, a source with its issue, a parent with his offspring, because the radical meaning suggested the *ground* or *original*? *Te* is still occasionally written; but it has been generally superseded in this sense by *teih*, a

[1] sub voce$_{(526)}$. [2] See Morrison sub voce.

word quite distinct from *te* in its Chinese orthography, but in the northern mandarin almost identical in respect of *sound*. This similarity of sound renders it doubtful whether any *logical* account of the adoption of *teih* as a sign of case is now to be given. Court etiquette[1] may at some period have forbidden the ordinary use of the character *te;* and then *teih* may have been adopted in its place since they were alike in sound, and both belonged to the *inflected*[2] class of tones, though they are ranged under different subdivisions of that class. The *meaning* of *teih* at any rate does not suggest any probable reason for its selection. 'Clear, bright, real, true; an illuminated target; an important circumstance;' are the definitions of Morrison.

In the Ningpo dialect it is equally difficult to trace the origin of the enclitic use of *go*. It is no doubt *ko* of the dictionaries, which Morrison defines to be 'a particle that *precedes* a variety of nouns, denoting individuality.' His examples indeed[3] go beyond this definition, if they do not shew that the word is *rather an enclitic* of numerals and some other words, serving to connect them with the nouns they qualify. Its *orthography* in Chinese, which is different according as it is used of men or things, gives little aid in the investigation; unless indeed it suggests a word of comparatively recent origin, invented on purpose to serve as a link between words in the manner shewn in the examples, and adapted by the two-fold

[1] According to Julien *yuen*$_{(12504)}$ is said to have been written for *heuen*$_{(2820)}$ in the name of the great Buddhist Pilgrim of the 7th century, ever since *heuen* formed part of the reigning Emperor's name. I cannot verify this, as the Chinese orthographical Guide for such cases is not at hand. There is another method at any rate of avoiding the violation of etiquette, viz. by writing *heuen* with four strokes, instead of five, of the pen; thus omitting one dot.

[2] The *tones* in the southern dialects, e. g. of Fuhkien and Kwangtung, are eight, viz. an upper and a lower of each of the four classes *p'ing* even, *shang* rising, *kheu* departing and *jŭh* entering.

Only five of these are heard in the mandarin dialect, that is to say the upper and lower *p'ing* and *kheu* and the upper *shang*. The *jŭh* is merged in the *shang* and *kheu* classes.

For *literary purposes* the whole are divided into *p'ing* and *tsih* (inflected) the latter including the 'rising,' 'departing,' and 'entering' classes.

[3] These examples are *yih ko jin* one man, *urh ko jin* two men, *peih ko* another, *mei ko* each.

orthography for use in different cases. If this be so, it has been adopted into the Ningpo dialect, for some unknown reason, as a substitute for the mandarin genitive affix *teih*, and its use has thus been extended.

The genitive case is the only one marked by a regular enclitic. Even this is sometimes dropped when the connexion of the words is sufficiently clear. The *instrumental, dative, ablative,* and *locative* senses, are all expressed by prepositions[1] or particles following the noun[2].

II. The sign of the *Plural* is almost confined to the pronouns. Only a few nouns used in address are, in the court dialect, treated in this respect like pronouns.

(1) In the *Classical Chinese* the plural sign is different for each of the three persons. Thus:

Singular.	*Plural.*
Wo$_{(11727)}$, or Woo$_{(11743)}$, I;	Wo-chae, or woo-chae$_{(123)}$, We.
Urh$_{(11524)}$, Thou;	Urh-tsaou$_{(10549)}$, You.
E$_{(1933)}$[1], or Pe$_{(8330)}$, He;	E-tăng, or pe-tăng$_{(9885)}$, They.

Pe-tăng is rather 'he and his associates,' 'he and such as he' (cf. *οἱ περί*). In this sense *tăng* is also used with the pronouns of the first and second persons; whilst *chae* and *tsaou* are their proper enclitics for the mere plural. *Chae* means originally 'class' or 'company;' and *tsaou,* 'meeting,' 'order,' 'class.' *Tăng* is a word of the same kind as *chae* and *tsaou;* but, if I am not mistaken, retains its distinctive meaning, and does not degenerate so completely as they do into a *mere* sign of the plural. Its senses are both verbal and substantive; *e.g.* 'to compare, to be of the same kind, to wait for,' and 'kind or quality, class, rank, &c.' (Morrison). In the Ningpo colloquial *tăng* stands for 'with,' 'and,' like *yu* in the classical, and *ho* in mandarin.

(2) In the *Mandarin colloquial,* the plural for all three persons alike is formed by the particle *mun*$_{(7817)}$; a compara-

[1] E. gr. in the Classical style, *e* with, *yu* to, *wei* for, *yew* from.

[2] *shang* upon, *nuy* or *chung* within.

[3] *E* is not used *in this sense* in the earlier classical style; nor do I recollect an *example* in a classical book of *any* 3rd pers. pl. of the pronoun.

tively modern word compounded of the symbols for 'man,' and 'gate,' the latter of which is also pronounced *mun*.

According to Morrison the meaning of the word is 'full' or 'plump.' But I do not recollect to have met with it anywhere except as the sign of the plural. The mandarin pronouns are as follows:

Singular, Wo, I; Ne$_{(7918)}$, Thou; T'ha[1]$_{(9686)}$, He.

Plural, Wo-mun, We; Ne-mun, Ye; T'ha-mun, They.

A few nouns such as *yay*$_{(11988)}$, a father or other venerable person; *heung*$_{(3389)}$, a brother; *neang*$_{(7944)}$, a lady; are treated like pronouns in respect of the plural. Thus *Yay-mun*, sirs; [2]*Te*$_{(9979)}$*-heung-mun*, brothers; [2]*Koo*$_{(6471)}$*-neang-mun*, ladies.

(3) In the *Ningpo colloquial* the word *lăh* is the sign of the plural; thus:

Singular, *Ngô*[3] (= Wo), I; *Ng* (= ? Ne), Thou; *Gyi* (= Ke), He.
Plural, *Ah-lăh*, We; *Ng-lăh*, Ye; *Gyi-lăh*, They.

The irregularity of the first person plural may perhaps be traced through the dialect of Shaou-shing, a department conterminous with that of Ningpo, its chief city being 80 miles to the west of Ningpo. There we find *Ngo*, I and *Ngah-lah* (for Ngo-lah), we; which, dropping the initial *ng*, gives the Ningpo word *ah-lah*.

Chay$_{(480)}$, 'this,' and *Na*$_{(7857)}$, 'that,' for the nearer and remoter subject respectively, are much used in mandarin. Their plural is formed by means of the adjective *seay*$_{(8899)}$, 'small,' or 'few.' Thus, *chay-seay*, 'these,' *na-seay*, 'those.'

[1] *T'ha* is by Morrison written *Ta*. He was careless almost as much of aspirates as of tones.

[2] *Te* is the younger brother, *heung* the elder; *koo* a term of respect, literally 'yielding,' 'gentle'.

[3] Here the orthography is that adopted by the Protestant missionaries at Ningpo;

ô = English aw, and
i = ,, ee.

The nasal *ng* without a vowel is not found in mandarin. The Ningpo dialect adopts it frequently, e. g. in place of *ne* thou, *woo* (ngwoo) five, and *yu* a fish.

Gy represents a consonant between the hard and soft *g*. The counterpart of *Gyi* in mandarin pronunciation is *Ke*$_{(5194)}$.

At Ningpo we use *keh*, perhaps a corruption of *chay*, in place of both these demonstratives, and form its plural by the syllable *sing*; *keh-sing*, 'these,' or 'those.' Our native scholars have adopted for this *sing* a symbol (9476), which means, 'a star,' and also, says Morrison, 'dots, single unconnected things.'

The plural of *nouns* is implied rather than expressed by the juxtaposition of a numeral or some word implying plurality; such as *chung*, 'many,' *soo*, 'some,' *keae*, 'all,' &c.

It has been affirmed that words of class, rank, &c., such as *pei*$_{(8470)}$, *luy*$_{(7431)}$, *tăng*$_{(9885)}$, are used as affixes 'to form the plural of nouns,' so that v. gr. *e-pei* means 'foreigners,' the plural of *e*$_{(1938)}$, 'a foreigner.' *Pei* and *tăng* are in fact so defined by Morrison. But to the best of my recollection I have never met with a single place in which the *proper sense*,—class[1] or kind,—was not preferable as a rendering for *pei*, *tăng*, &c., to treating them as mere signs of the plural. In the large majority of instances all nouns are written alike and without affix[2], whether they be singular or plural. And when we find a noun with the affix in question, it is surely reasonable to enquire whether the ordinary sense of the affix will hold before we conclude it to be a mere sign of the plural.

With regard to *keae*$_{(5463)}$, Professor Max Müller has, I think, mistaken the Chinese construction. He says[3]: 'man in China is *gin* (*jin*), *kiai* (*keae*) means the whole or totality. This added to *gin* gives *gin-kiai* which is the plural of man.'

To the best of my belief there is no proper 'plural of man' in Chinese. But in fact *keae* ought not to be treated as an affix at all; though, as Prémare (pp. 47, 144) rightly says, it must be 'put after' its noun. Two of Prémare's examples, one from the mandarin the other from the classical part of the Notitia, will serve to illustrate the real construction of *keae*:

[1] So that *e-pei* should mean 'the class of people called *e* or 'barbarian;' *jin-luy*, 'mankind,' not simply 'men' the plural of man; and so forth.

[2] E. gr. *jin* meaning 'man,' 'a thousand men' is *yih*$_{(12175)}$-*t'hseen*$_{(10697)}$ *jin* not *yih-t'hseen jin-keae* or *jin-pei*. And 'sheep' (as in English) whether singular or plural is always *yang*$_{(11864)}$. *Yang-luy* or *yang-che-luy*, if it occurred, would mean the ovine species; not a mere plural of *yang*.

[3] Lectures on the Science of Language. First Series, p. 43.

(1) '*Jin keae yew ping,* singuli homines habent morbum;' and (2) the well-known Confucian aphorism, '*Sze hae che nuy keae heung te yay,* in toto terrarum orbe omnes sumus fratres.' Here 'singuli' and 'omnes' of the translator are as much the prefix and affix respectively of 'homines' and of the clause 'in toto terrarum orbe,' and as little integral parts of speech, as *keae* is a mere plural affix or has ceased to sustain its part as an adjective.

The interest with which a missionary, whose field of duty lies in China, is naturally drawn to the speculations and discussions of scholars and scientific men when they touch upon Chinese is the writer's excuse for having ventured to contribute to this journal.

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NOTE ON THE HEBREW ROOT יקש.

THE discussion of this root is important as leading up (§ VII) to the great *crux* of Gen. vi. 3: 'And the LORD said, My Spirit shall not always strive with man, *for that he also* is flesh.'

I. There are many passages in which מוקש may be sufficiently rendered by some such general expression as '*snare;*' and that, without any attempt to distinguish it from other words (such as פח), which might be rendered in certain cases by the same word '*snare.*' But it becomes needful in respect of certain passages to attempt a more exact definition of the meaning of the root יקש and its derivatives; and this is especially the case with the passage subjoined:—

'Can two walk together, except they be agreed? will a lion roar in the forest, when he hath no prey? will a young lion cry out of his den, if he have taken nothing? *Can a bird fall in a snare upon the earth, where no gin* (מוקש) *is for him? shall one take up a snare from the earth, and have taken nothing at all?* Shall a trumpet be blown in the city, and the people not be afraid? shall there be evil in a city, and the Lord hath not done it?' (Amos iii. 3—6).

The verse italicized suggests (in connexion with its context) that the root יקש may refer to the *baiting* of a trap. The prophet is arguing from the necessary correspondence of cause and effect:—

הילכו שנים יחדו בלתי אם נועדו

Can two things go together, except they correspond?

When an effect is observed we can argue to the occurrence of its natural cause; its corresponding cause must *go with it.* When the lion's growl is heard, we infer that he has taken

prey (ver. 4). When the trumpet is blown in the city, we know that the city is in danger (ver. 6). The fifth verse contains a similar argument from the correspondence of cause and effect:—

התפול צפור על פח הארץ ומוקש אין לה
היעלה פח מן האדמה ולכוד לא ילכוד

'Will a bird light upon a trap in the earth, if it has no bait? Will a trap spring up from the ground, when there is no bird on it to catch?'

II. That the root יקש does not refer properly to being *caught* or *taken* in a trap, may be gathered from its being used in this and other places as complementary to לכד. Thus, יקשתי לך וגם נלכדת ונוקשו ונלכדו (Is. viii. 15, xxviii. 13); (Jer. l. 24); which agrees with the conjecture that יקש means *to lure*, as distinct from לכד, *to catch*.

This is further borne out by the fact that מוקש is complementary to פח *a trap*. Thus, לפח ולמוקש (Jos. xxiii. 13; Is. viii. 15). In Ps. lxix. 22 the idea of a *bait* is appropriate: 'Let their table become a trap (פח) before them; and a snare (מוקש), when they are at peace.' In the preceding verse the *stupefying* ראש is spoken of; and in the verses following, its effects: 'Let their eyes be darkened, &c.'

III. The word יָקוּשׁ is usually taken to mean *a fowler*. But this involves the use of a passive instead of an active form; and that, when there is a form יָקוּשׁ, for *fowler*. In Ps. xci. 3 it is usual to render פַּח יָקוּשׁ by, 'snare of the *fowler:*' but the meaning, *baited* (=*prepared*, or *set*) trap, seems equally appropriate. If יָקוּשׁ be thus explained it might also not unnaturally stand alone, with פַּח understood, and thus signify not *a fowler* but *a trap*. At first sight Prov. vi. 5 seems to require that it should mean *a fowler*, in accordance with our Authorized Version: 'Deliver thyself as a roe from the hand [of the hunter], and as a bird *from the hand of the fowler*

(מִיַּד יָקוּשׁ). But the occurrence of יד does not imply personality; and מיד may mean simply *out of the power of*, or *out of*. It happens moreover that this form of expression occurs in connexion with another word for *trap*, in Ps. cxli. 9: מידי פח יקשו לי, '*out of the hands of the trap* they have *set*[1] for me.' In accordance with this analogy it would seem better to replace *fowler* by *trap* in Prov. vi. 5, *supra*.

IV. The plural of יָקוּשׁ occurs in Jer. v. 26, and is there again explained of *fowlers:* but, in order to adapt this rendering to the context, it is assumed further that שַׁךְ, instead of being a participle (from שבך to *settle down, subside*), is an infinitive of unusual form. Thus Gussetius (quoted by Rosenmüller):—

'*Speculatur* improbus quisque populi mei *ut aucupum quiescere*, h. e. ut id aucupes faciunt, quando sedati ac immoti tacitique sedent, expectantes num avis aliqua in retia sese induat, nolentes eas inde avertere strepitu.'

Assuming the general accuracy of this explanation we may yet demur to the actual translation to the words יָשׁוּר בְּשַׁךְ יְקוּשִׁים, as involving, (1) the use of the passive form יָקוּשׁ for an active; and (2) the use of the participle שַׁךְ for an infinitive. This latter would seem to mean *a croucher*, i. e. a fowler in the act of crouching down (as described by Gussetius) and watching his traps. In default of a better word we may render it broadly by *fowler*. The word יְקוּשִׁים may be taken, as above, in the sense *traps;* and that, in connexion with יָשׁוּר as its governing verb; seeing that שׁוּר may be followed by an accusative, as in שור שחקים (Job xxxv. 5); מגבעות אשורנו (Numb. xxiii. 9). The meaning of the clause from Jer. v. 26 would thus be that they watch *as a fowler* WATCHES HIS TRAPS. This gives the same general result as that which is commonly adopted, while yet avoiding the introduction of grammatical anomalies.

[1] Or, *baited*. Compare v. 4, 'and let me not eat of their dainties.'

V. In the passage 1 Sam. xviii. 21 the meaning *lure* or *decoy* suits מוקש better than that of *trap*. Michal is there put forward as a *bait* to draw David into the hands of the Philistines, who are the *trap*: 'And Saul said, I will give him her, that she may be a snare (מוקש) to him, and that the hand of the Philistines may be against him.' The word is applied in Ex. xxiii. 33 to the *enticement* of idolatry; and in Deut. vii. 25 to that of 'the gold or silver that is on them.' Compare Ex. xxiv. 12, Deut. vii. 16, Jud. ii. 3, viii. 27. In Prov. xx. 25 the similitude of a *bait* swallowed thoughtlessly seems to be used. This is suggested with sufficient clearness by the Authorized Version: 'It is as a *snare* to the man who devoureth that which is holy, and after vows to make enquiry.' In Prov. xxii. 25 the expression ולקחת מוקש, and *get* (lit. *take*) a snare,' is used. Here the idea of *taking a* BAIT, with the implied consequences, is appropriate: but if מוקש meant properly a *snare* or *trap*, without reference to the bait, the expression would need further explanation.

VI. Thus far an attempt has been made to shew that the meaning *bait* is specially appropriate in certain passages for derivatives of יקש. In others the same derivatives might of course be used more directly of the *trap* itself. But it may be well to *state* that the former meaning is not here assumed to be of necessity primary. The first reference might be to the arrangement of the trap in the vicinity of the bait; to the *spring* perhaps. Thus יקש, the root of מוקש, might be cognate with קוש, the root of קשת, *a bow*, to which indeed יְקֹשׁוֹן (Is. xxix. 20) is referred. The primary reference in קשת might be (1) to its *shape*, or (2) to its *tension*. But, in either case, 'a snare,' having for its spring a bent or *bowed* twig, might be derived from a root cognate with קשת, *a bow*. Be this as it may, it seems that the meaning *bait* is suitable to מוקש in certain contexts, and might be said to be required in Amos iii. 5.

VII. The supposed infinitive שַׁךְ in Jer. v. 26 is referred to by Gesenius in connexion with his rendering of בשגם (Gen. vi. 3), of which in fact it is the main support.

Rosenmüller (ed. 1821) quotes with apparent approbation the grammatical blunder of J. F. Bernd, who makes בְּשַׁגַּם an infinitive piel, with prefix and affix, from שגה. Thus (the reference being to the Rabbinic rendering adopted in the English Bible):—

'Pluribus refutavit illam de voce בשגם sententiam *J. F. Bernd* in peculiari de hoc vocabulo ejusque significatu *Exercitat. crit. philol.* Hal. 1732. 4., docuitque referendum esse ad radicem שגה *erravit*, ita ut בְּשַׁגַּם sit Infinitivus Pihel cum Prefixo et Affixo, et cum verbis הוּא בָשָׂר vertendum: *dum errare eos facit caro.*'

Gesenius, who notices the error of Bernd, assumes an infinitive שַׁג, from שגג, and renders, '*propter lapsum*, s. delicta *eorum*.' But this is inappropriate to the context, seeing that the singular, '*he* is flesh,' follows immediately; and it would thus be open to serious objection, *even if it were granted that* שַׁג *was an infinitive.* We may conclude then with Fürst, *lex.* s.v. שַׁגַּם (without adopting his own unsound conjecture): 'the construction that it is an infinitive שַׁג with suffix ־ַם is unsuitable, because of the following הוּא.'

CHARLES TAYLOR.

ON A SUPPOSED FINANCIAL OPERATION OF JULIUS CÆSAR'S.

THERE is a stroke of finance described in the following passage:

SUETONIUS, *de vita Divi Julii*, cap. 42. ed. Teubner.

De pecuniis mutuis, disjecta novarum tabularum exspectatione, quæ crebro movebatur, decrevit tandem, ut debitores creditoribus satis facerent per æstimationem possessionum, quanti quasque ante civile bellum comparassent, deducto summæ æris alieni, si quid usuræ nomine numeratum aut perscriptum fuisset; qua condicione quarta pars fere crediti deperibat.

This passage is thus interpreted by Mommsen, Book v. Chap. 11:

"Two important concessions were made to the debtors and that as early as 705. First, the interest in arrear was struck off, and that which was paid was deducted from the capital. Secondly, the creditor was compelled to accept the moveable and immoveable property of the debtor in lieu of payment at the estimated value which his effects had before the civil war and the general depreciation which it had occasioned. The latter enactment was not unreasonable; if the creditor was to be looked on *de facto* as the owner of the property of his debtor to the amount of the sum due to him, it was doubtless proper that he should bear his share in the general depreciation of the property." There is nothing perhaps very astonishing in Cæsar's being praised for that application of the sponge to debts, which when recommended by an American President is treated as a freak of craziness. To deduct from the capital sum owed by the debtor all that he has ever paid as interest is

merely a downright act of spoliation. But the forced valuation of the property is less defensible: it is not a crime, but an absurdity. Of course it is true that, if the creditor became the owner of his debtor's lands and houses on the ground of an acknowledged insolvency, he must be content with what they will fetch in the market: but no money-lender could be so silly as to acknowledge that he had received ten thousand pounds worth of land as equivalent to so much money lent merely because the land formerly was worth that sum. And as to its being fair that the money-lender should share in the general loss sustained by depreciation, this is as absurd as it is immoral. He had lent his money on a contract: if he released his debtor from the contract it was but charity: if circumstances made it impossible for the contract to be fulfilled, it was necessity: the interference of a third party could give it no show of equity. Such interference must have been plainly and absolutely unfair. It is conceivable that Cæsar did thus interfere; but it is not to be endured that he should be praised for it as if he had done a statesmanlike thing. But what is this "general depreciation"? If money was hoarded from a sense of insecurity, land was depreciated; that is, it would fetch less money. But money was not depreciated. The claims of money-lenders were not depreciated. They had a legal right to enforce these claims. If, in enforcing these claims, they took men's lands, they were not necessarily losers: they suffered perhaps a temporary inconvenience, but if they held on, they must have been in a very short time gainers. For they took land when it was to be had cheap: they had only to wait till Cæsar had finished his wars, and then they could recoup themselves by the enhanced value of land, arising from the restoration of order and security.

But did they take the land at all? I doubt it. The passage which Suetonius must have had before him when he made his statement is this:

His rebus confectis, cum fides tota Italia esset angustior, neque creditæ pecuniæ solverentur, constituit, ut arbitri darentur: per eos fierent æstimationes possessionum et rerum, quanti

quæque earum ante bellum fuissent, atque *eæ* creditoribus traderentur. Hoc et ad timorem novarum tabularum tollendum minuendumque qui fere bella et civiles dissensiones sequi consuevit, et ad debitorum tuendam existimationem esse aptissimum existimavit.

· *De bello civili,* Lib. III. cap. 1. ed. Hotoman.

It seems to have been assumed by the historians that *eæ* means *possessiones.* The property itself was delivered to the creditors, according to Mommsen. If so, what need of valuers (arbitri)? "It was Cæsar" (says Mommsen, IV. 11, p. 525, Dickson's translation) "who first gave an insolvent the right—on which our modern bankruptcy regulations are based—of formally ceding his estate to his creditors, *whether it might suffice to satisfy them or not.*" Then what need of a comparison of the estate's former value and its actual value? If the transaction was like our foreclosing on a mortgage, the creditor must have taken the property at its actual market-price, and the appointment of appraisers must have been futile.

But suppose we consider *eæ* to refer not to *possessionum* but to *æstimationes.* Suppose the appraisers handed in certificates, based upon their judgment as experts and on the evidence of neighbours, declaring what had been the reputed value of the estates in quiet times. This would in the simplest way calm the uneasiness of the monied men; for it would satisfy them that their debtors were really substantially solvent, requiring only a little time for things to come round.

Cæsar's economical policy on this occasion has been compared by writers generally, and by Mr F. Newman in particular (in his Lectures on political economy), to the policy of Tiberius at the time of the commercial crisis or tightness of the money-market described, obscurely but instructively, by Tacitus, *Annals,* Lib. VI. cap. 17.

This is a case of indebted landholders, and they are saved from a sale of their lands, which at the actual low price, caused by the abundant supply or "glut," would have been ruinous to them. They are saved, not by a ridiculous edict ordering the creditors to take lands at their *former* value, but

by a government loan on easy terms, which like our relaxation or promised relaxation of restrictions on paper currency (1847), restores monetary confidence, and enables debtors to escape the sale of depreciated property.

Thus to restore confidence is the duty, when it is possible, of a government. And it is this which I conceive Julius Cæsar to have done by appointing valuers of estates. But, if scholars can prove that he did something more than this, I can only say in answer, that I protest against his being praised for doing what Mommsen says he did.

It is very far from incredible that Julius Cæsar was a worse political economist and a worse lawyer than Tiberius. What concerns us is that our young men should not be taught in Roman history doctrines of economy and law which would be condemned in English history.

WILLIAM JOHNSON.

ROMANS V. 12.

Before making any remark myself on this passage I will briefly cite the explanations given by some of the chief commentators; from which it will appear that, not having a clear apprehension of its meaning themselves, they were unable to represent it in a clear light to their readers: and their disagreement will perhaps justify further investigation. I pass by Origen, partly because his opinions are only expressed in a Latin version, and partly because I am ready to say with Erasmus, Non facile est intelligere quid senserit (Critici sacri in loc.).

Chrysostom writes thus: *πῶς οὖν εἰσῆλθεν ὁ θάνατος καὶ ἐκράτησε; διὰ τῆς ἁμαρτίας τοῦ ἑνός. τί δέ ἐστιν ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον; ἐκείνου πεσόντος, καὶ οἱ μὴ φαγόντες ἀπὸ τοῦ ξύλου γεγόνασιν ἐξ ἐκείνου πάντες θνητοί· ἄχρι γὰρ νόμου ἁμαρτία ἦν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, ἁμαρτία δὲ οὐκ ἐλλογεῖται, μὴ ὄντος νόμου..... δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ αὐτὴ ἡ ἁμαρτία ἡ τῆς τοῦ νόμου παραβάσεως, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη ἡ τῆς τοῦ Ἀδὰμ παρακοῆς, αὐτὴ ἦν ἡ πάντα λυμαινομένη. καὶ τίς ἡ τούτου ἀπόδειξις; τὸ καὶ πρὸ τοῦ νόμου πάντας ἀποθνήσκειν.*

Theodoret says, *λέγει ὁ ἀπόστολος ὅτι, τοῦ Ἀδὰμ ἡμαρτηκότος καὶ θνητοῦ διὰ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν γεγενημένου, ἐχώρησεν εἰς τὸ γένος ἀμφότερα. εἰς πάντας γὰρ ἀνθρώπους διῆλθεν ὁ θάνατος, ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον· οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὴν τοῦ προπάτορος ἁμαρτίαν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἕκαστος δέχεται τοῦ θανάτου τὸν ὅρον.*

Œcumenius has *πάντες ἡμάρτομεν κατὰ τὴν ὁμοίωσιν αὐτοῦ. ...φησὶ τοὺς δι' ἕνα ἄνθρωπον ἁμαρτωλοὺς καὶ θνητοὺς γεγενημένους, ἐπεὶ ἐζηλώσαμεν αὐτοῦ τὴν παρακοήν.*

Theophylact states the argument thus: *δι' ἑνὸς ἀνθρώπου τοῦ Ἀδὰμ εἰσῆλθεν εἰς τὸν κόσμον ἡ ἁμαρτία, δηλαδὴ καὶ ὁ θάνατος· καὶ αὖ δι' ἑνὸς ἀνηρέθησαν ἀνθρώπου τοῦ Χριστοῦ.*

τί δέ ἐστι τὸ ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον; τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἐπὶ τῷ Ἀδὰμ *πάντες ἥμαρτον. πεσόντος γὰρ ἐκείνου, καὶ οἱ μὴ φαγόντες ἀπὸ τοῦ ξύλου γεγόνασιν ἐξ ἐκείνου θνητοὶ, ὡς ἂν καὶ αὐτοὶ πταίσαντες, διότι ἐκεῖνος ἔπταισεν....σκόπον ἔχει δεῖξαι ὅτι καὶ οἱ μὴ φαγόντες ἀπὸ τοῦ ξύλου μηδὲ ἁμαρτάνοντες ὁμοίως τῷ* Ἀδὰμ *ὁμῶς διὰ τὴν ἐκείνου ἁμαρτίαν ὡς καὶ αὐτοὶ ἁμαρτόντες ἐλογίζοντο καὶ ἀπέθνησκον...ὁ παλαιὸς* Ἀδὰμ *πάντας ὑποδίκους ἐποίησε τῷ οἰκείῳ πταίσματι καίτοι καὶ μὴ πταίσαντας.*

Augustine seems to have hesitated whether to understand the Latin version *in quo* to mean *in quo peccato* (Erasmus in Critici sacri); or *in quo homine,* according to Origen's notion that, when Adam transgressed, all mankind were in his loins: thus he writes, Restat ut in illo primo homine peccasse omnes intelligantur, quia in illo fuerunt omnes, quando ille peccavit (cited by Tischendorf). In the one case *ἐφ' ᾧ* would have been *ἐν ᾗ,* scil. *ἁμαρτίᾳ,* in the other *ἐν ᾧ.*

Erasmus himself writes (Critici sacri): Constat sermonem non carere tropologia, quam si excludimus, plurima consequuntur absurda. Again, Constat totam hanc Pauli disputationem esse plenam obscuritatibus, quemadmodum vere praefatur Origenes. Constat multa non sine tropo dici.

Grotius (ibid.) says, Frequens est *μετωνυμία* Hebraeis dicere *peccatum* pro *poena* et *peccare* pro *poenam subire,* unde et procedente longius figura per *μετάληψιν peccare* dicuntur qui malum aliquod etiam sine culpa ferunt. Gen. xxxi. 36; Job vi. 24: *ἐφ' ᾧ* (*in quo*) hic est *per quem,* quomodo *ἐπὶ* cum dativo sumitur Luc. v. 5; Act. iii. 16; 1 Cor. viii. 11. Then he quotes Chrysostom, *ἐκείνου πεσόντος...θνητοί,* as above.

Whitby (on vv. 12 and 19) follows Grotius and insists that *in whom* must be the correct version of *ἐφ' ᾧ,* because the version *for that* induces a contradiction.

In confirmation of this he cites 1 Cor. xv. 22; but there it is not *ἐπὶ τῷ* Ἀδάμ but *ἐν τῷ* Ἀδάμ.

Locke adopts the interpretation by Metonymy and paraphrases *ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον* 'for that all Adam's posterity thereby became mortal.'

Not being satisfied with any of these interpretations, yet without the slightest suspicion of any error in the text, I

resolved to try to unravel the perplexity by allowing to each word its natural signification. ἐφ' ᾧ I rendered indifferently according to the Versions before the year 1611, in*somuch as,* or, according to our version from that date, *for that.* ἄχρι νόμου in ver. 13, I understood with Grotius to mean 'ante legem Mosis, quae gravibus facinoribus poenam ascribit mortem,' as μέχρι Μωϋσέως in the next verse; not with Origen and Augustine 'usque ad finem legis Mosaicae' (Critici sacri). Then, noting that γὰρ in ver. 13 was ushering in a reason, I observed that the reason was repugnant to ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον, but confirmatory of the earlier part of the statement in ver. 12. Thus it appeared that ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον, while seeming to confirm what preceded, was both contradicting it and verse 17, and intercepting a good reason for it immediately following.

Then I observed that, although ver. 13 lent no support to ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον, yet conversely ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον was a corroboration of ἄχρι νόμου ἁμαρτία ἦν ἐν κόσμῳ, one indeed which the Apostle might have used, (though with a little detriment to the sequence of his argument) had he not already used it twice in iii. 9 and 23. These reflexions led me to the conclusion that ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον was a marginal gloss on ἄχρι...κόσμῳ, taken from iii. 23, and that this is the answer to be given to Chrysostom's query echoed by Theophylact.

Here I must acknowledge that the MSS exhibit no variation and that I have nowhere met with any expression of doubt as to the correctness of the text: but I know that Bentley did not believe that the MSS could supply correction of all errors; that Valckenaer (Scholae in 1 Cor. xv. 29) says, "In omnibus libris antiquis mendae remanserunt antiquiores codicibus, quibus adeoque sanandis nulla datur medicina, aut in ingenio petenda est;" and that Porson says on Mark vii. 6, "The transcribers of the Greek MSS have in other places been very prone to stuff out the text with the same sentence:" of which he gives examples (Letters to Travis, p. 166). I must add one. In several MSS the first verse in chap. viii. of this same Epistle contains a line taken from the fourth verse of the same chapter. In consequence our Version has it in both verses.

GILBERT AINSLIE.

PROPERTIUS III (II) 34 61—84.

PROPERTIUS gives his opinion of Virgil's different works in these beautiful and very interesting verses; but as they now stand, there is much difficulty and obscurity in them. In the first place the way in which the poet passes to and fro from the third to the second person, and then from the second to the third, then back again to the second, and still once more to the third in addressing Virgil, is intolerably harsh even for him. And in the next place, after asserting in vv. 77—80 that the georgics are as perfect a poem as Apollo himself could compose, it is quite ludicrous to go on to say that yet this poem will not be unwelcome to any reader, whether new to love or not. Why, what more in the world would a reader have, and what have the georgics to do with teaching love? Much of the obscurity and absurdity vanishes at once by a simple transposition, made by Prof. O. Ribbeck in a Kiel program which the writer courteously sent me about a year ago. In vv. 67—76 'Tu canis umbrosi—Hamadryadas', the poet speaks of the eclogues: then in 77—80 'Tu canis—articulis' of the georgics, having first of all extolled the coming Aeneid: Ribbeck simply puts the four verses concerning the georgics before the ten which treat of the eclogues, vastly to the benefit of the whole passage; the transposition too is easily accounted for by the same words 'Tu canis' commencing each of these sections. So far then all is in order: after saying in v. 75 that Tityrus is now resting wearied with his oaten pipe, yet is he praised by the kindly wood-nymphs, in v. 81 he thus proceeds: 'yet these eclogues such as they are will be welcome to every reader, whether new to love or not'. But then follow two difficult verses which stand thus in the manuscripts:

> Nec minor hic animis aut sim minor ore canorus
> Anseris indocto carmine cessit olor.

All editions rightly give *si* for *sim*, the *m* having come from *minor*. Ribbeck's transposition throws some light on these lines too; but I have never seen any explanation of them, as they stand, in the least satisfactory to my mind: Lachmann in his first and large edition transposes and alters them to very little purpose: most editors read *his* for *hic*, but with small result; and Mr Paley makes 'cessit carmine' = cessit carmini, comparing several other ablatives in Propertius. But neither Propertius nor any Latin writer to my knowledge has an ablative really like this which I should look upon as portentous. It appears to me that the omission of a single letter will make all clear: for 'Anseris' I read 'Anseri', which the scribes would have been sure to alter for metrical reasons: thus in Juvenal XII 32 Jahn and Mayor seem rightly to follow Lachmann in reading 'Arborĭ incertae' for 'Arboris' of Mss.; and in Lucretius VI 743 'Remigĭ oblitae' is changed by the scribes to 'Remigio ob.': comp. Virgil's 'Insulae Ionio', Catullus' 'lectulŏ erudituli', Ennius' 'Scipiŏ invicte', and the like. The sense then will be: And not lower here (*hic* i.e. in the eclogues) in genius, or, if somewhat lower in expression (minor ore), yet here too the tuneful swan has not by an unskilled song yielded the palm to Anser (the goose): an allusion, as all have seen, to Virgil's own 'argutos inter strepere anser olores'.

I would here add that as the best Ms. N omits the end of v. 83 'minor ore canorus', so above it has lost the conclusion of the corrupt v. 53, which in other Mss. is given thus 'Nec si post Stygias aliquid restaverit undas' or 'restabit erumnas': Jacob's 'arbiter undas' I believe to be right; but 'aliquis sedet' or 'manet' is not probable: I would read 'Nec si post Stygias aliquid rest (= re est) arbiter undas': comp. Propertius' own 'Sunt aliquid manes: letum non omnia finit'; Ovid's 'Aut sine re nomen deus est', and similar expressions.

H. A. J. MUNRO.

VIRGIL AND SENECA, ETC.

One cannot read the tragedies of Seneca without feeling in every page how thoroughly the writer's mind was saturated with Virgil and the odes of Horace. As the great contemporary grammarians and commentators have perished, he might be looked upon as after Ovid one of the oldest extant illustrators of Virgil. Born apparently not more than ten or fifteen years after the poet's death, he must have been brought up among those who were best acquainted with him and his editors, and who would have preserved the first and freshest traditions as to the meaning of obscure passages; for his father was not many years younger than the poet himself and dwelt in the very focus of the intensest literary life of Rome.

Aeneid vi 545, Deiphobus says to the impatient Sibyl, 'Discedam, explebo numerum reddarque tenebris': Conington prefers one of Servius' explanations, 'I will fill up the number of the shades by rejoining them'; but says that the meaning is not yet placed beyond doubt. Though he quotes I see a line from Seneca after Forbiger, I will cite the whole passage, because it appears to me to prove that Seneca thus understood Virgil: Phaedra (Hippol.) 1158 'Pallas Actaeae veneranda genti, Quod tuus caelum superosque Theseus Spectat et fugit Stygias paludes, Casta nil debes patruo rapaci: Constat inferno numerus tyranno'. As Theseus was fated to return to the light, 'the nether tyrant has his tale complete', 'numerus expletur', nothing is due to him.

Vss. 743 744 of the same book are even more obscure, forming as they do a strange parenthesis in the midst of an otherwise continuous description; but I here speak only of 'Quisque suos patimur manis', which I am convinced means simply 'we put on, bear the burden, each one of us good or bad, of his own

manes, or garb of death', i.e. the shadowy semblance of one's living self which the dead spirit was supposed to assume at the funeral pile or elsewhere. This is illustrated by the old picture in the Vatican Virgil, and, as I think, by Seneca ibid. 1226 'Donator atrae lucis, Alcide, tuum Diti remitte munus, ereptos mihi Restitue manes. impius frustra invoco Mortem relictam'.

Aen. II 12 'animus meminisse horret luctuque refugit': the perfect is illustrated by the Herc. Furens 1199 'Miserere, genitor, supplices tendo manus: Quid hoc? manus refugit: hic errat scelus'; and perhaps by Hor. epist. II 2 170 'Sed vocat usque suum, qua populus adsita certis Limitibus vicina refugit iurgia'. I think I have observed similar uses of *fūgit* and *suffūgit*.

Seneca's prose as well is full of allusions to Virgil's language: epist. 74 29 'aeque magna est [virtus], etiamsi in se recessit undique exclusa' has a reference to georg. IV 147 'spatiis exclusus iniquis', and shews that *exclusus* = inclusus, and something more: 'shut up within narrow limits and prevented from expanding myself freely'.

Ovid would be an older interpreter than Seneca: in georg. III 232 we have the obscure expression 'irasci in cornua'. Conington comes to the conclusion that it may perhaps virtually = 'irasci cornibus'. Aen. x 725 'surgentem in cornua cervum' is also not very clear: Heyne thinks it means 'surgere, eminere, erigere se cornibus', but has more of *ἐναργείας*. From the more precise expression in the Metamorphoses x 538 'Aut pronos lepores aut celsum in cornua cervum', Ovid too would seem thus to have understood Virgil: 'high-raised by their horns' or 'towards, in the direction of their horns'.

Ecl. III 16 'Quid domini faciant, audent cum talia fures?' seems to be a reminiscence of Catullus 66 47 'Quid facient crines, cum ferro talia cedant?': Virgil has the more poetical indicative in the second clause, while Catullus employs the more usual subjunctive. Perhaps the same love of variety has induced him to put *faciant* for Catullus' *facient;* but the manifest echo of the ars III 655 'Quid sapiens faciet, stultus cum munere gaudet?' would dispose one to infer that Ovid found or fancied he had found *facient* in his Virgil.

One other passage I will seek to illustrate from writers of the same or the next generation: Georg. IV 372 'Eridanus, quo non alius per pinguia culta In mare purpureum violentior effluit amnis'. In another place he calls it 'fluviorum rex', by which he would seem to denote its size. As it is far the greatest river in Italy, patriotism would induce the people, while their geographical notions were limited, to think it therefore one of the largest and swiftest rivers in the world: indeed Strabo in his dry prose says it is the greatest river in Europe next to the Danube. As to its rapidity, I see from Conington that opinions are much divided: it has, I can testify from crossing it more than once in boats, a very powerful current; but last September on going over it near Ferrara by the railway-bridge, a young friend and I, looking by the way over different sides of the bridge, came to somewhat different conclusions; he pooh-poohing its rapidity and being certainly a far acuter observer than I am. But let us hear Livy: XXI 43 4 he puts into Hannibal's mouth the words, 'circa Padus amnis, maior ac violentior Rhodano': these words are supposed to be spoken only a few weeks after Hannibal had crossed the Rhone where it was six times as great as the Po at any point which he could possibly have seen, and certainly one of the very swiftest of large rivers. After this we need not feel surprised at Virgil's hyperbole, who like his 'conterraneus' Livy would feel a local pride in the great Cisalpine stream: just think how Pope and other patriots speak of our respectable but not gigantic Thames. At the same time editors seem not to attend enough to the way in which Virgil limits his statement: 'In mare—effluit': in this perhaps is contained the gist of his expression; which then might be illustrated by the oldest extant Italian geographer Pomponius Mela who says (II 63) 'inde tam citus prosilit [Padus], ut discussis fluctibus diu qualem emisit undam agat, suumque etiam in mari alveum servet'. I have never seen its mouths, and am unable to say if this description applies at the present day.

H. A. J. MUNRO.

ON *ἀναιρεῖν* AND *ἐναίρειν*, 'TO SLAY.'

THE meaning of both these words in the above sense is familiar to most; the origin of that meaning however is rather obscure, and the investigation of it leads to some curious results.

That *αἴρέω* and *αἴρω* are forms of the same word cannot be doubted. 'To remove by lifting[1]' is the primary idea of both. The root contained the lost F (compare *ἀείρω*), which accounts for the aspirate in *αἴρέω*, and the double form has the analogy of *κίω*, *κύσω*, *κυέω*, *κυήσω*, *αἴνω* and *αἰνέω*, *κύρω* and *κυρέω*, *μαρτύρομαι* and *μαρτυρέω*, and many other words. The former compound is more readily explained than the other. It was a euphemism, and signified generally, 'to make away with.' It was a very old notion that when a person was lost, or had disappeared from sight, he had been caught up into heaven, or carried away by a tornado. Hence such notions arose as that of the Sphinx and the Harpies, and the idea is very clearly seen in such passages as Od. I. 241,

νῦν δέ μιν ἀκλειῶς ἅρπυιαι ἀνηρείψαντο,

with which compare XX. 77, and ib. 66,

ὡς δ' ὅτε Πανδαρέου κούρας ἀνέλοντο θύελλαι.

So also Il. VI. 345,

ὥς μ' ὄφελ' ἤματι τῷ, ὅτε με πρῶτον τέκε μήτηρ,
οἴχεσθαι προφέρουσα κακὴ ἀνέμοιο θύελλα.

Hence too arose the beautiful legend of Boreas carrying off Orithyia, Plat. Phædr. p. 229 C, *φαίην ἂν αὐτὴν πνεῦμα Βορέου κατὰ τῶν πλησίον πετρῶν σὺν Φαρμακείᾳ παίζουσαν ὦσαι· καὶ οὕτω δὴ τελευτήσασαν λεχθῆναι ὑπὸ τοῦ Βορέου ἀνάρπαστον*

[1] So Il. XXIII. 736, *ἀέθλια δ' ἴσ' ἀνελόντες*, 'lifting and carrying off equal prizes,' and hence the Attic use of *αἶρε* for *φέρε*, Soph. Aj. 545, Ar. Pac. 1.

γεγονέναι. From this notion of sudden and mysterious removal a man was said ἀνηρπάσθαι or ἀνάρπαστος γεγονέναι or ἀνηρῆσθαι, as in Dem. Mid. p. 555, ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ ἴσως διεωσάμην, καὶ ἄλλος τις ἂν, ψευδῆ λόγον καὶ συκοφαντίαν, καὶ οὐκ ἀνήρπασμαι, and *ibid.* p. 548 fin., ὡς δέον, εἴ τις ὑβρισθεὶς ὑπὸ τούτου δίκης ἀξιοῖ τυχεῖν καὶ μὴ σιωπᾷ, τοῦτον ἐξόριστον ἀνηρῆσθαι καὶ μηδαμῆ παρεθῆναι, i.e. 'to be caught up and carried beyond the confines and there put to death, and not to be allowed to return (lit. to be allowed to pass in) even for burial.' This last passage is interesting as illustrating the transitional meaning between the old Epic and the common Attic. Hesychius, ἀναιρετὴς, φονευτής. ἀναιρῶ, φονεύω. ἀνεῖλεν, ἐφόνευσεν. ἀνέλω· φονεύσω. It is unnecessary to give examples from the classic writers, the use being a common one.

Our term 'to make away with' is therefore an exact equivalent to ἀναιρεῖν. Both phrases are intended to avoid the shock to the feelings which would be caused by more plainly suggesting a violent end. So the Greeks use ἄφαντος and ἀφανισθῆναι of one lost at sea.

Still more common and (as I should have expected before knowing the fact, but after investigating the word) more *epic* is ἐναίρειν. Thus, Il. XXIV. 243,

> ῥηίτεροι γὰρ μᾶλλον Ἀχαιοῖσιν δὴ ἔσεσθε
> κείνου τεθνηῶτος ἐναιρέμεν.

Ibid. XXI. 485,

> ἤτοι βέλτερόν ἐστι κατ' οὔρεα θῆρας ἐναίρειν.

In the middle voice, Il. XVI. 92, Τρῶας ἐναιρόμενος. Hesych. ἐναίρει· ἀναιρεῖ, φθείρει.—ἔναιρε· ἄνελε, φόνευε, σκύλευε.—ἐναίρειν· τὰ αὐτά.

Now a remarkable fact here presents itself; the active aorist of ἐναίρειν is not ἐνῆρα but ἤναρον, and yet the medial aorist is ἐνήρατο, regularly inflected as from αἴρομαι. Hom. Il. v. 43,

> Ἰδομενεὺς δ' ἄρα Φαίστον ἐνήρατο, Μῆονος υἱόν.

The common epic word for 'spoils' is ἔναρα, often associated with the epithet βροτόεντα, 'gory.' It becomes a question then whether ἔναρα is from ἐναίρειν, or conversely, as others think, ἐναίρειν from ἔναρα. (See Buttmann, Lexil. p. 119, in v. ἀνήνο-

θεν, who is evidently much perplexed by ἐναίρειν regarded as a compound, and hazards the very improbable suggestion[1] that it comes from ἔνεροι, and means 'to send to the infernal regions.') It seems more correct to say that ἔναρα is from the same root as ἐναίρω, and that the secondary verb ἐναρίζειν is formed directly from ἔναρα. Properly, ἐναρίζειν is 'to play the ἐναρής,' or spoiler. That the 'Εναρέες of Herod. I. 105 is really a Greek name, meaning 'spoilers,' and not a Scythian word (though, of course, the root may be the same in both languages), is clear from the context itself. But what must we say of the ἐν, which Buttmann thinks "perfectly inexplicable" (Lexil. *ibid.*)? I cannot doubt that 'to lift on a spear's point' —as a gory head, a slaughtered infant, or a mangled limb—was the original sense. This is at once perfectly consistent with the savage customs of primitive man, and gives a direct and easy transition to the sense of 'spoils,' since a skull, a scalp, or a skin of an enemy would always be regarded in this light. It was therefore a war-word in times the most remote and uncivilized.

Such an explanation would suggest a new and very emphatic sense to such verses as Il. XIII. 483,

ὃς μάλα καρτερός ἐστι μάχῃ ἔνι φῶτας ἐναίρειν.

The *lifting* a corpse on a spear would be an act of great strength, but by no means an impossible feat.

As for the aorist ἤναρον it seems formed (like ἠμφίει, ἤμπισχεν in later Greek) by prefixing the augment to the preposition, regarded as an integral part of the word. The metrical convenience of such a form, which embodies the short ἀρ of the root[2], would sufficiently account for its taking the place of

[1] He remarks however that καθαίρειν, 'to purify,' is from καθαρὸς, not compounded of κατά.

[2] The root seems to have been ἀϜρ = ἀϜερ, ἀϜορ. Compare ἄορ, 'a sword,' παρήορος, ἠέρθη, ἄωρτο, ἀορτήρ, with ἀείρω. The shortened root ἀρ in ἐναρεῖν would result from the total evanescence of the Ϝ, a fact not without analogies even in the more archaic language. The aorist of αἱρέω, ἑλεῖν, may be explained by the ρ being convertible into λ, as λείριον is *lilium*, &c. In the Homeric γέντο the λ is again changed into ν (as ἤνθε for ἤλθε), and the initial Ϝ into γ.

the more regular active *ἐνῆρα*, while *ἐνήρατο* is more convenient than *ἠνάρετο*. Or it may result from a mere interchange of the long and short syllables.

As an appendix to these remarks I may briefly add that *ἀναιρεῖν*, in the well-known sense of 'giving an oracular answer,' as *ἀνεῖλεν ἡ Πυθία*, Herod. I. 13, seems to refer to the *raising up* from the regions below the responses which the spirits in Hades were thought capable of giving.

F. A. PALEY.

ON THE WORD *ἀδάμας*, 'ADAMANT.'

NEITHER the ancient nor the modern lexicographers appear to have had any clear idea of the meaning of this word. Indeed, the vagueness of the expression is seen by its use even in early poets. Like our term *adamant*, which is a merely poetical and non-existent thing, it was supposed to be some very hard material; steel, or iron, or some sort of stone, or even the diamond, were taken as possible representatives of it. Thus, in the Prometheus[1], we find mention of "adamantine chains;" Pindar[2] gives to Jason an "adamantine plough;" but this was a secondary and merely poetic sense, like the "adamantini clavi" of Horace[3]. Hesychius has *ἀδάμας· γένος σιδήρου.* In another gloss, *ἀγνάμων, ἀπειθὴς, ἀθαμβὴς, ἰσχυρός. καὶ ὁ λίθος.* Liddell and Scott's Lexicon gives as the meaning "the hardest metal, probably *steel*." But none of these give the true and original meaning, about which there can be no doubt. Ἀδάμας meant *basalt*. Hence, as that material was plutonic, or associated with volcanic regions, it was very appropriately taken by the poets as denoting the hard substance of which the walls of hell were built; thus Propertius, v. 11. 3:

"Cum semel infernas intrarunt funera leges,
Non exorato stant adamante viæ."

[1] ver. 6.
[2] Pyth. IV. 224.
[3] Carm. III. 24, 5 (from Pind. Pyth. IV. 125).

A sacrificial knife made of adamant is a 'celt' or stone axe; Ovid, Fast. III. 805,

"Immolat hunc Briareus facta ex *adamante* securi."

With which compare Lucret. II. 447, "in primis adamantina saxa Prima acie constant ictus contemnere sueta."

The epithets applied to adamant by the epic poets[1], χλωρὸς and πολιὸς, 'grey' or 'glistening,' very well suit the colour of the material, which has many shades, from grey and green to black, and the crystalline fracture, with specks of felspar, augite, olivine, &c., which impart a shining appearance to some specimens. This is the Στυγὸς μελανοκάρδιος πέτρα of Arist. Ran. 470.

The origin of the name, if this view is right, is curious. It is not, like the names of so many gems, Indian, but Greek. The term for *reducing* or smelting ore was δαμάζειν. Thus, Hes. Theog. 865, it is said of iron, that

οὔρεος ἐν βήσσῃσι δαμαζόμενος πυρὶ κηλέῳ
τήκεται ἐν χθονὶ δίῃ.

Eurip. Alcest. 980, speaking of Ἀνάγκη, says,

καὶ τὸν ἐν Χαλύβοις δαμάζεις σὺ βίᾳ σίδηρον.

Aesch. Cho. 315,

τέκνον, φρόνημα τοῦ
θανόντος οὐ δαμάζει
πυρὸς μαλερὰ γνάθος.

Now the appearance of basalt, especially from its very great weight, is so like some kinds of iron ore, that by an unscientific person it would very easily be mistaken. I conceive therefore that in early times attempts had been made to extract iron from basalt, and on the experiment failing after repeated trials, it was appropriately termed *irreducible*. And its actual hardness combined with its obstinacy under the fire (for though we can melt basalt, the ancients could not) afterwards made the term a general one to express any material that resisted all ordinary efforts to break it.

[1] Hes. Scut. 231, Theog. 161.

F. A. PALEY.

EMENDATION OF A PASSAGE IN PINDAR.

In Pyth. vi. 10—18, there is an interesting description of a treasure-house of songs, *θησαυρὸς ὕμνων*, which the poet says is built at Delphi for the wealthy clan of the Emmenidæ, and which no storm shall overthrow and no torrent shall overwhelm with drift and sweep away into the sea. Then follow these very difficult words:

φάει δὲ πρόσωπον ἐν καθαρῷ
πατρὶ τεῷ Θρασύβουλε, κοινάν τε γενεᾷ
λόγοισι θνατῶν
εὔδοξον ἅρματι νίκαν
Κρισαίαισιν ἐν πτυχαῖς ἀπαγγελεῖ.

Which Dr Donaldson renders, "The hymn, with joyful, serene countenance (as befits a messenger of good news) will announce a chariot-victory, glorious through the reports of men, and common, O Thrasybulus, to thy father and thy clan."

Now, to justify this version of the words *ὕμνος πρόσωπον ἐν καθαρῷ φάει ἀπαγγελεῖ νίκαν* (which, in fact, are nonsense) Dr Donaldson proposes to supply *ἔχων* to govern *πρόσωπον*, and somewhat awkwardly takes *πατρὶ τεῷ κοινάν τε γενεᾷ* as equivalent to *κοινὰν πατρὶ τεῷ γενεᾷ τε*.

I do not believe that *πρόσωπον* refers to the bright face of the messenger, but I think it means the conspicuous façade of the treasure-house, just as in Ol. vi. 3 we have *πρόσωπον τηλαυγές* applied to the front of a palace. Then *ἐν καθαρῷ* should refer to the *clear* place in which the building stands, i.e. not half buried by the sand and gravel. By the insertion of a single letter, viz. reading *φανεῖ* for *φάει*, all becomes plain and easy: "It (the *θησαυρὸς ὕμνων*) will show its front in a clear site to your father, Thrasybulus, and will report (i.e. virtually, the *hymn* will report) a victory gained in the chariot-race, a common glory

to him and to the whole clan, to be celebrated by the praises of mortals." The τε couples the two verbs φανεῖ and ἀπαγγελεῖ.

F. A. PALEY.

EMENDATION OF A PASSAGE IN TACITUS.

In the eleventh book of the Annals, chap. 4, we read:

Vocantur post hæc patres, pergitque Suillius addere reos equites Romanos inlustres, quibus Petra cognomentum. At causa necis ex eo quod domum suam Mnesteris et Poppææ congressibus præbuissent. Verum nocturnæ quietis species alteri objecta, tanquam vidisset Claudium spicea corona evinctum, spicis retro conversis, eaque imagine gravitatem annonæ dixisset.

Here we have the statement, which is not in itself illogical, that two brothers were accused (and it afterwards appears, were put to death), because they had lent their mansion to the illicit meetings of Poppæa and her paramour; but that one of them was charged with interpreting a dream in a manner that was thought derogatory to the Emperor Claudius. But surely, as a matter of Latinity, *at* is used very strangely[1] in the second sentence, as introducing the cause of the accusation. I think that for *at—præbuissent* we should read *alteri—præbuisset*, the corruption having arisen from the compendium *alt.* Then we get this much clearer and better sense: "One of them was put to death for having lent his mansion, &c., while the other was accused of a disloyal interpretation of a dream." The historian adds: "Illud haud ambigitur, qualicunque insomnio ipsi fratrique perniciem adlatam;" which means, I think, that the *nominal* cause of the death of both was the dream, while the *real* cause was the fact that one of them had secretly favoured the amours of the Empress—a fact communicated by the informer privately to the Emperor, though not made a public charge.

[1] Since writing the above, I see that Haase incloses *at* in brackets.

F. A. PALEY.

1 THESS. III. 3.

In this passage there is a peculiar variation of reading. The later MSS. give *τῷ μὴ σαίνεσθαι*, while ℵ, A, D, E have *τὸ μὴ σαίνεσθαι*, which is undoubtedly right, and = *ὥστε μὴ σαίνεσθαι*, 'so as not to be won over.' There is a precisely similar variation in Thucyd. II. 102. 5, in describing the islands at the mouth of the river Achelous. *τό τε γὰρ ῥεῦμά ἐστι μέγα καὶ θολερὸν, αἵ τε νῆσοι πυκναὶ, καὶ ἀλλήλαις τῆς προσχώσεως τῷ* (E, K, i have *τὸ*) *μὴ σκεδάννυσθαι σύνδεσμοι γίγνονται, παραλλὰξ καὶ οὐ κατὰ στοῖχον κείμεναι, οὐδ' ἔχουσαι εὐθείας διόδους τοῦ ὕδατος ἐς τὸ πέλαγος.* If *τῷ* be read here, the only admissible sense of the dative is the instrumental one, and the subject of *σκεδάννυσθαι* must be sought for in *αἱ νῆσοι*, "because they, the islands, are not dispersed." But would not this have required *ἐσκεδάσθαι*, the perfect, instead of *σκεδάννυσθαι*, the present? There is no need of Poppo's correction *τοῦ* for *τῷ*, but the reading *τὸ* gives both a complete sense and the required sense, indicating that the islands from their position become 'fastenings' of the deposit so as for it not to be dispersed? It is singular, that precisely the same variation of reading should occur in these two passages, which reciprocally illustrate each other.

PIND. *Isth.* V. (VI.) 66.

λίσσομαι παῖδα θρασὺν ἐξ Ἐριβοίας
ἀνδρὶ τῷδε, ξεῖνον ἀμὸν μοιρίδιον τελέσαι,
τὸν μὲν κ.τ.λ.

All the commentators translate the latter part of the second of the above lines, after Hermann; "to make my friend perfectly happy." *Expeto abs te huic viro filium, qui hospitem meum*

beatum reddat. Dr Donaldson doubts whether the words will bear this meaning, in which I fully agree with him, and, removing the colon at τελέσαι, translates τελέσαι as equivalent to γεννῆσαι, quoting Pind. P. III. 8, 9, where τελέσαι is used of a *mother*, and Eurip. Bacchæ, 104, where it is used of the Fates, but not bringing forward any passage in which it is applied to a *father*. For my own part I am inclined to refer to the frequent use of τέλειος as applied to marriage or to Hera as presiding over marriage. A man was imperfect until he had completed his essential existence as such by the possession of a wife, and a married pair would similarly be looked upon as imperfect until the birth of an heir. I thus translate with some confidence: "I pray for a bold son by Eribœa for this man, to *perfect* (ὥστε τελέσαι) my fate-protected friend." I should proceed with the rest of the passage as Dr Donaldson has proposed.

1 PET. III. 21.

ὃ καὶ ἡμᾶς ἀντίτυπον νῦν σώζει βάπτισμα, (οὐ σαρκὸς ἀπόθεσις ῥυπου, ἀλλὰ συνειδήσεως ἀγαθῆς ἐπερώτημα εἰς Θεὸν) δι' ἀναστάσεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ.

This passage has so long presented such difficulty to commentators, that no one, who believes himself able to throw any light upon it, needs excuse for endeavouring to do so. Assuming as matter of common sense and scholarship, that διεσώθησαν δι' ὕδατος in the preceding verse means 'were brought safe through water,' and not 'were saved by water,' which is simply contrary to the fact, and also that ἐπερώτημα means a 'contract' or 'engagement' according to the gloss of Œcumenius: ἐπερώτημα δὲ τοῦτ' ἐστιν, ἀῤῥαβὼν, ἐνέχυρον, ἀπόδειξις, we are perplexed by a most awkward construction in the words: ὃ καὶ ἡμᾶς ἀντίτυπον νῦν σώζει βάπτισμα. The neuter relative ὃ appears to have (1) an adjective, ἀντίτυπον, and then (2) a substantive, βάπτισμα, in apposition to it. In a dithyrambic poem we might possibly endeavour to deal with such a

construction, but in plain prose we cannot very easily find a parallel to it. Reference to any commentary will satisfy the reader of the contorted nature of the explanations to which recourse must be had, if the usual method of taking ὅ, *ἀντίτυπον* and *βάπτισμα*, as *nominatives* in apposition with each other, is adopted. Very early this difficulty appears to have been noticed, and ὃ was altered into ᾧ in a large number of MSS. But is it necessary to consider ὃ as the subject of the sentence at all? Is it not at least equally legitimate to take into consideration such passages as Rom. VI. 10, *ὃ γὰρ ἀπέθανε, τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ ἀπέθανεν ἐφάπαξ, ὃ δὲ ζῇ, ζῇ τῷ Θεῷ*; Gal. II. 20, *ὃ δὲ νῦν ζῶ ἐν σαρκὶ, ἐν πίστει ζῶ*; 1 Cor. III. 2, *γάλα ὑμᾶς ἐπότισα*; and Thucyd. VI. 11, *ὅπερ οἱ Ἐγεσταῖοι ἡμᾶς μάλιστα ἐκφοβοῦσι*, and construe ὃ as the cognate object instead of the subject of *σώζει*. Thus as *ὃ ἀπέθανε = ὃν θάνατον ἀπέθανε*, and *ὃ ζῶ = ἣν ζωὴν ζῶ*, so *ὃ καὶ ἡμᾶς ἀντίτυπον νῦν σώζει βάπτισμα = ἣν σωτηρίαν καὶ ἡμᾶς ἀντίτυπον νῦν σώζει βάπτισμα*, where it is immaterial whether we connect *ἀντίτυπον* with the accusative ὃ or the nominative *βάπτισμα*. The sense thus obtained is particularly simple. The events previously alluded to are stated as having taken place, "while the ark was preparing, by entering into which few, that is eight, souls were brought safe through water; a salvation which, being antitypical, baptism now confers upon us [lit. 'saves us']; (not the putting off of fleshly filth, but an honest [lit. 'good conscience's'] contract with reference to God) by virtue of the resurrection of Jesus Christ." There is thus no necessity of forcing into comparison the destroying water of the flood and the saving water of baptism, no awkwardness of expression or meaning left, and the figurative correspondence between the flood and baptism is complete. As Noah and his family were brought safe through the waters of the flood into a new state of life in the new order of things, so are we brought safe through a figurative death in baptism into a new order of things as Christians, to whom "the old things have passed away, lo! all things have become new."

A. H. WRATISLAW.

HEADING OF THE PARIS MS. OF THE IGNATIAN EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS.

In a paper on *Two neglected facts bearing on the Ignatian Controversy* in the last number of this Journal, I stated (p. 49 sq.) that the heading of the Ignatian Epistle to the Romans in the only extant MS (Colb. 1451) of the Middle Recension is πρὸς Ῥωμαίους. This statement was made on the combined authority of Jacobson, Dressel, and Petermann, the three most recent editors. Petermann distinctly says that this is the reading of 'Lat. 1 ut Gr. 1' (i.e. of both the Latin and Greek texts of the Middle Recension); Jacobson and Dressel, if they do not refer to the MS for the title, yet head the epistle πρὸς Ῥωμαίους, though it stands between two epistles whose headings represent the other type, Τραλλιάνοις Ἰγνάτιος and Φιλαδελφεῦσιν Ἰγνάτιος. I seemed therefore to have the very best reasons for the statement; but, since the paper was written, I have been at Paris and collated the MS itself. I find that this epistle has *no heading at all*, the text of the letter being written continuously with the text of the martyrology in which it is inserted, without any title or indication of a break. It is correctly printed in Ruinart's *Act. Sinc. Mart.* p. 15. We may indeed infer that its title was πρὸς Ῥωμαίους from the rendering of the Latin Version (see the last number p. 50), as also from the expression used in the martyrology in introducing it, οἷα πρὸς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ἐπιστέλλει Ῥωμαίων; but direct evidence fails us. If I mistake not, my argument remains unimpaired notwithstanding this fact: but I take the opportunity of correcting an error into which I had been led by editors of the Ignatian Epistles, and which probably would have been followed by others.

J. B. LIGHTFOOT.

REMARKS ON MR W. G. CLARK'S ARTICLE, ENTITLED "ENGLISH PRONUNCIATION OF GREEK."

The following brief observations are meant as commentary rather than as reply.

Following the order of Mr Clark's article I would draw attention, in the first place, to a point of some interest with

regard to the pronunciation of *κ*. In Magna Græcia, I learn from Mr Clark, *κ* was in some cases pronounced like the soft Italian *c*. No doubt this would be in the same cases as those in which the Italian *c* is so pronounced, namely before *e* and *i* sounds. I do not however believe that the pronunciation of Magna Græcia arose from a "corrupt following" of the Italians. I should rather be disposed to believe it was the other way. First, because this pronunciation is now prevalent, especially in Crete, a part of Greece perhaps the furthest removed from Italian influence though I dare say it obtains elsewhere. Secondly, because the usual and comparatively hard pronunciation of *κ* by Greeks before *e* and *i* sounds, is already an approach to the Italian soft *c*, and constitutes one of the main difficulties in the pronunciation of Greek. I never understood till I went to Greece how a sound like *chee-* could ever come out of what must originally have been *kee-*, as is apparently the case in Italian. But as soon as I looked at a Greek's mouth when he said *καὶ*, *ἐκεῖνος*, *κίνδυνος*, the mystery was explained. I cannot teach this pronunciation on paper, but I will do my best to describe it. The tongue comes well forward to the palate, so that the tip appears between the teeth. The reason is very clear. The sounds *ι* and *ε* are palatal vowels, as compared with *α* and *ω* or even *ου* (Italian *u*), and the Greek laws of "Sandhi" as the Sanskrit Grammarians would call them require the *κ* to be palatal too. I noticed that whenever this palatal *κ* (an idea of the sound of which may be obtained by sounding a *k* with a *t* before it as *tkeen*), was very forcibly or emphatically pronounced, it had a tendency to become *ch*, a tendency completely carried out in the Cretan pronunciation. I will not say that the Italians got the *c* soft from the Greeks in Magna Græcia, but if they developed it themselves they must have developed it, I think, by the same process. It thus becomes plain not only how the *ch* sound could arise in Italian, but also why *e* and *i* are the only vowels before which the change takes place.

As to the theoretical question how did the ancient Greeks pronounce their language? it is hard to answer it without first propounding another; Who were the ancient Greeks? If the Greeks of the Ptolemaic era are meant, then certainly the re-

searches of M. Rénan have gone far to shew that the Semitic transcriptions of this period speak with one voice in favour of the modern Greek pronunciation. If the Greeks of the Roman period be allowed the title of ancient, then the bad spelling in inscriptions belonging to that time tell the same tale. Unfortunately I have here room only for assertions and not for proofs.

I quite admit that *ι, η, υ, ει, οι,* and *υι* had at one time different sounds, but I think, to mention nothing else, *πῖδαξ* from *πηδάω, ἵκω* and *ἥκω, βύβλος* and *βίβλος, εἵλη* and *ἵλη, λέγει* and *λέγῃ* (2 pass. of *λέγω*), incontestably prove that at least a strong tendency to Ioticism was prevalent even in the age of Homer.

The very early pronunciation of the diphthongs as simple letters is, I think, conclusively proved by the fact of the diæresis which would otherwise be superfluous, and the fact, be it remembered, is as old as Homer, whenever the sign may have come into use. That *αι* and *οι* were usually not only simple sounds but short too, we know from prosody and scansion.

As to the consonants, *β* is pronounced in Greece not like our *v* but like the German *w,* only much more strongly and explosively, if one may use the word. It is not sounded by bringing together the lower lip and the upper teeth, but by compressing the two lips together. Still in the Roman period it was used to transcribe the Roman *v,* as *Φλάβιος*. So too *φ,* and the consonantal sound of *υ* are pure lip letters and very different in point of formation from *f* or *v*. This is an important distinction, because it is easy to see how *ἀ-υτός* rapidly pronounced, the *υ* sounded like the German *ü,* would almost inevitably become *ἀφτός*; whereas aftós would be, I think, inexplicable. As for *ζ* and *δ* they throw light upon each other. If *δέλτα* be pronounced as *d* in Spanish, and *ζ* like our own *z,* I at once understand *τωθάσδω* becoming *τωθάζω*; otherwise the change appears mysterious in the extreme. The pronunciation of *γ* as the German *g* in Tag as early as the Septuagint is placed beyond a doubt by its being used frequently to transcribe the Hebrew ע. As to *πέντε* pende, and *ἐμπρὸς* embros, who can avoid thinking of *Ἀμπρακία* and Ambracia, *ἐνδελέχεια* and *ἐντελέχεια*?

With regard to accents I would just remark: first, that having paid the utmost attention to this very point during a three months' residence in Athens I am quite convinced that the accent neither lengthens by its presence nor shortens by its absence any more than, as a rule, it does in English. Λόγος, ὀνος may appear to be so affected from the fact that the ὀ is followed by but one consonant, forming what in Hebrew would be called an open syllable. But ἐξαίρεσις, πραγματικῶς, are pronounced in the most marked manner ἐξέρεσις, πραγματικός.

I think Dionysius himself gives us a pretty clear answer to the question what he would have thought of the Accentual modern Heroic measure, when he gives as accentual (προσῳδικοὺς) the following lines which scan precisely in the same way.

Οὐ βέβηλος ὡς λέγεται τοῦ νέου Διονύσου
Κἀγὼ δ' ἐξεργασίης [reading corrupt] ὠργιασμένος ἦκω.

Hephæstion's Enchiridion completes the triplet thus:

Ὀδεύων Πελουσιακὸν κνεφαῖος παρὰ τέλμα.

What has been called the clashing of the accentual with the quantitative beat constitutes the real beauty of quantitative measure.

It is this τύπος ἀντίτυπος which makes the charm and melody of the old heroic measure. The accent and quantity of these two words as well as the thought expressed in them seem to me exactly to embody the idea of beauty in quantitative versification, which is, as beauty always is, the harmony of contrasts. Where both coincide, as very rarely in Epic poetry,—

(Indignor quandoque bonus dormitat Homerus,)

then the other part of the line (in which, happily for my illustration, this coincidence takes place) is realized:

καὶ πῆμ' ἐπὶ πήματι κεῖται.

E. M. GELDART.

THE JOURNAL

OF

PHILOLOGY.

ON THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN GREEK LANGUAGE.

If the question were asked, what is the origin of the Greek of the present day? is it the offshoot of Byzantine literature, the creation of Church fathers, or of philosophers, sophists, and rhetoricians, or is its source to be looked for in the common dialect of the Ptolemaic era, in the idioms of Dorians, Æolians, and Bœotians, or the vulgarisms of the Athenian market-place? the true answer, perhaps, would be, it had its beginning in none of these and in all of them: in none of them alone, and in all of them together.

In speaking of the history of a language we should bear in mind the distinction between its outer and inner part, the form and the matter, the skeleton of grammar, and the life which makes that skeleton a living body with a living soul. These two parts of language should never be confounded, and yet it is sometimes hard to keep them separate. For there is an essential, as well as an actual connection between them, which may be set forth as follows.

The mere shapes and changes of words in a language may be called its grammar, while the thought of which these shapes

and changes are the expression may be spoken of as the metaphysic of the age to which it belongs. But between this outer part, the grammar, and this inner part, the thought, comes a third something, which is neither altogether outward nor altogether inward, and which, for want of a better name, we may call the logic of a language, or the way in which the thought finds utterance in words.

Now, just as the metaphysic of one age will tend to become the logic of the next, so logic will in its turn become petrified into grammar, as we shall soon see by examples in the language before us. Hence the difficulty of drawing a rigid line of demarcation between the mere vehicle of thought and the thought itself. Grammar and thought, linked as they are in the nature of the case by logic, which is the way in which the one finds utterance in the other, merge together by scarcely felt degrees, like the waves of the stream of time which bears them along, so that it is often hard to say whether we are treading in the domain of philosophy or of grammar, or lingering on the border-land between the two.

The combination of causes in producing phenomena is however no excuse for confusing them, when those phenomena are to be explained, and when we are attempting to write the history of a language, we must beware of attributing every change and development to one source. We should begin by inquiring whether there be any part of language which is quite independent of the progress of human thought. If there be, we may then proceed to inquire what are the causes which may have affected its development. Then we can go on to consider the influence of intellectual progress on such part of language as must be considered liable to be affected by it.

Nor can we be long in admitting that there is that in language which may be changed independently of the advance of thought, or remain unchanged in spite of it; and this is the mere form which words or inflexions assume, which is a very different thing, it must be remembered, from changes in their usage and meaning; or, again, from their disuse or introduction. To make this clear by an example. It is plainly, as regards the history of thought, a matter of indifference whether the

word *οἶνος* be written with or without a digamma, whether we write *ἐντὶ* as in Doric, *ἐστὶ* as in Attic, or *εἶνε* as in modern Greek, whether *ἑωϋτοῦ* as in Herodotus, *ἑαυτοῦ* or *αὑτοῦ*. It is very different when the Homeric demonstrative *ὁ, ἡ, τὸ* becomes the simple article, or when the infinitive mood in later Greek is supplanted by the subjunctive with *ἵνα*.

In accordance with the above remarks it is proposed in the following pages, first, to consider the mere forms of words and inflections, or the purely outward part of the Greek language; then the structure, in which the movement of thought already begins to play a part; finally, the use and formation of words, in which the inner life of the language attains its greatest significance.

First, then, as to mere grammatical forms; or,

1. *The Accidence of Modern Greek.*

It must not be supposed that every form discussed under this head is in common use in the language of literature and of educated men. The cultivated language for the most part preserves the grammatical forms of the age of Thucydides, avoiding, as a rule, all the extremities of the later Attic dialect, as, for instance, *θάλαττα* for *θάλασσα*, or *χερρόνησος* for *χερσόνησος*. In the language of the common people, however, the following peculiarities may be briefly noticed.

a. *δόξα*, and words like it, make in the genitive *τῆς δόξας*, in the plural *ἡ δόξαις*, acc. *ταῖς δόξαις = τὰς δόξας*.

b. A host of nouns belonging to different declensions are made to follow one. Thus *ταμίας*, *Ἄλυς*, *Μάρτις*, or *Μάρτης*, contracted from *Μάρτιος*, *Ἄρης*, *Πάρις*, *κεφαλᾶς*, are, in the singular number, all declined alike, namely, by cutting off the sign of the nominative, *-ς* in the genitive and vocative, and changing it to *ν* for the accusative.

This *ν* is dropped in pronunciation where the phonetic laws of the language admit it.

c. The plural of many words, especially of foreign origin, is formed by adding *-δες* to the stem, as *πασάδες* from *πασᾶς*,

pashas; μαϊμούδες from ἡ μαϊμοῦ, monkeys; μαννάδες, from ἡ μάννα, mothers.

These plurals are always paroxytone, whatever the accent of the word in the singular.

d. Many feminines, whose root vowel is ω or ου, take ς in the genitive singular, as ἡ μαϊμοῦ, τῆς μαϊμοῦς, ἡ Κῶ, τῆς Κῶς (exactly the reverse of the classical form, which in this case is ἡ Κῶς, τῆς Κῶ).

e. There are a few irregular nouns of a compound declension, especially verbals, in ιμον, as τὸ γράψιμον, genitive τοῦ γραψίματος, plural τὰ γραψίματα.

f. Metaplastic nouns or secondary formations are common, as ἡ αἶγα, ὁ πατέρας, ὁ βασιλέας.

g. Of the pronouns, ἐμὲ often appears as ἐμένα, and σὲ as ἐσὲ and ἐσένα, ἡμεῖς becomes often ἐμεῖς, and in the accusative both ἐμᾶς and μᾶς. The latter, used as an enclitic, supplies the place both of ἡμᾶς and ἡμῶν.

ὑμεῖς becomes σεῖς, acc. and enclitic possessive σᾶς, σας. The article, as enclitic and proclitic, is used for the personal pronoun in oblique cases.

In the verbs:

h. λέγουσι becomes λέγουν or λέγουνε. For ἔλεγον we have ἔλεγα; for ἔλεξας, ἔλεξες; for ἐλέξατε, ἐλέξετε. In the passive, instead of λέγῃ or λέγει, we find λέγεσαι, for λεγόμεθα, λεγόμεστε, λεγόμασταν, and various other forms down to the tragic λεγόμεσθα.

For ἐλέχθην we get ἐλέχθηκα. In the imperative aorist act. λέξε for λέξον, and do. passive λέξου for λέχθητι.

i. In the present tense of contracted verbs in άω, ῶ, the third person is often uncontracted, as ἀγαπάει for ἀγαπᾶ. Ἀγαπῶσι appears sometimes as ἀγαποῦν or -οῦνε, sometimes as ἀγαπᾶνε. Ἀγαποῦμεν is written for ἀγαπῶμεν, whereas νοέει, νοεῖ, and the like generally become νοάει[1], &c., ἐτίμων is ἐτιμοῦσα, -ες, -ε.

j. The verb εἰμὶ presents all the appearance of a verb in the middle voice, being conjugated thus: εἶμαι, εἶσαι, εἶνε,

[1] This particular word always appears actually as νογάει to avoid the double hiatus.

εἴμεθα, εἶσθε, εἶνε; impf. ἤμουν, ἦσο, ἦτο, ἤμεθα, ἦσθε, ἦτον; inf. εἶσθαι; imper. ἔσο.

k. The present participle active often appears as an indeclinable metaplastic in ας: ὄντας, λέγοντας, &c. The feminine λέγουσα is however by no means disused. The only other participles in use among the uneducated are the present passive, and perfect passive, the latter minus the reduplication, as γραμμένος, θλιμμένος, θραμμένος. The present participle sometimes appears as though formed from the conjugation in -μι, e.g. ἐρχάμενος, λεγάμενος. The termination -μι however is never found in the common language of the people. Finally, prepositions mostly govern the accusative; ἐκ is rare, σὺν has disappeared, and εἰς is used for ἐν. Such are the main features of modern Greek accidence. Let us attempt to account for them and to trace their development. We will begin by inquiring what causes remain to us, when we have eliminated those which belong to the intellectual movements of the Greek mind, and, of course, could explain nothing so merely external as the bare accidence of a language.

First amongst the influences which would remain to be considered is the levelling tendency common to all languages, or, in other words, the ever-increasing desire to do away with irregularities in grammar.

It may be said that all language is originally regular in intention, but in the first formation of words, the stubbornness of matter, that is, the difficulty of pronouncing certain combinations of sounds, causes irregularities in the result. These irregularities are then transmitted from race to race, and the reason of them being forgotten their existence becomes an inconvenience and a levelling tendency sets in[1].

So in English we now say, he climbed, he helped, for he clomb, he holp, and in Spanish the participle *apreso* has given way to *aprendido*. Here then at once we see the explanation of such forms as τοῦ Ἄρη, τοῦ Ἄλυ, &c. The first instance of the latter form, so far as I am aware, is to be found in an

[1] Accordingly Sanscrit is more irregular than Greek, and Greek than Latin; that is, the older a language is, the less regular is its grammar.

anonymous writer of the tenth century, known as Theophanes Continuatus.

In Constantine Porphyrogenitus, also an author of the tenth century (905—959), we get *μονογενῆ* as the vocative of *μονογενής*. Porphyrogenitus, as he tells us himself, used frequently the current forms of the vulgar Greek of his day, excepting in his life of St Basil, which is written in an artificial language in imitation of classical writers. His numerous modernisms will be noticed in their place. The very same tendency made the ancient Greeks say *τὴν ἔριν* instead of *τὴν ἔριδα*, *τὸν γέλων* for *τὸν γέλωτα*, and the like. Another similar influence is the tendency to metaplasms or secondary formations. From one point of view this may be regarded as one of the forms of the tendency to simplification above noticed, for it is plain if we turn *βασιλεὺς*, *γέρων*, *Ἄραψ*, *ἀνὴρ*, into *βασιλέας*, *γέροντας*, *Ἄραβας*, *ἄνδρας*, and decline them all like *ταμίας*, we have got one scheme of declension instead of five. But still it remains to be explained how such a form as *ἄνδρας* could arise from *ἀνὴρ*, or *βασιλέας* from *βασιλεύς*. If we turn to the Septuagint we shall find our answer. There such forms as *τὸν βασιλέαν*, *τὴν αἶγαν* are of frequent occurrence, and it is plain that such forms postulate the nominatives *ὁ βασιλέας*, *ἡ αἶγα*. Yet such forms are nowhere found till we enter the confines of modern Greek (if we except a few names of animals and birds occurring in Aristotle's natural history, as, for instance, *ἀσκαλώπας* from *ἀσκαλώψ*). Plainly, then, these metaplastic accusatives first existed alone, and the nominatives and other cases were formed from them. In all likelihood the *ν* was added to the old accusative merely from euphonic reasons to avoid the hiatus. It may be that it was almost silent or seemed so to a Greek ear, when followed by a consonant, even when it formed an essential part of the word. This is the case in the present day, and the explanation of it is to be found in the peculiarity of Greek pronunciation. All consonants are pronounced by the Greeks with the utmost force and distinctness of which they admit; and *ν*, being incapable of emphatic utterance, is by comparison scarcely heard except when followed either by a vowel or some consonant, the pronunciation of which it affects

and thereby preserves its own existence. Thus in *τὴν* Αἴγυ-*πτο(ν)* the *ν* of *τὴν* is never lost, whereas in *τὴ(ν)* Σάμο(ν) it is completely evanescent; while in *τὴν πόλιν* (pronounced *τημ*-bólin) it is preserved.

Now where the *ν* is so evanescent a letter its presence is naturally imagined wherever it would facilitate pronunciation, and it would soon be liable to be written, though not sounded, even where there were no such reason for its introduction. There may however have been a special reason for accusatives like *αἶγαν* and *βασιλέαν*. Comparative philology teaches us that a *ν* has been lost in these accusatives as also in the pronouns *σὲ* and *ἐμέ*. What wonder then if this same *ν* should have lived on in the mouth of the common people, and appeared in the Septuagint, the language of which is evidently, as far as it departs from the classical standard (a few Hebraisms of course excepted), the vulgar Greek of the period. This consideration suggests a further explanation of the grammatical phenomena of later and modern Greek. This is nothing else than the simple and well-known fact that archaisms are constantly perpetuated in the language of the vulgar which have long since been lost to literature. Our own dialects are sufficient proof of this, to go no further: witness *I can-na, he's no recht, kie, we do'n,* for *I cannot, he's not right, cows, we do;* where we have sounds or grammatical forms preserved to us which cultivated English ignores. Now to speak first of the language of the Septuagint, no mistake could be greater than to imagine that it was an artificial dialect, the results of an indiscriminate reading-up of the language. According to this theory, as recently enunciated by the Grinfield lecturer on the Septuagint at Oxford (Michaelmas term, 1868), the Greek of the Septuagint is a farrago of words culled at random from Epic Poetry, Attic Prose, and every conceivable dialect, and with a grammar, we are left to suppose, invented by the writers themselves. With the utmost respect for the learned lecturer, I would submit that such a theory is improbable in itself, and does not explain the phenomena of the Septuagint. First, it is inconceivable that there should not have been found, even at the time when the earliest parts of the translation were made,

Jews at Alexandria perfectly familiar with Greek as a spoken language. Again, if the translators had not been familiar with the language, it is impossible that they could have escaped grammatical slips such as using an imperfect for an aorist. Finally, the peculiar forms and usages which are found are easily explained by a reference to modern Greek and other unclassical Greek writers. For, example *πιάζω* is not peculiar to Doric but occurs in the Revelation of St John, and is common in modern Greek. *Ἐδολιοῦσαν* is an imperfect from *δολιόω* (3rd person plural), and is explained by the consonantal forms *ἐλέγοσαν*, a Septuagint form, &c. and further illustrated by the modern Greek forms *ἐδολιοῦσα*, *ἐτιμοῦσα*, of which the 3rd person plural is respectively *ἐδολιοῦσαν* and *ἐτιμοῦσαν*. We may say if we like that such a form as *ἐδολιοῦσαν* or *ἐλέγοσαν* for *ἔλεγον* follows the conjugation in *μι*, but we must not forget that there was originally no other conjugation, and that the *σ* in the 3rd person of *ἐδολιοῦσαν* is, etymologically speaking, just as much in its right place as in *ἐδίδοσαν*, *ἵστασαν*, *ἐτίθεσαν*. What the *σ* does in this position is indeed a mystery, as it has no place in Sanscrit, and as far as I know its presence has not been explained. But if it was found, as it seems it was found, convenient to insert it for phonetic reasons here, we can see that it would be especially so if the usage of the language at any period required the imperfect to end in *α* instead of *ον*. Such a form as *ἐδολιοῦα* would plainly clamour for a sigma. Now that *α* was, for the termination of the imperfect, at least as old as *ον*, is just as likely as not. Originally, as we see from Sanscrit, the termination of the 1st aorist and of the 2nd aorist and imperfect were the same. In Homer we have *ἦα*, *ἔον*, and *ἦα*; in Ionic both *ἔην* and *ἔα* for *ἦν*, "I was." In order to account for the diphthong *ου* however we should have to suppose either that *ν* was changed to *α* after the contraction *ἐδολίουν* from *ἐδολίοον* had taken place, in which case the accent in such a word as *ἐδολιοῦσα* would be a mystery, or else, as appears to me to have been the fact, there was a paragogic vowel slipped in between the *ο* and the *α*. That appears to have been the fact beyond doubt in the case of *ἦα* for *ἔα*, *ἔην*, and *ἦεν* for *ἔεν*, and *ἤην*, which would seem to present us with a pair of paragogic *ἔ*'s

(ἔ-ε-ε-εν). However that may be, we have the termination *-σα* for the imperfect of contracted verbs in modern Greek, and of contracted verbs only. In the Septuagint we have the termination *-σαν* in the 3rd person plural of many verbs, but as far as I know no trace of the *σ* in any other person. Yet the *σ* has just as much right (pace grammaticorum) to exist in any other person as in the 3rd, and it is my belief that in many parts of Greece where in the first person *α* was the favourite termination (*εἶδα* for *εἶδον*, *εἶπα* for *εἶπον*, which we have in the Septuagint and New Testament), *ἐδολιοῦσα*, *ἐμισοῦσα*, &c. would inevitably arise.

At any rate it is important to remember that all the Greek that was spoken from Homer's day to the era of the Ptolemies is not to be found in books, still less in Grammars, and, above all, that vulgar dialects both of ancient and modern times should be expected to contain far more archaisms than innovations.

Let us see whether this principle will carry us further in the explanation of modern Greek forms. First then as to the nominative *δόξαις* for *δόξα*. How are we to account for the *ι*? Schleicher, in his Comparative Grammar, following as I believe in the steps of Bopp, postulates *δοξα-ι-ας* or some such form as the original plural of *δόξα*. It is but right to state that Professor Max Müller differs from this view, but at any rate it is remarkable that the modern Greek form supplies exactly one of the stages of transition that the theory of Bopp and Schleicher demands. As to the accusative *ταῖς δόξαις* that is the Æolic form, and as such an acknowledged archaism. *Ταῖς δόξαις* is ascertained to be a representative of *τὰνς δόξανς*, the modification of the vowel indicating the loss of the *ν*.

Turning next to the pronouns, we have already observed that *ἐμένα* and *ἐσένα* for *ἐμὲ* and *σὲ* preserve the original *ν* (in Sanscrit *m*, *mâm*, and *tvâm*) of the accusative. *ἐμεῖς* is referred to by Plato (*Crat.* 418 c) as an older form for *ἡμεῖς*. As to the enclitic and proclitic use of the article in the oblique cases it is very nearly the same as the Homeric usage, *Τὸν ἐσκότωσε*, "he killed him;" *ἀπεσύλησέ τους*, "he spoiled them." Passing to the verbs, we find in *λέγουν* or *λέγουνε* the traces of the old form *λέγοντι* (*λέγονι*, or rather *ἔχονι*, is quoted, I believe, by Hesy-

chius as a Cretan form). In the passive the forms λέγεσαι, 2nd person present, λεγόμαστε or λεγόμεσθα as well as λεγόμεθεν, are so plainly archaic forms that they need no explanation. In St Paul's Epistle to the Romans we have already καυχᾶσαι, "thou boastest." In the imperative aorist active λέξε for λέξον is Homeric. As to the imp. aorist passive λέξου, I cannot but agree with Dr Mullach that it is the classical middle 1 a. of verbs in μι used as a passive, there being no middle voice in modern Greek, as there was none in the κοινὴ διάλεκτος. Few who compare such forms as στάσο with the corresponding modern στάσου, δέξου will be able to doubt this.

The verb εἶμαι (εἰμὶ), so far as it presents us really with a middle form, has the precedent of the Homeric ἔσο, which is precisely the modern Greek imperative, not to speak of the future ἔσομαι. But nearer examination shows us that εἶμαι is not conjugated throughout as a middle. The third person singular and plural εἶναι or εἶνε, which is more correct in writing, while in pronunciation the two forms are the same, is plainly not for εἶται and εἶνται. Now the formation of this word we are able to trace through its various stages. The oldest shape in which it appears is ἐντὶ, which in the Doric dialect was the same for both numbers. This ἐντὶ appears already in classical Greek as ἔνι in such phrases as οὐκ ἔνι, ἔνιοι for ἐστὶν οἱ. It is not unlikely that it was the vulgar word in regular use for ἐντὶ or ἐστὶ, which was known to literature only in such short phrases as the above. In the Acts of the Council of Constantinople (536 A.D.), we find ἔνι used simply for ἐστὶ, "Τίς ἔνι Νεστόριος." In Ptochoprodromus, the first Romaic writer, we get ἔνε, and soon afterwards the present form εἶναι or εἶνε.

One other principle which seems to have been at work in the development of modern from ancient Greek is the principle of extended analogy. From this point of view modern Greek may be called the logical result of ancient Greek. In ancient Greek the dual number was disappearing; in modern Greek, as already in the κοινὴ διάλεκτος, it is gone. The middle voice as a separate formation was on the wane. In the New Testament we have ἀπεκρίθη for ἀπεκρίνατο, much earlier ἐδέχθη

for *ἐδέξατο*; in modern Greek the only relic of the ancient middle appears in the passive imperative aorist. In later Greek we have many instances of a tendency to dispense with a separate form for the perfect, using the aorist instead. In modern Greek the perfect has disappeared, leaving perhaps a trace of its former existence in such an aorist as *εὑρῆκα* for *εὕρηκα*. Already in the Septuagint we get *εὕρηκαν* and *ἑώρακαν*, for *εὑρήκασι* and *ἑωράκασι*. Verbs in *μι* have entirely disappeared in modern Greek, leaving behind them only such remnants as the participles *λεγάμενος*, *ἐρχάμενος* above noticed. The termination *ῆκα* in *ἐλέχθηκα*, *ἐγράφηκα*, &c., seems but a following out of the analogy of *ἔδωκα* for *ἔδων*, *ἔθηκα* for *ἔθην*, and so forth. Mr Walker, High Master of the Manchester Grammar School, has called my attention to the fact that the termination *κα* for perfects is almost unknown to Homer.

Under the head of extensions of analogy we may place the double or mixed declensions, as *τὸ γράψιμον*, *τὰ γραψίματα*, with which we may compare *τὸ ὄνειρον*, *τὰ ὀνείρατα*, &c. It is worthy of notice that the plural *τὰ ὀνείρατα* is the only one known to the common people (in Athens at any rate), and I have been corrected myself by my landlord in that city, a man who barely knew how to read, for saying *τὰ ὄνειρα*. It is needless to say his corrections were not always of so happy a nature, and sometimes caused great amusement to his more educated countrymen who were present.

Phrynichus, the grammarian, notices the increasing use of this termination *-ιμον*, and complains particularly of the employment of *τὸ γελάσιμον* for *τὸ γελοῖον*. One cannot but be glad that the forms prevailed in spite of Phrynichus, for they are a real gain to the Greek language. They constitute a class of verbal substantives with a shade of meaning not accurately expressed by any other word. Certainly there is no adequate ancient Greek translation of *ἀκούω σμίξιμον σπαθιῶν*, "I hear the clash of mingled swords."

It remains that we should notice the influence of dialects in the forms of modern Greek. The *κοινὴ διάλεκτος* was probably so called quite as much from the fact that it was no dialect in particular but a mixture of all, as that it was gene-

rally understood. Pindar's dialect was called by grammarians κοινή, because it was according to them a mixture of more than one.

Now the fact that the Greek of the Septuagint presents us with forms belonging to different dialects, is one reason for the false notion above referred to, that the translators took their words at random from the several dialects, much as an indiscriminating schoolboy might do in our own day. We are apt to forget that the Greek language was just as familiar to the Hebrews, who wrote the Septuagint, as their own language. Just as they adopted the language of "stammering lips" in Babylon, so they spoke Greek under the Ptolemies; and, in all likelihood, both spoke and wrote that language with greater ease than their sacred tongue. The only natural explanation of the appearance of Doric forms like πιάζω, and rare Homeric words like ἀγέρωχος in the Septuagint, is that they were current in the vernacular of the period. Πιάζω is to this day the modern Greek for "to catch," and in this sense it is that it is used in the Bible (cf. Latin *opprimere*), while ἀγέρωχος is actually found in the Romaic popular ballads collected by Passow. We are continually reminded of the existence throughout the history of the Greek language (at any rate beginning with the time of Aristophanes), of a common spoken dialect quite distinct from the cultivated language of literature, but seldom coming to the surface. As often as it strove to raise its head, some tyrant grammarian, a Phrynichus, a Dionysius, or a Choeroboscus beat it down, till at last a poor monk, nicknamed Ptochoprodromus, in the 11th century, by his example liberated Greek for ever from the shackles of the grammarians, and showed that a language has neither power nor beauty except it be free.

Meanwhile of course the language of literature, of the schools, and of the law-courts, was comparatively stationary, while that of the people was continually developing and changing, as a living spoken language always will and must be. No doubt one of the first changes that came over the popular dialects was that they became mixed and merged in one. Probably it was only a very old Megarian who, even in the days

of Aristophanes, would be heard in the Athenian market-place expressing himself thus,

ἄμβατε ποττὰν μάδδαν αἴ χ' εὕρητέ πα.

Constant intercourse with men from other parts would soon soften down dialectic distinctions, especially when all political divisions were swamped by the Macedonian dynasty. Doubtless the Attic dialect, as that of the most cultivated portion of the nation, would give the leading tone to the *κοινὴ διάλεκτος*, but at the same time we should quite expect isolated provincialisms to survive. This is actually the case not only in the language of the Septuagint, but also in the modern language of Greece. The modern Greek, when speaking in the vernacular of his country, says, *μικρὴ* with the Ionians of old, *δόξας* with Dorians, *ταῖς τιμαῖς* for *τὰς τιμὰς* with the Æolians, *ἔσο* and *φεῦξε* for *ἴσθι* and *φεῦξον* with the Epic poets. Yet we may be well assured that the shepherd or vine-dresser who speaks in this way is as ignorant of the language of Dorians, Ionians, or Epic poets, as a South-sea islander. As peculiarly characteristic of the Bœotian variety of Doric Greek we may notice the preference of *ου* for *υ*. So too in modern Greek we have *κουτάλιον* for *κυτάλιον* from *κυτάλη*, *τρούπα* for *τρύπα*. Sometimes this *ου* represents an *η*, as *σουσάμι* for *σησάμιον*, *σουπιαῖς* for *σηπίαι*; compare *κρουνὸς* and *κρήνη*.

Having now, as far as our time and space allow, disposed of the mere grammatical forms of the modern Greek language, let us go on to examine

The Syntax of Modern Greek.

Here we have left the region of archaisms and dialectic forms, and enter the territory of the history of the human mind. To the mere philologist the former part of the inquiry may seem the most interesting; for the philosopher the succeeding portion will present the greatest attraction. That we may obtain in the outset a general view of the difference in structure and expression, we will compare part of the eighth chapter of Plu-

tarch's life of Cæsar, as translated by Mr Rangabes, with the original as written by Plutarch.

Ἡ γνώμη λοιπὸν αὕτη ἐφάνη φιλάνθρωπος, καὶ ἰσχυρὸς ὁ λόγος ὅστις ἐῤῥέθη περὶ αὐτῆς. Δι' ὃ οὐ μόνον οἱ μετ' αὐτὸν ἐγερθέντες παρεδέχοντο τὴν πρότασιν αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν προομιλησάντων, ἀρνούμενοι τὰς ἰδίας των γνώμας, παρεδέχοντο τὴν ἐδικήν του, ἕως ὅτου ἦλθεν ἡ σειρὰ τοῦ Κάτωνος καὶ τοῦ Κάτλου. Οὗτοι δ' ἠναντιώθησαν μεθ' ὁρμῆς, καὶ ὡς ὁ Κάτων μετὰ τοῦ λόγου ἔῤῥιψε καὶ ὑπόνοιαν κατ' αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἐξανέστη κατ' αὐτοῦ βιαίως, οἱ μὲν ἄνδρες παρεδόθησαν ὅπως θανατωθῶσι· κατὰ δὲ τοῦ Καίσαρος, ἐν ᾧ ἐξήρχετο τῆς βουλῆς, πολλοὶ τῶν νέων τῶν φρουρούντων τὸν Κικέρωνα τότε, ὁρμήσαντες, ἔστρεψαν γυμνὰ τὰ ξίφη κατ' αὐτοῦ. Ἀλλὰ λέγεται ὅτι ὁ Κουρίων, περικαλύψας τότε αὐτὸν διὰ τῆς τηβέννου του, τὸν ἐξήγαγε· καὶ ὁ Κικέρων, ὅταν οἱ νέοι προσέβλεψαν εἰς αὐτὸν, ὅτι ἔνευσεν ἀποφατικῶς, φοβηθεὶς τὸν δῆμον, ἢ τὸν φόνον ὅλως ἄδικον καὶ παράνομον θεωρῶν. Τοῦτο ὅμως δὲν ἠξεύρω πῶς ὁ Κικέρων, ἂν εἶναι ἀληθὲς, δὲν τὸ ἔγραψεν εἰς τὸν περὶ τῆς ὑπατείας λόγον του· κατηγορεῖτο δ' ὕστερον ὅτι δὲν ὠφελήθη

Οὕτω δὲ τῆς γνώμης φιλανθρώπου φανείσης καὶ τοῦ λόγου δυνατῶς ἐπ' αὐτῇ ῥηθέντος οὐ μόνον οἱ μετὰ τοῦτον ἀνιστάμενοι προσετίθεντο, πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ τὰς εἰρημένας γνώμας ἀπειπάμενοι πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνου μετέστησαν. ἕως ἐπὶ Κάτωνα τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ Κάτλον περιῆλθε. Τούτων δὲ νεανικῶς ἐναντιωθέντων, Κάτωνος δὲ καὶ τὴν ὑπόνοιαν ἅμα τῷ λόγῳ συνεπερείσαντος αὐτῷ καὶ συγκατεξαναστάντος ἐρρωμένως, οἱ μὲν ἄνδρες ἀποθανούμενοι παρεδόθησαν, Καίσαρι δὲ τῆς βουλῆς ἐξιόντι πολλοὶ τῶν Κικέρωνα φρουρούντων τότε νέων γυμνὰ τὰ ξίφη συνδραμόντες ἐπέσχον. Ἀλλὰ Κουρίων τε λέγεται τῇ τηβέννῳ περιβαλὼν ὑπεξαγαγεῖν, αὐτός τε ὁ Κικέρων, ὡς οἱ νεανίσκοι προσέβλεψαν, ἀνανεῦσαι, φοβηθεὶς τὸν δῆμον ἢ τὸν φόνον ὅλως ἄδικον καὶ παράνομον ἡγούμενος. Τοῦτο μὲν οὖν οὐκ οἶδα ὅπως ὁ Κικέρων, εἴπερ ἦν ἀληθές, ἐν τῷ περὶ τῆς ὑπατείας οὐκ ἔγραψεν· αἰτίαν δὲ εἶχεν ὕστερον ὡς ἄριστα τῷ καιρῷ τότε παρασχόντι κατὰ τοῦ Καίσαρος μὴ χρησάμενος, ἀλλ' ἀποδειλιάσας τὸν δῆμον ὑπερφυῶς περιεχόμενον τοῦ Καίσαρος.

τότε ἐκ τῆς εὐκαιρίας ἥτις ἀρίστη παρουσιάζετο εἰς αὐτὸν κατὰ τοῦ Καίσαρος, ἀλλ' ἐδειλίασεν ἐνώπιον τοῦ δήμου, ὅστις ὑπερτάτως ηὐνόει τὸν Καίσαρα.

Here the words are all ancient Greek; but there is a strange departure from the old simplicity of expression, combined with a sort of effort to say a great deal, and a certain indescribable insincerity of language which is in itself a history. The mere words, the outer shell, are still the same as Plutarch himself, or even Thucydides, might in certain connections have employed; but a change has passed over the spirit of the whole. It is as though a new soul had taken up its abode in an old body, or as if, to take a simile from an ancient story of Sacred Writ, the rough, out-spoken, stalwart elder brother were being counterfeited and supplanted by a wily younger one. "The hands are the hands of Esau, but the voice is the voice of Jacob."

We will now proceed to consider the syntax of modern Greek somewhat more particularly, and that we may follow a definite order we will begin with that part of syntax which seems most nearly to enter into the accidence of the language, the subject we have treated above.

The compound tenses of the verbs may fairly claim our first attention. In modern Greek the future is formed in three ways. By the particle *θὰ* with the subjunctive, by the verb *θέλω* used personally, and followed by the infinitive, and, thirdly, by the same verb used impersonally followed by the subjunctive. Thus *γράψω* becomes *θὰ γράψω*, *θέλω γράψει(ν)* for *γράψαι* (?) or *θέλει (νὰ) γράψω*. *Θὰ γράψω* is usually regarded as a contraction for *θέλει νὰ = θὲ νὰ = θὰ γράψω*; but such a contraction would be quite without analogy, and I am much disposed to look upon *θὰ* as a mere particle, to speculate on the etymology of which would be hazardous, though it may be either a part or a fragment of *τάχα*, a possible dialectic form of which would be *θα-κα*; cf. *κιθὼν* and *χιτὼν*, *ἐνθεῦτεν*, *ἐντεῦθεν*. I am the more inclined to regard it as a simple particle because its use with the subjunctive corresponds to the use of *κε* in Homer,

with the same mood, while its employment with the imperfect, as *θὰ ἐπεθύμουν* (vulg. *θὰ ἐπεθυμοῦσα*), answers precisely to the classical *ἐπεθύμουν ἄν*; only that this usage is more exact in modern Greek, it being impossible to say *θὰ ἐπεθύμησα* in the same sense. This would mean, not, "I should have wished," but, "I probably did wish." It is worth consideration whether *ἄν* with the aorist indicative in ancient Greek has not sometimes the same meaning. However that may be, with *θὰ*, if it be a simple particle, we have nothing at present to do. *θὰ πολεμήσω* is just as much in the spirit of ancient Greek as *κε πολεμήσω*.

But with *θέλω γράψει* and *θέλει γράψω* the case is different. *Θέλω γράψει* explains itself. But what induced the Greeks to grow discontented with their simple future *γράψω*? It seems to have been nothing else than a certain wastefulness of speech always observable in the Greek language, as in such phrases as *ἔτυχεν ὢν, μέλλει ποιεῖν* (which is after all but another kind of compound future); but this tendency to waste words always increases in proportion as solidity of character and depth of thought begin to wane. Inanity always vents itself in expletives: and it is no wonder that we cannot write Cicero's Latin without swearing Cicero's oaths. Now every needlessly forcible expression is only another kind of expletive; it fills up a proportionate void in the mind of the speaker and the hearer, and may be compared to a still more feeble resource of modern times, the printer's trick of italicising. The Nemesis of waste is want; and so we find in the present case. *Θέλω γράψει* having come to mean, "I shall write;" the need arises of a separate phrase for "I will write." This accordingly is expressed by the still more explicit mode of speech *θέλω ἵνα γράψω, θέλω 'νὰ γράψω*. This use of *ἵνα* begins in the New Testament, where it is extremely common. But this leads again to a further need; if *ἵνα γράψω* in this and other cases is to be equivalent to *γράψαι*, what are we to do if we want to say *ἵνα γράψω* in good earnest? We must have recourse to a further periphrasis, and say *διὰ 'νὰ* (*δι' ἵνα*) *γράψω*. This process is like the career of a perpetually insolvent debtor borrowing money at compound interest. The same principle may be seen at work in a vast number of words and expressions. To notice a few. The preposition *διὰ*,

through, becomes διαμέσου, ἀνὰ grows into ἀνάμεσον, μετὰ is felt to be too weak to express the relation *with*, and accordingly ὁμαδῆ (᾽μαζῆ) is pressed into the ranks of the prepositions. Τίς becomes ποῖος, τὶς, κᾄτις, κἀνεῖς, or κᾄμποσος = respectively *some one, any one*, and *some*. Τώρα (τῇ ὥρᾳ), supplants the simple νῦν; πᾶς and ἕκαστος become καθεὶς, first, as most frequently in the New Testament, used only in the accusative καθ᾽ ἕνα, but soon regarded and declined as one word, as already in the epistles of St Paul: ὃς and ὅστις become ὁ ὁποῖος (cf. *il quale, el cual, le quel*, in Italian, Spanish, French, as also ποῖος with *quel*, &c.). For the old ποῖος the Greeks often say ποιός τις, and the common people τί λογῆς; (the τί being used indeclinably) like *wasfür* in German. Τί λογῆς must have meant originally, "of what vintage or gathering?"

Examples of this kind might be multiplied without end; but the limits of our space warn us not to linger too long in any one subject, however full of interest. We would rather point the way and draw the outlines which we think, with Aristotle, "any one may fill up for himself."

The third or impersonal form of the future θέλει γράψω we prefer to consider a little later on when we come to examine the influence of Greek systems of thought upon the development of the language. We will say now a very few words on the compound perfects. Of these there are two, ἔχω (γε) γραμμένον, which is simply a more explicit way of saying γέγραφα, and will be quite familiar to the classical scholar, and ἔχω γράψει from ἔχω γράψαι, which is difficult to explain, rather from the want of illustration and analogy in ancient Greek or other languages, than from any inherent unreasonableness in the thing itself. Perhaps the idea present to the minds of those who first used it may have been, that as τὸ γράφειν, and even if the case required it τὸ γράψαι, might mean "the writing," so ἔχω γράψαι might be used for "I have a writing," of anything as a deed done, γεγραμμένον μοί ἐστι. At any rate he who is not scandalized at ἑκὼν εἶναι need not be offended at ἔχω γράψαι.

It might be worth some one's while to see whether in certain cases οὐκ ἔχω γράψαι, οὐκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν, οὐκ ἔχει ἀπο-

δεῖξαι, and the like, may not admit of a perfect sense, as used by Herodotus and other classical authors. With reference to both the future and perfect tenses in modern Greek it is to be observed that being duplicate, according as the infinitive aorist or imperfect is employed, they give a greater precision of meaning than the simple forms γράψω or γέγραφα are capable of expressing. Γράψω in ancient Greek might mean either "I will write" (e.g. a letter), or, "I will be an author." In the one case it would be in modern Greek, θὰ γράψω, θέλω γράψει, or θέλει γράψω; in the other θὰ γράφω, θέλω γράφει, or θέλει γράφω.

Leaving for the present the subject of syntax, let us notice some changes in the meaning of words.

In the language of Greece as it is in our own day, we shall be surprised and interested to find the eminently Greek tendency to euphemism, carried out to a still further extent than in ancient Greek. Αὐθέντης means no longer murderer but master. Possibly during the period of Turkish supremacy the Greeks thought it came to much the same thing. This I have put under the head of euphemisms, though it appears to be a kind of inversion of the euphemistic tendency, inasmuch as a bad meaning has come to have a better one. But in all probability it is a real euphemism. Αὐθέντης in the sense of murderer probably stands as a separate idiom from αἰθέντης, master. Αὐθέντης, meaning according to its derivation "the very doer," was employed to denote the doer of a particular crime. This etymological sense "real doer" was most likely never lost among the common people, and when, as especially under the Turkish dominion, δεσπότης was felt to be an odious term, αὐθέντης would be applied to the master, half to soften down the bitterness of the relation in the mind of the slave, half flatteringly and fawningly towards the master, as though the meaning were "he is the real doer of all that is done, we are nothing but the tools." A more palpable instance of euphemism may be found in such words as σκοτόνω, "I darken," for kill, ψοφάει of an animal dying, compare the French *crever*, and the German *crepiren*. The meaning is literally of course "to make a noise." Death is still called Χάρων in the

popular dialect, Χάρος or Χάρωντας, etymologically (?) "the joyful God." Βασιλεύει ὁ ἥλιος means, "the sun sets." Such euphemisms are quite in the spirit of the Greek language in all ages. Who does not remember at the sound of σκοτόνω the grand Homeric periphrasis for death, σκότος ὄσσε κάλυψεν? and who that gazes on the setting sun, as the Greek shepherd has so often done, from some commanding height, but feels the majesty of the great Ruler of the skies more sensibly as he lights up with his last golden rays ocean, islands, clouds, and mountain tops, and owns the fitness of the words put by Campbell into the mouth of the "Last Man" who sees the sun set never to rise again:

> "Yet mourn I not thy parted sway,
> Thou dim discrowned king of day"?

If there is a difference between the euphemisms of ancient and modern Greece, it is perhaps that the modern ones are more stereotyped and fixed; that the language of poetry has become the language of life.

Thus much of the euphemisms in the Greek of our own day. There is however many a word which bears the impress of a deeper and harder kind of thought than that which is content with softening stubborn facts into gentle metaphors.

The biography of a new word and expression would often be a page from the history of philosophy.

The whole language in its vocabulary as well as in its structure, appears to have undergone a change from truth to fiction, from Nature to Art. If it be asked, When did this change begin? the answer is, With the beginning of speculative thought; an answer perhaps none the less true because it is indefinite.

What has philosophy done for language generally, and what for Greek in particular? might prove no uninstructive enquiry. The most comprehensive reply to the question would seem to be, that it gave terms for thoughts as well as for things. The main feature of a language before the beginning of speculative thought, is a kind of honest simplicity. Men call a spade a spade, not an agricultural instrument.

Before philosophy, human research is a mere registration of given phenomena. It asks only what is there? Philosophy asks why is it there, then, how is it there, and lastly, is it there at all?

When new questions are asked, new answers must be given; and new answers require new words, or at least words with new meanings.

Even the Ionic philosophers have handed down a host of words to the colloquial language of to-day. Such are *φύσις*, *ἀρχὴ*, *στοιχεῖον*, *ἐξάτμισις*, *ἀναθυμίασις*, *ἀνάλυσις*, *κόσμος*, *ἄπειρος*, *πύκνωσις*, *ἀραίωσις*. Could any of these words write its own biography, what a strange history that would be! Had any of them been gifted with the tongue of a prophet, how it would have amazed the sages of old!

The unlettered Athenian in the Café de la Belle Grèce, as he melts a lump of sugar in a cup of coffee, little dreams that the name by which he calls the process (*ἀνάλυσις*) meant in the mouths of the old Ionic philosophers, the dissolution of the elements of created things in decay or death; and scarcely could Heraclitus, with all his admiration of antipathies, have divined that *κόσμος*, the divine order of nature, and *ἄπειρον*, the formless void, should ever be wedded together in one expression, *κόσμος ἄπειρος*, and mean a "countless multitude," perhaps a disorderly rabble. Could Anaxagoras have foreboded that *κόσμος*, which expressed to him divine beauty and perfection of arrangement—*πάντα χρήματα ἦν ὁμοῦ, εἶτα νοῦς ἐλθὼν αὐτὰ διεκόσμησε*—should in a very few hundred years become the subject of the Apostle's lament, "the whole world lieth in wickedness"? Who could foresee that *τὸ ἄλογον*, which would mean in the mouth of Heraclitus, so much of matter as was untouched by the heavenly fire of reason, should come to signify in our own day a horse; or that *στοιχεῖον*, an element, should presently become a ghost, the *δαίμων* of the ancient Greeks, haunting murmuring rills or whispering groves, and terrifying the simple shepherd as he tends his flocks upon the lonely mountain side? Scarcely could Democritus and Leucippus have guessed, that of their philosophical terms *σχῆμα*, *θέσις*, and *τάξις*, the first should mean in the present day, "a monk's habit," the second, "a place

in a coach," and the third, "a class" in a steam-packet and a railway train, any more than Pythagoras could have foreseen that his doctrine of the Pilgrimage of Souls should have taken such firm root in popular superstition and popular poetry, that those lines of Xenophanes :

> Καὶ ποτέ μιν στυφελιζομένου σκύλακος παριόντα
> Φασὶν ἐποικτεῖραι καὶ τόδε φάσθαι ἔπος·
> Παῦσαι, μηδὲ ῥάπιζ', ἐπεὶ ἦ φίλου ἀνέρος ἐστὶ
> Ψυχὴ τὴν ἔγνων φθεγξαμένης ἀΐων·

should have found their echo in such words as these, uttered by the hero Tsamados in the person of a bird of the air :

> Ἐγὼ πουλὶ σοῦ φαίνομαι ἀλλὰ πουλὶ δὲν εἶμαι·
> Εἰς τὸ νησὶ ποῦ ἀγνάντια εἶναι τῶν Ναβαρίνων,
> Ἐκεῖ τὴν ὕστερην πνοὴν ἄφησα πολεμῶντας.
> Ὁ Τσάμαδος εἶμαι ἐγὼ καὶ ἦλθα εἰς τὸν κόσμον.
> Σ τοὺς οὐρανοὺς ποῦ κάθομαι καθάρια σᾶς ξανοίγω·
> Μὰ νὰ σᾶς δῶ ἀπὸ κοντὰ εἶναι ἡ πιθυμιά μου.

To take another instance, how has the common language of modern Greece reversed the judgment of the Eleatics, when τὸ ὂν no longer means the most abstract but the most concrete Being, as ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὗτος εἶναι τὸ δυστυχέστατον ὂν τοῦ κόσμου !

Even the Sophists have a claim, and not the least, to our attention. If these thinkers, or as some would perhaps be inclined to call them, talkers, have little right to the name of philosophers, it should still be remembered that they more than any philosopher, not excepting Plato, who owed more to them than he was aware, left their mark upon the Greek language, a mark which has never since been effaced. Before their time men were in the habit of saying what they thought; since they have rather inclined to think what they should say, a tendency from which even genius cannot now wholly shake itself free. Before the Sophists, thought was everything and expression as an end nothing; hence while it was often laborious, it was always unstudied. Since their age, expression has been too often either everything or more than half the whole. Antithesis, emphasis, precision of language, nice dis-

tinctions, well balanced sentences and smoothly rounded periods, these are the work of the Sophist and the delight of the Rhetorician. We can mark this leaven working already in the speeches reported by Thucydides not so much as they were but rather as they ought to have been spoken: we can trace it in the orations of Demosthenes, it is the paramount feature in Isocrates and the later orators of Greece, and reaches a kind of climax in the discourses of Chrysostom. What a gulf is fixed between a Chrysostom and a Nestor! And if we listen to any sermon or public address in Athens at this day our ears are struck by the same balancing of epithets, the same rounding of sentences which constituted in so great measure the art and the power of the early rhetoricians. Here is a brief extract from a funeral oration on Lord Byron:

Τί ἀνέλπιστον συμβεβηκός! Τί ἀξιοθρήνητον δυστύχημα! ὀλίγος καιρὸς εἶναι, ἀφ' οὗ ὁ λαὸς τοῦ πολυπαθοῦς Ἑλλάδος ὅλος χαρὰ καὶ ἀγαλλίασις ἐδέχθη εἰς τοὺς κόλπους του τὸν ἐπίσημον τοῦτον ἄνδρα, καὶ σήμερον ὅλος θλῖψις καὶ κατήφεια καταβρέχει τὸ νεκρικόν του κρεββάτι μὲ πικρότατα δάκρυα, καὶ ὀδύρεται ἀπαρηγόρητα. ὁ γλυκύτατος χαιρετισμὸς ΧΡΙΣΤΟΣ ΑΝΕΣΤΗ ἔγεινεν ἄχαρις τὴν ἡμέραν τοῦ Πάσχα εἰς τὰ χείλη τῶν Ἑλλήνων χριστιανῶν,.....Δεκτὰ βέβαια, ἀγαπητοί μου Ἕλληνες, πολὺ δεκτὰ εἶναι εἰς τὴν σκιάν του τὰ δάκρυά μας διότι εἶναι δάκρυα τῶν κληρονόμων τῆς ἀγάπης του· ἀλλὰ πολὺ δεκτότερα θέλει ἦναι τὰ ἔργα μας διὰ τὴν πατρίδα· αὐτὴν καὶ μόνην τὴν εὐγνωμοσύνην ζητεῖ ἀπὸ ἡμᾶς εἰς τὰς εὐεργεσίας του, αὐτὴν τὴν ἀμοιβὴν εἰς τὴν πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀγάπην του, αὐτὴν τὴν ἐλάφρωσιν εἰς τὰς ταλαιπωρίας του, αὐτὴν τὴν πληρωμὴν διὰ τὸν χαμὸν τῆς πολυτίμου ζωῆς του.

For the purpose of sophists and rhetoricians, which was "not to convince but to persuade," new words were needed. Such words for example as τῷ ὄντι—*indeed*, literally *in being, in the world of real existence,* (no bad comment on the consistency of a school, whose leading axiom was that there was no such thing as Truth,) τοὐλάχιστον, κατ' ἀλήθειαν, δηλαδὴ, ἤγουν,—are the true children of the Sophists and have survived to this day; in fact without them it would be impossible to carry on a

connected conversation, or pen an article for a newspaper. On the other hand the simpler and less explicit particles such as *μὴν, γε, οὖν, τοὶ, γὰρ,* have in modern Greek either received a restricted sense, and thus been made as explicit as was required, or have been supplanted by others. So *γὰρ* and *οὖν,* which are very expressive but not at all explicit, have been entirely displaced by *διότι* and *λοιπὸν,* which are very explicit but not at all expressive. As the first stage of the displacement of *γὰρ* by *διότι* and *οὖν* by *λοιπὸν,* we may observe the frequent use of *ὅτι* for *γὰρ* in the New Testament, which is I believe much more frequent than is the case in the Septuagint, and the constant occurrence of *λοιπὸν* for *οὖν* in Polybius, wherever rather an emphatic *οὖν* is required.

To Socrates may perhaps be traced, or at any rate with his teaching may be closely connected, the modern meaning of such words as *καθόλου, διόλου, ὅλως,* (often emphatically joined for the sake of greater force—*ὅλως καθόλου, ὅλως διόλου,*) *ἀρετὴ, εἰρώνεια, ἠθικὸς, ἐπιστήμη, διορισμός.*

The Cyrenaics appear to have invented the word *μερικὸς, particular* (as in the phrase *μερικαὶ ἡδοναὶ*), which in modern Greek survives in the sense of *certain, some,* having degenerated from a philosophical term to a mere part of grammar. So true is the remark above quoted that the metaphysics of one age will become the logic and finally the grammar of succeeding generations. A like fate has befallen some terms of the Platonic philosophy; as *εἰδικὸς* from *εἶδος, specific,* which is now nothing more than part of the possessive pronoun *ὁ εἰδικός μου, τὸ εἰδικόν της,* &c. *mine, hers,* and so on. A curious and interesting instance of a somewhat complicated metaphysical significance in certain grammatical forms is presented by the history of the pronoun *αὐτός.* This word expressed originally what may be called the feeling of subjectivity rather than the idea: for the subject as an idea had as yet no existence. Nevertheless the subject appeared in the world very often in an objective light, and in Homer this is expressed by putting together the objective particle *ἑ* with the subjective *αὐτὸς* in the oblique cases, as *ἑ αὐτὸν, οἱ αὐτῷ, ἕο αὐτοῦ,* but it had never yet occurred to the Greeks actually to join the

two together as subject-object. This by a kind of anticipation of philosophy occurs first in the more thoughtful age of Attic and Ionic literature, where we get ἑαυτόν. But both in the Homeric and Attic age there was as yet nothing but a kind of unconscious registration of metaphysical facts. The subject never till the time of the sophists and probably not until long afterwards got so clear of itself that it could be spoken of as an objective reality, as a thing. Yet such must have been the case to a great extent before the modern Greek substitute for ἑαυτὸν, ἐμαυτὸν, &c. could arise; before men could say τὸν ἑαυτόν μου, τὸν ἑαυτόν του, &c. There may come a time perhaps when this tendency to objectivity in the subject may go farther still, and men will find no difficulty in contemplating the subject as an object, not only in its objective relations (as in the oblique cases), but even in its most subjective state, as the nominative. In this respect, the English language is ahead of the Greek, for we can say "himself" in the nominative though we almost require a "he" to help it out; whereas ὁ ἑαυτός του in Greek would be a barbarism;—ὁ ἴδιος being used in such cases instead of the classical αὐτός.

In passing from Socrates and the Cyrenaics to Plato, we must not forget the Cynics, who have left their stamp on the language in such words as αὐτάρκης, αὐτάρκεια.

If the Sophists gave a new direction to language, to Plato belongs the credit of having not inconsiderably increased its power of utterance. In truth the Sophists and Plato together seem in great measure to have conquered the difficulties of expression, and by so doing to have given to Greek one of the characteristics of a modern language. As a mere matter of style Plato comes nearer to a modern Greek writer than Polybius, or any Hellenistic or ecclesiastical writer. We seldom reflect what labour and art were once employed in beating out those convenient expressions, those ways of turning a sentence, which make the flow of a modern language so easy and its sense so clear and precise. Here indeed other men have laboured and we have entered into their labours.

Besides words to which the Platonic philosophy gave a new sense, as δημιουργὸς, "creator," with all its derivatives, one is

struck by the fact that many of his commonest phrases and words have established themselves in the colloquial language of the present day.

Πρὸς τούτοις, ὅπως δήποτε, ἴσως, φαίνεται, παντάπασιν, ἄραγε, μάλιστα, τοίγαρ, common and necessary helps to conversation in modern Greek, are the very hinges of the Platonic dialogues, and when one hears a common peasant say μάλιστα for yes, or πῶς δὲν εἶδα = πῶς οὐκ εἶδον; in emphatic affirmation, one cannot but be struck by such modernisms of Plato, or if the reader will, such Platonisms in modern Greek.

But while modern Greek is indebted largely to Plato for its form, to Aristotle it owes much of its vocabulary. If we would understand how such words as ὕλη, ὑποκείμενον, παράδειγμα, ὑπάρχειν, πρότασις, ὄρεξις, οὐσιώδης, ἐνδέχεται, χορηγεῖν came to have their present meaning, it is almost necessary to go to Aristotle for the explanation. And yet how Aristotle himself would wonder at their modern employment. Γραφικὴ ὕλη, "writing materials," οὐσιώδης διαφορὰ ὑπάρχει, "an essential difference exists;" σοὶ εὔχομαι καλὴν ὄρεξιν, "I wish you a good appetite;" ἄμεσος πρότασις, "an immediate proposal;" ὑποκείμενον ἀπαραδειγματίστου ἐνεργείας, "a subject of unexampled activity." He would either think that every fool was his disciple, or that all his disciples were fools.

The Stoics were not much of independent speculators, but perhaps there is one idiom in modern Greek which may be an echo of Stoic resignation, namely the third form of the compound future already noticed, θέλει ν' ἀποθάνω for ἀποθανοῦμαι, as though it were, "It wills that I should die," that is, it is the will of that great unknown impersonal necessity, whom we sometimes worship with the name of God.

As regards the philosophers, the history of innovations may almost be said to close with Aristotle and the Stoics.

Succeeding schools having lost the grain continued to thrash out the straw of Aristotle or of Plato, until words had little meaning left, and men had little hope of anything better.

Yet in spite of the deadness of philosophers, and the active opposition of grammarians and pedants, the Greek language did not stand still. The conquests of Alexander, and the con-

solidation of Greece, gave rise to what was called the κοινὴ διάλεκτος.

Hitherto we have sketched the outlines of what may be called the basis of modern Greek, of which the principal elements seem to have been first as regards its accidence, archaisms, preserved in the vulgar dialect from generation to generation, a tendency to simplification or regularity both in declension and conjugation, and the mixture of dialects previously distinct; secondly, as regards its syntax, and the use and meaning of words, a change in the mode of thought and expression.

Having now considered the origin of modern Greek, let us proceed briefly to trace its development, beginning with the so-called Hellenistic Greek.

To the first or Macedonian age of the κοινὴ διάλεκτος, belongs the Greek of the Septuagint, though there is every reason to believe that this translation was made at various times, and by persons very variously qualified to fulfil their task. And here I may be allowed to remark, how very important is a knowledge of modern Greek for the study of the Septuagint; and I need not add of the New Testament also. So much the more in the latter case as we have there to deal with the meaning of an original instead of only with a translation. It is a mistake to think that classical Greek + Hebrew will give us the Greek of the Septuagint.

It is very easy to explain everything as a Hebraism, and the less our knowledge of Hebrew, the more readily does the explanation suggest itself. Now there are Hebraisms in the Septuagint, and though in a less degree, in the New Testament; but all unusual phrases are not Hebraisms. Polybius, certainly a contemporary of many of the translators of the Septuagint, may have many Latinisms in his writings, but all his peculiarities are not Latinisms. Whatever light may be thrown on the Septuagint and on Polybius, by Hebrew and by Latin, infinitely more may be gained both for the one and the other from a study of modern Greek. And what perhaps sounds still stranger, the Greek of the present day affords a better commentary on the language of Polybius, of the Septuagint, and of the New Testament, than either the writings of contemporary

historians, rhetoricians, grammarians, and philosophers, who for the most part wrote a purely artificial Greek—or than from the many thousand ponderous tomes which encumber the threshold of verbal criticism. To speak first of the Septuagint. We have already shown how the grammatical peculiarities of its authors are the first appearance of the same forms which are familiar to us in modern Greek. But more than this, the phraseology of the Septuagint is modern to an extent which is quite marvellous, when compared with that of contemporary writers, and only explicable by the assumption that the writers are using the common vernacular, which had already become in its spirit and essence much what modern Greek now is. For example, *Ἐξελθε ἐκ τῆς γῆς σου, καὶ ἐκ τῆς συγγενείας σου...πάντες ἐξέκλιναν, ἅμα ἠχρειώθεσαν,...τάφος ἀνεωγμένος ὁ λάρυγξ αὐτῶν,* sound just like modern Greek familiar phrases. Let us mention a few well-known words, common to the Septuagint and modern Greek. *Ἐπισκέπτομαι,* "I visit;" *ἀποκρίνομαι* (passive), "I answer;" *ἐπιστρέφω,* "I return;" *ἡγούμενος,* "a leader" (in modern Greek the superior of a monastery); *προσκυνῶ,* "to worship" or "salute;" *ἑτοιμάζω,* "make ready;" *ἐνώπιον,* "in the presence of;" *προσκόπτω* and *πρόσκομμα, πειράζω,* "to tempt;" *ἀκολουθῶ* in preference to *ἕπομαι*; *κοιμῶμαι* in preference to *εὕδω*; *ὅλος* for *πᾶς*; *ἕως ἑνός,* "as many as one;" *κατοικῶ,* for "to dwell;" *καθέζομαι* and *καθίζω,* for "to sit;" *τὰ ἱμάτια,* for "the clothes;" *ὑπάγω* for *εἶμι.* Besides words of this kind, there are others, the present usage of which dates from the Septuagint, words to which Jewish ideas have given a new and higher meaning.

Οὐρανὸς is no longer the mere blue sky, or a mythical name for one of many deities, but the habitation of the Ancient of Days. *Ἁμαρτία,* no longer a mistake, but the fundamental error of mankind, estrangement from God, and the breaking of his perfect law. *Πίστις* becomes the trusting obedience of faithful Abraham, and of all the saints; *Δόξα* is the glory, or sometimes the honour of the Almighty; *ὁ Κύριος* is no longer the man in authority, but the name of the Lord of lords, and the King of kings.

Before going on to the New Testament the order of time

demands a few words for Polybius. It cannot be said that the general run of his sentences is so modern as the Septuagint or the New Testament. Many of the novelties of this author are equally found in the New Testament. For example, he uses *πλὴν* for *ἀλλὰ*, *ὅταν* and *ἄν* for *ὅτε* and *εἰ*. Other modern usages are *ἀκμὴν* for *ἔτι*, as already Theocritus, IV. 60. Cf. Anthologia, P. VII. 141. *Ἴδιον* frequently for *ἑαυτοῦ*, far more so than is the case in classical authors. *Ἴδιον* in one place in the sense of *same*, the most usual meaning in modern Greek. *ἴδιον καὶ παραπλήσιον ταῖς πόλεσι συνέβη*. *Ἀπὸ* in the sense of worth or weight, as *ἀπὸ δέκα ταλάντων*, weighing 10 talents. So the Greeks of to-day say *δός μοι ἀπὸ δέκα λεπτά*, *ἀπὸ μία δεκάρα*. *Εἰς τοὺς καθ' ἡμᾶς καιρούς*, which is completely modern Greek, for *ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἡμᾶς χρόνοις*. This use of *εἰς*, as well as of *καιρὸς*, belongs equally to the New Testament. I will now add one or two examples of the modern phraseology of Polybius. *Ὁ τῆς πραγματικῆς ἱστορίας τρόπος*: i.e. the method of actual history. *πραγματικῶς διενοήθησαν*, II. 50. 5. *Δικαιοδοσία*, jurisdiction, XX. 6. 2; XXXII. 17. 19. *Τρώγομεν* for *ἐσθίομεν*. *Λοιπὸν ἀνάγκη συγχωρεῖν τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς ὑποθέσεις εἶναι ψευδεῖς*, I. 15. *εἰς ἀληθινὰς ἐννοίας ἄγειν*. *Συμφωνοῦντες*, in the sense of bargaining, already used in this sense by Xenophon, Hell. I. 3. 8. *κατὰ τὰς περιστάσεις*, according to circumstances, *κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν προαιρέσεις*. *Ἀντίσπασμα*, a diversion, XI. 18. *Ἐκ τοῦ ζῆν ἐξεχώρησαν διὰ τὸν χρόνον*. Id. 22, *ἡ γὰρ λέξις αὕτη τοῦτο σημαινει κυρίως*. *εἰς φόβους συνεχεῖς καὶ ταραχὰς*, into continual fear and distress.

In the New Testament, among many others, we may notice the following modernisms: *Εἰς* for *ἐν*, as *εἰς τὸν κόλπον τοῦ πατρὸς*, St John i. 18. *Ἵνα* with the subjunctive is used continually for the infinitive, as Matthew iv. 3, *εἰπὲ ἵνα οἱ λίθοι οὗτοι ἄρτοι γένωνται*. *ἀνὰ μέσον*, for among: *ἄφες ἐκβάλω* the modern *ἂς ἐκβάλω*. *βρέχει* for *ὕει*, Matth. v. 45. *Ἔνοχος εἰς τὴν γέενναν* for *τῇ γεέννῃ*. *Ἐπάνω ὄρους*. *περισσότερον* for *πλέον*, as *περισσότερον κρῖμα*, "greater damnation." *Δυσκόλως* for *μόγις* or *χαλεπῶς*, "with difficulty," Luke xviii. 24. *Αὐτὸς* for *ὃς* or *οὗτος* passim. *Ἐστάθην* for *ἔστην* passim. The genitive for the dative as in modern Greek. *οὗ ἐγὼ οὐκ εἶμαι ἄξιος*

ἵνα λύσω αὐτοῦ τὸν ἱμάντα τοῦ ὑποδήματος. Ἰδοῦ for "here," the modern *ἐδῶ*, Acts ii. 7, *οὐκ ἰδοὺ πάντες οὗτοί εἰσιν οἱ λαλοῦντες Γαλιλαῖοι;* Εὐχαριστῶ for *χάριν εἰδέναι.* Cf. Lob. in Phryn. on the word. Καθεὶς for *ἕκαστος* in Romans xii. 5. Such forms as *γεμίζω*, "to fill," *ἐγγίζω*, "to approach," are all Hellenistic and modern.

In Romans the phrase *τῶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐν ἀδικίᾳ κατεχόντων* receives considerable light when it is known that *κατέχω* in many dialects of modern Greek is used for the more general *ἠξεύρω*, "I know," formed from the aorist of *ἐξευρίσκω, ἤξευρον.* Many another phrase, which to the mere classical scholar appears dark and strange, and in which superstitious critics of the school of Bengel profess to hear the unearthly utterances of an oracle, would appear simple and natural to one versed in the vernacular of the modern Greeks. In leaving the New Testament we may remark finally how many words there are to which it has given a peculiar meaning which has now become the prevalent one, as *διάβολος, κόλασις, θλίψις, μετανοέω, αἰώνιος.*

With Polybius and the New Testament we pass within the Roman period. If any one desires to form an idea as to the state of the spoken language about 180 years after Christ, no book will be more useful than Lobeck's edition of Phrynichus' Eclogae and Epitome. It is really astonishing to see how nearly every unattic form, against which Phrynichus protests, has established itself in the language of our own day. One may instance such forms as *φαγᾶς* and *φακᾶς, νηρὸν*, now *νερὸν*, for *ὕδωρ, φλούδιον* for *φλοίος, κρύβω* for *κρύπτω, ἀπὸ μακρόθεν*, a common New Testament and modern pleonasm, *λιθάριον, σταθερὸς, βασίλισσα, γελάσιμον, ζωΰφιον* (and similar derivatives), *ξενιτεύειν, κοράσιον, εὐχαριστῶ, ῥοΐδιον* for *ῥοίδιον.*

Passing on to the age of Diocletian let us stop for a few moments to read a Nubian inscription by a king Silco, Corpus Insc. III. p. 486, which may serve as a type of the Greek spoken at that time in Æthiopia.

Ἐγὼ Σιλκὼ *βασιλίσκος* Νουβαδῶν *καὶ ὅλων τῶν* Αἰθιόπων *ἦλθον εἰς* Τέλμιν *καὶ* Τάφιν, *ἅπαξ δύο ἐπολέμησα μετὰ τῶν* Βλεμμύων, *καὶ ὁ θεὸς ἔδωκέν μοι τὸ νίκημα μετὰ τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἅπαξ, ἐνίκησα πάλιν καὶ ἐκράτησα τὰς πόλεις αὐτῶν, ἐκαθέσθην*

μετὰ τῶν ὄχλων μου· τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἅπαξ ἐνίκησα αὐτῶν καὶ αὐτοὶ ἠξίωσάν με. ἐποίησα εἰρήνην μετ' αὐτῶν καὶ ὤμοσάν μοι τὰ εἴδωλα αὐτῶν, καὶ ἐπίστευσα τὸν ὅρκον αὐτῶν ὡς καλοί εἰσιν ἄνθρωποι· ἀναχωρήθην εἰς τὰ ἄνω μέρη μου. ὅτε ἐγεγονέμην βασιλίσκος οὐκ ἀπῆλθον ὅλως ὀπίσω τῶν ἄλλων βασιλέων ἀλλὰ ἀκμὴν ἔμπροσθεν αὐτῶν. οἱ γὰρ φιλονεικοῦσιν μετ' ἐμοῦ οὐκ ἀφῶ (cf. *ἀφέωνται* in New Testament) *αὐτοὺς εἰς χῶραν αὐτῶν εἰ μὴ κατηξίωσάν με καὶ παρακαλοῦσιν καθεσθῆναι. Ἐγὼ γὰρ εἰς κάτω μέρη λέων εἰμὶ καὶ εἰς ἄνω μέρη αἶξ εἰμί. ἐπολέμησα μετὰ τῶν Βλεμμύων καὶ Πρίμεως ἕως Τελ[μ]εως ἐν ἅπαξ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι Νουβαδῶν ἀνωτέρω ἐπόρθησα χώρας αὐτῶν, ἐπειδὴ ἐφιλονείκησαν μετ' ἐμοῦ. οὐκ ἀφῶ αὐτοὺς καθεσθῆναι εἰς τὴν σκιὰν εἰμὴ ὑποκλίνουσί μοι καὶ οὐκ ἔπωκαν νηρὸν ἔσω εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν αὐτῶν. οἱ γὰρ φιλονεικοῦσί μοι ἁρπάζω τῶν γυναικῶν καὶ τὰ παιδία αὐτῶν.* For wildness of grammar this inscription is not equalled even by the Revelation of St John, while for childishness of expression it stands unrivalled. The chief modernisms are *ὅλων* for *πάντων*, *ἐπολέμησα μετὰ* as passim in Revelation, and *ἐποίησα εἰρήνην μετ' αὐτῶν, ἀφῶ* for *ἀφίημι*, *ἔπωκαν*, a hybrid aorist-perfect like *εὕρηκαν* and *ἑώρακαν* in the Septuagint, *εἵρηκα*, and *ἔβηκα* in modern Greek, and *ἔσω εἰς* for *ἐν*, in modern Greek *μέσα εἰς*.

Other Nubian inscriptions give, as in Romaic, such forms as *Ἰοῦλις* for *Ἰούλιος*, with genitive *ἰούλι*, *του* as enclitic for *αὐτοῦ*, besides every possible extravagance in grammar and every conceivable error in spelling, the latter class of mistakes, however, invariably pointing to the identity of the pronunciation of that age with that of the present day; as *ἤλκυσε* for *εἵλκυσε*, *τέκνος* for *τέκνοις*, *ἴκωσι* for *εἴκωσι*, *ἀρχέως* for *ἀρχαίως*, *εἱερέος* for *ἱερέος*.

From the age of Diocletian to the Byzantine Period is but a step, and the history of the development of modern Greek from that time is shortly told. Until the time of Ptochoprodromus, in the eleventh century after Christ, artificial Attic was still the language of literature; but the popular dialect, often referred to by authors, keeps coming from to time to the surface; especially in such works as the Gospel of Nicodemus (end of fourth century), the Apophthegmata Patrum, Acts of

the Council of Constantinople, 536, Theophilus Antecessor and Joannes Moschus, 620, Justinian's Constitutiones Novellae, 565. In the Gospel of Nicodemus and in Justinian we have a number of Latin words, not many of which have survived. One of them, however, *ἅρματα* for *arma*, is a curious instance of Greek ingenuity in disguising barbarisms; for an "armed man" is in modern Greek *ἁρματωλός* = *ὁπλίτης*, on the analogy of *ἁμαρτωλός*. See Sophocles' Glossary of Later and Byzantine Greek, p. 59 of the Introduction.

The chief modernisms of this period are *ὁ ἀββᾶς, τοῦ ἀββᾶ*, pl. *οἱ ἀββάδες, κοπάδιν* for *κοπάδιον*, the modern *κοπάδι* (a piece); *πολλὰ τὰ ἔτη*, as a form of salutation; *ἄμβων* for *βῆμα*, *ἔνι* for *ἔστι*: and the combination *τζ* as *τζουμᾶς, τζαγγάρια*. At the beginning of a word this is found only in barbarisms; but in all probability the combination existed in certain words even in classical times, as a necessary intermediate stage between the old Attic double *σ* as in *κόσσυφος*, and the later Attic *ττ* as in *κόττυφος*. It is interesting to know that the vulgar Greek of the present day gives us *κότσυφος* or *κότζυφος*, sometimes pronounced almost *κόchυφος*.

I subjoin a short specimen of the popular style adopted in this period from the Apophthegmata Patrum:

Ἠλθόν ποτε πατέρες εἰς Ἀλεξάνδρειαν κληθέντες ὑπὸ Θεοφίλου τοῦ ἀρχιεπισκόπου ἵνα ποιήσῃ εὐχὴν καὶ καθέλῃ τὰ ἱερά. Καὶ ἐσθιόντων αὐτῶν παρ' αὐτοῦ παρετέθη κρέας μόσχιον. Καὶ ἤσθιον μηδὲν διακρινόμενοι καὶ λαβὼν ὁ ἐπίσκοπος ἓν κοπάδιν ἔδωκε τῷ πλησίον αὐτοῦ γέροντι λέγων, Ἰδοῦ τοῦτο καλὸν κοπάδιν ἐστὶν, φάγε ἀββᾶ. Οἱ δὲ ἀποκριθέντες εἶπον, Ἡμεῖς ἕως ἄρτι λάχανα ἠσθίομεν εἰ δὲ κρέας ἐστι οὐ τρώγομεν. Καὶ οὐκέτι προσέθετο οὐδὲ εἷς ἐξ αὐτῶν γεύσασθαι αὐτοῦ. A strange improvement on the Apostolic precept, "ask no questions, for conscience' sake." The meanness of the language is in strange harmony with the moral degradation of a religion of meats and drinks usurping the name of Christianity.

The next period in the history of the Greek language may be reckoned from 622, the date of the Hegira, to 1099. We have here before our eyes the transition in literature from ancient to modern Greek; or, speaking more correctly, from

the language of the grammarians to the language of the people.

Theophanes (758—806) gives us *-άδες* as the plural of nouns in *-ας*, Ἂς *λαλήσωμεν* for *λαλήσωμεν*, and *ἂς εἰσέλθωσι* for *εἰσελθόντων*. The perfect participle without reduplication, as *σιδηρωμένος*, *καστελλωμένος*, *πυρπολημένος*. Ἀπὸ with the accusative, *σὺν* with the genitive, as well as *ἅμα* with gen. Malalas, whose age cannot be determined with certainty, gives us in addition *-ες* for *-αι*, as Πέρσες for Πέρσαι, *ταῖς πλάκαις*, metaplastic from *ἡ πλὰξ*, as though it were *ἡ πλάκα*. Κἂν in its modern Greek usage, *οἷαι κἂν ἦσαν*, "whatsoever they were like." Μετὰ with the accusative in the sense of with, as the mutilated modern *μὲ*(?) The nameless biographer of Leo Armenius uses the ending *-ουν* for *-ουσι*. Ἐκ with the accusative, and *εὐγενὸς* for *εὐγενής*. Leo the Philosopher, 886—911, has *ἰδικὸς* = *proprium*, as in Romaic, the ending *-εσαι* for *-ει* (second pers. sing. passive). Constantine Porphyrogenitus, who wrote all his works, with the exception of the life of St Basil, in a style purposely popular, gives us *ἀλλάξιμον* gen. *ἀλλαξίματος*: cf. the form *τὸ γελάσιμον*, condemned by Phrynichus. Μονογενῆ for the vocative of *μονογενῆς*. The ending *-ικος*, proparoxytone (possibly a Latinism). Σᾶς for *ὑμῶν*, *τῶν* for *αὐτῶν*, *ἕνα* for *ἓν*, *εἶσε* for *εἶ*: *εἶσε* is probably from *ἐσσὶ*, just as *εἶνε* is from *ἐντί*. *σου* for *σοι*, as *καλή σου ἡμέρα*, "good morning to you." Νὰ for *ἵνα*, and *ἕως* with the accusative.

An anonymous writer, known as Theophanes Continuatus, gives us Ἄλυ gen. of Ἄλυς, *χρυσὸς* for *χρυσοῦς*: Cedrenus, A.D. 1057, the numeral adverb *ἑπτάϊ* for *ἑπτάκις*. This would appear to be a relic of an old instrumental ending. Scylitzes gives us the following specimen of the common dialect, *ἐῶ σὲ ἔκτισα φοῦρνε, ἐῶ ἵνα σὲ χαλάσω* = in modern Greek *ἐγώ σε ἔκτισα φοῦρνε, ἐγώ σε νά* (sometimes used for *θά*) *σε χαλάσω*. Ἐῶ occurs in modern Greek as a dialectic form, as well as *ἰῶ*, *ἰών*. Cf. Boeotian *ἰὼν*, *ἰώνγα*. Anna Comnena, who wrote a history of the Byzantine war about the year 1100, gives another example in the following verse:

Τὸ *σάββατον τῆς τυρινῆς*,
Χαρῇς Ἀλέξιε, *ἐνόησές το*,

Καὶ τὴν δευτέραν τὸ πρωΐ
Εἶπε, Καλῶς γεράκιν μοι.

Here we have τὸ σάββατον for τῷ σαββάτῳ, ἐνόησες for ἐνόησας, the enclitic το, Χαρῇς for χαρείης used optatively, τὴν δευτέραν for τῇ δευτέρᾳ, Καλῶς, as a form of salutation, still common in Greece, and the diminutive γεράκιν for γερόντιον, on the analogy probably of σκυλάκιον, diminutive of σκῦλος, or, properly speaking, of σκύλαξ. Γεράκιν is contracted for γεράκιον, and, in modern Romaic, would appear as γεράκι.

This closes the mediæval period of Greek literature. The first writer who can be said to have used the popular dialect in its entirety was Theodorus Prodromus, nicknamed Ptochoprodromus from his poverty; a monk who lived in the reign of the emperor Manuel Comnenus, and addressed to him a series of popular verses, στίχοι πολιτικοὶ, preserved to us by the grammarian Coray in the first volume of his *Atacta*. The burden of these verses appears to be the poverty of learned men. They are written with great spirit, and remind us of Juvenal. The Greek language is now emancipated, and begins again to show its native power. We subjoin an extract taken from Mr Sophocles' book above-mentioned:

Τὴν κεφαλήν σου, βασιλεῦ, εἰς τοῦτο τί με λέγεις;
Ἂν ἔχω γειτονάν τιναν κἔχῃ παιδὶν ἀγόριν,
Νὰ τὸν εἰπῶ 'τι, Μάθε το γραμματικὸν νὰ ζήσῃ;
Παρὰ κρανιαροκέφαλον πάντες νὰ μ' ὀνομάσουν.
Νὰ τὸν εἰπῶ 'τι, Μάθε τὸ τζαγγάρην τὸ παιδίν σου.
Γείτοναν ἔχω πετζωτὴν, τάχα ψευδοτζαγγάρην·
Πλὴν ἔνε καλοψουνιστὴς, ἔνε καὶ χαροκόπος.
Ὅταν γὰρ ἴδῃ τὴν αὐγὴν περιχαρασσομένην,
Λέγει ἂς βράσῃ τὸ κρασὶν καὶ βάλε τὸ πιπέριν·
Εὐθὺς τὸ βράσειν τὸ θερμὸν λέγει πρὸς τὸ παιδίν του
Νά το, παιδίν μου, ἀγόρασε χορδόκοιλα σταμένου,
Φέρε καὶ Βλάχικον τυρὶν ἄλλην σταμεναρέαν,
Καὶ δός με νὰ προγεύσωμαι, καὶ τότε νὰ πετζόνω.
Ἀφ' οὗ δὲ φθάσῃ τὸ τυρὶν καὶ τὰ χορδοκοιλίτζια,
* * * * * * *
Κἂν τέσσερα τὸν δίδουσιν εἰς τὸ τρανὸν μουχρούτιν·
Καὶ παρευθὺς ὑπόδημαν ἐπαίρει καὶ πετζόνει.

Ὅνταν δὲ πάλιν, βασιλεῦ, γέματος ὥρα φθάσῃ,
Ῥίπτει τὸ καλαπόδιν του, ῥίπτει καὶ τὸ σανίδιν
Καὶ λέγει τὴν γυναῖκά του, Κυρὰ καὶ θὲς τραπέζιν
Καὶ πρῶτον μίσσον (Lat. *missus*) ἐκζεστὸν, δεύτερον τὸ σφουγγάτον,
Καὶ τρίτον τὸ ἀκριὸπαστον ὀφθὸν ἀπὸ μερίου.
Καὶ τέταρτον μονόκυθρον, πλὴν βλέπε νὰ μὴ βράζῃ.
Ἀφ' οὗ δὲ παραθέσουσιν καὶ νίψεται καὶ κάτζῃ,
Ἀνάθεμά με βασιλεῦ καὶ τρισανάθεμά με
Ὅνταν στραφῶ καὶ ἴδω τὸν λοιπὸν τὸ πῶς καθίζει,
Τὸ πῶς ἀνακομπόνεται νὰ πιάσῃ τὸ κουτάλιν·
Καὶ οὐδὲν τρέχουν τὰ σάλια μου, ὡς τρέχει τὸ ποτάμιν.
Καὶ 'γὼ ὑπάγω κ' ἔρχομαι πόδας μετρῶν τῶν στίχων
Εὐθὺς ζητῶ τὸν ἴαμβον, γυρεύω τὸν σπονδεῖον·
Γυρεύω τὸν πυρρίχιον καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τὰ μέτρα,
Ἀλλὰ τὰ μέτρα ποῦ 'φελοῦν 's τὴν ἄμετρόν μου πεῖναν;
Πότε γὰρ ἐκ τὸν ἴαμβον νὰ φάγω κοσμοκράτορ;
Ἢ πῶς ἐκ τὸν πυρρίχιον ποτέ μου νὰ χορτάσω;
Ἴδε τεχνίτης σοφιστὴς ἐκεῖνος ὁ τζαγγάρης
Εἶπε τὸ Κύριε 'λέησον, ἤρξατο ῥουκανίζειν.

The language here is essentially modern Greek, though the middle voice appears not quite extinct as we have *προγεύσωμαι*, *ἤρξατο*, &c., and *ν* sometimes etymologic, sometimes ephelcystic, is written after a number of words where it is now left out, as *ὑπόδημαν*, *παιδίν*. Ἴδε for *ἴδε* strengthens the etymology of *ἐδῶ* from *ἰδοῦ*. *οὐδὲν* is written for the modern *δέν*. The form *ἔνε* we have referred to on page 170.

For the subjoined translation I am responsible.

"By your own sacred head, O king, say what is here your meaning;
Suppose I have a neighbour now, blessed with a boy in breeches,
Shall I go tell him, 'Teach your son his letters for his living'?
Sure all the world would dub me then a most consummate blockhead.
Nay, I should say, 'Go teach your son a bootmaker's profession.'

One of my neighbours cobbles shoes, perhaps pretends to make them;
Now there's a famous manager, who understands good living.
No sooner does he see the dawn streaking the sky to eastward,
Than straight he cries, 'Let boil my wine, and sprinkle in some pepper.'
Scarce has the hot potation boiled, when thus he hails his servant:
'Here boy! a shilling's worth of tripe go bring me from the market:
A shilling's worth of cheese besides, Thessalian cheese remember.
If I'm to cobble shoes to-day, I first must have my breakfast.'
And when the cheese comes with the tripe in dainty little clusters,
Four times they fill him to the brim a mug of vast dimensions.
And then he takes a shoe in hand and cobbles at his leisure.
But when the dinner-time comes round, why then, my lord and master,
Away with last and cobbling-board, the time has come for eating.
'Good wife,' he cries, 'come lay the cloth, and get the dinner ready.
Bring me the broth, that's the first course, the second is an omelette,
The third a haunch of venison pie, browned nicely in the oven,
A mess of hotch-potch for the fourth; take care it don't boil over.'
When all is served and he has washed, and seats himself at table,
Curse me, your gracious majesty, not once, but three times over,
If—as I look and contemplate the way he sits at dinner,
Unbuttoning his waistcoat first, to hold his spoon the easier—
It does not fill my hungry mouth with water like a river.
And I; I go and come again, and measure feet for verses,
Now hunting for a short and long, now for two longs together;

And now for two short syllables, with all the other measures.
Alas! what help the measures my unmeasurable hunger?
When, mighty prince, will shorts and longs provide me with
a dinner?
Or how with two short syllables am I to fill my belly?
Behold a shoemaker indeed, a skilful craftsman truly;
A blessing asked, he straight proceeds to polish off the victuals."

E. M. GELDART.

NOTES ON ROMAN HISTORY.

1.

Livy, I. 60. Duo consules inde comitiis centuriatis a præfecto urbis ex commentariis Ser. Tullii creati sunt.

So far as this passage can be regarded as of historical value, it obliges us to suppose that the consulship formed an integral part of the Servian constitution, and is therefore at variance with the common account, according to which the consulship was instituted on the abolition of the monarchy. The difficulty is usually got over by the help of another statement (Liv. I. 48) that Servius Tullius himself, according to 'certain authors,' intended to lay down his kingly office. Several circumstances however seem to bear out the simpler explanation, that the consuls existed along with the king in the original Servian constitution. I shall endeavour to show (1) that this view of the case is in agreement with the later constitutional theory, and (2) that the account of Livy may be derived from a source which would give it the value of a contemporary record.

If there were *consuls* during the monarchy—that is to say, annual magistrates elected by the Servian Comitia Centuriata—they must have been military officers, commanding under the king. For a constitutional parallel to such an office we naturally look to what took place in later times when the *regium imperium* was restored in the person of a dictator. In this case the consuls did not go out of office, but acted under him; he was 'moderator et magister consulibus appositus' (Liv. II. 18). The dictatorship was not (like the decemvirate) a suspension of the constitution, but its restoration to an original completeness. As soon as the dictator laid down his office, the

imperium of the consuls revived. So far, then, as this doctrine can be applied to the consuls of the regal period it confirms the interpretation of Livy's words now suggested.

The same view of the relation of the Servian consuls to the king leads us to an explanation of the Revolution of 245 U. C., which gives it a peculiarly Roman character. The change then made may have consisted simply in suppressing or suspending the highest magistracy of the state, and so allowing the supreme power to devolve, *ipso facto* as it were, on the magistrates next in rank. This theory of the Regifugium is not only probable in itself, but seems to furnish explanations of some obscure points in the history of that event.

1. The transference of power from the Comitia Curiata to the Comitia Centuriata becomes a natural consequence of the abolition of monarchy. The Curies cease to have any elective functions. The first republican consuls are created, as before, by the *exercitus procinctus;* their confirmation by the Curies tends thenceforth to sink into a mere formality, if it was not so from the first institution of the Comitia Centuriata. In the same way the appeal to the people from the Consuls would naturally lie to the assembly with which they were otherwise connected, and not, as in the regal period, to the Curies. A precedent may have been found in the form of the appeal, said to have been allowed by Tullus Hostilius, from the *Duumviri perduellionis.*

2. The important distinction between the powers of the consul in the city and in the field may have arisen without a special enactment. That the king should delegate his imperium on a campaign, but not in Rome itself, is thoroughly according to Roman principles: just as in later times a *proconsul* could only hold *imperium* in a province, that is to say, in a country where war was supposed to be going on. The expulsion of the king then did not give the consuls any powers different in kind from those which they had formerly during his temporary absence. The Dictator, on the contrary, is absolute both at home and abroad. The more complete separation of religious and secular functions may have been due in part at least to the same circumstances. The consuls would only succeed to such

religious duties as they had been in the habit of performing for the king.

3. The name *consul* seems a natural one for such an office as is here supposed. They are assessors, *in consilio* with the king (for *consul* is to *consilium* as *exul* to *exilium*). The word is peculiar to Rome, whereas *prætor* and *dictator* are common Latin titles. It may be noticed too that the dictator might be called *prætor maximus,* but there was no *consul maximus.* Prætor is a much wider word: there might be in the state at once, a *prætor maximus* (or dictator), two *prætores consules,* and a prætor *κατ' ἐξοχήν.* In their peculiar relation to the kings they may have been like the Ephors; the name *consul* reminds us of the *ξύμβουλοι* created by the Spartans in 418 B.C. (Thuc. v. 63).

The further question arises; supposing that Livy's notice represents the correct constitutional theory, can it be regarded as based on contemporary record?

The Lex Curiata, by which the military imperium was given, was a form handed down from the earliest times, and doubtless only varied as the powers to be conferred were modified from time to time. Now it appears from the well-known passage of Tacitus (*Ann.* XI. 22), that the Lex Curiata was renewed (*repetita*) by Brutus after the Regifugium, and that Tacitus was able to gather from its terms that the quæstors dated from the regal period.

The same 'law' may well have indicated to Livy, or rather to the writers whom he followed, that the consulship itself was not a novelty, but had existed under the Servian constitution, although in abeyance perhaps under the tyranny of Tarquin.

The view now taken of the constitutional changes of 245 U.C., brings them into analogy with several features of the later history. It is characteristic of the Romans rather to avail themselves of the powers of an existing magistracy than to create an entirely new set of powers. In the same way when the plebeians first claimed political equality, the consulship was temporarily set aside, and the military tribunes—the next magistracy—were invested, so far as was constitutionally possible, with 'consular power.' This seemed less violent than making

such an alteration in the nature of the consulship as would make it tenable by plebeians.

The transference of power from the Comitia Curiata to the Comitia Centuriata offers a certain parallel to the process by which a great part of the same power was afterwards transferred to the Comitia Tributa. In neither case was any part of the constitution formally superseded; the first step in both cases is the establishment of a new assembly for the election of a new class of magistrates: and in both the powers of these magistrates are subordinate at first, but develop gradually from the force of circumstances, and draw with them increased importance for the assembly to which they belong.

Finally, the establishment of the Republic, thus carried out, will add another to the examples of the skill with which the Romans effected their most vital changes with the least break in the traditions of the constitution—keeping the form while they altered the substance, and making a bridge out of familiar names and customs by which to pass from the old to the new order of things.

2.

Plutarch, *Marius*, c. 5 (p. 408). Ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν Μάριον καὶ Γάϊος Ἐρέννιος μάρτυς εἰσαχθεὶς οὐκ ἔφη πάτριον εἶναι καταμαρτυρεῖν πελατῶν, ἀλλὰ τὸν νόμον ἀφιέναι ταύτης τῆς ἀνάγκης τοὺς πάτρωνας· οὕτω γὰρ οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι τοὺς προστάτας καλοῦσι· τοῦ δ' Ἐρεννίων οἴκου τοὺς Μαρίου γονεῖς καὶ Μάριον αὐτὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς γεγονέναι πελάτας. Ἀποδεξαμένων δὲ τὴν ἀπόρρησιν τῆς μαρτυρίας τῶν δικαστῶν, αὐτὸς ἀντεῖπεν ὁ Μάριος πρὸς τὸν Ἐρέννιον ὡς ὅτε πρῶτον ἄρχων ἀνηγορεύθη τὸν πελάτην ἐκβεβηκώς· ὅπερ ἦν οὐ παντάπασιν ἀληθές· ἀρχὴ γὰρ οὐ πᾶσα τοῦ νέμειν προστάτην ἀπαλλάσσει τοὺς τυχόντας αὐτοὺς καὶ γένος, ἀλλ' ἧ τὸν ἀγκυλόποδα δίφρον ὁ νόμος δίδωσιν.

Mommsen has justly called attention to this passage (in his *Römische Forschungen*, p. 365, n. 15) as containing one of the few positive rules of law relating to the institution of the Clientela, and as indicating the original identity of the status of client

with that of plebeian. The patrician Herennius in claiming Marius as his client, meant to remind him insultingly that he was a plebeian; and the reply of Marius invoked the principle that the holder of a magistracy at once ceased to be liable to the incidents of plebeian birth. Plutarch feels a difficulty in understanding the point of this argument, because Marius had only held the plebeian ædileship, which was not a *magistratus populi*, and therefore he might still be technically a simple plebeian.

The solution is to be found in the strict interpretation of the rule of law as quoted by Marius. He was on his trial for bribery, being at the time *prætor designatus:* and he maintained that *from the moment of his election* as prætor (ὅτε πρῶτον ἄρχων ἀνηγορεύθη—i. e. *ut primum renunciatus esset*) he had ceased to be a client. The story, therefore, as Plutarch found it in his authorities is perfectly consistent, and his difficulty is an additional testimony to its correctness.

The words νέμειν προστάτην appear to be a translation of *colere patronum.*

The view which this passage suggests of the gradual extinction of the original clientela as a relation between the patricians and the plebeians may possibly be applied to the much disputed question of the Comitia Curiata. Mommsen has shown (*Röm. Forsch.* pp. 140—150) that in historical times the plebeians were members of that assembly, not only from the unanimous testimony of the ancient historians, but still more decisively from the fact that plebeians took part in the religious rites of the Curies. On the other hand, he feels with all modern writers the impossibility of supposing that a pure democracy existed in the period before the timocratic Servian constitution: and he is therefore led to suppose that at some time the plebeians extorted the right of voting in the Curies from the ancient patrician citizens (*Röm. Forsch.* p. 276).

We may perhaps dispense with so arbitrary a supposition if we consider the relations of the Roman *gens* with the Curia on one hand and the Clients on the other. Patricians only were, properly speaking, *gentiles* or members of a gens (Liv. x. 8, *vos solos gentem habere*), but their clients belonged to it for

many purposes both sacred and civil (*Röm. Forsch.* pp. 368, 371), and it was especially their duty to attend their patron in the Forum and other public places. If they went to the Comitia Curiata they did so in their character of dependents on the *gens*—for the Curia was composed of a certain number of *gentes*—and merely helped to swell its numbers. In the Comitia Centuriata, on the other hand, the plebeian's position depended upon himself; for the *precarium* which was assigned to a client was probably not a qualification for the Servian classes. Indeed it may be worth considering whether the establishment of the Comitia Centuriata was not one of the causes of the increased importance and independence of the plebeians, by leading the patricians to enfranchise the land of their clients in order to swell their own influence in the Comitia. However that may be, there is no doubt that plebeians voted from the first in the Centuries, but in the character of independent owners of property. If they voted in the Curies they were controlled by the *esprit de corps* of the *gens*, and by all the sacred associations of the clientela. It may be added that in the early period to which the Comitia Curiata belongs the assembly was not itself so important that the right of being present and voting would be jealously guarded. It is only when such an assembly is the organ of an active political life that its franchise becomes the subject of limitation and dispute.

3.

The following passages seem to show what perhaps has not been sufficiently recognised, that Livy took not only the facts of history but the substance of the speeches from the earlier writers whose works he used.

Livy, III. 47. Quem decreto sermonem prætenderit forsitan aliquem verum auctores antiqui tradiderint: quia nusquam ullum in tanta fœditate decreti verisimilem invenio, id quod constat nudum videtur proponendum, decresse vindicias secundum servitutem.

Livy, III. 54. In Aventinum ite, unde profecti estis. Ibi felici loco ubi prima initia inchoastis libertatis vestræ, tribunos plebis creabitis.

These words can hardly refer to anything but the First Secession, and if so the speech is taken from an historian who followed Piso's account of that event: for Livy himself makes the plebs secede to the Mons Sacer.

4.

Cic. *De Orat.* III. 39, § 177. Quid quod item in centumvirali judicio certatum esse accepimus qui Romam in exilium venisset, cui Romæ exulare jus esset. Si se ad aliquem quasi patronum applicavisset, intestatoque esset mortuus—: nonne in ea causa jus applicationis, obscurum sane et ignotum, patefactum in judicio atque illustratum est a patrono?

In the elaborate parallel which Mommsen has drawn (*Röm. Forsch.* pp. 319—390) between *hospitium* and *clientela* he has made good use of this passage as affording points in which these two relations may be compared. The client created under the *jus applicationis*, like the *hospes*, must be a citizen of an independent state, so as to have the *jus exilii* at Rome; but he cannot be a *hospes*, because he has lost his rights in his own state and has therefore nothing to offer in return for Roman *hospitium*. He is, in Homeric language, an *ἀτίμητος μετανάστης* and as such compelled to place himself in a relation of dependence (*se ad aliquem quasi patronum applicare*) in his new home. The citizens of a newly conquered state are in the same unprotected condition; and accordingly if spared from death or slavery they usually place themselves under the *patronatus* of their conqueror and his descendants.

The ancient legal doctrine of the *jus applicationis* (which was antiquated, as it appears, in the time of Cicero) may be illustrated by a suggestive passage of the *Odyssey*. In the story which Ulysses tells Eumæus in Book XIV. he relates how he and his comrades were defeated by the Egyptians, who 'slew

many and took others alive to work for them perforce;' but Zeus put into his mind this thought (vv. 276—284):

αὐτίκ' ἀπὸ κρατὸς κυνέην εὔτυκτον ἔθηκα
καὶ σάκος ὤμοιϊν δόρυ δ' ἔκβαλον ἔκτοσε χειρός·
αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ βασιλῆος ἐναντίον ἤλυθον ἵππων
καὶ κύσα γούναθ' ἑλών· ὁ δ' ἐρύσατο καί μ' ἐλέησεν,
ἐς δίφρον δέ μ' ἔσας ἄγεν οἴκαδε δακρυχέοντα.
ἦ μέν μοι μάλα πολλοὶ ἐπήϊσσον μελίῃσιν
ἱέμενοι κτεῖναι—δὴ γὰρ κεχολώατο λίην—
ἀλλ' ἀπὸ κεῖνος ἔρυκε, Διὸς δ' ὠπίζετο μῆνιν
ξεινίου, ὅστε μάλιστα νεμεσσᾶται κακὰ ἔργα.

The picture given by these lines exemplifies the moral basis of the *jus applicationis*, viz. the compassion which the helpless suppliant excites, and the religious sanction, the anger of Zeus (πρὸς γὰρ Διός εἰσιν ἅπαντες ξεῖνοί τε πτωχοί τε), if his rights are violated. The prayer of Lycaon in the *Iliad* (XXI. 74 sq.) turns on the same principles:

γουνοῦμαί σ' Ἀχιλεῦ· σὺ δέ μ' αἴδεο καί μ' ἐλέησον·
ἀντί τοί εἰμ' ἱκέταο, διοτρεφές, αἰδοίοιο.

It is characteristic that in Homer the moral feeling (αἰδώς) is more prominent, while at Rome the incidents of the relation are more systematically worked out and its sanctions distinctly specified (*si quis clienti fraudem fecerit sacer esto*, Serv. *Æn.* VI. 604). In both cases however the idea of right—of definite acts prescribed by legal or quasi-legal rules—is clearly to be traced.

5.

FESTUS, *Ep.* p. 247. Patres senatores ideo appellati sunt quia agrorum partes attribuerant tenuioribus ac si liberis propriis.

Here again the Odyssey offers a parallel. Eumæus says of his master, *Od.* XIV. 61—66:

ἦ γὰρ τοῦγε Θεοὶ κατὰ νόστον ἔδησαν,
ὅς κεν ἔμ' ἐνδυκέως ἐφίλει καὶ κτῆσιν ὄπασσεν,

οἷά τε ᾧ οἰκῆϊ ἄναξ εὐθυμος ἔδωκεν,
οἶκόν τε κλῆρόν τε πολυμνήστην τε γυναῖκα,
ὅς οἱ πολλὰ κάμῃσι, Θεὸς δ' ἐπὶ ἔργον ἀέξῃ,
ὡς καὶ ἐμοὶ τόδε ἔργον ἀέξεται ᾧ ἐπιμίμνω.

Eumæus is speaking of slaves, such as he was himself, whereas the 'tenuiores' of Festus are clients. This difference shows how the servile relation might be modified so as gradually to assume a milder character. As Mommsen points out, there is no mode of manumission provided by the earliest law: the *vindicta* proceeds on the legal fiction that the person in question is already *de jure* free. If however the master gave a slave a farm of his own, he practically gave him freedom: and by being enrolled in the list of the censors he became a Roman citizen. At the same time his position towards the family to which he belonged—his moral duty in return for protection and his religious duty as a sharer in the *sacra*—was not altered. Hence the client (somewhat like the filius familiæ) was a citizen but yet dependent.

6.

HORACE, *A. P.* 341—6:

Centuriæ seniorum agitant expertia frugis;
Celsi prætereunt austera poemata Ramnes;
Omne tulit punctum qui miscuit utile dulci.
Lectorem delectando pariterque monendo;
Hic meret æra liber Sosiis, hic et mare transit
Et longum noto scriptori prorogat ævum.

It may not have been observed that the metaphors from the Comitia Centuriata are carried on to the end of this passage. The Ramnes stand for the centuriæ juniorum, the equites being technically and at this time really juniores (*illa adolescentulorum ætas*, Q. Cic. *De Pet. Cons.* 8. 33). 'Meret æra' is equivalent to stipendium facit: 'mare transit' refers to foreign service: and 'prorogat' to the extension of a command by a vote of the comitia.

D. B. MONRO.

THE CASES.

It is commonly said that the cases are of local origin. Denoting in the first instance relations of place, they became by degrees transferred to relations of a more abstract character. This theory has gained favour because it is in harmony with that general law of progress by which the human mind mounts from what is tangible and concrete to what is abstract and intellectual. It is intelligible, and therefore possibly true. It seems to explain the striking contrast between the fewness of the forms of the cases and the multitude of their uses. It is also borne out to some extent by an examination of the forms of particular cases, especially the genitive and locative. On the other hand, it has met with opposition, as incompatible both with the philosophy and the forms of the cases. Professor Curtius regards it as untenable. Were it true, he says, that the nominative denoted the starting-point of the action of the verb, and the accusative denoted the goal, then, of the three categories of space, *unde*, *ubi*, *quo*, two are absorbed by the nominative and accusative, and but *one*, *ubi* is left for the remainder, five at least in number. Moreover if the nominative originally signified motion from a place, it would be included in the same category with the ablative and genitive.

These objections are alternatives, and cannot be urged simultaneously. If the local theory is unsatisfactory because it leaves but one category for all the cases except the nominative and accusative, it cannot also labour under the objection that it includes nominative and ablative in one and the same category. They assume, moreover, (1) That the nominative is a case in the same sense in which the accusative, genitive, and

ablative are cases; (2) That all the cases came into being at one and the same time; (3) That in the period of the formation of language the human mind was capable of forming such general notions as categories of space; and (4) That these categories are indivisible.

Let us examine these assumptions briefly. (1) The ancient grammarians distinguished between the casus rectus and the casus obliqui. In other words, they regarded the nominative as the standard form of a word from which the other cases were declined. In this they were most undoubtedly mistaken. The nominative is a separate formation from the stem, and requires a termination no less than the accusative; λόγο-ς no less than λόγο-ν. On the other hand, modern grammarians take great credit for putting the nominative on the same level with the other cases, and consider that in doing so they have removed an anomaly from the theory of declension. Yet it is a remarkable fact that the article (so called) ὁ, ἡ, τό has one form for the masculine and feminine nominative, and another form for the neuter nominative and oblique cases; and that it is this very article or pronoun which is applied in the formation of the nominative case, for the ς of λόγο-ς, χάρι-ς is in Bopp's opinion a remnant of the demonstrative *sa*, which in Greek appears as ὁ. In the personal pronouns also we find the nominative formed from one stem, and the other cases from another stem. The inference to be drawn from these facts seems to be that the old grammarians were correct in separating the nominative from the other cases, and regarding it as standing on a different level.

(2) The objection that the local theory leaves but one category, *ubi*, for five cases out of the seven, has no point unless it is assumed that all the cases came into existence at one and the same time. For as one case denoting this local relation became applied to other uses, its place would be supplied by a new formation of strict and obvious local meaning. In this manner there might without difficulty arise as many as five different forms, all in the first instance signifying a similar local relation. But such an assumption will scarcely be maintained in the face of what we know about the nature

of language. Forms are not created in groups but arise gradually as the need of them is felt. Thus prepositions have supplanted the cases; and auxiliary verbs have taken the place of the moods, but in neither instance has the change been sudden or the new uses introduced otherwise than singly. In language again, as spoken at the present day—and it is only from language actually living that we can gain any true notion of the life of language—we see the same gradual and isolated change. Unless therefore we suppose the processes which governed language in the earliest eras to have been quite different from those in force now, this assumption is quite untenable.

(3) and (4). Still less can we admit that the formation of language was carried on in subservience to such general and abstract notions as the categories. The categories are not necessary forms of thought, but merely summaries of relations under which we are accustomed to look at things. Such summaries cannot be made until the mind has become acquainted with abstractions, and language has become fixed: we require the aid of language in forming them. But language—as we know from the study of barbarous dialects—begins with the individual impression, and proceeds by slow degrees to what is general. Thus the notions of 'creeping,' 'running,' 'walking,' 'riding,' are prior to the more general notion of 'going.' And similarly 'from beneath,' 'from above,' 'from the side of,' 'from out of,' are prior to the more general conception *unde*. What wonder then if more than one case can be subsumed under the category *unde!* Who would attempt to prove the existence of ἐξ as a preposition governing the genitive impossible because we have already παρὰ with the same case denoting motion from? 'From' = 'out of' is not by any means identical with 'from' in the sense of 'removal from.' The notions require two different prepositions; we may therefore suppose it possible that they were felt to require two different cases. Even therefore if it were admissible to make use of arguments based on the categories in investigating the origin of the cases, the mode in which they are here applied is more than doubtful

But these assumptions and the objections based upon them

are of a general character. It is to the forms of the cases that we must look for reliable evidence of their original meaning. Professor Curtius divides the cases into two groups, the first comprising the nominative, accusative and vocative; the second comprising the remaining cases. Without acquiescing in the division or in any arguments based upon it we may adopt it for convenience' sake in going through the cases. In regard to the first group Professor Curtius entirely rejects the local theory, his chief objection being that were the nominative originally a case signifying *unde* and the accusative originally a case signifying *quo*, there would be a confusion of diametrically opposite notions in the use of the accusative for the nominative in the neuter nouns, which use is very ancient.

We have seen reason to dissent from those modern grammarians (of whom Curtius is one) who place the nominative on the same level as the oblique cases. The *sa*, which appears as the *s* of the nominative, was found to be confined to the masculine and feminine gender and nominative case, the remaining cases of masculine and feminine and the neuter gender in all cases being formed from a different stem *ta*. Now this connection between the animate genders and the nominative case on the one hand and between the oblique cases and the neuter gender on the other hand is sufficiently striking. It suggests the inference that the *s* of the nominative is a suffix denoting animate gender. And what more natural or simple means could be adopted to denote the subject of an action in an operative sense than a gender-suffix, significative of life and action? If this be true the nominative may be at once removed from the number of cases of originally local origin. For the distinction of animate and inanimate gender is quite as primary as distinctions of a local nature.

The vocative is not a case at all. It does not bring a word into relation with the other words of the sentence. The termination, when it has one, is identical with that of the nominative, and the addition is due to false analogy.

The termination of the accusative is in the animate genders *m*, Greek *ν*. The neuter has as a rule no termination—in the second declension only do we find *m* (Greek *ν*); the pronouns

have *d*, e.g. *quod, quid.* This last-mentioned suffix is apparently identical with the pronoun *ta* which we have already found to be used only in the neuter gender throughout and the oblique cases of the animate genders. And as we found a connection between the nominative and animate gender so we may also infer some connection between the oblique cases and inanimate gender, for the oblique cases are all to a certain extent cases of the object and what is inanimate may be regarded as objective. The pronoun root *ta* then denotes inanimateness, or objectivity in general, in contrast to *sa* (ὁ, ἡ), which denotes life and animateness. Hence it is peculiarly applicable for the signification of the neuter in stems of indeterminate gender such as the pronouns (except the personal) seem to be.

When on the other hand the stem is animate or regarded as animate, another suffix is required for the case of the object. Thus *m* (Greek *ν*) is added to all masculine and feminine nouns and to neuter nouns of the 2nd declension. Of the origin of this suffix we can say nothing certain. It has been suggested that it is identical with *ma,* which we find in the oblique cases of the first personal pronoun. However this may be, the real force of the suffix *m* would seem to be that it transfers what is animate into a case in which it may be regarded as inanimate. If this be true the stems of neuter nouns of the second declension must all or at least a portion of them which gave the type to the rest have been at one time of animate gender. In support of this hypothesis it may be said (1) that there are no neuters of the first declension (which is ultimately identical with the 2nd); that the neuters of the second declension are anomalous; that only in the 1st declension can the *s* of the nominative be dropped, which seems to imply some notion of agency in the stem; and lastly, that Professor Schleicher considers the *a* or *o* in such stems as *bhara-*, *φερο-* to be a 'determinative pronoun, signifying the doer.' In form, then, *θεόν* and *τέκνον* are identical; both are to be regarded as inanimate, both are accusatives, both are neuters.

With regard to these three cases then, the theory of local origin appears untenable, and if what has been said is true we hardly require the additional proof which Professor Curtius

adduces, viz. that, were the nominative a case signifying *unde,* and the accusative a case signifying *quo,* the use of the accusative for the nominative is a confusion of diametrically opposite relations. In fact the proof is misleading; the use of the accusative for the nominative would on any hypothesis be a confusion of opposite relations and the true explanation of such forms as *τέκνον, regnum,* is that the suffix *m* is here applied as a gender-suffix and that the neuter gender, as we see from all the other declensions but the 2nd, has neither accusative nor nominative.

Nor can we infer that cases are of similar origin because they are to some extent of similar form or usage. Analogy, false as well as true, would quickly tend to produce similarities of this kind. Similar residua again may be all that is left of dissimilar originals, as in the nominative and accusative plural of the 3rd declension in Latin.

Before passing on to the remaining cases, we must here guard against a misconception. If, as is most probable, the original meaning of each case is special, not general, it is obviously inadmissible to take it for granted that the most widespread and general meaning of a case, as we find it in historical times, is the original meaning. The fact, therefore, upon which Curtius lays great stress—that the most common use of the genitive is to express simple connection between two substantives—does not prove that this was the original signification of the case. And after what has been said about similarity of form the argument that the ablative and genitive, were they both originally cases signifying *unde,* ought to be similar in form, whereas we find, in the plural, that the dative and ablative are identical, will not be of much weight. Besides the relations of the cases in the plural to those in the singular are far from clear. The former are obviously fewer in number just as the dual are fewer still; and in some instances of quite different formation.

The original forms of the genitive singular are *-as, -asja, -ajas* (fem.). No satisfactory explanation has been given of any of these. If however it is right to compare *δήμο-(ο)-ιο* with *δημό-σιο-ς* and regard the latter as an adjective formed by means of the suffix of the genitive, the signification of *asja*

would seem to be 'of' or 'belonging to.' This however does not exclude the local origin of the suffix, for a particle which primarily signified *unde* might without violence be used to denote 'connection with.' And we have clear evidence that in the Greek sense of language in Homer's time, the genitive was regarded as a local case, and that a local case could be used in non-local relations. For we have *σέθεν*, a case of obviously local formation used as a genitive, even where all ideas of locality are excluded, *e.g.*

οὐδὲ σέθεν Μενέλαε, θεοὶ μάκαρες λελάθοντο.

Here either *σέθεν* was not felt to be of local origin which is absurd, or we have a proof that cases of local origin can be applied to non-local usages. If this is so with *σέθεν*, analogy would lead us to similar conclusions concerning *σεῖο*. Certain it is that *σέθεν* in the passage quoted is regarded as having the same sense as *σεῖο*.

Of the four remaining cases the locative, though nothing can be proved from the form, must be allowed to be of local origin. The same may be said of the ablative or case of separation. The form of the dative (singular, for the dat. plur. is either locative or ablative in form) is also very obscure; and at a very early period in Greek at least this case became interchanged with the locative. It would be rash therefore to conclude from such usages as

ἀλλ' ἔτι που ζωὸς κατερύκεται εὐρέϊ πόντῳ,

that the dative was originally of locative meaning. Yet there are no usages of the dative which cannot be connected with local relations. Thus, even the 'remoter object' can be brought under the category of *ubi:* in so far as it implies that the object is not in the immediate vicinity of the subject but at a distance. It may also be mentioned that the ideas of 'giving' and 'placing before' are easily connected; just as there is some similarity between *dadami*, I give, and *dadhami*, I place.

Lastly, the form of the instrumental is also too obscure to allow us to draw any conclusions from it with regard to the original meaning. As in several other cases, the singular and plural are totally distinct. The former is *a* or *ina* in Sanskrit;

the latter is *bhis* to which φι and *bi* in Greek and Latin correspond. *Bi* however is used in the singular only, φι in the singular and plural. Now with regard to *bi*, *ubi* and *ibi* are evidence enough that a local meaning was attached to the termination at an early period. *Tibi* also can mean 'at thee,'

A te principium, tibi desinet.

The senses in which φι is used are various, and local relations are certainly to be found among them, *e.g.* ἐπ' ἐσχάροφι. And there is nothing in the meaning of the case which should lead us to reject these indications slight though they are. The instrumental is also known as the sociative or comitative case, epithets which certainly imply the use of it in a local signification. In our own language we may see that this conjunction is not unnatural. 'With' and 'by' denote at once the instrument and the companion.

On such a question as this it is impossible to arrive at certainty: we must content ourselves with the view which seems most probable upon the evidence before us. That evidence is both scanty and dubious; such as it is it seems to tend to conclusions of this kind:—

I. That the nominative as the case of the subject holds a position apart from the oblique cases which are all to some extent cases of the object.

II. That the nominative and accusative (and vocative, so far as this can be called a case,) are significative of gender, not of local relation. For this reason neither is found in stems which are by nature of neuter gender.

III. That in the other cases it is probable that the original signification was local.

EVELYN ABBOTT.

ON HEROD. II. 116, AND THUCYD. I. 11.

THESE passages were examined by Mr Paley (Iliad, Pref. pp. xxxii. xxxiv.), and his interpretation of the former has been quoted in a recent article by Mr G. W. Cox (Fortnightly Review, Sept. 1, p. 245), with the view of showing that the Iliad in its present form was not known to Herodotus and Thucydides. The interest which the subject still attracts, and the high authority of these two scholars, may be sufficient apology for the present somewhat tardy criticism.

Herodotus believed the account which was given him by the Egyptian priests that Helen was really in Egypt during the Trojan war: and his object in this chapter (II. 116) is to show that Homer was acquainted with the same version of the story, but rejected it as unsuitable to the poem. His argument is that, 'according to the Iliad' (*κατὰ γὰρ* is surely Ionic for *καθ' ἁ*, the *γὰρ* being redundant), Paris on his way home from Sparta was carried out of his course (*ἀπηνείχθη*), and in particular, that in his wandering he came to Sidon (*τῇ τε δὴ ἄλλῃ πλαζόμενος καὶ ὡς ἐς Σιδῶνα τῆς Φοινίκης ἀπίκετο*). To prove this he quotes as from the *Διομήδεος ἀριστείη* the lines Iliad VI. 289—292, and then two passages from the Odyssey. 'In these verses,' he concludes, 'Homer shows that he knew of the wandering of Alexandros to Egypt; for Syria borders upon Egypt, and the Phœnicians, whose city Sidon is, dwell in Syria.' Since the verses from the Odyssey say nothing of Sidon, these last words must refer to the quotation from the Iliad. The view of Herodotus is, that Homer by taking Paris to Syria betrays his knowledge of a long wandering, of which the Egyptian story forms another part. The *πλάνη* is the

main point insisted upon, both here and in c. 117 (*ἐν δὲ Ἰλιάδι λέγει ὡς ἐπλάζετο ἄγων αὐτήν*). Mr Paley objects that 'no such account occurs in our Iliad:' but Herodotus, while he maintains that *the verses* he quotes imply such an account (*ἐν τούτοισι τοῖσι ἔπεσι δηλοῖ ὅτι ἠπίστατο τὴν ἐς Αἴγυπτον Ἀλεξάνδρου πλάνην*), nowhere says that the Iliad gives it in express terms. On the contrary, Homer 'abandoned it' (*μετῆκε αὐτόν*); and *τῇ τε δὴ ἄλλῃ πλαζόμενος* means 'wandering as we may infer (*δὴ*) to other places.' The inference that Egypt was one of these other places is a weak point in the reasoning: but it is precisely because the Iliad of Herodotus contained no fuller account that he was obliged to strain the *data* which he had.

This is confirmed by the parenthesis *καὶ οὐδαμῇ ἄλλῃ ἀνεπόδισε ἑωυτόν*. Whether *ἀνεπόδισε* means 'corrected' or simply 'repeated,' the words imply that Herodotus, when he mentioned the Iliad, had a definite quotation in his mind. Moreover, *ἐπιμέμνηται δὲ αὐτοῦ*, in the style of Herodotus, does not mean 'there is another mention of it,' but 'the mention of it is' at such a place.

Mr Paley further objects that the title *Διομήδεος ἀριστείη* 'belongs to our fifth, not to the sixth book.' But we do not know that the present division into books was made so early. In respect of subject the lines clearly fall within the Aristeia in question: compare the prayer, 'break now the spear of Diomede, &c.' (vv. 305—310), with which the *πέπλος* which Hecuba has just taken from her store of Sidonian captives' work is laid on the knees of Athênê. Not only does the whole passage relate to Diomede, but it forms an excellent ending to his Aristeia: and, what is still more important, it cannot well be brought under the title now prefixed to the sixth book, viz. *Ἕκτορος καὶ Ἀνδρομάχης ὁμιλία*. That description only suits the latter half of the book, in which moreover the exceptional prowess of Diomede is forgotten (see vv. 435—437): so that although his Aristeia flows over into our sixth book, it does not encroach upon the part which belongs to that book under its ancient title. From these circumstances I am led to think that the 'Rhapsodies' thus described were not 'detached

ballads,' as H. Köchly ingeniously suggested, but parts belonging to an older division of the Iliad, which in this instance can be traced back to the time of Herodotus. The exact point of division may well have been at VI. 311, where the change of subject is very clearly marked.

Mr Paley also quotes the passage (Hdt. v. 67) in which it is said that Kleisthenes stopped the rhapsodists at Sicyon, because in Homer's verses Argives and Argos were chiefly celebrated. Mr Grote, who like him thought that these words were inapplicable to the Iliad or Odyssey, proposed to refer them to the Homeric Thebais. They would not suit the Odyssey: but Ἄργος for the Peloponnesus, or even for Greece generally, and Ἀργεῖοι for the Greek army are constant in the Iliad. Kleisthenes did not consider that such terms may change their meaning in the course of centuries: the hateful name was enough. The words of Herodotus should be noticed: *τὰ πολλὰ πάντα ὑμνέαται*, 'in most places nothing but Argos and Argives are sung.' Thucydides (I. 3) notices that the Greeks are called Ἀργεῖοι by Homer.

In Thucydides Mr Paley considers that the references, with one important exception, are in agreement with our text of the Iliad. That exception is I. 11, *ἐπειδή τε ἀφικόμενοι μάχῃ ἐκράτησαν—δῆλον δέ· τὸ γὰρ ἔρυμα τῷ στρατοπέδῳ οὐκ ἂν ἐτειχίσαντο κ.τ.λ.*, where 'the historian states distinctly that on the first arrival of the Greeks they must have been victorious, or they never would have been able to make a fortified naval camp.' There is here a double difficulty: first that *the* (not *a*) fortification is nowhere else, either in our Homer or in the abstract of the Cypria in Proclus, assigned to the first arrival of the Greeks; and secondly, that such a fortification is not a proof of superiority in the field but the reverse. I venture to think that Thucydides says neither of the two things which his commentators have found so perplexing. By *τὸ ἔρυμα* we must understand (as Krüger points out) '*the* fortification' of the story: and the meaning must be that the fact of their fortifying the camp when they did, in the last year of the war, and after at least a partial defeat (see the taunts addressed to the Greeks by Hêrê, Il. v. 788—791), proves that at first and until

that time they had been victorious. The new measure of defence showed that new circumstances had arisen. The obscurity of the sentence is caused chiefly by the way in which the story of the Iliad is taken for granted rather than quoted. The ellipse may perhaps be best filled up by translating, 'they must have conquered in the field at first (and until the events of books V—VII), otherwise they would not have fortified their camp (immediately after these events).' It may be asked whether Thucydides would not have made this clear by saying that 'otherwise (in case of defeat) they would have built the fortification at first.' But this would have been less logically accurate. They might have returned at once: or they might not have found a fortification necessary. In every case the proposition holds as Thucydides puts it, viz. that 'if they had not been victorious at first, they would not have built the fortification (of book VII.).'

The result of these remarks may be summed up as follows. Herodotus knew the 'Iliad' and the 'Aristeia of Diomede' as respectively the whole and a part of a poem whose author was Homer: four lines which he quotes from this Aristeia are found in the corresponding part of our Iliad: and those four lines, quoted by him to prove that Homer was acquainted with a certain story, are in fact the only passage which he could have found in our Iliad to give any colour to his opinion.

If we may suppose that Herodotus and Thucydides read the same Iliad, it was one which agreed with ours in frequently bringing in the names Ἄργος and Ἀργεῖοι, the latter as a national name for the Greeks, and in never using the word Ἕλληνες in that sense. Here, as in the other case, we find a combination of positive and negative agreement with the Iliad as we have it.

Finally, Thucydides not only is acquainted with the account of the rampart as it is found in our Iliad, but supposes perfect familiarity with it on the part of his readers.

It may be instructive to compare the result of applying similar tests to the Cypria,—one of the Cyclic poems which Mr Paley considers as more ancient than the Iliad and Odyssey. That poem, according to Herodotus (II. 117), cannot be

Homer's, because it relates that Paris reached Troy 'in three days from Sparta with a fair wind and smooth sea.' But in the abstract of the Cypria given by the grammarian Proclus, the story agrees exactly with the Iliad. A storm is sent by Hêrê: Paris is driven by it to Sidon, and takes that city. Thus in the case of a poem of which we have only the argument and a few fragments, there is evidence of at least one extensive interpolation between the time of Herodotus and that of the grammarians: while in the Iliad, with much greater chance of detecting such alterations, none has yet been satisfactorily proved. The change in the Cypria was evidently made to bring it into harmony with Homer.

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48. For *Ventorum exirtant placentur omnia rursum* I would read *Ventorum existant* (so Bernays) *placentur momina rursum*, which is sufficiently justified by 474, *Posse quoque e salso consurgere momine ponti.*

53. Munro makes *quae* supplied from the *quae* of 50 the subject of *faciunt.* May it not be *homines*, 'and when they humble their spirits through fear of the Gods'? Similarly in 15, *homines*, rather than *corda*, is the subject of *uexare*, as is perhaps indicated by *cogei.* Cf. 645, *Cernentes pauida complebant pectora cura.*

68. *Quae nisi respuis ex animo longeque remittis*
Dis indigna putare alienaque pacis eorum.

'Unless you drive from your mind with loathing all these things and banish far from you all belief in things degrading to the Gods and inconsistent with their peace', Munro, who follows Lachm. in making *putare* mean 'to hold a belief', as in the passage quoted from Cicero, *de Sen.* 4, *Quis coegit eos falsum putare.* It seems to me that this is not the first impression the words convey; *dis indigna putare* with *quae* preceding must surely be 'think them unworthy of the Gods'; to separate the two clauses looks like an after-thought, occasioned by the difficulty of *longeque remittis.* I think that the negative idea in these two words led Lucretius into a construction more Greek than Latin. As in 399 *parcit in hostis* is, *not* 'refrains against his enemies', but 'spares it to attack his enemies', i. e. *ita parcit ut in hostes uertat*, so *l. remittis putare dis indigna* is in effect *atque ita remittis ut putes dis indigna*, and might be translated, as in similar repeated

negatives in Greek, 'and remove far from you the thought that they are worthy of the Gods and compatible with their peace'.

116. *Fit quoque enim interdum non tam concurrere nubes*
Frontibus aduersis possint quam de latere ire.

Lachm. and Munro after Pius insert *ut* before *non*. In 145 *Fit quoque* is followed by an indic., *trucidat* thus standing simply, though separated, it is true, by two clauses and two lines from *Fit;* in 426—430 *Fit...ut descendat* is followed by *et quaecumque in eo tum sint deprensa tumultu Nauigia in summum ueniunt uexata periclum,* where *sint* has induced Lachm. to change *ueniunt* into *ueniant,* while others read *sunt,* retaining *ueniunt.* Is it not possible that *Fit ut* is sometimes represented by *fit* alone? If not, to read *possunt* in 117 seems less harsh metrically than to insert *ut* in 116.

129. *Tum perterricrepo sonitu dat missa fragorem. Missa* is changed by Bernays to *scissa,* by Lachm. to *fissa;* yet *missa* was not only read by Isidorus, XIII. 8, but makes very good sense whether it is the *procella* or the *uenti uis* as in 300, *uenti uis missa sine igni.* The launching of the storm no doubt implies the rending of the cloud, and hence the transition in the next line to a bladder bursting. For *saepe ita dat paruum sonitum* I propose *Suppetat haut paruum ad sonitum.*

154. *magis* I would rather take with *crematur* 'burns more decidedly', or, to speak more exactly, with the whole sentence than with *terribili sonitu.*

258. *et fertur,* which it is the custom at present to write as *ecfertur,* is supported by so very large a number of similar instances, as to make it probable that before *f* as before *g,* a *t,* not a *c,* was the dominant spelling and pronunciation. So in Catullus, VI. 13, *etfututa,* XXVIII. 6, *etquidnam,* and in X. 8, *etquonam* may be the right reading, rather than *et quonam.*

286. *uideantur* which is retained by Lachm. need not be changed to *uideatur* as Munro, who quotes *abeant,* the MS. reading in I. 1108, for *abeat,* the subject to which he makes *terra:* where I should take *omnis,* 'all men', as the subject and retain *abeant.* Here the subject to *uideantur* seems to be *lumina,* not *templa* as Lachm. who altered *opprimere* to *exprimere.*

296. *Incidit in ualidam maturo culmine nubem,* 'Falls on a

strong-built cloud culminating to fulness'. The line is too consistent not to be spoilt by alteration; it gives the idea of a firm bed of cloud rising into a point, a fully formed well-defined mass, to which the strong expression *Quam cum perscidit* is well applicable.

370. *Dissimilis inter se turbareque mixtas.* Lachm. has *inter se res,* which Munro rejects as *interse* becomes one word; he prefers *res inter se;* may not *inter sese* be the right reading, i.e. *partis?* 'they must needs fight as differing from one another and fall into confusion as now mixed together'.

428. *incita,* 'roused', Munro, and so 137, *ualidi uis incita uenti,* 'the force of the strong wind when aroused,' 582 *incita cum uis Exagitata foras erumpitur,* 'when their force afterwards stirred and lashed into fury bursts abroad'. I should prefer to translate it in each case 'set in motion', from which it passes naturally into its later use of 'moving rapidly, rapid'.

475. *Nam ratio consanguineast umoribus omnis,* 'For liquids have a kindred principle in all cases'. *ollis* Lachm. and Munro, I think unnecessarily.

483. *illi* gives a possible sense 'to join that mist', i.e. *halitui* 478.

490. *Tam magni montis tempestas atque tenebrae Coperiant maria,* 'In such huge mountains do storm and darkness cover the sea', or 'such huge mountains of storm and darkness', is so natural and Lucretian an expression, cf. 189, *cum montibus adsimulata Nubila portabunt uenti,* as to make any alteration unnecessary.

548. *Et merito, quoniam plaustris concussa tremescunt*
Tecta, uiam propter, non magno pondere tota;
Nec minus exultantes dupuis cumque uim
Ferratos utrimque rotarum succutit orbes.

Lucretius who is fond of accumulating ablatives, cf. 367, *magnoque tumultu Ignibus et uentis furibundus fluctuet aer* (which I would translate, 'the air full of fury heaves with waves of fire and wind exceeding tumultuously', rather than make *ignibus et uentis* depend on *furibundus*), 155, *Terribili sonitu flamma crepitante crematur,* is likely to have preferred *plaustris,* followed as it is and explained by *non*

magno pondere, to *plaustri*, which would more naturally depend on *tecta* than *pondere*, 'with good reason, since buildings by the way-side tremble under the shock of wagons, no great weight yet shaking the whole of them'. In the next line *scrupus* (Munro) is very probable, *uiai* (Lachm.) certain; but after *nec minus, et* or a similar word would surely be expected, and hence I venture to think, in spite of the unusualness of a bare *cumque*, that the right reading is *Nec minus ex. et scrupus cumque uiai*, 'and rock no less than a pebble on the road at times jolts the iron tires of the wheels'. Analogous, though of course with a difference in the *qua* preceding which makes it inconclusive, is the use of *cumque* in such lines as 85, *Quid faciant et qua de causa cumque ferantur*, where *cumque*, of which Munro takes no notice either in his translation or notes, seems to go rather with the *ferantur* than the *qua*, 'what they do and what is the reason of their motion in any case'; the often quoted *Dulce lenimen mihi cumque salue Rite uocanti*, if genuine, shows that *cumque* may stand independently, whether it is taken with *salue* or *uocanti*.

563. *Inclinata minent* is retained by Lambinus, and I think rightly; it recurs perhaps in 1195, *frons tenta mebat*, i. e. *minebat*, the IN having fallen out from its looking like another M. The meaning is shown in the compound *imminere*, 'to hang over', a word very expressive either of the upper part of a house bulging out and appearing on the point to fall, or of a brow heavy and overhanging the rest of the face, as in severe illness. For the same reason I would change *tellens* in 237 to *cellens* as Wakefield, rather than *pellens* Munro, or *pollens* Lachm.

568. *Quod nisi respirent uenti, uis nulla refrenet Res.* 570. *Nunc quia respirant alternis inque grauescunt.* In both places Munro translates, 'abate their blowing', and practically this is the meaning. Yet it may be doubted whether in itself *respirare* can mean a pure negative; it seems rather to contain the double idea 'to blow and lull', which agrees with the notion of alternation conveyed by the passage throughout, *collecti redeunt ceduntque repulsi.*

574. *Et recipit prolapsa suas in pondera sedes*, 'and after tumbling forward recovers its proper position to an equipoise'.

Munro reading *pondere* says in his note, '*prolapsa* answers to *inclinatur, recipit sedes in pondere* to *retro recellit;* falling forward out of its place is the natural force of *prolapsa* in Forc. and comp. 1006, *primordia ferri In uacuum prolapsa cadunt coniuncta: recipit sedes in pondere* then is a proper expression, not *prolapsa in pondera*'; granting that *prolapsa* has this meaning, and answers to *inclinatur,* why should this necessitate *pondere? Recipit sedes in pondere* seems to me slightly unnatural, *in pondera* not so; the accus. implying the motion of recovery or return to a former position is more like Latin idiom than the abl., which states the return in its accomplished, more quiescent, state.

600. *Idque* is perhaps right; its vagueness suits the tone of the passage, 'the void it has made'.

618. *Exsiccare suis radiis ardentibu' solem,* 'we see him with his burning rays thoroughly dry clothes', Munro; perhaps *suis* may be expressed 'by the mere force of his rays'.

623. *Tum porro uenti quoque magnam tollere partem*
Umoris possunt uerrentes aequora uenti.
Una nocte uias quoniam persaepe uidemus
Siccari, mollisque luti concrescere crustas.

Lachm. says 'Absurda et sine pondere repetitio; nam quae secuntur satis intellegi non possunt nisi addimus qua re efficiantur, ita *Uentis una nocte,* &c.' The repetition is not absurd and has weight, preceded as the second *uenti* is by *uerrentes aequora,* 'for do they not sweep the surface, those winds?' *uentis* is unnecessary to explain what explains itself, and is to take away from Lucretius one of those ornaments of style of which he is never too profuse, and which, when they do occur, are the more jealously to be retained for their rarity.

663. *Et satis haec tellus morbi caelumque mali fert,*
Unde queat uis immensi procrescere morbi.

Lachm. changes *morbi* to *orbi,* Munro to *nobis,* which is found in the Juntine, and is read by Lambinus. I believe *morbi* to be right, a carelessness of style paralleled by many others, e. g. 778, 9, *infesta atque aspera tactu. Nec sunt multa parum tactu uitanda.* 932, 3, *Perpetuo quoniam sentimus et omnia semper Cernere odorari licet et sentire sonare.*

715. *Aut quia sunt aestate aquilones ostia contra,*
Anni tempore eo qui etesiae esse feruntur.

729, 30, 1. *Fit quoque uti pluuiae forsan magis ad caput ei*
Tempore eo fiant quo etesia flabra aquilonum
Nubila coniciunt in eas tunc omnia partis.

These two passages seem so parallel as to explain each other. In each case the *eo* refers to the relative which follows, in each there is the same hiatus of the relative in the same place of the verse. How then explain *qui* in 716? It can hardly be a locative like *die quinti*, &c., for as a locative *qui* seems to confine itself to the meaning of 'how'. Perhaps it is an illustration of that loose undefined power of the relative, of which the earlier Latin was full, though in literature, as might be expected, it was an ever diminishing quantity. Literally translated the line would be, 'at that time of the year which is the so-called Etesian winds', drawn out, 'which coincides with the so-called period of Etesian winds'; an attraction of the same kind as *orbis quae terra dicitur*, literally is 'the globe which is the so-called earth', such attractions being in fact contractions or compressions of a double sentence. This expansive power of the relative pronoun, extends, I think, to the demonstratives; e. g. *Redditus his primum terris*, 'restored to earth first here', and this would be the meaning of Catullus's *Illa rudem cursu proram imbuit Amphitrite* (LXIV. 11), if, as I have conjectured, this is the true reading of that line, 'it was that Amphitrite, i. e. the Amphitrite of that time when the Argo was built that first imbrued a prow as yet strange to voyaging'. In 730 *quo* is not disproved by *tunc* in the next line; for *tunc* is to be taken closely with *omnia*, 'at that time in which the winds are driving the clouds towards those parts, as then happens, all together'.

743. *Remigio oblitae pennarum uela remittunt* is perhaps right; the birds instead of sailing along smoothly and evenly, move their wings with an effort like that of a straining rower. *oblitae pennarum remittunt uela remigio* (dat.), 'forgetting the use of their wings give up their sails to (take to) rowing'.

799. *Denique si calidis etiam cunctare lauabris*
Plenior effl ueris, solio feruentis aquai

Quam facile in medio fit uti des saepe ruinas.
Carbonumque grauis uis atque odor insinuatur
Quam facile in cerebrum, nisi aqua praecepimus ante.
At cum membra domus percepit feruida seruis,
Tum fit odor uini plagae mactabilis instar.

In 800, for *effluueris* I propose *e flustris*, i. e. on a full stomach after being on the sea; the effect of the inhaled brine followed by a hearty meal being to produce fainting fits. Cf. 933, *Denique in os salsi uenit umor saepe saporis, Cum mare uersamur propter.* In 803, may not *aqua* be right, 'anticipated it by taking water'. The accus. after *praecepit* in 1050 is different. In 804, *feruida sorbus* would not be very far from the letters of *feruida seruis* or *feruis*, and would agree with the vegetable character of the smells mentioned before. *Feruida sorbus* would be '*branches* of boiling service-berries', and as such a decoction would go on in the kitchen or in chambers attached to it, *membra domus* would be a natural if homely addition to the picture. Service-berries, of which Pliny XV. 21, mentions four kinds, three of them vinous in flavour, and one of the three acid, were actually made into a kind of wine (Plin. XIV. 16) to which Virgil alludes, G. III. 379, *Pocula laeti Fermento atque acidis imitantur uitea sorbis.* Hence *uini* in 805 need not be changed to *uiri*.

851. *Partim* agrees with the general description of the fountain, part hot, part cold, i. e. hot by night, cold by day. This use of *partim* is easily intelligible, though strictly the same fountain is not partly hot, partly cold, at the same moment; 'the fountain is heated partly', passing naturally into 'the fountain assumes its part of heat' or 'takes its turn of heat'.

951. *Denique per dissepta domorum saxea uoces*
Peruolitanat, permanat odor frigusque uaposque
Ignis, qui ferri quoque uim penetrare sueuit.
Denique qua circum caeli lorica coercet
Morbida uisque simul cum extrinsecus insinuatur
Et tempestatem terra caeloque coorta
In caelum terrasque remotae iurae facessunt.
Quandoquidem nil est nisi raro corpore nexum

Lachmann, whom Munro follows, changes *caeli lorica* to

Galli lorica, 'the Gaulish cuirass', a rather forced expression, to say nothing of the absence of a defined object for *coercet*. It seems to me that *caeli lorica* may possibly mean 'the enclosing sky', something like Spenser's 'baldrick of the heavens bright', *Prothalamion*, ad fin., and cf. 1134, *caeli amictum*. If so, *qua* will be *aquam*, and the sense is, as cold, heat, voices, fire, penetrate in various directions, so water is always encompassed and permeated by air, with its morbific properties wherever they coexist with it. Cf. 1102, *Nonne uides etiam caeli nouitate et aquarum Temptari*, where Lucretius perhaps hints at the *combined* effect of air and water in producing disease. In 956 Lachm. is surely right in changing *tempestatem* to *tempestate in;* the transition from a singular to a plural is easily intelligible, as in Catullus CXI. 1, 2. *Iurae*, I think, simply represents *iure*, as *praeces*, &c. for *preces*, a spelling which probably indicates the close agreement of the sounds *e*, *ae*. In 958 *raro corpore nexum* is in effect a more poetical form of *raro corpori' nexu*, and as in other instances of the same kind should be retained as modifying the prosaic style to which Lucretius habitually confines himself.

971. *Effluat ambrosias quasi uero et nectare tinctus*, which Lachm. changed to *ambrosiae quasi uere et nectari' linctus*, an emendation retained by Munro, is perhaps an illustration of the vague meaning attached to *ambrosia* and *nectar*. No doubt Ἀλλὰ τόδ' ἀμβροσίης καὶ νέκταρός ἐστιν ἀποῤῥώξ was familiar to Lucretius, probably in his mind when writing this passage; that would not prevent his using the two words in a slightly different way; if in Homer ambrosia is the food of the Gods, nectar their drink, a distinction which appears to imply that one was more solid than another, that distinction can hardly be said to exist in the words of the Cyclops, applying as they do to the wine he had just received from Ulysses; and if it does not exist, or at any rate is not the point thought of there, Lucretius might go a step farther, and keeping the words drop the individuality of meaning, in fact speak of ambrosia as nectareous. *Ambrosias* then is the Greek genitive, though Lachm. denies this because Lucretius elsewhere writes *harmoniam harmoniai;* an inadequate reason, and one which would banish every indivi-

dual peculiarity of grammar or construction. *Et* will then be for *e* as in 1018. The prosaic *linctus* will recede; it does not seem to have much in its favour, whilst *tinctus* is natural and in every way likely. *Effluat ambrosias quasi uero e nectare tinctus* will be, 'as if it were an off-set tinctured with the true nectar of ambrosia whence it is drawn'. *Tinctus e nectare,* because the tree is supposed to be dipt in ambrosia and then drawn out.

972. *Qua nil est homini quod amariu' frondeat esca.* So Lachm. and Munro for *exscet* or *extet.* I should prefer *escae,* i. e. *Qua (esca) nihil est escae quod.*

1069. *Glutine materies taurino iungitur una,*
Ut uitio uenae tabularum saepius hiscant
Quam laxare queant compages taurea uincla.

In 1069 Lachm. and Munro read *uno,* and this is certainly like 1078, *Denique non auro res aurum copulat una?* 1074, *Purpureusque colos conchyli iungitur uno Corpore cum lanae,* to say nothing of *sola calce* in 1068. Yet *una,* 'joined into one piece', with *ut hiscant* following so closely, would have some force; if indeed *una* is not *materies.* The next lines I would translate, 'to such an extent that veins open up through some flaw in the boards many times, for one where the soldered parts can unloose the binding glue'. *Compages* is apparently nominative, *laxare taurea uincla,* a less ordinary form of expression for *laxari uinclis,* or *laxare se uinclis.*

1119. *Proinde ubi se caelum quod nobis forte alienum*
Commouet atque aer inimicus serpere coepit.

'Therefore when an atmosphere which happens to put itself in motion unsuited to us and a hurtful air begin to advance', Munro, who makes *caelum* as well as *aer* nominatives to *coepit.* It is more natural to make *commovet* do double duty, *ubi caelum se commovet, quod nobis forte alienum (se commovet),* a construction in the manner of Thucydides.

1126. *Aut in aquas cadit aut fruges persidit in ipsas,* i. e. indirectly into the waters which breed pestilence, or directly and immediately upon the corn.

1136. For *corumptum* perhaps *coruscum;* bright after gloom, or brighter than is natural to the climate.

1199. *Quorum si quis, ut est, uitarat funera leti:* for *ut est* Munro reads *ibei;* yet it may be right, as Lucretius has it in this book again, 1167, *Corpus, ut est, per membra sacer dum diditur ignis,* and the corresponding ὡς ἐνδέχεται may well have been in his mind, whilst writing of the Athenian plague.

ROBINSON ELLIS.

THE MOSTELLARIA OF PLAUTUS. With notes critical and explanatory, Prolegomena and Excursus, by William Ramsay, M.A., edited by George G. Ramsay, M.A. *Professor of Humanity in the University of Glasgow.*

It is to imply no disrespect to the name of Professor Ramsay to say that this book, with its merits and defects, is distinctly the work of a teacher. The materials collected in the Prolegomena and notes would, in the hands of a skilled and vigorous lecturer like Professor Ramsay, be of great service in awakening the interest and stimulating the effort of pupils. As put together in a book, they would be of considerable use to any one beginning the study of old Latin, and unacquainted with the course which Plautine criticism has lately been taking in Germany. But the philological activity of the Germans has by this time so far outstripped that of the English, that an independent study of original authorities, indispensable as it is, is now hardly sufficient of itself in any line, to enable a scholar of less than extraordinary grasp and insight to avoid the mistakes naturally incident to an early examination of the ground. If the reader of Professor Ramsay's work occasionally feels, as he does, a want of mastery and conclusiveness, he will naturally attribute it to the inadequacy, perhaps unavoidable, of the author's study of the latest results of German labour in a field where minuteness and subtlety are qualities as requisite in the critic as vigour and common sense.

The Prolegomena consist of three essays: on the text, the orthography, and the metres of Plautus. The chapter on the text is interesting as far as it goes. Professor Ramsay's labours on the Milan Palimpsest and the Vatican MS. (B) are the most

original and most complete part of his work: though it is to be regretted that he is not always sufficiently critical in the use which he makes of his materials. That on orthography seems encumbered with needless detail. The full array of facts which is presented, facts already known and turned to account by the modern writers on pronunciation and orthography, is hardly necessary as an introduction to an edition of a single play: the less so as Professor Ramsay has, like Ritschl, given up the impracticable attempt to represent the true spelling of the Plautine era. In the treatment of these materials there is little that calls for remark except the paragraph on the "*D* paragogicum." "It is well known" says Professor Ramsay "that in the earlier stages of the Latin language we find many words ending with a *d*, which was entirely dropped at a later period. It appears chiefly in datives and ablatives, but by no means exclusively" &c. *D* was the proper termination of the Latin ablative: but the statement that it appears in datives is new, and (as far as I know) quite unsupported. The fact that it appears in adverbs is generally regarded as a proof that the Latin adverbs in *e* were originally ablatives. The accusative forms *med* and *ted* (if they can be defended) are exceptional.

The first part of the chapter on prosody (p. l—lxxiii) in which a general exposition of the ordinary rules of Latin comic metres is given, is very clear and good, recalling, in its fulness and patience, the author's "Manual of Latin Prosody." In the second part, on "the rule of position," the writer enters upon more difficult ground. He sets out (p. lxxv—vi) by denying the main position of Hermann: "apud Latinos duplex recitatio in usu fuit, una accentum maxime vocabulorum et vulgarem pronuntiationem sequens, qua scenici veteres usi sunt, altera ad Graecorum exemplum conformata, quae ab Ennio primum in epicam poesin, Augusti aevo in omnia fere genera poeseos introducta est." As Professor Ramsay remarks, Hermann goes too far in not limiting the statement which follows "(scenica recitatio) non curat positionem:" but take the passage in the rough, and it is hard to see what other hypothesis can account for acknowledged facts. Indeed the line which Hermann indicated has been strictly followed by later research. Accent,

and the vulgar pronunciation, are now confessedly regarded as the keys which unlock the difficulties of comic prosody.

But how does Professor Ramsay deal with Hermann? A little further on he gives a list of between thirty and forty words with regard to which the law of position is habitually violated: a fact which he without hesitation accounts for by the statement that "all the words given above were occasionally, in familiar conversation, pronounced *correptim:* that is, the first syllable was almost entirely suppressed in enunciating the word, and thus the dissyllables were transformed into monosyllables." This sentence, loose and inaccurate as it is, concedes at least the force of the "vulgaris pronuntiatio:" the question of accent Professor Ramsay rudely dismisses altogether: with what justice will appear below. Further on an additional number of contractions is acknowledged. Professor Ramsay never stops to ask whether these contractions, or any of them, are found in the hexameter poets. Not a word is said even of Ennius or Lucilius. Yet nothing (to take one instance) is a stronger proof of the general truth of Hermann's position than the fact that Ennius observes one rule for his hexameters and another for his iambics: even *enim* and *quidem* being used by him as dissyllables in the former, as monosyllables in the latter. From what hexameter writer could such a "correption" be quoted as "iuventus" scanned as a spondee or an anapaest (p. lxxxiv)? Nothing can be clearer than the distinction which, from the outset, exists in this respect between Roman hexameters and Roman iambics. There is even a distinction in the iambics and trochaics, according as they were employed for the stage, or for merely literary composition. Few, if any, violations of the law of position can be found in the fragments of Lucilius or Varro. But of the comedians we have Cicero's own words (Orator 55) quoted by Professor Ramsay himself: "comicorum senarii propter similitudinem sermonis sic saepe sunt abiecti, ut nonnunquam vix in eis numerus et versus intellegi possit."

But it is not only clear that all the facts alleged by Professor Ramsay go to support Hermann's theory, but that Hermann's explanation of them is on the whole the true one. Hermann

asserted that the anomalies of the comic metres represented the accent on the vulgar pronunciation of the words in the scansion of which those anomalies chiefly occurred. As to accent, Professor Ramsay ventures so far as to maintain "that the belief that we can employ the knowledge which we possess with regard to the accentuation of Latin words in any way whatsoever so as to explain or illustrate questions with regard to quantity, is an absolute delusion, and moreover a mischievous delusion," &c. (p. lxxvii). No delusion, absolute or not, can be other than mischievous: and it would therefore have been well if Professor Ramsay had attempted to prove this remarkable statement in detail, instead of spending his pains in explaining the distinction between Accent, Ictus Metricus, and Quantity. It is clear that the fact that no Latin polysyllable ever admitted an acute on the last must have had a great deal to do with the uncertainty, so remarkable in all the older Roman poets, as to the quantity of many final syllables (the third person singular of verbs, for instance) whose metrical value was only settled later. It seems equally clear that contraction was peculiarly easy and frequent in the case of enclitics (as *ille, iste, ipse, enim, quidem, ergo, esse*)[1]. In face of these patent facts, Professor Ramsay's determined opposition to Hermann seems difficult to explain.

Having thus put accent out of court, Professor Ramsay can only fall back on the "vulgaris pronuntiatio." Here the reader has to complain of a want of nicety and accuracy. Everything is accounted for by "correption," that is, the almost entire suppression of the first syllable. In this view a number of words, the account of whose scansion is in all probability by no means the same, are thrown together into two alphabetical lists and dealt with in the lump. But this proceeding involves an important point. In the case of words like *bonus, domus, herus, manus, malus, modus, nimis, quibus, magis, genus,* it is surely more plausible (with Corssen and Wagner) to assume the shortening of the final syllable (by the well-known habit of dropping the weak consonant *s*) than the omission of the first.

[1] See Corssen, *Aussprache, Vokalismus,* &c., Vol. II. p. 77 foll.

The abnormal scansion of words ending in *r* (*amor, color, pater*) is harder to account for, especially as the final syllable of these words is sometimes lengthened. The dropping of the final *r*, assumed by Dr Wagner after Ritschl, is not confirmed by old Latin inscriptions (see Mommsen, C. I. L. 78), nor does it seem certain (as Dr Wagner, according to his late pamphlet, thinks) that the instances from later Latin collected by Schuchardt (Vokalismus des Vulgärlateins, Vol. II. p. 390) prove it for Plautus. The supposition that *r* stands for *s* is good for *color* and *amor*, but not for *pater* or *miser*. Yet as the pronunciation *père, frére* &c. must (since Ritschl's prolegomena) be given up, it is difficult to see what explanation remains but the dropping of the final consonant. The final *d* was dropped in *apud*, the final *t* in *caput, erat*, the final *l* in *simul*, the final *n* in *tamen* (an enclitic). But in *inde, unde, intus, inter, nempe*, the first syllable was probably shortened owing to the weakness of the vowel before a nasal and a mute. (See the instances in Wagner's Aulularia, p. xliv.)

Professor Ramsay is sceptical as to the scansions *perĭstromata, expapĭllato, satĕllites, supĕllectili*, and some others. The doubtful quantitative power of *ll* in early Latin might account for *expapĭllato, satĕllites, supĕllectili*, especially as they are supported by *simĭllumae* Asin. 241: *perĭstromata* is not more violent than *magĭstratus*. The shortening of the first syllable of *exercitus*, which Professor Ramsay gets rid of by unnatural scansions, might be supported by the shortening of the same syllable in *uxor, excludo*, and *extemplo* (Wagner, Aulularia, pp. xlv, xlvi).

In the section on synizesis there is no mention of the very common scansions of *huius, eius*, and *cuius* as monosyllables. Nor, through the whole of the Prolegomena, is anything said on the lengthening of final syllables which the late republican and Augustan poets commonly shorten (amāt, patēr, &c.). The reader also misses any illustration from the fragments of the older Latin dramatists Naevius, Ennius, Pacuvius and Attius.

The explanatory notes are full of matter: but as they stand they will serve rather as a quarry for lecturers or future editors than as a well-redacted commentary on the play to which they

are attached. Their strength lies in the laborious accumulation of facts, and in general freshness and interest. Such notes as that on *pollucere* (1. 1. 23), *sagina* (1. 1. 62), *Hercules* (4. 3. 45), *ariolus* (3. 1. 40), *vagulatio* (3. 1. 55), *arrabo* (3. 1. 111), and the Excursus xiv—xvii, are very good specimens of Professor Ramsay's full and vigorous treatment of questions of antiquities. The collection of terms of roguery and abuse is amusing. The first thirteen excursus, on words such as *adeo, etiam, dum, enim,* and some other of the more delicate phrases of Latin comedy, seem very complete, and will probably be of great use to students. So also will such notes as that on *mirum quin* (2.2.62), *tricae* (3. 1. 41), *oppido* (1. 2. 51), *mactus* and *mactare* (1. 1. 58), *dierectus* (1. 1. 8). As the book was unfortunately left unfinished, a considerable number of difficulties is still unexplained.

H. NETTLESHIP.

NOTES ON Mr PALEY'S EDITION OF THE AGAMEMNON.

When a book has established itself as the standard work upon any subject, it seems to be the duty of those who are interested in the subject and more or less capable of forming a judgement upon it, to point out any parts in which they may think that improvement is desirable; and the duty becomes more obligatory when the book is one to which the critic is personally indebted and which he believes to be on the whole fully deserving of its popularity.

For both these reasons I have thought it might be worth while to send to the Philological Journal some occasional jottings which I had made in reading portions of Mr Paley's excellent editions of the Greek Tragedians.

Agam. 82. *ἡμερόφαντον*, explained by Mr Paley "his ideas are as vague and ill defined as a dream in a mid-day *siesta*." I agree with Blomfield in considering it a distinguishing epithet like *πτηνὸς κύων*, "a dream, but one that walks abroad by day."

205. *λιπόναυς*. The analogy of *λιποναύτιον*, *λιποστρατία*, inclines me to prefer the active sense 'deserting the expedition.' This epithet might be used of Agamemnon if he refused to take the steps which were necessary for the success of the expedition and so became a 'traitor to the cause.' The *γάρ* which follows would then imply "it is impossible for me to betray them, *for* they are justified in demanding such a sacrifice at my hands."

269. P. 'at what time has the city been captured?' rather, 'within what time?' *i.e.* 'how long?'

271. I should prefer to make *τάχος* the object after *ἐξίκοιτο* rather than cognate.

282. *παρῆκεν ἀγγέλου μέρος.* P = *παρήγγειλεν.* It seems to me easier to translate "did not neglect the messenger's part or duty."

299. Stanley's conjecture *ἔστε* seems to me better than Hermann's *εὖτε* which has been adopted by Mr Paley. I think *εὖτε* not only weakens the force of the preceding *εἶτα*, which is already defined by what goes before; but is scarcely suited to the following *ἔσκηψεν* which means 'shot,' 'swooped,' 'pounced,' not simply 'alighted' or 'stopped.'

312. *ἄμικτον.* P. 'a cry distinct not confused.' Is it not better to take it "a cry that will not blend, discordant, is plainly audible (*πρέπειν*)"?

314. Surely it is an unnecessary passage to the ridiculous, to make Aeschylus here "reproach the oil and vinegar for their unsociable behaviour." The analogy of *προσαγορεύω* seems to show that *προσεννέπω* may mean 'to style,' 'to call,' as well as 'to address.'

358. The force of the passage is very much injured by taking *εἰπεῖν* as equivalent to *ὥστε εἰπεῖν.* Translate "they can tell of the stroke of Zeus," *i.e.* they know what it is to be smitten by Zeus.

406. Mr Paley is I think not justified in speaking of its being the object of the poet in these exquisite lines 'to describe the uxorious not to say sensual character of Menelaus.' For purity and delicacy of sentiment they approach very nearly parts of Tennyson's In Memoriam. Compare with the lines which follow, the poem beginning "Tears of the widower when he sees, A late-lost form which sleep reveals."

568. Hermann's interpretation of *πλουτίζειν* is exceedingly forced. The position of the words shows that the opposition lies between Κλ. and *ἐμέ*, not between *μέλειν* and *πλουτίζειν*, as it would do if Clytemnestra were the subject of the latter. I should take either *ταῦτα*, or you, the herald, as the subject of *πλ.* translating, "and that along with this, your news (or you) should enrich (*i.e.* cause happiness to) me."

595. *χαλκοῦ βαφάς.* The literal sense (staining of brass)

seems to me quite allowable if we conceive Clytemnestra in her consciousness of falsehood as catching at any far-fetched comparison to heighten her assertion of innocence.

640. *ποιμένος κακοῦ στρόβῳ.* The interpretation "through the unsteady guidance of the incompetent helmsman" is forced in itself, and it is besides inconsistent with the description given of the storm in the subsequent lines. If it was so violent that only a god could have saved them, how could the shipwreck be imputed to the unskilful pilot? I see no objection to understanding *ποιμὴν κακός* either of Typhon, like "dux turbidus Hadriæ," or "of some unseen malignant power" according to Mr Paley's second suggestion.

645. I am not satisfied with Mr Paley's defence of the reading *ἐξητήσατο*. *θεός* cannot be an after-thought: it is a necessary part of the supposition and is already implied in *τις*, but is added afterwards for the sake of emphasis. The explanation of an 'after-thought' would only be allowable if the preceding clause as a whole were ambiguous, *i.e.* left it open whether the action should be ascribed to a man or a god; and above all the verb immediately preceding ought to be predicable of a god, or there is a palpable poetic *non sequitur*. Hermann's emendation *ἐξηρήσατο* gives an excellent sense, and the rarity of the form accounts for the ordinary reading.

744. *ἀπομούσως.* P. 'unskilfully:' rather, 'unpleasantly.'

844. *τὴν κάτω γὰρ οὐ λέγω.* P. "because if reference had been made to the earth under the body the figure employed would have been incorrect," but surely this critical examination of a metaphor is most unlike Aeschylus. On the other hand it is very like a scholiast, and when I read *πολλὰς ἄνωθεν* only four lines below and observe the awkwardness of *πολλήν* here, I have little doubt that the whole line is spurious. If it is retained, I should understand *κάτω* of the under world, as a kind of *absit omen*.

872. I must protest in passing against the doctrine enunciated in the note that "the inspiration of a poet in penning a noble passage is not to be held liable to trifling criticism." The more noble the inspiration the more sensitive will it be to any weakness or want of truth in the expression, and thus the

more noble the passage the more right has criticism to challenge any slight blemish as showing another than the master's hand, though elsewhere we might be willing to accept the explanation "dormitat Homerus."

903. If *πράσσοιμ' ἄν* is read, it can only have the potential force, could, might, would. There seems no occasion to translate the optative as a future in the passages quoted. I should prefer however to read *πράσσοιμεν* here.

1016. I do not quite understand Mr Paley's translation here. The meaning of the passage is "whether you obey or not, you are within her toils, you cannot help yourself." Just as 1365, *ὡς ὧδ' ἐχόντων, χαίροιτ' ἂν εἰ χαίροιτ'* "these things are so whether you like it or not," *lit.* "if you rejoiced, you would rejoice with the knowledge that these things are so, and cannot be altered."

1134. I agree with Klausen in taking *ὑπαί* adverbially. In the instances quoted it is used to introduce 'accompanying circumstances,' but I do not think it could ever denote the simple instrument as in Mr Paley's translation.

1239. Mr Paley's emendation *ἄγ' ὧδ'· ἄμ' ἕψομαι*, seems to me objectionable on the score of rhythm, and it also breaks the connection between *ἴτε* and *πλουτίζετε*, both of which I take of the *στέφη* &c. of the prophetess. The order of thought is excellently preserved in Hermann's reading *ἐγὼ δ' ἄμ' ἕψομαι.*

1242. The fact seems to me inconsistent with Mr Paley's explanation of *μετά*, 'her countrymen shared in the insults heaped upon the prophetess.' It was her *countrymen* who had so long mocked her pretensions to prophetic insight; the insults she met from her *enemies* were of a different nature, and it is farfetched to suppose that her friends were taunted by them on the ground of the supposed absurdity of Cassandra's prophecies. I think *μέγα* should be read for *μετά* and I would then translate *φίλων ἐχθρῶν* 'by friendly foes,' *i.e.* by unkind friends.

1369. I see no reason for separating *ἀραίων* and *κακῶν*. Is it not better to take *μολών* of death, than of return home?

1382. The emphatic repetition of *ἀπό* in this line, like that

of *κατά* 1530 seems to show that the words should be read continuously, and the stop placed after *ἀράς*.

1446. *ἰσόψυχον*, 'equally malignant' rather than 'equally imperious.'

1537. Mr Paley's note seems to me to miss the point of this and the following lines. "The reproach which comes instead of reproach" is surely Clytemnestra's defence of the murder as an act of vengeance due to the Manes of Iphigenia: *δύσμαχα κρῖναι*, "it is hard to judge between them, she (Clyt.) spoils the spoiler (Agam.) and the slayer (Agam.) pays the full penalty." In the next line *ἐν χρόνῳ* should go with *παθεῖν* "as long as the sovereignty of Zeus remains, it remains for the sinner to suffer in the end."

1547. The terms of the bargain do not seem to me quite so favourable to Clytemnestra as Mr Paley states them to be. Her reply to the chorus begins with an acknowledgement of the universal law that the guilty must suffer; this (which involves her own death) she is willing to submit to, if it will avert the other part of their foreboding, and end the curse of the race.

JOSEPH B. MAYOR.

OLD LATIN PALIMPSEST FRAGMENTS AT PARIS.

In the third volume of Sabatier page 507 he refers to "MS Reg. n. 5367 exhibens fragmentum vet. Versionis capitis 3 and 4 Act. Apost."—This fragment Mr Hort lately requested me to examine and to correct any mistakes in Sabatiers quotations: which I readily promised to do provided I could find it.—The proviso was not unwise: for a request for No. 5367 brought me as I rather expected quite a different MS. Then I betook myself to Mons. Claude, the superintendent of the MS reading room, whose unvarying kindness during my many visits to the Bibliothèque Impériale I am glad to have an opportunity of acknowledging. We examined the catalogue of the Latin MSS: but in none of those containing *partes Ni Ti* could we hit on the track of our fragment. Then he took me to the printed books department (which is entirely separated from the MSS, perhaps for good reasons, but not without decided inconvenience to some students, for instance to any one who would have liked to compare a reprint with the original MS) and introduced me into the Salle du Travail, in hopes that by examining Sabatiers prefaces and notes I might find some better clue. The examination only sent me back to the manuscript room and to despair. But the indefatigable courtesy of Mons. Claude knew no despair: and at last he discovered I know not how the object of our search.

The title and number of the MS is "Boethii et Isidori quaedam, Lat 6400 G:" on the first page is the old number 5367. "Isidorus de Mundo et de officiis Ecclesiasticis" is written in a character not later than the eighth, perhaps of the seventh century, upon 33 palimpsest leaves. The first 18 (fol. 112—

130) belong I have no doubt to one and the same MS of the N. T.: 10 leaves were of the Acts, 2 of Apocalypse: there was no time for me to see whether I could identify the other 6. Each page contains 23 long lines, in a clear and graceful character (perhaps v, not later than vi). The writing is semi-uncial, or perhaps the more correct term is litterae majusculae. There are some compendia scribendi: fortunately these are mostly found at the ends of lines: in the middle of a half-effaced line when one is trying to make out the reading by calculating the space they are particularly troublesome. For instance what seemed all one day a simple N in the middle of a perplexing line displayed next day in a different light a faint loop at the top of the left hand stroke, making it=RIN.—There was an ample margin in the original at top and bottom; probably at the sides also, but these have been cut down less sparingly, so that in every page the lines are curtailed of a few letters either at beginning or end.—After fol. 130 we come upon the remains of a different MS. The material is thicker, the character ruder and later, the lines more numerous, and the writing in double columns: but this is all I can say about the latter palimpsest, having given whatever time I could spare to the former. To read palimpsest writing requires practice, and my only practice had been making out one palimpsest leaf in Wake 37 (Paul 246)[1], so that my progress was slow: and I only brought home twelve pages with more or less lacunae. But these lacunae might be diminisht by further inspection,—perhaps almost entirely filled up with the help of a younger and keener pair of eyes. About as many more pages, including three of the Apocalypse, might I think be made out: but from the remainder we must be content to glean lines and words here and there. My friend Mr Mowat, who has much experience in collating Latin MSS, will I hope undertake to publish in a convenient form all that can be recovered[2].

[1] This leaf is an uncial fragment (IX?) containing Mar. v. 16—40. Nearly all can be made out: but there is nothing of particular interest in the readings.

[2] It seems advisable to suggest a symbol by which readings from these fragments may be quoted. For a Paris palimpsest *pp*[1] might not be unsuitable: and if any fragments from the O.T. can

That Sabatier actually saw this MS seems improbable: surely he would not have said in his note on Acts iv. 18 "deficit hic codex" and so dismist it, without noticing any other pages from the Acts, or being attracted by the very clear announcement of the beginning of the Apocalypse at the bottom of fol. 118 b. But probably he took what some friend sent him as a specimen, and thought there was no more. In the corners of nearly half the pages you find in a small neat handwriting a note of where the page begins: in one instance I found this misleading, Acts xxii. 7 being put for ix. 4. The same hand has noted two pages of the second palimpsest as containing passages from Numbers.

fol. 114 b. Acts iii. 3. This page begins with Qui introibant to which Sabatier prefixes *ab his:* an unaccountable mistake if he had seen the MS; but not surprising if he had before him a book on which some friend had noted the various readings. Whether in the first line the reading was *introibant templum* or *introibant in templum,* with *nt* and *in* written compendiously I cannot say, not being able to see anything between *an* and *em.* The narrow space and the absence of any traces of such compendia scribendi argue for the omission of *in:* but I am doubtful. Sabatiers text is creditably correct: but there are a few slight mistakes of order and spelling. The word for σφυρὰ (v. 7) quite puzzles me, though I seem to see most[1] of the letters. In v. 10, *horr.* must be part of *horream;* taking ὡραίᾳ as a proper name to be transcribed not translated.

fol. 113 a. Acts iii. 23. Why does Sabatier ignore the first part of this page? it is for the most part easy reading, and will serve as a specimen. The right edge is a little clipt.

Que.....nonaudieritprofetamillume
nabiturde*po**pu*loetomnesprofetaeasamuel
d.....quodquodlocutisuntadnuntiauer
tosdiesuosestisfiliprofetarumette*sta*ment
d̄s̄dis*p*osuitadpatresnostro*s* dicensadabra

be recovered from the later 15 leaves they might be denoted by pp^2.

[1] It looks like laccani or laccanae. Can there have been such a word (comp. Ducange s. v. lacca) meaning ancles or swollen ancles?

inseminetuouenedicenturomnesnatione
raeuobisprimodsexcitauitfiliumsuumet
anequitissuisloquentibusautemillisadpo.

The rest of this page and of the next (113 b) are given by Sabatier. But in v. 5 the MS does not contain *in hierusalem.* The lines are easy to read:

senioresetscribeetpontifexannasetcai*aphaset*
ioannesetalexanderetquodquodfuer*untexge*
nerepon*tificum*—(from the traces I think not pontifi*cali.*)

In the last line of this page (ver. 8) after *seniores is* is clear and I think I see *tra* following. If this line contained *si nos hodie* there could hardly be room in it for *audite.* At the end of ver. 12 I read *nos.*

From the other nine pages which I endeavoured to transcribe I have selected sufficient readings to shew the independent character of the text; supplying in italics letters of which some traces remain, or about which the context leaves little doubt.

Foll. 120 and 119 begin in Acts v. 23 and end in vii. 2.

v. 23. in omni firmi*tate.* 24. quomodo a*udierunt* uerba ista magistra*tus templi* et pontifices confundebantur. 25. quos misistis in custodi*am.* 28. Non praccepto prae*cepimus* uobis—Uos a*utem* ecc*e* implestis. 29. respondens autem petrus dixit ad il*los* Cui obaudire oportet dō an hominib'? 33. perdere eos. 34. exurrexit autem de co*ncilio fari*seus quidam nomine gamaliel qui erat *legis doctor et* acceptus totae plebi. *ib.* interim (*βραχύ*). 37. census (*ἀπογραφῆσ*). persecutiones habuerunt (*διεσκορπίσθησαν*). 38 and 39 are obscure: but in the former verse I can see ..... etis manus and in the latter neque uos neq.....t*y*ranni. 40. itaque illi et uocauerunt apos*tolos et caesos* dimiserunt eos praecipientes ne um Quam loquerentur alicui in nomine ihū. 42. annuntiantes (*εὐαγγελιζόμενοι*). vi. 1. ends with a ministris hebreis. 2. *t*otam plebem (*τὸ πλῆθοσ*). 3. quid est ergo frat*res ex*quirite ex uobis ipsis homines probatos sept*em ple*nos spū scō et sapientia dnī quos constitu*amus in* hunc usum. 5. et placuit sermo *iste in* conspectu o*mnium* discentium. 7. magna autem turba *ex te*mplo

audiebant fi*dei*. 8. signa coram plebem in nomine ihu xpi. 9. contendentes. 10. *non* ualebant contradicere. 11. tunc itaq*ue*.....*resistere* aduersus *ueri*tatem summiserunt ho*mines* qui dicerent audivimus eum loquentem. 12. majores natu (πρεσβυτέρουσ). 13. et statu*erunt* aduersus eum testes falsos qui dicerent, non *defi*cit homo iste uerba iacere aduersus legem *et adu*ersus hunc locum scm. 13. consuetudinem istam muta*uit*. 15. uidebant u*ultum eius* tamqu*am uultum* angeli di stantis inter illos. vii. 2 ds clari*tatis* (here the page ends).

fol. 125. Acts vii. 42.—viii. 2.

42. numquid hostias et immolatio*nes obtu*listis mihi per annos x*l*. 43. et recepistis domum moloc et sidus di ue*stri re*pham et effigies quas fecistis ut adore*tis* ea*s et trans*feram uos ultra babylonem. 44. secundu*m* effigie*m*. 45. in possessione nationum ex—and after a few missing letters at the end of the line the next line begins with saluabit: perhaps the writer read ωνεξεωσεν (with E) and translated it as if it had been εξωνεσωσεν. 46. cora*m* d*o* et petit habitationem invenire pro do iacob. 48. sed altissimu*s non* habitat in aedificis ma*nu*factis hominu*m*. 50 nunquid non manus mea fecit omnia ista. 51 semper sco spui contradixistis: the end of this verse is not quite clear: but apparently there is no equivalent for καὶ ὑμεῖσ. 52. nunc proditores et latrones fuistis. 53. *rec*epistis legem in praeceptis angelorum nec *obs*eruas*tis*. 54. cum haec audissent. 55. et ihm dnm ad dex*teram*. 56. *ad d*exteram di stantem. 57. pariter omnes in eum. 58. et expulerunt eu *e ciui*tate et lapidabant eum et illi testes posu*erunt* uestimenta sua ante pedes iuvenis. 59. recipe. 60. et dum hoc dicit. viii. 1. tribulatio et persecutio.—apostolos qui remanse*r*unt hieru*salem*. 2. homines pii.

fol. 216, a. Acts ix. 4—14.

5. respondit dicens *quis es* dne et dixit dns ego sum ihs nazarenus que*m tu per*sequeris uanum autem est tibi contra stimu*lum calc*itrare. 6. In the first line of this verse, ...ens timore is followed by some words which I could not read: then comes dixi*t* dne quid me uis facere et dns ad eum. 7. *ne*minem uidebant cum loqueretur. 8. et cum uidissent illum nihil

uidentem apertis oculis. 9. et sic mansi*t* per.....neque cibum neque potum accepit. 11. After tarseum ecce enim adorat ipse (omitting ver. 12) follows (13) res*pondit* autem annanias.—*ib.* quantas persecutiones. 14. u*ti* alliget universos.

fol. 116. Acts xvii. 34—xviii. 29.

34. Quidam autem crediderunt in quibus. xviii. 1. et *tum* recessit *saulus*. 2. *cum pris*cilla uxore sua et salutauit eos hi aute*m propte*rea exsierunt ab urbe quod dixisset claud*ius* uti omnes iudaei exirent ab urbe. 3. paulus autem agnitus est aqui*l*ae *cum* esset ejusdem artis et mansit apud eum. 4. dis*putavit* interponens *nomen* dn̄i ih̄u. 6. ex*cussit* vestem suam p*aulus* et dixit sanguis ue*ster*. 7. et recessit ab aquila..... metuentis d̄m. 8. in this verse there does not seem to be room for baptizabantur: it ends with *cre*dentēs dō in nomine ihū xpi. 9. in uis*ione ne* timeas sed lo*quere*. 10. pro*pte*rea quod plebs est mihi. 12. et conlocuti secum de paulo inie*cerunt* manus et perduxerunt ad proconsulem. 13. cla*mantes et* dicentes. 14. et cum uellet paulus os ape*rire*. 17. *adprehen*derunt graeci sostenen.....et gallio simulabat. 18. pa*ulus* autem commoratus illic conplu*res dies* ualefecit fratrib' nauigans in syriam *et cum eo* priscilla et aquila qui votum cum fecisset *in cenchris* capud tondit.

A few concluding lines of miscellaneous information may be useful to some readers. First as to certain Latin MSS which are or have been at Paris. Some years ago I sought diligently for three Corbei MSS: the Barnabas—I did not then know it had been conveyed to St Petersburg; Corbeiensis ff^1—this I hope may be safe somewhere, but I could not find it at Paris; and Corbeiensis ff^2, now Latin 17,225. Sending one day for this last I had brought me by mistake 17,226; an uncial MS of the Gospels, containing apparently little of St Mark, but the first two gospels are mixt up together: bound by Bozerian Jeune, which looks as if it had arrived at Paris early in this century: by collating the pericopa (Scrivener, p. 268) resembles Forojuliensis: can this be Forojuliensis itself or is it only a near relation?—Secondly, as to the times when libraries are closed; let no one who visits Paris in September be dismayed as I once was by reading in Murrays Handbook that

the Bibliothèque Impériale is shut during that month: neither let any one blame Murray overmuch for a misstatement which I am told Paris newspapers continued to repeat years after it ceased to be true: the real times of closing are I believe the week before and the week after Easter, the first two days of the year, and a few great feast-days. A learned and polite author at Florence, with whom I have had some interesting correspondence on onophagy, informs me that Italian libraries are closed during October and part of November; but that it is possible to obtain admittance in the interval.

A. A. VANSITTART.

EXPLANATION OF A DIFFICULT PASSAGE IN FIRDAUSÍ.

In the celebrated Satire of the Persian poet Firdausí upon Sháh Mahmúd occurs the following verse:

كفّ شاه محمود عالي تبار
نه اندر نه آمد سه اندر چهار

"The hand of Sháh Mahmúd of noble origin is nine times nine and three times four."

i. e. $(9 \times 9) + (3 \times 4) = 81 + 12 = 93$.

M. Jules Mohl, in his magnificent Edition of the *Sháhnámah* (Le Livre des Rois, Paris 1838), has the following note on this:

"L'expression dont se sert Firdausí signifie litteralement, *neuf dans neuf, et trois dans quatre;* je pense qu'elle est empruntée à un jeu. Je n'ai pas rencontré autre part cette singulière locution, de sorte que je ne puis en donner le sens que par conjecture."

His conjectural translation of the passage is: "La générosité du Roi Mahmoud, de si illustre origine, n'est rien, et moins que rien," which is incorrect.

The allusion is not to any game, but to a particular method of counting with the fingers called عقد الانامل *'Eqd el Anámil.* This notation is much used in the East, especially by Persian horsedealers as a means of conducting a business transaction privately between two parties, the price being named and agreed upon while apparently merely shaking hands. It is thus described in the غياث اللغات *Ghiyáṣ ul loghát,* a Per-

sian and Arabic lexicon by Ghiyás ud dín Mohammed of Rámpore, and published at Lucknow.

عقد الانامل نوعي از شمار مسنون كه باشكال بستن وكشادن انگشتان دست اسماء اشيارا ملحوظ دارند وتفصيلش اين است براي واحد خنصر دست راست فرو بايد گرفت وجهت دو بنصررا باخنصر ضم كردن وبراي سه وسطي را نيز چنانچه در عدد اشياء بين الناس معهود ومتعارف است ولكن درين سه عقد بايد كه رووس انامل بسيار نزديك باصول اصابع باشند وبراى چهار خنصر را رفع بايد كرد وبنصر ووسطي را معقود گذاشتن وبراى پنج بنصر را نيز رفع كردن وبجهت شش وسطى را رفع كرده فقط بنصر فرو بايد گرفت چنانچه سر انملهٔ آن بر وسط كف باشد وبراي هفت بنصر را هم برداشته خنصر تنها را عقد بايد گرفت چنانچه سر انگشت نيك مايل باشد بجانب نرمهٔ دست يمينى قريب بمنتهاى كف بسوى ساعد وبراى هشت با بنصر همان بايد كرد وبراى نه با وسطى نيز همان بايد كرد كه درين عقود ثلاثهٔ اخير سرهاي انگشتان برطرف كف باشد تا بعقود ثلثهٔ اول مشتبه نگردد وبراى ده سر ناخن سبابهٔ دست راست را باطن برمفصّل اول انملهٔ ابهام يعنى نرانگشت بايد نهاد چنانچه فرجه ميان اين دو انگشت بحلقهٔ مدوّر مشابه باشد وبراي بست طرف عقد زيرين سبابه كه

متصل وسطی است بر پشت ناخن ابهام باید نهاد چنانچه پنداري انملهٔ ابهام را در میان اصول سبابه ووسطی گرفته اند لیکن وسطی را در دلالت عقد بست دخلی نباشد چه اوضاع او برای عقود احاد متغیر ومبدّل گردد واتصال ناخن ابهام بطرف عقد زیرین سبابه بحال خود دلالت بر بست کند وبرای سي ابهام را قایم داشته سرانملهٔ سبابه برطرف ناخن او باید نهاد چنانچه وضع سبابه بابهام شبیه باشد بصورت قوس ورودہ آن وبراي چهل ناخن انملهٔ ابهامُ را برظهر عقد زیرین سبابه باید نهاد چنانکه میان ابهام وطرف کف هیـچ فرجه نماند وبراي پنجاه سبابه را قایم داشته ابهام تمام خم باید کرد وبرکف باید نهاد محاذي سبابه براي شصت ابهام را خم داده باطن عقدهٔ دویم سبابه را بر پشت ناخن ابهام باید نهاد چنانچه پشت ناخن ابهام تمام مکشوف باشد وبرای هفتاد ابهام را قایم داشته باطن عقدهٔ اول یا دویم سبابه بر پشت ناخن ابهام باید نهاد چنانچه پشت ناخن ابهام تمام مکشوف باشد وبرای هشتاد ابهام را منتصب گذاشته طرف انملهٔ سبابه را بر پشت مفصل انملهٔ اول باید نهاد وبرای نود سر ناخن سبابه را باطن برمفصل عقدهٔ دویم ابهام باید نهاد وباید دانست که انچه در دست راست دلالت بر عقدي از عقود آحاد کند از یکي تا نه در دست چپ دلالت بر همان عقدي از عقود الوف کند از یک هزار تا نه

هزار وهمچنان انچه در دست راست دلالت بر عقدي از عقود نهگانه عشرات کند از ده تا نود در دست چپ دلالت بر همان عقدی از عقود مئات کند از یکصد تانه صد بدانکه صابع هردو دست بدان صور هیژدگانه مذکور الصدر ازیکي تا نه هزار ونه صد ونود ونه ضبط توان کرد وبرای عقد ده هزار طرف انملهٔ ابهام را متصل باید ساخت بطرف تمام انملهٔ سبابه چنانکه سر ناخن ابهام برابر باشد وطرفش بطرف او

TRANSLATION.

"'*Eqd el Anámil*, this is a system of notation in which numerals are indicated by opening or closing the hand in various ways. The following is an exposition of the method employed:

"1. Little finger of right hand bent.
"2. Little finger and ring-finger bent.
"3. Middle finger bent in addition to the other two. (In these three the tips of the fingers should be kept high up on the palm, and as near as possible to the bottom finger-joints.)
"4. Little finger raised, leaving the middle and ring-finger bent.
"5. Raise the little and ring-finger, leaving the middle finger only bent.
"6. Raise the middle finger and double the ring-finger. (In these three the finger tips must be kept as near as possible to the middle of the palm.)
"7. Little finger bent.
"8. Little and ring-finger bent.
"9. Middle finger bent in addition to the other two. (In these three the finger tips should approach as

EQD EL ANÁMIL

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

90 +
3 =
93

nearly as possible to the bottom or soft part of the palm, so that they may not be confounded with the first three.)

"10. Join the tips of the thumb and forefinger of the right hand so as to form a circle.

"20. Place the bottom joint of the forefinger over the back of the thumb, so that the thumb may appear between the bottom joints of the fore and middle fingers. N.B. The position of the middle finger does not count in showing 20, being restricted to the expression of units.

"30. Straighten the thumb and bend the forefinger over it, touching the nail, so as to present the appearance of a bow with its string.

"40. Place the side of the thumb tip against the bottom joint of the forefinger so as to leave no aperture between them.

"50. Bend the thumb on the palm immediately below the fore and middle fingers.

"60. Bend the thumb and place the second joint of the forefinger over it, showing all the thumb nail.

"70. Straighten the thumb and place the first or second joint of the forefinger across it, showing all the thumb nail.

"80. Straighten the thumb and place the tip of the forefinger on the back of the top thumb joint.

"90. Bend the thumb *over* the first joint of the forefinger.

"The signs for units on the right hand become thousands on the left hand; tens on the right hand become hundreds on the left hand. The fingers of the two hands may thus, by placing them in different positions, be made to represent 9,999. For 10,000 the thumb must be straightened and placed by the side of the fore-finger exactly parallel with it."

It will be seen that to express 93 the hand must be entirely closed, and a "close fist" دست تنگ in Persian is synony-

mous with *niggardliness*, just as an "open hand" دست کشادہ is the symbol of *liberality*. To say then that Sháh Mahmúd's hand is 93, is merely equivalent to calling him "close-fisted" or miserly.

This explanation will also apply to a passage of Harírí, Macámah 49, entitled 'of Sassán':

حكي الحارث ابن همام قال بلغني ان ابا زيد حين ناهز القبضة

"El Hárith the son of Hammám related and said: I have heard that Abu Zeid when he drew nigh unto the *fist*—or *grasp*—."

Mr Preston in his translation of the Macamat of Harírí, Cambridge, 1850, p. 428, note, comments upon the passage thus:

"القبضة probably means 'death,' the verb قبض being ordinarily used in the sense, 'he was snatched away' [by death]. Shareeshi says that it means 'the age of 93 years' (i. e. extreme old age), and that because the Arabs used to represent the number 93 by *clenching the fist*, the word became a metonym for the number of which that action was the sign. But it neither appears why the age of 93 years should be selected as peculiarly expressive of old age, nor why the number 93 should have been represented in the method stated by Shareeshi, so that his explanation cannot be regarded as satisfactory, particularly as Al Dgouhari and Al Firouzabadi are silent on the subject."

The passage in Harírí is the converse of that in Firdausí, the word "fist" in the former being synonymous with 93 by the calculation of the *'Eqd el Anámil*.

E. H. PALMER.

RHYTHM *VERSUS* METRE.

WITHOUT troubling ourselves about rules of scansion we can generally read an English verse so as to give the effect to the ear which the writer meant it to have. The uniformity of our rhythm, almost always iambic or trochaic, the simplicity of our strophic arrangement, and our certainty about the pronunciation, all combine to make this a comparatively easy matter. To a certain extent the same is the case even with the schoolboy's reading of some forms of ancient poetry. Though from the difference of pronunciation, a difference which in England takes an extreme form, our delivery of Greek or Latin heroics, alcaics, sapphics and asclepiadics, is very unlike the ancient; still we do succeed in getting a certain regular effect, sufficiently uniform and sufficiently well-known to make a badly-constructed line at once jar on the ear and offend the eye. But the moment we leave these more familiar forms, the case is altered. Even the "Solvitur acris hiems," and the "Miserarum est" of Horace, and still more the Atys of Catullus, to most boys and to many men convey little indication of law or form. But it is when we come to the Greek choral metres that all firm ground seems to slip from under us, and eye and ear are equally perplexed. Even scholars who have attained to some acquaintance with metrical tradition on these obscurer forms, who know the rules which allow a long syllable to be resolved in one place but not in another, and what feet may be substituted in the antistrophe for the corresponding feet in the strophe, even they have probably no living perception of a grateful rhythm, no mental hearing of a sweet succession, such as *a priori* we have a right to look for in the finest products of the most

highly organised race the world has ever seen. Assuming then that these compositions were constructed in accordance with rule, and were not mere lawless confusions; assuming farther that they were meant to satisfy the ear, and that the human ear, at least the civilised human ear, has always required the same sort of satisfaction, we have to account for the ordinary inability to obtain this satisfaction from the lyrics of Pindar and the choral passages of the Grecian drama. The main cause of this inability is believed by the writers whom it is the object of this article to introduce to the English reader, to be the all but universal ignorance of a rhythmical as distinguished from the vulgar metrical teaching.

What we are all taught as boys, and all that we are taught, is that verses are composed of various kinds of feet variously combined: the feet themselves being made up of syllables of a definite and generally invariable quantity. And to read the verse in such a way as to mark each separate foot is what we call scanning. The rules which determine the quantity of syllables, the nature of the various feet, and their combinations to form the different kinds of verse, are metrical rules. Now this metrical knowledge, this scansion of verse, answers very well up to a certain point. But we soon find that it is insufficient by itself for an understanding of the more complex forms of ancient poetry; and above all, that frequently our knowledge of the metrical structure of a verse is of no help towards obtaining from it what we can scarcely doubt it must have had, a movement satisfactory to the ear. For this satisfaction, this grateful movement, is the real end of all metrical arrangement. The master-science, that to which metric is subsidiary, and for which alone it exists, is the science of Rhythm. The facts and details of the mere metrician are to Rhythmic what shaped stones and carved timbers are to architecture, not dictating the character of the structure, but themselves liable to be altered in subordination to the builder's thought. And when we consider how strong and self-willed is the rhythmical faculty, how we can make a clock tick to almost any time, it would be strange indeed if man's own creation, language, refused obedience to this plastic energy. Well one way, and a most import-

ant way, in which Rhythm asserts its dominion over metre is, that while recognizing and dealing with the metrical feet, it strips them of their independent character and individual ictus, and makes them parts of new and larger groups (to which the old Rhythmic still gives the name of *feet*), held together by one dominant ictus. Take for instance Tennyson's Locksley Hall. Assuming as we must that accent not quantity determines the relation of the syllables in English verse, the metre is trochaic tetrameter catalectic. Yet no one would think of reading it by single trochees, with an equal stress on the first syllable of each. There may be some arbitrariness, more or less diversity in our modes of grouping and accenting, but group them we do. Most readers probably break the line into two rhythmical feet, each of four trochees, allowing for the catalexis in the last half; though they might not be equally agreed about the syllables on which to place the ictus. The scanning of some of the classical metres by dipodiæ instead of single feet, which is generally recognized as essential to the beauty of the verse, is itself a rhythmical rather than a metrical process.

But rhythm does more than combine a succession of metrical feet into a larger rhythmical foot with a single ictus. It takes liberties with metrical quantity, and declares that under certain circumstances a spondee or a dactyl shall be delivered as a trochee, that the 2 : 2 relation shall for the time cease, and become, if not precisely 2 : 1, something sufficiently near to pass for it. Now something like this is constantly taking place in English verse. But our reading of English is so much matter of practice and so little of theory that we are hardly conscious of it, and when we do come to observe it, perhaps misunderstand or misrepresent it. Take for instance the word *merrily*, which I suppose we may call *per se* a dactyl. For although even in modern verse the inherent quantity of a syllable is not without its modifying effect, still it is undoubtedly true that modern accent does in the main represent ancient quantity. Now in such passages as "Merrily lived the Tartar king," "So merrily the village bells did sound," the word *merrily* has two distinct rhythmical values. In the first it stands for a trochee: i. e. it

is a dactyl delivered, by the hurrying together of its first two syllables, in trochaic time; what the rhythmicians call a cyclic or rolling dactyl, such as is common in logaœdic verse. In the second example it is an iambus and a half. By dwelling on its last syllable it is made to occupy something like, something which to the ear will do for five times. While then metrically and *per se merrily* is a dactyl, it may by rhythmical manipulation be made, according to its context, the rough equivalent of either a trochee or an iambus and a half. And while on this subject, I venture, though with some misgiving and with the highest respect for his profound knowledge and penetration, to differ from Dr Guest in his treatment of certain superabundant syllables in English poetry. He thinks, for instance, that in Milton's lines—

> "And all the Prophets in their age shall sing,
> Of great Messiah shall sing; thus laws and rights, &c."

the -ah of *Messiah* is elided. So also in his view the *o* in *violent*, and in many other words a short vowel following a long *i* similarly disappears. He also holds the actual elision of the *o* in *to*, or at any rate regards it as blending with the initial vowel of a following word. "When she was dear to us, we did hold her so." Now I have a difficulty in believing that *to us* in this example was pronounced either *tus* or *twus;* and in all such instances the ear does surely admit of every syllable being distinctly sounded, though by some rhythmical management we keep within the prescribed limits of the metre. I hold in short that *to us we* and *-ah shall sing* may be regarded as cyclic anapæsts, rhythmically equivalent to iambi. A similar account perhaps may be given of Moore's line,

> "Shining on, shining on, by no shadow made tender,"

in which Dr Guest objects to the slurring over of the accent on the word *shining*. I should not wholly sacrifice the accent, but only subdue it, diminish on rhythmical grounds its ordinary force.

What I have been here trying to illustrate is the rhythmical doctrine of *ἄλογοι χρόνοι*. The doctrine, i. e. that the sylla-

bles of which a foot is composed are not always and absolutely of the same length, and therefore in the same ratio to one another: that the 2 : 2 relation of the spondee and dactyl may be changed into the 2 : 1 relation of the trochee. Whether these changed relations are capable in every case of an exact mathematical expression, we may perhaps doubt, the more so as different writers conceive the mathematical relation differently; but that some change does take place by which feet of originally different times are substituted for each other without detriment to the general time-uniformity of the passage, seems completely established. Yet while these substitutions take place without altering the time, we are not to suppose that they were either motiveless or mere concessions to the poverty of poetic diction. The iambus of tragedy admitted the spondee, Horace tells us, in jura paterna, "Tardior ut paulo graviorque veniret ad aures;" and some special character was no doubt intended and given by every recognized substitution. The Greek ear was probably abnormally sensitive to rhythmical effects. It was not therefore because he was unable to construct his dialogue of pure iambi, or his logaœdic passages of pure trochees, that the poet introduced his dactyls and spondees. Although the general rhythmical movement remained the same, yet there was a peculiar character given by the intermingling with the proper three-timed feet of those originally four-timed, or *vice versâ*. The admitted spondee was still statelier than the native trochee; the trochee even when representing a graver foot would not part with all its hereditary liveliness.

By the side of this constantly recurring apparent change of time thus obviated by rhythmical considerations, comes that second opprobrium of the current metrical theory, catalexis; according to which an immense quantity of verses are one or more syllables short of the legitimate complement. Now of this catalexis rhythm knows nothing. Every measure must be complete, if not in its verbal, at least in its orchestic matter. If, that is, the original music of the passage had come down to us, or a record of the several dance-steps, we should have found no imperfect bars. As it is we have nothing but the

words left; and the general rhythmical character of the piece can alone determine the precise mode of filling up the hiatus. This may always be effected in one of two ways, both of which we know to be recognized weapons of the musical armoury. Either a syllable may be dwelt on for so much more than its proper time as would compensate for the absence of its companions, this elongation being technically called τονή; or we may intercalate a pause, a χρόνος κενός, during which the voice rested while a dance-movement completed the measure. The term catalectic is generally applied only to verses defective at the close; but the same phænomenon occurs equally in the middle of the verse, and admits of the same explanation and the same remedy. Only we must beware of imagining a pause between two syllables of the same word, and therefore in this case the compensation must be effected by τονή. Indeed, according to Schmidt, prolongation, not pause, is always the remedy for this internal catalexis. Now it is in connexion with this internal catalexis that the rhythmical tradition expounded by our authors has rendered perhaps its most signal service; delivering us from those monstrous combinations and violent changes of rhythm, with which in our editions of Greek plays the eye is painfully familiar. According to Dindorf the Strophe Agamemnon 367 is thus composed:

1, 9, 10, Antispastic.
2, Iambic.
3, Iambic.
4, Iambico-cretic.
5, 6, Iambico-trochaic.
7, 8, Ischiorrhogic.
11, Iambico-trochaic with antispast.
12, Choriambic clausula.
13, 14, Dactylic.
15, Glyconic.

Whereas by the application of τονή, and the recognition of a law which I will only here allude to, that an alloiometric series may stand at the beginning or end of a rhythmical period, we get rid of all this portentous jumble, and find nothing but

good Iambic dimeters and trimeters, in which the thesis is omitted sometimes after the first arsis[1] only, sometimes after both first and second. A similar syncopation in trochaic metre gives rise to the seeming cretic and pæonic feet, which are really rhythmical equivalents of the ditrochæi amid which they are found. Let any one who doubts the value of this rhythmical teaching read such lines as *ἰὼ γενεαὶ βροτῶν*, first in the ordinary way by which they are mere prose, and then employing *τονή*, pause, and cyclic measurement, thus,

$$\text{ι} \mid \text{⏑} - \text{⏑} \mid - \text{⏑} \mid - \text{∧} \parallel$$

where ι indicates that the *ι* in *ἰώ* has the time of a trochee, and ∧ is the mark of a rest of a single time, and I think he will be conscious of a clear gain by the latter method.

It may possibly be objected to these views that there seems to be no reason why, with the acknowledged fertility of Greek invention, the poet should have chosen to let one syllable stand for two or three. The answer is that syllables were not the all-in-all to him which they are to the modern poet. The music, the dance, these filled up the time and enabled him to indulge in a variety in his λέξις which was only less essential to the Greek than organic unity. No doubt he would avail himself of this at times to give special expression. And that this is the true explanation is rendered additionally probable by the fact that in those forms of poetry which were adapted to recitation, the hexameter and elegy, no such catalexis is admissible.

The work which is the foundation of these remarks is the treatise on Metrik by Rossbach and Westphal, published at Leipsic between the years 1856 and 1865. Not that the existence of an early rhythmical tradition was entirely unknown previously to their investigations. I myself picked up recently a small treatise by Mr Edward Manwaring, published 1738, in

[1] The words arsis and thesis are used here in their Bentleian and ordinary but improper sense, *arsis* for the heavy or accented, *thesis* for the light or unaccented part of the measure. With the ancients the usage of these words was the exact converse of this, the *arsis* indicating the lifting of the foot at the light, the *thesis* the setting it down at the heavy portion of the bar.

which some of the broad principles of rhythmic modification are clearly asserted. But the first who assigned to this tradition anything like its due importance was Bœckh, the grand old scholar who died only the other day, full of years and of the honour which Germany alone of countries pays to scholarship. But the complete explanation and confirmation of this theory belongs to Rossbach and Westphal. With some of their opinions we may disagree; some of their reasonings may seem not quite conclusive; but in the general opinion of Germany they have placed the theory of Greek metre and rhythm in a position it has never occupied before in modern times, and in all its main points unassailable. That which distinguishes them from all preceding inquirers is the firmness with which they rest on the old rhythmical tradition, and the care with which they have tracked out this teaching to its best and earliest sources. The first treatises on the subject of which we have any remains, and those to which they attach the highest value, are the *στοιχεῖα ῥυθμικά* and other fragments of Aristoxenus, a scholar of Aristotle. He lived sufficiently near the time of the great singers to comprehend their works as living organisms, while to the later grammarians and scholiasts they were little better than dry anatomies; and he seems to have inherited no mean portion of the philosophic method of the mighty master. Aristides, the next in order of their authorities, but *longo proximus intervallo*, is a writer of a very different stamp. He was a Neoplatonist of the period immediately following that of the Antonines; a mere encyclopediast, whose sole merit to us consists in his having extracted from better men passages the meaning of which he evidently himself often failed to understand.

In regarding rhythm as the determining principle of all metrical phænomena, our authors do no more than Hermann had done before. Hermann even goes so far as to say that if by good fortune any complete work of one of the great rhythmical writers had come down to us, it would of course have served as our head source of information. But unluckily, he thinks, the fragments which have survived are so meagre and disjointed, that all attempts to make use of them for the form-

ation of a scientific theory have proved more mischievous than profitable. So he proceeds to do what I feel sure he enjoyed much more even than reading Aristoxenus in his integrity, to construct out of his own intelligence and sense of what must have been, the laws that gave form to Greek poetic composition. And some of my readers doubtless remember with feelings of mingled reverence and discomfort the very abstract notions with which he started on his quest. The only two doctrines which he borrows from the rhythmicians are those of the cyclic dactyl and the trochæus semantus. Not that Hermann was unacquainted with the relics of Aristoxenus: on the contrary he had studied them carefully. But failing to detect in them anything like a complete system, and having invented one of his own, he would not be baulked by the fact that all his fundamental positions are directly opposed to the precise statements of Aristoxenus. The sole portions of Hermann's theory thus independently developed which are sound, are his recognition of the fact that trochaic, dactylic and pæonic measures represent various kinds of musical time; his perceiving that for all rhythmical purposes iambi are the same as trochees and anapæsts as dactyls; and that several single bars may by the dominating force of a principal ictus be grouped in a higher unity, a larger rhythmical whole. That there are still metrical writers who make Hermann their text-book excites in our authors no surprise. There are still, they say, philologers who talk of Latin being derived from Greek, still chemists whose method remains unaffected by the discovery of oxygen. The chief credit of reviving the doctrines of the rhythmicians belongs, as I said above, to Bœckh; but there had previously appeared an intermediate school, that of Voss and Apel. Much as Hermann had spoken of rhythm, they saw that what he meant by it was not what the world commonly understands by the term, and they were right in believing that ancient feeling on this matter must have been essentially the same with modern. But they were deficient in the philological acquirements necessary for understanding the old rhythmicians, and merely employed a Procrustean method of forcing Greek verses into the forms of modern music. Bœckh himself had at one time leaned to the views of

Apel, but by the time when he brought out his great Pindar with its metrical treatise appended, he had already attained that stand-point which can never again be yielded, that the teaching of the rhythmicians is the one true foundation of all metrical theory. And though he was wrong in not making more use of this teaching, and in some respects misinterpreted it, as in maintaining the absolute equality of the bars and in his explanation of the *ἄλογοι χρόνοι*; still the services he rendered, both negative and positive, were of the highest value. Above all he rescued the metrical system from being a mere dead schematismus by re-infusing into it the living principle of rhythm.

In an article like this I can scarcely pretend to do more than call attention to the great work of Rossbach and Westphal, and indicate a few of its leading principles. The following conclusions I think they may be considered to have established. 1. That the Greek rhythm corresponded in general with modern musical time, its principal forms agreeing with our $\frac{2}{4}$, $\frac{3}{4}$, and $\frac{5}{4}$ time[1] respectively. 2. That uniformity of measure was with them as with us the rule, but that exceptions to this were somewhat more common, especially to express the sudden changes of violent and excited feeling. 3. That to remove the apparently frequent violations of this uniformity, we must recognize a controlling and modifying power by which feet naturally and metrically unequal are made practically and rhythmically equal. 4. That no such change as from trochaic to iambic metre in the same verse ever really takes place; but that what appears such is the result of syncopation, or as it may be called internal catalexis: in which as in the final catalexis the missing time is made up either by what we call a dotted note or a rest. 5. That not only in the arrangement of the whole choral ode is there unity and symmetry, but that this symmetry may be found in each single strophe, colon corresponding to colon and period to period. But for these latter details, the character and extent of the rhythmic feet, their aggregation into periods, the nature of the verse-arrangement,

[1] Including under these such measures as $\frac{4}{8}$, $\frac{8}{8}$, $\frac{6}{8}$, $\frac{5}{8}$. The $\frac{5}{4}$ and $\frac{5}{8}$ though rare, are not unknown in modern music.

the general structure of the strophe, for these and a multitude of other points connected with the subject, I must refer the reader to the work itself, hoping that what I have here written may be useful by way of introduction.

The 'Eurhythmie' of Dr J. H. Heinrich Schmidt to which I have already alluded, and which was published only last year, may be regarded as a further development of the principles of Rossbach and Westphal. Their general interpretation of the rhythmical doctrine, of the nature of the cyclic feet, of the use of τονή and pause, and of the various kinds of period-structure, he accepts almost in its entirety; only that he restricts the pause to the end of the verse, and remedies the internal catalexis by τονή alone. But he thinks he has discovered a new principle of immense importance for the arrangement of choral passages and the consequent determination of their periodic structure, in regarding the verse-pause, not with them as outside the rhythm and therefore exacting no correspondence, but as in all cases exhibiting as close a correspondence as the cola themselves. With respect however to his application of this principle I cannot speak with any certainty, nor can I feel quite as sure as he does that he has arranged his verses in the only possible way. But there is one chapter in his book of great interest and I think great value, in which he illustrates Greek rhythms by modern dance-music; and shews the different effects to be got in the same bar, the same that is as regards the time, by varying the position and relative strength of the subordinate musical accents.

In conclusion I may say that while the Metrik of Rossbach and Westphal is, and will probably long continue to be, the great store-house from which future rhythmicians will borrow their facts and evolve new theories; for a briefer statement of results and an ingenious practical application of them, the student may with confidence be referred to the 'Eurhythmie' of Dr Schmidt.

G. PERKINS.

M. RENAN ON THE EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS.

In the introduction to his recent volume on St Paul, M. Renan has offered a novel theory to account for certain phenomena connected with the Epistle to the Romans. If, for reasons which I shall give hereafter, this theory seems to me to be unsatisfactory, it is yet sufficiently ingenious and striking to claim a fair discussion; and, as the subject itself possesses great critical interest independently of M. Renan's views, I gladly avail myself of the opportunity to investigate it in detail.

The documentary facts which demand explanation, and which have served as the foundation for several theories more or less allied to that of M. Renan, are the following:

(1) In Rom. i. 7 one MS (G) for *τοῖς οὖσιν ἐν Ῥώμῃ ἀγαπητοῖς Θεοῦ* reads *τοῖς οὖσιν ἐν ἀγάπῃ Θεοῦ*; while in i. 15 it omits the words *τοῖς ἐν Ῥώμῃ*. Again the cursive 47 contains the following marginal note on i. 7, *τὸ ἐν Ῥώμῃ, οὔτε ἐν τῇ ἐξηγήσει οὔτε ἐν τῷ ῥητῷ μνημονεύει*, where however it is not clear to what authority the scribe refers, though apparently he is speaking of some commentator. Moreover I seem to see other traces of the omission (at least in i. 7), which hitherto have not been recognised. Though Origen elsewhere quotes the common reading (II. p. 301, IV. p. 287), and though it is given as the text in Rufinus' translation of his commentary on this very passage, yet the comment itself, even as disguised by its Latin dress, still appears to me to indicate that Origen here had before him a text in which the words *ἐν Ῥώμῃ* were omitted; 'Benedictio hæc pacis et gratiæ quam dat dilectis Dei ad quos scribit apostolus Paulus' (IV. p. 467). The same inference also, if I mistake not, is suggested by the language of the Ambrosian Hilary;

'Quamvis Romanis scribat, illis tamen scribere se significat qui in caritate Dei sunt'; though here again the text has 'qui sunt Romæ dilectis Dei,' but with the important various reading (in one MS) of 'in caritate Dei' for 'dilectis Dei.' These, it will be remembered, are the two oldest extant commentaries on the Epistle to the Romans. Still further; I am disposed to think that the reading *ἐν ἀγάπῃ Θεοῦ* (for *ἀγαπητοῖς Θεοῦ*), which is found in several other authorities, has arisen out of a combination of the two readings *τοῖς οὖσιν ἐν Ῥώμῃ ἀγαπητοῖς Θεοῦ* and *τοῖς οὖσιν ἐν ἀγάπῃ Θεοῦ*, and thus bears indirect testimony to a still wider diffusion of a recension omitting the words *ἐν Ῥώμῃ*. This reading occurs in the Latin of D (the Greek is wanting), and in the two oldest MSS of the Vulgate.

(2) The ascription of praise, with which according to the received text (xvi. 25—27) the epistle closes, occupies different places in different copies. In ℵ, B, C, D, f, Vulg., Pesh., Memph., Æth., and in the commentaries of Origen, Hilary, and Pelagius, it occurs at the end of the xvith chapter, as in the received text; in L, 37, 47, and by far the greater number of cursives, in the Harclean Syriac, in the commentaries of Chrysostom, Theodoret, and others, and in Cyril of Alexandria, its place is at the close of the xivth chapter: in A, P, 17, Arm. (MSS and Zohr.), it is found in both places; while in F, G, it is omitted in both (a blank space however being left in G between the xivth and xvth chapters). This variation of position moreover is at least as early as Origen, who commenting on xvi. 25—27 writes; 'Caput hoc Marcion, a quo scripturæ evangelicæ atque apostolicæ interpolatæ sunt, de hac epistola penitus abstulit; et non solum hoc, sed et ab eo loco ubi scriptum est, *Omne autem quod non est ex fide, peccatum est* (xiv. 23), usque ad finem cuncta dissecuit. In aliis vero exemplaribus, id est in his quæ non sunt a Marcione temerata, hoc ipsum caput (i.e. xvi. 25—27) diverse positum invenimus. In nonnullis etenim codicibus post eum locum quem supra diximus, hoc est *Omne autem quod non est ex fide peccatum est,* statim cohærens habetur *Ei autem qui potens est vos confirmare.* Alii vero codices in fine id, ut nunc positum est, continent.' From this language we may perhaps assume that the authorities for either position seemed

to Origen to be nearly evenly balanced. Whether in 'ut nunc positum est' he refers to the position which he himself adopts in this commentary, or to the position which was most common in his day, does not distinctly appear. He makes no mention of any MSS as having it in both places, or (except Marcion's copies) of any as omitting it in both. St Jerome however (on Ephes. iii. 5) speaks of this passage as occurring 'in plerisque codicibus,' thus implying that it is omitted in some; but he may have been deceived by not finding it in the place where he expected to find it.

(3) As appears from the statement of Origen just quoted, Marcion's recension of the epistle closed with the end of the xivth chapter. Moreover Tertullian (*adv. Marc.* v. 14) refers to *tribunal Christi* (xiv. 10) as occurring *in clausula* of the epistle; but, as he is refuting Marcion, we might reasonably suppose that he here takes Marcion's own copy and argues from it. On the other hand, it does not appear that he himself elsewhere quotes from the xvth or xvith chapters of the epistle, though the omission may be accidental. Neither is there, so far as I know, any reference to these last two chapters in Irenæus, but here also no stress can be laid on the omission, as there was no special reason for his quoting them. Again, Wetstein says, '*Codex Latinus* habet capitula epistolæ ad Romanos 51, desinit autem in cap. xiv,' but later critics have not been able to identify the MS and thus to verify the statement.

To explain these documentary facts, as also to account for certain phenomena in the closing chapters of the epistle itself, various theories have from time to time been suggested, which I shall here attempt to classify.

(i) Baur, with characteristic boldness, *denied the genuineness of the last two chapters*, or, in other words, accepted the recension of Marcion as preserving the original proportions of the epistle (*Paulus* p. 398 sq.). This solution does not take into account all the facts stated. Thus, for instance, it passes over in silence the omission of the words ἐν Ῥώμῃ in one or more copies. For this reason it must be rejected on the ground of external criticism alone. But again, when we come to examine the xvth and xvith chapters themselves, whatever may be our

conclusion as regards their *destination*, we are forced to recognise their *genuineness*. M. Renan expresses his surprise 'qu'un critique aussi habile que Baur se soit contenté d'une solution aussi grossière. Pourquoi un faussaire aurait-il inventé de si insignifiants détails? Pourquoi aurait-il ajouté à l'ouvrage sacré une liste de noms propres?' (p. lxxi sq.) If the argument is just, the surprise is hardly reasonable; for in spite of his acknowledged ability, Baur's prompt method elsewhere is entirely consistent with the rejection of these chapters. But indeed we need not rely on this negative argument derived from the inadequacy of the motive for such a forgery. The style and the substance of the chapters afford conclusive testimony, that we have here not only the thoughts, but the words, of the Apostle himself. To this it must be added that the incidental notices, of which Paley has made use to establish the time and place of writing, hang together in a manner which would suppose not only the most consummate skill, but also the most minute knowledge, on the part of a forger.

From this solution which maintains the spuriousness of the last two chapters, we pass to others which, accepting them as genuine, assume their *displacement* to a greater or less degree. And here we may subdivide, according as these chapters are supposed to have been addressed wholly to the Romans or partly (at least) to some other Church.

(ii) Among those who accept the Roman destination of the whole, but assume some displacement, is HEUMANN[1]. He supposes that the original epistle comprised the first eleven chapters, to which were added two postscripts, xvi. 1—24, and xvi. 25—27. The intermediate matter (cc. xii—xv) formed a separate letter to the Romans written on account of some intelligence received meanwhile from Rome. The two letters were afterwards combined (but not by the Apostle himself), in such a manner as to throw the postscript to the end.

In like manner PAULUS (*de Orig. Ep. ad Rom.*, Jena 1801) offered another solution on the same basis. The xvth chapter

[1] The views of Heumann, Paulus, Griesbach, and Semler, are here given at second hand from Reiche *Erklärung des Briefes an die Römer* 1833, as I have had no opportunity of verifying the references.

was a sort of supplementary letter, addressed to the enlightened. The xvith chapter, written on a separate parchment, contained recommendations of Phœbe the bearer of the letter to the principal members of the Church, and instructions to her to salute certain persons. Finding that there was space remaining on this leaf, the Apostle availed himself of it to add some directions to the presbyters. The doxology at the end belonged originally to the general letter, but was afterwards displaced when the several documents were put together.

Another hypothesis, which like the two last mentioned supposes the epistle to consist of a number of Sibylline leaves stitched together almost at random, is that of GRIESBACH (*Curæ in Hist. Test. Gr. Epp. Paul.* p. 45). He believes that the original letter ended with xiv. 23, the parchment being exhausted. The final doxology, xvi. 25—27, was attached on a separate leaf. Another parchment contained the salutations from certain friends of St Paul, with a benediction, xvi. 21—24. St Paul then found leisure to continue the subject, where he had broken off, in a postscript (xv), to which he added another benediction. A fourth parchment contained the names of the Roman Christians who were saluted, together with a warning against intriguers; and here again a benediction was appended. At a later date, when these various leaves were attached together, different places were assigned to the doxology, and in some copies it was entirely omitted.

The three solutions last mentioned, while disintegrating the epistle, assume that all the component parts were addressed to the Roman Church. This is not the case with those which follow.

(iii) SEMLER (*Paraphr.* 1769) supposes that the letter to the Romans closed with the xivth chapter; that the bearers of the letter were charged to distribute copies to the leading members of certain churches which they would visit on the route; and that an authoritative list of these persons (xvi) was given to them at the same time. To these persons, not to the Roman Church, the xvth chapter was addressed. The bearers would visit Cenchreæ, the residence of Phœbe, and Ephesus, where Aquila was staying. The places where the others dwelt

are not mentioned by name, because they were well known to the bearers.

Not very different is EICHHORN'S hypothesis (*Einl.* Th. iii). The parchment destined for the original letter, he supposes, ended with the xivth chapter. A separate leaf contained on one side the final doxology, on the other the salutations and benediction. This formed the whole of the letter as originally conceived. But some time intervening before it was sent, the Apostle added on a separate leaf (which was interposed) certain warnings and personal explanations (xv). The remainder of the present epistle (xvi. 1—20) was not addressed to the Romans, but was a letter of introduction for Phœbe, perhaps intended for Corinth. Phœbe forgot to deliver it, and took it with her to Rome.

From these complex theories, which hardly deserve credit for ingenuity, it is a relief to turn to simpler solutions. Allowing the xvth chapter to stand as part of the Epistle to the Romans, several critics have separated the xvith chapter from the rest, and assigned it to some other letter. Thus SCHULZ (*Stud. u. Krit.* 1829, p. 609) supposed it to be a portion of an epistle written from Rome to Ephesus: and this view has been recently adopted by EWALD (*Sendschr. des Apostels Paulus* p. 428 sq.), who however restricts the intrusive fragment to xvi. 3—20. On the other hand SCHOTT (*Isagoge* p. 250 sq.) regards the xvith chapter as a congeries of fragments written by the Apostle from Corinth to some Christian community in Asia Minor.

It will be seen at once that in this last class of solutions the documentary facts are entirely neglected, the theories being built on certain phenomena in the chapter itself. But indeed the same charge lies, though in a less degree, against all the solutions enumerated under the heads (ii) and (iii). No regard at all is paid to the remarkable omission of the mention of Rome in the opening verses; and, as attempts to explain the textual phenomena of the last two chapters, they are in most cases at once superfluous and defective. At the same time they are condemned by their highly artificial character.

I hope to show that M. Renan's theory also must be rejected, both as involving strong improbabilities in itself, and as being

more complex than the phenomena demand. But, in so far as it grapples fairly with the documentary facts, it has a higher claim to attention than the others.

M. Renan then supposes that the so-called Epistle to the Romans was a circular letter, of which several copies with distinct and appropriate endings were sent to different churches, the body of the letter being the same for all. One of these was despatched to Rome, a second to Ephesus, a third to Thessalonica, and a fourth to some unknown Church. Our epistle is the work of a later editor, who had these four copies in his hands, and combined all the endings so that nothing might be lost. The following table will show what parts of our epistle (according to M. Renan's view) belonged to each of these:

Romans.	Ephesians.	Thessalonians.	Unknown Church.
i—xi.	i—xi.	i—xi.	i—xi.
	xii, xiii, xiv.	xii, xiii, xiv.	xii, xiii, xiv.
xv.			
	xvi. 1—20.		
		xvi. 21—24.	
			xvi. 25—27.

In the last three some modification would be made also in the first chapter. The mention of Rome (vv. 7, 15) at all events must have been expunged.

M. Renan founds this theory of a quadripartite epistle on the assumed fact that in the existing recension we meet with four successive endings, xv. 33, xvi. 20, xvi. 24, xvi. 25—27. His reasons for assigning the several portions to letters addressed to the several churches above mentioned will appear in the sequel.

The most convenient method of dealing with M. Renan's opinions will be first to consider the difficulties which he feels in the received view that the whole epistle was written to the Romans and which oblige him to substitute another hypothesis, and then to state the objections which lie against his own theory.

The difficulties then, which M. Renan proposes to remove by his theory, are the following:

1. Certain phenomena in the body of the letter are perplexing, if it was written to the Romans. He selects as instances, the passages ii. 16, xi. 13, xvi. 25. Of these he says that they are 'only moderately adapted to the faithful of Rome, and would amount to indiscretion if addressed to these last alone' (p. lxxiv). This objection rests on the assumption that the Roman Church consisted wholly of Jewish Christians; an assumption which I shall consider hereafter. At present I would only remark that, inasmuch as the letter (on M. Renan's hypothesis) was specialized by attaching an appropriate ending and thus became to all intents and purposes an Epistle to the Romans, it is difficult to see how the 'indiscretion' would be affected by the fact that other copies with other endings were despatched to other churches.

Again, M. Renan, building on the assumption already mentioned that the Roman Church must have been Judæo-Christian, claims for his theory the merit of explaining 'the hesitation of the best critics on the question whether the letter was addressed to converted heathens or to Jewish Christians'; for on his hypothesis 'the principal parts of the epistle would have been composed to serve for several churches at once' (p. lxxiv). The answer to this argument is the same as to the former; and to the same extent I must reserve what I have to say in reply.

2. Moreover M. Renan thinks it surprising that St Paul should have composed 'un morceau si capital,' 'having regard solely to a church which he did not know and over which he had not incontestable rights' (p. lxxiv). Considering the general and comprehensive character of the epistle, it seems to me that the church of the metropolis would naturally be chosen for such a purpose, and that the Apostle saw a distinct advantage in addressing such a letter to a community with which he had no special relations, so that he would run no risk of being diverted from his aim by any personal interests. But to this subject again I shall have occasion to return hereafter.

3. When he reaches the xiith, xiiith, and xivth chapters, M. Renan sees many difficulties in supposing that St Paul can have addressed such language to the Romans. He regards it as a departure from the Apostle's principle 'Each on his own

ground' (p. lxiii). He cannot understand that one who is so unsparing towards those who 'build on other men's foundations' should himself give such bold counsel to a church which he had not founded. He discovers a difference in tone between these chapters and the xvth, which he supposes to be really addressed to the Romans, and which seems to him to hold gentler language. I am not sure that others would find out this difference; but if any such exists, the Apostle's own words supply the explanation. In xv. 15 he himself apologizes for speaking to the Romans 'with over-boldness' (τολμηρότερον). But indeed, if this interference with the Roman Christians be truly a violation of the Apostle's rule not to build on another man's foundation, he has already violated it in addressing to them a letter of instruction of which the doctrinal portion is at least as peremptory as these special precepts, and he has expressed his intention of still further violating it by paying them a visit and by communicating to them some spiritual gift (i. 11). This argument proves nothing, because it proves too much.

4. The opening verses of the xvth chapter also occasion some surprise to M. Renan on the common supposition as to the integrity and destination of the letter. They seem to him merely to repeat and to enfeeble what has gone before. 'It is hardly supposable,' he says, 'that they occurred in the same letter' with the foregoing chapters (pp. lxiv, 461). Moreover 'the verses 1—13 appear to be addressed to Judæo-Christians. St Paul there makes concessions to Jewish ideas' (p. lxiv, 462). These remarks seem to me to show a strange misapprehension of the Apostle's drift. At the close of the preceding chapter he has taught that in the matter of meats there must be mutual concession and forbearance; that the man who can conscientiously eat may do so, but that in so doing he must take care not to scandalize his weaker brother. At the opening of the xvth chapter he turns round and addresses, not Jewish Christians who were too scrupulous about such matters, but ultra-Pauline Christians who were only too ready to go their own way and to ignore the effects of their conduct on others; 'But it is the duty of *us*—the strong—to support the infirmities of the

weak and not to please ourselves.' A comparison with 1 Cor. viii. 1, Gal. vi. 1, Phil. iii. 15, where there is the same touch of irony in St Paul's language, will show the force of ὀφείλομεν δὲ ἡμεῖς οἱ δυνατοί, as addressed to the extravagant disciples of liberty. I am somewhat confident therefore that most persons who will read the xivth and xvth chapters continuously, bearing this in mind, will not only not agree with M. Renan, but will find it difficult to believe that the two did *not* occur in the same letter[1].

Another argument, of which M. Renan makes use against the Roman destination of these chapters, admits a still more direct refutation: 'Il s'y sert du verbe παρακαλῶ, verbe d'une nuance très-mitigée sans doute, mais qui est toujours le mot qu'il emploie quand il parle à ses disciples.' If this argument is to have any force, it must mean that παρακαλῶ is never used by St Paul except to his disciples. If so, he has forgotten that it occurs in xv. 30, παρακαλῶ δὲ ὑμᾶς κ.τ.λ., a passage which on M. Renan's own showing was addressed to the Roman Church.

It should be added that throughout his remarks on this xvth chapter M. Renan is hampered by the hypothesis that the Roman Church was Judæo-Christian. In one passage indeed he seems ready to make a concession, for he speaks of the *majority* as Judæo-Christian (p. lxiv); but this has no practical influence on his argument. Yet surely the expression προσλαμβάνεσθε ἀλλήλους (xv. 7), not less than the whole tenour of the epistle, points to a mixed community of Jews and Gentiles, in which it was the Apostle's aim to conciliate the discordant elements. If the expression *Christ a minister of the Circumcision* (xv. 8) points (as M. Renan justly infers) to Jewish prepossessions among St Paul's readers, yet on the other hand the Apostle's language a few verses below, xv. 15, 16, 'Reminding you by the grace which was given to me by God that I might be a minister of Christ Jesus *unto the Gentiles*,' shows still more clearly that he looked upon the Roman Church as in some sense Gentile, and therefore under his own jurisdiction.

5. The objections which M. Renan brings against the

[1] 'Es ist unleugbar,' says de Wette, 'dass Cap. xv. 1—13 zu Cap. xiv. gehört."

Roman destination of the xvith chapter are partly his own and partly adopted from others.

The Apostle, he urges, concludes the xvth chapter with a benediction and a final *Amen.* This therefore must be the end of a letter, since St Paul never adds salutations after such a close (p. lxv). As he mentions the final Amen twice, it must be supposed that he lays great stress on the occurrence of the word here. We are therefore the more surprised that he has not consulted the critical editions of the text. In this case he would have found that *ἀμὴν* is omitted by Griesbach, and placed in brackets by Lachmann and Tregelles. As the bias of scribes is always in favour of inserting rather than omitting an Amen in such cases, and as in this place it is wanting in some good copies (though present in the majority), these editors have justly regarded it with suspicion. Deprived of the Amen, the passage has a very close parallel in Phil. iv. 9, *καὶ ὁ Θεὸς τῆς εἰρήνης ἔσται μεθ' ὑμῶν* (comp. 2 Cor. xiii. 11, Gal. vi. 16), which occurs in the body of the letter. But indeed doxologies and benedictions, with or without the accompanying Amen, are very frequent in St Paul, in other places than at the close of an epistle, as *e.g.* Rom. xi. 36, Gal. i. 5, Ephes. iii. 20, 21, Phil. iv. 19, 20, 1 Thess. iii. 11—13, v. 23, 2 Thess. ii. 16, 17, iii. 5, 1 Tim. i. 17, vi. 16, 2 Tim. iv. 18; comp. Heb. xiii. 20, 21. In some cases these occur immediately before the salutations, as in the present passage.

6. In the salutations themselves M. Renan finds the same difficulties which have been a stumbling-block in the way of others before him. He and they are surprised that St Paul should salute so many persons in a church which he had not visited, when he is so sparing of individual salutations in writing to churches with which his relations are most close and intimate. Let us ask in reply, What is the common experience in such matters? Will not a man studiously refrain from mentioning individual names where he is addressing a large circle of friends, feeling that it is invidious to single out some for special mention, where an exhaustive list is impossible? On the other hand, where only a limited number are known to him, he can name all, and no offence is given. This in fact is exactly

what we find in St Paul. So far as the data are sufficient to establish any rule, it may be said that the number of names mentioned is in the inverse proportion to his familiarity with the church to which he is writing. In the Epistles to the Corinthians and Thessalonians no individuals are saluted. In the Epistle to the Philippians again there are no salutations properly so called, though a special warning is addressed to two persons by name and a commission given to another. On the other hand, in the Epistle to the Colossians, whom the Apostle had never visited, certain persons are saluted by name.

This preliminary difficulty therefore is no difficulty at all. But—M. Renan proceeds—there is great improbability in supposing that St Paul knew so many members of a church which he had never visited, that he should have had such intimate relations with several of them, and that he should be so well acquainted with their circumstances. In the case of almost any other church such a supposition would indeed be improbable. But Rome with its vast and ever-growing population of immigrants from the East, and especially from Syria and Palestine, could not but contain a large number of residents known directly or indirectly to one who had travelled so long and so wide as St Paul. On this point let M. Renan himself be witness; 'By the side of the Apostles who attained celebrity,' he writes, 'there was also another obscure apostolate, whose agents were not dogmatists by profession, but which was only the more efficacious on that account. The Jews of that time were *extremely nomadic.* Tradesmen, domestic servants, small craftsmen, they overran all the great towns on the coast (p. 96). Rome was the rendezvous of all the Oriental religions, the port of the Mediterranean with which the Syrians had the closest relations. They arrived there *in enormous bands*... With them disembarked troops of Greeks, of Asiatics, of Egyptians' (p. 97).

But again, when he examines the names in detail, M. Renan is more than ever convinced that these salutations were not addressed to the Church of Rome. On the one hand he cannot find in the list any names known to have belonged to the Church of Rome at this time, and to substantiate this assertion he refers to 2 Tim. iv. 24, which, with some little ingenuity,

he describes as a 'passage which has its historical value, *though the letter is apocryphal.*' I too allow the historical value of the passage (though, if I thought the letter apocryphal, I should hardly venture to build an argument on it); but I cannot see that the mention of four other names and only four in an epistle written from Rome after an interval of several years throws any discredit on this earlier list, as a catalogue of Roman Christians. On the other hand M. Renan finds in the list 'several persons who assuredly never formed part' of the Roman Church. Of these he singles out Aquila and Priscilla, remarking that as 'every one knows,' 'only some months' (quelques mois) elapsed between the writing of the First Epistle to the Corinthians and the Epistle to the Romans, and that, when the former was written, they were still at Ephesus (1 Cor. xvi. 19). Now it is just in a case like this that words should be carefully chosen. Yet on M. Renan's own showing (and the fact can hardly be disputed) the Epistle to the Romans was not despatched till the early part of the year 58 (see pp. 459, 498); whereas the First Epistle to the Corinthians was written about the same time or a little later in the preceding year ('probablement à l'epoque même de Paques,' are M. Renan's own words, p. 383); so that by the 'some months' we must understand 'at least ten months.' Elsewhere indeed (p. 6) he places even the Second Epistle to the Corinthians in the year 56, thus making a longer interval; but I presume that this is a slip of the pen. Is there then any real difficulty in supposing that they returned to Rome in this interval of a year more or less, and that St Paul should have been made acquainted with their return, seeing that his own travels meanwhile had lain mainly on the route between Ephesus and Rome? Aquila and Priscilla appear first at Rome, then at Corinth, then at Ephesus (Acts xviii. 2, 18, 19, 26, 1 Cor. xvi. 19). All this M. Renan admits. But he will not allow their return to Rome. This would be 'leur prêter une vie par trop nomade.' Why, does not M. Renan himself afterwards in a passage already quoted (p. 275) describe the life of these itinerant Jewish artisans and traders exactly in this way? Does not the narrative of the Acts distinctly assign to this couple a 'nomadic' life, which indeed was the

direct consequence of the peculiar trade which they plied? But 'to bring them back to Rome, without their sentence of banishment being rescinded, on the very morrow of the day (juste le lendemain du jour) when Paul had bidden them farewell at Ephesus,' this in M. Renan's opinion is to 'accumulate improbabilities.' But how does he know that a special sentence of banishment was pronounced against them individually or that, if pronounced, it was not revoked? On this point however I will appeal to a witness, whose testimony ought to be conclusive, so far as M. Renan is concerned, and who (I confess) seems to me to put the matter in the right light; 'These expulsions' (the writer is speaking of the edict of Claudius) 'were never more than temporary and conditional. The flood, arrested for a moment, always returned. The measure of Claudius had in any case very little result; for Josephus does not mention it, and in the year 58 Rome had already a new Christian Church' (*Saint Paul* p. 111). But again, M. Renan, though he holds the 2nd Epistle to Timothy to be spurious, yet cannot refrain from using it to increase the supposed difficulty, because in that epistle Aquila and Priscilla appear again at Ephesus (2 Tim. iv. 19). Is it at all improbable that after an interval of nearly ten years they should again revisit this important city? They were wanderers not only by the exigencies of their trade, but also by the obligations of their missionary work. Why should we deny them a rapidity of movement, which we are obliged to concede to Timotheus, to Tychicus, to St Luke, to St Paul himself?

But 'this is not all. In ver. 5 St Paul salutes Epænetus, the first-born of Asia in Christ.' 'What!' exclaims M. Renan, 'had all the Church of Ephesus assembled at Rome?' Let us dissect this sentence. This 'all' in plain language consists of three persons. Of one, Epænetus, we do not know that he belonged to Ephesus, but only that he was a native of the province. The other two belonged no more to Ephesus than to Pontus, to Corinth, to Rome, though about a year before this they happened to be residing in Ephesus. But once again, is there any improbability in imagining two or three Asiatic Christians resident or sojourning in Rome? Does not M. Renan himself speak of

the 'troops of Asiatics' that flocked thither? And history teaches that this language is not an exaggeration.

'But,' M. Renan continues, 'the list of names which follows is in like manner better suited to Ephesus than to Rome.' He allows indeed that 'the earliest Church of Rome for the most part spoke Greek': but he argues that in examining the Jewish inscriptions in Rome 'Garrucci has found that the number of Latin proper names was double the number of Greek names,' whereas in this list 'of twenty-four names, sixteen are Greek, seven Latin, one Hebrew, so that the number of the Greek names is more than double that of the Latin.' To this objection it would be a sufficient answer that St Paul's acquaintances must necessarily have lain, not among the native Latin population, but among the Greek and Oriental immigrants whom he had crossed in his travels. But a little examination will show that the argument is fallacious, even as applied to the Church of Rome generally. A better test of its composition, than these Jewish inscriptions, is the list of the Roman bishops in the first two centuries. Analysing this list, we find that in a catalogue of fifteen names (from Linus A.D. 67? to Callistus A.D. 219), twelve are Greek, while three only (Clemens, Pius, Victor) are Latin. After Callistus the proportions are about reversed; the Roman Church was becoming gradually Latinized and there is a corresponding preponderance of Latin names. This fact illustrates the fallacy of M. Renan's comparison. Garrucci's Jewish inscriptions (I am repeating M. Renan's own statement elsewhere, p. 106, note 3) for the most part belong to a much later date than St Paul's age. We should therefore expect to find in these, as we find in the Christian lists at the same time, an increase of the Latin names at the expense of the Greek.

But among these numerous Greek names, which thus create a difficulty to M. Renan, he especially remarks on the fact that 'the names of the masters of houses, Aristobulus and Narcissus, are Greek also.' This remark seems to me peculiarly unfortunate. It so happens that we know of two great 'chefs de maison' at Rome about this time, bearing these very names. The former was a Jew, a member of the Herodian family, and therefore among his slaves and depend-

ents the Apostle was most likely to have formed friendships; nor is it an unimportant coincidence, as I have remarked elsewhere[1], that after the mention of the household of Aristobulus the next person specified is one Herodion, whom St Paul calls his kinsman and who therefore was a Jew by birth, while at the same time his name seems to indicate a dependent position in the family of this Jewish prince. Again in a foot-note M. Renan for some reason or other (probably thinking of his namesake, the writer on prodigies, who was a native of Tralles) singles out *Phlegon*, as a name more suited to Ephesus than to Rome. Even the Trallian Phlegon however, who was a freedman of Hadrian, resided at Rome: and in fact the inscriptions show that this name was by no means of rare occurrence in the metropolis[2].

On this point therefore I cannot but think that M. Renan is entirely wrong, though he can quote the authority of some important critics on his side. How far I have succeeded, I am not competent to say; but I seem to myself to have shown elsewhere[3] that the names in this list are quite appropriate on the hypothesis that the salutations were addressed to the Romans, and that on this supposition alone they present several coincidences which go far to establish its truth. I am glad also to be able to quote on my side the opinion of a writer whose bias would certainly have led him to take a different view, if he had shared M. Renan's difficulty. Baur, who goes so far as to deny the genuineness of the last two chapters of the epistle, explains the salutations by supposing that the forger inserted 'a catalogue of those who were known at the time as the notabilities of the oldest Roman Church' (*Paulus* p. 414).

'So,' M. Renan concludes decisively, 'the verses Rom. xvi. 3—16 (containing the salutations) were not addressed to the Church of Rome; they were addressed to the Church of Ephesus.' 'No more,' he continues, 'can the verses 17—20 have

[1] See *Philippians* p. 173, where I have interpreted the expressions *οἱ ἐκ τῶν Ἀριστοβούλου, οἱ ἐκ τῶν Ναρκίσσου* to mean *Aristobuliani, Narcissiani.*

[2] The index to Gruter gives only three inscriptions, where this name occurs, DCLXXI. 6, DCCLIX. 12, DCCCLVIII. 3, and all three are Roman.

[3] *Philippians* p. 169 sq.

been addressed to the Romans.' The strength of his affirmations seems at this point to be in the inverse proportion to the strength of his evidence. He appeals here again to the use of the word παρακαλῶ (ver. 17)—an argument demonstrably erroneous, even on his own showing, as I have already pointed out (p. 273). He quotes the expression ἐφ' ὑμῖν χαίρω, which he explains as 'the language of a master to his scholars,' not remembering that St Paul uses a similar expression in writing to the Colossians (ii. 5) whom he had never visited, and apparently not entertaining any objection to the allied phrase εὐχαριστῶ περὶ πάντων ὑμῶν (i. 8) as addressed to the Romans. He remarks that St Paul knows the condition of the church he addresses, and glories (se fait gloire) in its good reputation; but why should he not do all this in the case of Rome? And thus he infers 'il est là en famille.' Then by a rough and ready method he argues that the verses could only be addressed to the Corinthians or to the Ephesians; and, as the epistle at the close of which they occur was written at Corinth, they must have been addressed to Ephesus. I seem to myself to have shown that the reasons for questioning their Roman destination are wholly insufficient to counteract the weight of external evidence. But, I would ask, are there no difficulties in the counter hypothesis that they were written to the Ephesians? Why in this case have the personal allusions no points of coincidence either with the narrative of St Paul's long residence at Ephesus which terminated not a year before, or with his address to the Ephesian elders which was held only a few months afterwards? Why again is there no mention of Tychicus or of Trophimus, who were with St Paul at this time? Of the benediction, which closes the 20th verse and which M. Renan takes to be the conclusion of the Ephesian letter, I shall have something to say presently.

7. The next few verses also (vi. 21—24), containing salutations from divers persons in St Paul's company, 'cannot any more than the preceding have formed part of an Epistle to the Romans.' 'Why,' he exclaims, 'should all these people who had never been at Rome, who were not known to the faithful at Rome, salute these last? What meaning could these names

of unknown persons have to the Church of Rome?' As much meaning, I would reply, as the names of the persons saluting the Colossians could have to the Church of Colossæ (Col. iv. 10 sq.). They might or they might not be known to the Roman Church by name; personal acquaintance was not necessary to create Christian sympathy; and, being about the Apostle at the time, they might well pour out their hearts in this expression of good wishes. What more natural for instance than that Gaius in whose house St Paul was staying, and Tertius who acted as the Apostle's amanuensis, should join in the salutation?

But M. Renan goes on to remark, as an important fact, that the names mentioned in these verses 'are *all* names of Macedonians or of persons who might have known the Churches of Macedonia.' Will this statement bear examination? Eight names are mentioned in all. Of *Tertius* the amanuensis and *Quartus* 'the brother' we know nothing. Of *Lucius* also we are equally ignorant, unless he be the Lucius of Cyrene mentioned Acts xiii. 1, in which case he is as likely to have had relations with Rome as with Thessalonica. *Timotheus*, it is true, was well known in Macedonia; but as the constant companion of the Apostle, his fame must have reached Rome also. *Erastus* too, himself a Corinthian, had accompanied the Apostle on a missionary visit to Macedonia (Acts xix. 22); but the descriptive addition, 'the steward of the city,' is much more appropriate, if addressed to those to whom his name was unknown or scarcely known, than to those with whom he was personally acquainted. *Gaius* of Corinth (1 Cor. i. 14) again (for he must not be confused with Gaius of Macedonia, Acts xix. 29) had—so far as we are aware—no personal relations with Macedonia. Thus as regards six out of the eight persons sending salutations, M. Renan's remark has no force. The remaining two, *Jason* and *Sosipater*, were seemingly Macedonians. The former may be identified with St Paul's host at Thessalonica, Acts xvii. 5 sq. (though the name, as a Grecized form of Jesus or Joshua, is common among Hellenist Jews at this date); and the latter is most probably 'Sopater the son of Pyrrhus the Berœan,' who accompanied St Paul when he left Corinth on this occasion[1] and was probably with him now.

[1] Acts xx. 4, Σώπατρος Πύρρου Βεροιαῖος, the correct reading. The very

Both these however, as faithful friends and constant attendants of the Apostle, might very well append their salutations to his letter. On the other hand there is no mention of Aristarchus and Secundus the Thessalonians, who were with St Paul at this time (Acts xx. 4)[1], as might have been expected in a letter written to Thessalonica.

At this point again M. Renan calls attention to the benediction in xvi. 24 and adds, 'verse 24 is the conclusion of a letter. The verses xvi. 21—24 may therefore be an end of a letter addressed to the Thessalonians.' He has failed to observe that this benediction is wanting in the best critical editions, but to this matter I shall have to revert presently.

8. Thus we have arrived at the close of M. Renan's third epistle. His fourth is suggested by the documentary evidence. As the final doxology, xvi. 25—27, is found in many copies at the close of the xivth chapter, he concludes that it must have occurred in this place in one of the four copies of the circular letters which were welded together to form our recension. His fourth epistle in fact coincides in limits with Baur's Epistle to the Romans, though M. Renan himself supposes it to have been addressed to some unknown church. How much nearer to probability this part of his theory approaches than the rest, I hope to show hereafter.

I have thus examined in detail M. Renan's objections to the integrity of the letter, considered as addressed to the Romans; and, if I mistake not, have reduced them to very small dimensions. Every complex historical fact involves some improbabilities, prior to evidence; and in this case such improbabilities as remain are not greater than we might reasonably expect. On the other hand the direct documentary evidence is exceptionally strong here, as this epistle seems to have been more widely known from the very earliest ages than any of St Paul's letters, and therefore the probability of such a mani-

fact however that St Luke takes such pains to identify him, seems to show that he was not the only person of the name about St Paul at this time.

[1] M. Renan himself makes them accompany him to Corinth (p. 458).

pulation as he supposes having occurred without leaving any traces in the MSS is correspondingly diminished.

This examination has also brought out incidentally the positive grounds on which M. Renan constructs his own theory, and they have been severally considered. One point however has been reserved. The *quadripartite* character of the closing chapters of this epistle is a remarkable fact, if true, and indeed may be regarded as the foundation of his theory. If it fails, the theory must crumble and fall. I propose therefore to ask whether the epistle has or has not these *four distinct endings.*

Inasmuch as the establishment of this fact is all important to his theory, it is strange that M. Renan should not have glanced beyond the received text, except to suggest (with what bearing, it does not appear) a possible fifth ending; 'Nous arrivons donc à ce singulier resultat que l'épître finit quatre fois, et dans le *Codex Alexandrinus* cinq fois' (p. lxxi; comp. p. 461).

These four endings then (in the received text) are:

(1) xv. 33 *ὁ δὲ Θεὸς τῆς εἰρήνης μετὰ πάντων ὑμῶν. ἀμήν.*

(2) xvi. 20 *ἡ χάρις τοῦ Κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ μεθ' ὑμῶν.*

(3) xvi. 24 *ἡ χάρις τοῦ Κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ μετὰ πάντων ὑμῶν. ἀμήν.*

(4) xvi. 25—27 *τῷ δὲ δυναμένῳ...μόνῳ σοφῷ Θεῷ διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, ᾧ ἡ δόξα εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας. ἀμήν.*

Now the *first* of these has not the character of St Paul's final benedictions at all. The *ἀμήν* (this is a matter of little moment) is, as I have pointed out already, open to grave suspicion (see p. 274). The form of the prayer has many parallels in the body of the Apostle's letters, as I have also shown. But the final benedictions *in every other instance* are framed on the type of (2) or (3) *ἡ χάρις κ.τ.λ.*, consisting of more or fewer words, but preserving this characteristic feature. Any one who reads in succession the concluding benedictions of all St Paul's epistles will, I think, feel the force of this argument.

The *second* and *third* do exhibit the character of final benedictions. But here M. Renan has made an important oversight[1]. The two editors, to whom we are indebted for the best texts, Lachmann and Tregelles, omit the third. In fact a comparison of the oldest uncials will show, that these two benedictions are in reality the same, which occupies one or other place in the better authorities, but which in later copies is sometimes inserted in both. Thus we have to make a choice between xvi. 20 and xvi. 24, but we cannot retain both. In this respect the phenomena of this benediction present an exact parallel to those which attend the position of the long doxology (xvi. 25—27), as given above, p. 265.

The following is a conspectus of the facts relating to this benediction.

xvi. 20 *ἡ χάρις τοῦ Κυρίου ἡμῶν* Ἰησοῦ [Χριστοῦ] *μεθ' ὑμῶν.*

ins. ℵ, A, B, C, rel., Orig.

om. D, F, G.

xvi. 24 *ἡ χάρις τοῦ Κυρίου ἡμῶν* Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ *μετὰ πάντων ὑμῶν. ἀμήν.*

om. ℵ, A, B, C, Am., Fuld., Harl., Memph., Æth., Orig.

ins. D, F, G, (17), 37, 47, L, (P), Demid., Tol., (Syr. Pesh.), Syr. Harcl., (Arm.), [*om.* *ἡμῶν*, 37; *om.* Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, F, G].

As F, G, 37, L, Goth., omit xvi. 25—27, it becomes the end of the epistle in these.

In 17, P, Syr. Pesh., Arm., it occurs after xvi. 25—27 [*om.* *ἡμῶν* P].

It will thus be seen that Lachmann and Tregelles are right in placing this benediction at xvi. 20; and that it has been transplanted thence into the later positions, whether at xvi. 24

[1] Perhaps 'oversight' is hardly the correct term, for he adds in a note, 'Sur l'incertitude des manuscrits à propos de la place du verset 24, voir Griesbach, *Nov. Test.* II. p. 222.' But here his curiosity ends. As his theory mainly depends on the position of these benedictions, it is only the more strange that he should have accepted the received text without examination, knowing that it was open to question.

or after xvi. 27, by editorial revision, with a view to restoring it to what seemed to be its proper place. To this subject also I shall have to revert again.

M. Renan's *fourth* ending is different in character from the others, being a doxology and not a benediction. I shall reserve my explanation of it.

Thus then it will appear that the basis of M. Renan's theory, the quadripartite character of the epistle, has fallen away. But before dismissing this theory, I must point out some objections to which, even if it rested on more solid ground, it would be exposed, and which might in themselves prove fatal to it.

(1) In our existing Epistle to the Romans the topics in the last two chapters occur in the following order. (*a*) xv. Special injunctions and explanations concerning the Apostle's movements. (*b*) xvi. 1—20. A recommendation of the bearer of the letter and several salutations to divers persons, with a warning against divisions appended. (*c*) xvi. 21—24. Salutations from divers persons in St Paul's company. (*d*) A doxology (xvi. 25—27). This sequence is natural. In fact the topics follow each other in the same order in the Epistle to the Colossians, which, as regards the concluding matter, is the most complete of all the Apostle's letters. On the other hand all M. Renan's four epistles are incomplete, and incomplete in a remarkable way. The first—to the Romans—contains personal explanations without salutations to or from any one. The second —to the Ephesians—contains no personal explanations but only salutations to several brethren. The third—to the Thessalonians —has neither the one nor the other, but only salutations from several friends of the Apostle. Lastly, the fourth—to some unknown Church—has none of the three but only a bare doxology. We are required therefore to suppose that these four copies were defective in such a way that, when they were combined at some distance of time by a chance editor, they fitted together exactly, each supplying what was lacking in the rest, and all together forming a complete whole.

(2) But again; M. Renan's theory, though contrasting in this respect favourably with many of its predecessors, neverthe-

less fails to account for all the phenomena of the MSS. Thus, whereas the reading preserved in G *τοῖς οὖσιν ἐν ἀγάπῃ Θεοῦ* obliterates the mention of any individual church, M. Renan's theory supposes that in the several copies appropriate modifications were introduced to adapt them to particular churches. In this case we should rather have expected traces of such a reading as *τοῖς οὖσιν ἐν Ἐφέσῳ* (*or ἐν Θεσσαλονίκῃ*) *ἀγαπητοῖς Θεοῦ*, or at all events (as in the somewhat parallel case of the canonical Epistle to the Ephesians) *τοῖς οὖσιν ἁγαπητοῖς Θεοῦ*, the space which was originally left for the name having disappeared in the course of transcription and the words closed in upon the blank. On the other hand the substitution of *ἐν ἀγάπῃ* for *ἀγαπητοῖς* seems to have been made with a view to *obviating the necessity of mentioning any name.* This suggests a solution somewhat different from M. Renan's.

Again; as regards the concluding chapters of the epistle, it will be seen that the documentary facts point only to the *fourth* of M. Renan's four copies, and give no indication whatever of the other three. This fourth copy, as I hope to show, does represent a truth, though the destination was not what M. Renan supposes.

(3) M. Renan speaks with some vagueness about the body of the letter. In one passage in his introduction (p. lxxiii), he seems to imply that the copy sent to the Romans consisted of chapters i—xi, xv, exactly as we have them; for he mentions 'modifications in the first half of the first chapter,' as introduced into the three remaining copies. This I suppose to be his meaning. But, if so, what becomes of half his objections to the received view? These are based on the assumption that the Roman Church was Judæo-Christian. Of the truth or falsehood of this assumption I shall have something to say presently. I would simply ask now, how it is reconcilable with the Epistle to the Romans, as he leaves it. This is M. Renan's own statement of the case; 'Les passages de l'Épître aux Romains qui supposeraient (why not 'supposent'?) l'Église de Rome composée pour la plus grande partie de païens et de prosélytes, Rom. i. 6, 11, 13, vi. 14, 17 et suiv., vii. 1—6, xi. 13, 25, 28, 30, xiv. 1 et suiv., xv. 7 et suiv., viennent de ce que les Romains

n'étaient pas les uniques destinataires de l'Épître en question. Ces formules sont, du reste, si vagues que de bons critiques en ont pu conclure, les uns que l'Épître aux Romains a été écrite à des païens convertis, les autres qu'elle a été écrite à des Judéo-Chrétiens' (p. 483). Yet M. Renan lets all these passages remain in the copy sent to the Roman Church. It may be inferred however from his language here that these passages made a deeper impression upon him when he came to analyse the epistle towards the close of his volume, than when he wrote the introduction. For though he argues in the introduction on the hypothesis of a strictly Judæo-Christian Church, and even in this later passage speaks of it as 'en général composée d'Ébionites et de Judéo-Chrétiens,' he yet adds here 'Elle renfermait aussi cependant des prosélytes et des païens convertis'; and altogether his language seems to betray a vague misgiving that his theory is not very consistent with the hypothesis on which it is built.

It was not my intention, when I commenced this paper, to take up a merely negative position. As M. Renan has endeavoured fairly to grapple with the documentary facts, it is only due to him, while rejecting his theory, to attempt to suggest some other solution which shall account for them as well or better, and shall not be open to the same objections.

The view that the Epistle to the Romans was early circulated in a longer and a shorter form, i.e. both with and without the xivth and xvth chapters, is in some shape or other not new. Bertholdt and others, for instance, explained the phenomena of the different positions of the doxology by supposing that these two chapters were omitted in the public lessons[1]. More recently Mr Westcott (Vaughan's *Romans*, p. xvi) says, 'Whether it may be possible that the epistle proceeded in two forms from the Apostle's hands, the one closing with chap. xiv. and the doxology, the other extended by the addition of the two last chapters after the omission of the doxology, or whether any other more satisfactory explanation can be offered of the phen-

[1] This however is shown not to have been the case. See Reiche, *Comm. Crit.* p. 118.

omena of omission, repetition, transposition, authenticity, must be left for further investigation.' In an article on the epistle in Smith's *Dictionary of the Bible* I myself adopted the theory of a twofold edition, and further examination has confirmed me in this view. But the subject has never, so far as I am aware, received that 'further investigation' which Mr Westcott desires, and in the hope that I may be able to throw a little light on it, I venture now to examine the question more closely.

But by way of preface it is necessary to say something about the composition of the Church of Rome at this time, for (as we have seen already) much depends on the view adopted in this respect. M. Renan, in the passage quoted above (p. 286), offered his own explanation of the fact that the ablest critics were divided on the question whether the epistle was addressed to Jewish or to Gentile Christians. Would not the more natural explanation be that St Paul is here addressing a mixed church, composed of both in equal or nearly equal parts, and that he turns now to one, now to the other, as the tenour of his argument demands? Certainly the Gentile element is very strong; and I think few will agree with M. Renan, that such passages as i. 5, 6 *ἐν πᾶσιν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν...ἐν οἷς ἐστε καὶ ὑμεῖς*, or i. 13 *ἐν ὑμῖν καθὼς καὶ ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς ἔθνεσιν*, or xi. 13 *ὑμῖν λέγω τοῖς ἔθνεσιν* (with its whole context), or xv. 16 *ἐπαναμιμνήσκων ὑμᾶς διὰ τὴν χάριν τὴν δοθεῖσάν μοι ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ εἰς τὸ εἶναί με λειτουργὸν Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ εἰς τὰ ἔθνη*, are explained on the assumption that the Roman Church was strictly Judæo-Christian, together with (what M. Renan very reluctantly concedes) a sprinkling of Gentile Christians among them. St Paul, if I mistake not, starts from the fact that the Roman Church stood on Gentile ground, and that very large and perhaps preponderating numbers of its members were Gentiles. This is his justification for writing to them, as the Apostle of the Gentiles. It never once occurs to him, that he is intruding on the province of others. Yet at the same time it is equally clear that a considerable part of the argument is directed against Judaizing tendencies, and occasionally he appeals directly to Jewish readers (ii. 17, iii. 9, vii. 4 sq.). The inference from these two classes of facts seems to be plain.

Nor is there any prior improbability in such a mixed church. M. Renan insists that the Roman brotherhood must have been founded and built up by emissaries from Palestine. But why should the Christianity of Rome be due to Jerusalem solely, and not also to Antioch and Corinth and Ephesus, with which cities communication must have been even more frequent? Why at Rome alone should the Judaic element be all powerful, and the Pauline insignificant?

And, while the hypothesis of such a mixed church is probable in itself, it also harmonizes with the notices elsewhere. St Paul's language to the Philippians implies that, when he arrived at Rome, he found two parties of Christians there, the one friendly to him, the other hostile, but both alike stimulated to activity by his presence (Phil. i. 14—18). It may be truly said also that this view is quite consistent with all the notices of the Roman Church during the first two centuries of its existence, and that some of these seem to require it.

To this obvious inference from the Apostle's own language, M. Renan can only oppose the testimony of one or two much later writers. He refers especially to the commentator Hilary (p. 483), whom he commends as 'fort au courant des traditions de l'Église romaine' (p. 115). It may be granted that this writer has preserved more than one true tradition, but the mere fact that he wrote quite three centuries after St Paul deprives his statements of any value when they conflict with the natural interpretation of the Apostle's language. And after all, is not M. Renan mistaken in supposing that this writer here professes to give a tradition? His words are, 'Constat itaque temporibus apostolorum Judæos, propterea quod sub regno Romano agerent, Romæ habitasse; ex quibus hi qui crediderant, tradiderunt Romanis ut Christum profitentes legem servarent; Romani autem audita fama virtutum Christi faciles ad credendum fuerunt, utpote prudentes: nec immerito prudentes, qui male inducti statim correcti sunt et permanserunt in eo. Hi ergo ex Judæis, *ut datur intelligi,* credentes Christum non accipiebant Deum esse de Deo, putantes uni Deo adversum; quamobrem negat illos spiritualem Dei gratiam consequutos ac per hoc confirmationem eis deesse' (Ambros. *Op.* II. app. 25). He ap-

pears to state as matter of history ('constat') only that there was a large Jewish population in Rome. Beyond this his language is apparently based on the interpretation of the epistle itself ('datur intelligi'; comp. p. 30). He sees that a considerable portion of the epistle is directed against Judaizing views, and he therefore infers that the Judaizers were a very strong party in the Roman Church. M. Renan again appeals to the Clementine Homilies, which he asserts confidently were written at Rome, and which exhibit Ebionite views. The Roman origin of this work seems to me more than doubtful; but even if granted, it does not prove his point, for the cautious disguise, which the writer wears throughout, shows that he must have belonged to a comparatively small minority. That there was such a compact and active Judaizing minority in Rome in the early ages, few probably would deny. On the other hand, M. Renan omits to mention the one genuine document of subapostolic times, which was issued in the name of the Roman Church, and which may therefore reasonably be supposed to represent the views of that church. The Epistle of Clement exhibits no leaning to Judaism.

To the Church of Rome then, as a mixed body of Jewish and Gentile converts, the epistle was addressed. The destination of the letter was in harmony with its subject. Indeed it may very reasonably be conjectured, that the subject in the Apostle's mind was prior to the destination. To the Corinthians he had written rebuking the errors of Gentile licence. To the Galatians he had denounced the deadening effects of Judaic bondage. The letters to these churches had been called forth by special emergencies, and this fact gave a special direction to them. Thus the Apostle's mind for a year or more had been led to dwell especially on the relation of these two extremes separately to the doctrine of grace and liberty. It would not unnaturally occur to him to treat them together in a comprehensive manner, and to show where Judaic and Gentile feeling might find their true meeting point. This is exactly what he does in the Epistle to the Romans. Its aim from beginning to end is *conciliation*—conciliation of claims, conciliation of doctrine, conciliation of practice. The manner in

which the question of forbidden meats is treated in the xivth chapter is only a special example of the motive which pervades the whole work. The Apostle, it is true, had a personal reason for writing to the Romans, as he contemplated visiting them soon and wished to prepare them for his visit: but above all this, there was singular propriety in addressing such an exposition to the Church of the metropolis, composed, as we have seen, in almost equal parts of the same two discordant elements which he strove to combine. Thus the epistle, though not a circular epistle itself, yet manifested the general and comprehensive character which might be expected in such. It is more of a treatise than a letter.

This was our Epistle to the Romans. The shorter recension, in which the two last chapters were omitted, was, I suppose, an after-thought, being an attempt to divest it of all personal matter, and to make it available as a circular letter or general treatise. So far, it was a carrying out of the spirit of the original work. When and how this was done I shall endeavour to make out; but by way of introduction I will set side by side what I consider to have been the contents of these two recensions respectively.

Epistle to the Romans.	*Abridged Recension.*
i—xiv.	i—xiv.
	[Substituting τοῖς οὖσιν ἐν ἀγάπῃ Θεοῦ for τοῖς οὖσιν ἐν Ῥώμῃ ἀγαπητοῖς Θεοῦ in i. 5, and omitting ἐν Ῥώμῃ in i. 17].
xv.	
xvi. 1—23 [omitting the benediction (xvi. 24), and the doxology (xvi. 25—27)].	xvi. 25—27.

Of the abridged recension we have distinct traces in Marcion's copy (though he omitted the doxology), in FG, and less decidedly in other authorities; and some such hypothesis

alone will explain the varying positions of the doxology in different MSS.

The MS F is unfortunately defective in the first chapter, but doubtless preserved here the same phenomena which we find in G. These two MSS are very closely allied, and must have been copied mediately or immediately from the same prototype. They themselves may probably be referred to the IXth century, having belonged to two neighbouring Swiss monasteries, the one to Reichenau, the other to St Gall. Either their common prototype, or a still earlier MS from which it was copied, must have preserved the abridged recension. The space of about five lines, which is left blank between chapters xiv and xv in G, would be about sufficient for the doxology (xvi. 25—27), which however is omitted in both places. These features in the MS suggest that the copyist of an earlier MS, from which it has descended, transcribed a MS of the abridged recension till the end of chapter xiv, and then took up a MS of the original Epistle to the Romans to supply the lacking matter, omitting however the doxology as inappropriate to what had thus become the middle of the letter, and perhaps intending to give it a place afterwards, but abandoning his purpose. It is an instructive fact that in the allied MS F no space is left after ch. xiv, but the text is written continuously.

My reasons for supposing that the doxology (xvi. 25—27 of the received text) belonged to the abridged recension and not to the original epistle are the following:

(1) It has nothing in common with the usual endings of St Paul's Epistles, which close with a benediction of the type mentioned above (p. 283).

(2) On the other hand, such an abridged recension as I have supposed, whether issued by the Apostle or by some later editor, would hardly have been left to terminate abruptly with *πᾶν δὲ ὃ οὐκ ἐκ πίστεως, ἁμαρτία ἐστίν.* The addition of a doxology, or of some equivalent, would seem necessary.

(3) If it had occurred at the end of the xivth chapter in the original epistle, it would have been a violent interruption of the sense, for the xvth chapter continues the thread of the xivth, and there is nothing to call for such a thanksgiving.

On the other hand, if its position was at the end of the epistle, the displacement to the close of the xivth is somewhat difficult to explain.

(4) The difference of style between this doxology and the rest of the epistle has often been noticed, and has led some critics to question or deny its genuineness. The real fact is, that though it does differ somewhat in thought and diction from the epistles of this date, it has very strong affinities to the later letters of the Apostle, as the following table will show:

τῷ δὲ δυναμένῳ... *κατὰ τὸ εὐαγγέλιόν μου...*	*τῷ δὲ δυναμένῳ*, Eph. iii. 20. *κατὰ τὸ εὐαγγέλιόν μου* (2 Tim. ii. 8, but also Rom. ii. 16).
τὸ κήρυγμα Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ κατὰ ἀποκάλυψιν μυστηρίου χρόνοις αἰωνίοις σεσιγημένου φανερωθέντος δὲ νῦν διά τε γραφῶν προφητικῶν, κατ' ἐπιταγὴν τοῦ αἰωνίου Θεοῦ εἰς ὑπακοὴν πίστεως εἰς πάντα τὰ ἔθνη γνωρισθέντος.	*κατὰ ἀποκάλυψιν ἐγνωρίσθη μοι τὸ μυστήριον...ὃ ἑτέραις γενεαῖς οὐκ ἐγνωρίσθη...ὡς νῦν ἀπεκαλύφθη τοῖς ἁγίοις ἀποστόλοις αὐτοῦ καὶ προφήταις ἐν πνεύματι, εἶναι τὰ ἔθνη κ.τ.λ.* Eph. iii. 3, 5, 6. *τοῦ μυστηρίου τοῦ ἀποκεκρυμμένου ἀπὸ τῶν αἰώνων...ἵνα γνωρισθῇ νῦν*, Eph. iii. 9, 10. *ἣν ἐπηγγείλατο...πρὸ χρόνων αἰωνίων ἐφανέρωσεν δὲ καιροῖς ἰδίοις τὸν λόγον αὐτοῦ ἐν κηρύγματι ὃ ἐπιστεύθην ἐγὼ κατ' ἐπιταγὴν τοῦ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν Θεοῦ* (comp. 1 Tim. i. 1), Tit. i. 2, 3. *τὴν δοθεῖσαν...πρὸ χρόνων αἰωνίων, φανερωθεῖσαν δὲ νῦν διὰ τῆς ἐπιφανείας κ.τ.λ.*, 2 Tim. i. 9, 10.
τοῦ αἰωνίου Θεοῦ...μόνῳ σοφῷ Θεῷ διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ ᾧ ἡ δόξα εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας [τῶν αἰώνων]. ἀμήν.	*τῷ δὲ βασιλεῖ τῶν αἰώνων... μόνῳ [σοφῷ] Θεῷ τιμὴ καὶ δόξα εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας τῶν αἰώνων. ἀμήν.* 1 Tim. i. 17.

These facts seem to show that though written by the Apostle it was not written at the same time with the letter itself [1].

In order to account for all these data, I suggest the following hypothesis. At some later period of his life, not improbably during one of his sojourns in Rome, it occurred to the Apostle to give to this letter a wider circulation. To this end he made two changes in it; he obliterated all mention of Rome in the opening paragraphs by slight alterations; and he cut off the two last chapters containing personal matters, adding at the same time a doxology as a termination to the whole. By this ready method it was made available for general circulation, and perhaps was circulated to prepare the way for a personal visit in countries into which he had not yet penetrated (i. 11 sq.). The idea of a circular letter was not new to him; for he had already addressed one to the Churches of Asia. M. Renan pertinently remarks that the First Epistle of St Peter makes use chiefly of the Epistle to the Romans and the Epistle to the Ephesians, 'c'est-à-dire des deux épîtres qui sont des traités généraux, des catéchèses' (p. lxxii).

Thus I believe that the last, and the last alone, of M. Renan's four epistles represents a historical fact. It was not however a special copy, as he supposes, addressed to some individual church now unknown, but an adaptation of the original epistle for general circulation. A copy of this fell into the hands of Marcion, but (unless Rufinus in his translation has misrepresented Origen's meaning) he removed the doxology, as he well might have done with a doctrinal aim. Another was the prototype of FG. All the phenomena relating to the doxology arose from the combination of copies of this abridged recension with copies of the original epistle in different ways. The notice of Origen shows that such combinations took place at a very early date.

One point still remains to be settled—relating however not

[1] Dean Alford (*G. T.* III. Prol. p. 80) points out the resemblance of this doxology to the Pastoral Epistles, though not to the Epistle to the Ephesians, and suggests that it was appended to the epistle 'in later times by the Apostle himself, as a thankful effusion of his fervent mind.' This view seems not to supply an adequate occasion for the addition.

to the abridged recension, but to the original epistle. Where are we to place the benediction which occurs (1) at xvi. 20, (2) after xvi. 23, whether before or after the doxology, or (3) in both places, in different copies, as explained above (p. 284)? To this question the great preponderance of authority allows but one answer. It must stand at xvi. 20, and must be omitted from the later place. If so ver. 20 is the true close of the epistle, and the salutations from the amanuensis and other companions of St. Paul were added irregularly as a sort of postscript, as was very likely to have been done, considering the circumstances under which St Paul's epistles were written. The desire of later transcribers to get a proper close to the letter would lead them to transplant to the end of these salutations the benediction of xvi. 20, with or without modification, or to supply the defect with the doxology from the abridged recension. Either expedient appears in different MSS, and in some both are combined.

J. B. LIGHTFOOT.

ON SOME VERSES OF ECCLESIASTES.

In the third chapter of Ecclesiastes, there are two verses, viz. the eleventh and the eighteenth, which have given rise to much discussion: these verses I proceed to consider, first of all transcribing nearly without variation from the Authorized Version the whole passage in which they stand, since the argument will depend in great measure upon the context.

iii. 1. To everything there is a season, and a time to every
2 purpose under heaven: A time to be born, and a time to die;
9 &c. What advancement hath he that worketh in that[1] he
laboureth?
10 I have seen the travail, which God hath given to the
11 sons of men to be exercised in it. *He hath made everything beautiful in his time: also he hath set the world in their heart, so that no man can find out the work that God maketh*
12 *from the beginning to the end.* I know that there is no good for them[2], but to rejoice and to make merry in one's life.
13 And also that every man should eat and drink, and see en-
14 joyment in all his labour, it is the gift of God. I know that, whatsoever God doeth, it shall be for ever: nothing can be put to it, nor anything taken from it: and God doeth it,
15 that men should fear before him. That which hath been is now; and that which is to be hath already been; and God requireth that which is past.
16 And moreover I saw under the sun, that in the place of

[1] 'What good *i.e.* is there *in labouring*, seeing that every thing has its fixed time?' Here באשר is taken as an inseparable compound. Cp. ii. 16 (בשכבר); vii. 2; viii. 4; and see v. 15, מה יתרון לו שיעמל.

[2] Lit. *in them*. Cp. אין טוב באדם (ii. 24).

judgement there was wickedness; and in the place of right-
17 eousness there was iniquity. I said in mine heart, God
shall judge the righteous and the wicked: for there is a
18 time there for every purpose and for every work[1]. *I said
in mine heart concerning the estate of the sons of men, that
God might manifest them, and that they might see that they*
19 *themselves are beasts.* For that which befalleth the sons of
men befalleth beasts: even one thing befalleth them: as the
one dieth, so dieth the other; and they have all one spirit;
so that a man hath no pre-eminence above a beast: for all
20 is vanity. All go unto one place; all are of the dust, and
21 all turn to dust again. Who knoweth that[2], The spirit
of man, that is it which goeth upward; and the spirit of the
beast, that is it which goeth downward to the earth?
22 Wherefore I perceived that there is nothing better, than
that a man should rejoice in his own works; for that is his
portion: for who shall bring him to see what shall be after
him?

I. Eccl. iii. 11 runs thus in the Hebrew:

את הכל עשה יפה בעתו גם את־העלם נתן בלבם מבלי
אשר לא ימצא האדם את המעשה אשר עשה האלהים
מראש ועד סוף׃

Several points in this verse call for special notice:

יפה] It is very generally taken for granted that this word means *comely* or *good*, both in the passage before us, and also in another much disputed verse, *viz.* Eccl. v. 17. Elsewhere how-

[1] The latter part of this verse is very obscure. I retain the Authorized Version, not knowing what is the true rendering.

[2] Most commentators make the ה of הָעֶלֶם and הַיֹּרֶדֶת [some, as Ewald, *altering* the points] obliquely *interrogative*. A minority take it as the *article*, the pointing being suitable; and this gives perhaps the more appropriate meaning, thus:—'It may be said that the spirit of man goes upward and that of the beast downward; but *who knoweth*, who can be sure of this?' The rendering, 'who knoweth *whether* &c,' reads rather like an objection to ver. 20. The rendering of the text (=*no one* KNOWS *that there is any difference*) leads more naturally to the conclusion in ver. 22.

ever the relative or subjective meaning of *attractiveness* seems appropriate. The word is most frequently descriptive of personal beauty: sometimes it stands alone, and even in such cases may be taken to mean 'fair,' *sc.* to look upon: in other cases a subjectivity of application seems to be directly implied, as in יפת מראה, fair *of aspect* (Gen. xii. 11). In Cant. i. 16 יפה occurs in close connexion with נעים, *pleasant* or *agreeable*, thus, הנך יפה דודי אף נעים—where however נעים might be taken as introducing an entirely new element into the description[1]: in Ps. xlv. 3 יפיפית וג׳ is followed by הוצק חן בשפתותיך—cp. the expression 'to find *favour*,' which imports the giving of satisfaction: in Ps. xlviii. 3 the hill of Zion is described as יפה נוף, and, in immediate sequence, as משוש כל הארץ, 'the joy of the whole earth:' in Jer. iv. 30 the hithpael תתיפי is used of a woman striving to make herself attractive—'In vain *shalt thou make thyself fair;* thy lovers will despise thee:' in Ezek. xxxiii. 32 יפה is used of *sound*, 'And, lo, thou art unto them as a very lovely song of *one that hath a pleasant voice*.'

Now is it necessary to give יפה an unprecedented meaning in the book of Ecclesiastes? It is indeed commonly done, thus Gesenius, *s. v.* '2) *bonus, præstans,* καλός (Eccl. iii. 11): *Deus fecit omnia* יפה, καλῶς, v. 17'—but is the meaning, *pleasant, attractive, agreeable*, so clearly unsuited to these contexts? The former passage is one of the most controverted in the whole book, and there is a conspicuous absence of agreement about the construction of that portion of the latter in which יפה occurs, *viz.*

הנה אשר ראיתי אֲנִי טוב אשר יפה לאכול ולשתות

Here (1) the accentuation requires that we should pause on אני and take the following word as beginning the statement of that which the writer had 'seen'—'Behold that which I have seen, *viz.* טוב וג׳'—the same form of expression (*sc.* with a pause on אני) occurs in ii. 13, 24. Cp. ואמרתי אֲנִי (ix. 16).

[1] But for more on יפה see P. S.

And (2) טוב אשר must mean, '*It is good that,*' if it is to be rendered analogously to the same formula in ver. 4 and in vii. 18. Cp. ii. 3, 24; iii. 22. (3) If now יפה be taken with what seems to be a not unusual meaning, *viz. attractive* or *pleasant,* the verse in question may be rendered:

Behold what I have seen:
It is a good thing that it is pleasant to eat and drink, &c.—

since a man cannot rise out of the common concerns of life it is well that he can take pleasure in them: moreover (ver. 18) it is by the gift of God that any man is enabled to find satisfaction therein. [See iii. 12, 13.] Whether this rendering be satisfactory or not, it certainly is not proved that יפה ought to be rendered '*comely,*' *good, excellent,* in Eccl. v. 17; neither can it be granted as a thing obvious that any such meaning is required in iii. 11. I shall therefore render the first clause of that verse as follows:

He hath made it[1] *all pleasant in its season.*

העלם] The great controversy is about the meaning of עלם, a word which in the later Hebrew is used in the sense *mundus,* but in Biblical Hebrew—if the passage in question be excepted—is used only in the sense *eternity* (lit. the *hidden* or *sealed* past or future). But the *a priori* objection to the sense *mundus* in this passage is nevertheless a slight one, for (1) the LXX. render it by *αἰῶνα* in the required sense, and (2) the style of Ecclesiastes has very strongly marked peculiarities, and the book contains expressions which are not found elsewhere in the Bible. "Long ago Luther remarked that this book has *singularem quandam phrasin quæ a communis linguæ usu sæpe recedit et a nostra consuetudine valde aliena est.* This (writes Professor Moses Stuart) is entirely correct and true as to diction and peculiarity of phraseology"—an admission which is valuable as proceeding from one who, in contending for the antiquity of the book, labours to reduce its modernisms to a *minimum.* "The general result (he adds) is that the book, for so short a one, partakes after all somewhat largely of the two

[1] *Viz.* 'the travail, &c.' (ver. 10).

elements of later Hebrew and Chaldee, at least of what we are forced to regard as such. That its coloring throughout resembles most of all the later books, viz. Ezra, Nehemiah, Esther, and Daniel, every reader familiar with these books must feel. That he is moving in an element greatly diverse from that of the earlier books, becomes a matter of immediate consciousness when one reads Coheleth." This consideration makes it *a priori* not very improbable that עלם should stand for *mundus* in Eccl. iii. 11, while the authority of LXX, which gives that meaning, is assuredly not to be despised in such a matter.

גם] *Also, moreover, even, yea.* The word introduces something additional, but to render it by *yea* involves no departure from its primitive meaning, for the thing additional may be a confirmation or explanation of what precedes, and not entirely distinct from and unconnected therewith. In this verse I shall use the word *yea* as its equivalent; but the question at issue is, *To what does* גם *apply and what does it emphasize?* It is taken for granted on all sides that its whole stress is on the words which immediately follow, thus,

Also *the world* hath he put into their hearts.

But it is by no means necessary to make this assumption; indeed the accentuation points to a directly opposite conclusion[1]. In גַּם בְּמַלְכוּתְו (ch. iv. 14), where the accents are מרכא, טפחא, the emphasis of גם is restricted to the word next following[2]: but in iii. 11 the גם has מהפך, and then follow פשטא, מונח, זקף קטון. The very same sequence of accents occurs two verses later (iii. 13), and there the emphasis of גם is not on the clause which contains it but on the concluding words מתת אלהים היא. It had been concluded in ver. 12 that man must fall back upon the present and find his satisfac-

[1] Some persons may be inclined to reject *a priori* any argument which thus depends upon the accents. But it may be remarked (1) that—accents apart—there is *nothing to prevent us* from entertaining the view given in the text; and (2) that the accents have in fact here *suggested* a construction which even on other grounds alone seems specially appropriate.

[2] See also x. 20.

tion there; and in ver. 13 it is added, '*Moreover* that a man can do so *is the gift of God.*' See v. 18, where the emphasis of גם is on the same (but still more remote) clause מתת אלהים היא. In vii. 22, גם refers to the remote את, as is shewn by its emphatic repetition before that pronoun. See also vii. 14, 21; ix. 3, 12. I shall assume then that, as in iii. 13 גם emphasizes מתת וג׳, so in ver. 11 it emphasizes not עלם but מבלי וג׳. If this be the case the meaning of עלם is apparently determined, for the words

את העלם נתן בלבם

must be read in complementary parallelism with

את הכל עשה יפה בעתו

To express this the more clearly in English it may be well to insert the word *thus:*

He hath made it all pleasant in its season:
Yea—he hath thus given the world into their heart, &c.

[מבלי אשר לא ימצא (1) מצא = to *find out,* to *understand,* as in vii. 14; viii. 17.

(2) The significance of the preceding particles is much disputed. Some make the clause *final,* thus,

So that man $\begin{matrix}\text{cannot but}\\ \text{cannot}\end{matrix}$ find out the work which God hath wrought from beginning to end.

The positive rendering '...*cannot but*...' may be rejected on the ground that the book does not contemplate the possibility of man's being able to understand the whole work of God, but assumes throughout that he is totally unable to do so. The negative rendering may also be rejected, because the *giving of the world into man's heart* (= the making terrestrial affairs pleasant in their season) is regarded as a benefit, a good 'gift of God' (ver. 13), and therefore cannot well be regarded as *causing* an ignorance of 'the work which God hath wrought'—if at least that ignorance be viewed as an evil.

It is perhaps better to make מבלי *causal* (as in מבלי דעת,

Is. v. 13), and one of the negatives redundant, as in 2 Kings i. 3, המבלי אין אלהים בישראל. It may be added that בלי is followed by a *finite verb* in Gen. xxxi. 20, על בלי הגיד. The verse may now be rendered,

He hath made the whole [of man's travail] pleasant in its season: *yea*,—he hath thus given the world into their heart *because that*[1] man cannot find out the work which God hath wrought from beginning to end.

Since man cannot comprehend God's work in its entirety he falls back upon the present for satisfaction: he has no capacity for the highest knowledge, and so God has given him by way of compensation to find pleasure in mundane affairs: 'The heaven, even the heavens, are the Lord's: but the earth hath he given to the children of men' (Ps. cxv. 16). 'I know (concludes the Preacher) that there is no good for them but to eat, and drink, and enjoy life; and moreover that they can thus enjoy it is the gift of God' (ver. 12, 13).

II. The next verse to be considered, viz. Eccl. iii. 18, is of still greater difficulty. It runs thus in the Hebrew,

אמרתי אני בלבי
על דברת בני האדם לְבָרָם האלהים
ולראות שהם בהמה המה להם

בלבי] In ver. 17 and also in ii. 1, 15 the same phrase 'I said in my heart' occurs, and in each case the word following לבי begins the expression of the thought or thing 'said.' So, (we may conjecture) על דברת in ver. 18 is not to be joined to what precedes, as *e. g.* in the Authorized Version, but to what follows.

על דברת] The phrase על דברתי occurs in Ps. cx. 4, where it is commonly allowed to mean *κατὰ τὴν τάξιν*, '*after the order* of Melchizedek.' In Eccl. vii. 14 the meaning *κατὰ*

[1] Or we may compare מבלי משים (Job iv. 20) and render 'without man's being able...,' i.e. *even though* he cannot.... In other words:—'Man can find satisfaction in the present notwithstanding his failure in the quest of a higher knowledge.'

τὴν τάξιν is appropriate:—'God also hath set the one over against the other, *after such a sort* that man can find out nothing after him.' In Eccl. viii. 2, it would appear from the accentuation (וְעַל) that דברת and על are not to be combined. Analogy then suggests[1] some such rendering of Eccl. iii. 18 as,

I said in my heart, *It is* according to the condition of the sons of men *that* &c.

לברם האלהים] Some make לְבָרָם a preterite, with prefix and affix, from ברה: this accounts for the pointing, but as I do not at present see how to adapt this construction to its context[2], I follow the great majority of commentators in making the word an infinitive of anomalous form. Some take it as a contraction for לְבָרְרָם, from the piel infinitive בָּרֵר: or it may be suggested that it is contracted from לְבָאֲרָם, the א being absorbed in Qamets as in iv. 14, where הָסוּרִים is written for הָאֲסוּרִים[3]: but the most commonly received opinion is that the form is analogous to רַד and שַׁךְ, which are supposed to be infinitives from רדד and שכך. It is not quite clear that שך is an infinitive[4], but it has been well remarked that לברם may have taken its present pointing 'propter Resch', for ר (like ע and ח) has a predilection for *Pathach*, which with compens-

[1] The phrase *does not occur again in the Bible* except in Dan. ii. 30, where its explanation is similar to that given above in the case of Eccl. vii. 14, the meaning *so that*, or *in order that*, being assumed. Compare the sequence of meanings in *ὅπως*, viz. (1) *how, in what manner;* (2) *in such a manner that, so that.* Our 'in ORDER that' is literally the '*κατὰ τάξιν*,' which (after Ps. cx. 4) I take as the true meaning of 'על דבר'. When a verb follows, the meaning *ideo ut* is suitable; but not so (from the nature of the case) when, as in Eccl. iii. 18, a noun follows. In this case some such rendering as *κατὰ τὴν τάξιν τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην* may be assumed.

[2] The following gives a possible construction but perhaps a not very appropriate meaning:—'I said in my heart, It is [=happens] after the [common] lot of men [even] to *those whom* God has chosen; and it is for them to see (ולהם לראות) that they are beasts.' 'There is one event to the righteous [=*those whom God has chosen*], and to the wicked' (ix. 2).

[3] So הָרַמִּים for הָאֲרַמִּים (2 Chron. xxii. 5): but for the pointing compare p. 304, note 1.

[4] See No. 3 of this *Journal*, p. 132.

ation for *Dagesh* becomes *Qamets*. I shall attempt in the sequel to obtain a suitable meaning for לברם by comparing לָבוּר (ix. 1), which occurs in a very similar context; remarking (1), that even if the former comes from ברר or באר[1], it *may* still mean the same as if it came from בור[2]; and (2) that it is not clearly proved that it does not come (anomalously) from בור itself. But first, what is the construction? Is the affix subjective or objective?

According to the usual arrangement it would be the former, as in

Deut. vii. 24. עד השמידך אתם

Deut. xxviii. 48. עד השמידו אתך

Josh. xxiii. 15. עד חשמידו אותכם

Moreover, if as some have assumed, the subject of לברם is the same as that of the following ולראות, then the subject must be represented by the affix, for that of לראות is clearly not האלהים[3]—unless indeed we adopt the desperate expedient of accommodating the text where it is clear to a hasty conjecture about one of the most obscure words in the Bible[4]. This some have done, reading לראות as a hiphil, and making

[1] On further consideration I am inclined to think this by far the most natural account of the form לָבָרָם, as involving nothing beyond a simple contraction from a regular form. The verb באר occurs besides (always in the piel) in Deut. i. 5; xxvii. 8 (בְּאֵר היטב); Hab. ii. 2. We might also take for our groundform לְבַאֲרָם, comparing for the contraction, לְהָכִיל for לְהַאֲכִיל (Ezek. xxi. 33); מָסֹרֶת for מַאֲסֹרֶת (Ezek. xx. 37). For omissions of א compare further, 2 Sam. xix. 14; Prov. i. 10; xvii. 4; Is. xiii. 20; and see Fürst *Concord. V. T.* under the 1st pers. future or imperfect of אהב.

[2] The Authorized Version gives for באר in Deut. i. 5, and בור in Eccl. ix. 1, the same word 'declare.'

[3] Geier however, as quoted by Rosenmüller, gives the rendering: 'ob conditionem filiorum hominis futurum est ut purget eos Deos...et *ut intueatur Deus* quod ipsi jumentum sint sibi.'

[4] To guard against a possible misconception I remark that I am not here characterizing all emendations as desperate expedients, but simply objecting to such alterations (great or small) in what seems plain enough as are devised *in order to suit a precarious conjecture* about what is confessedly obscure.

האלהים the subject of both infinitives: so Rashi, after the LXX.,

הקבה להודיעם שלין שרירת כלום ולהרגותם שהם לף הפרים והמלכים: בהמה המה להם וג׳

It seems preferable to regulate that which is obscure by that which is plain, and therefore if the two infinitives have the same subject we may assume that the affix is subjective: but if this identity of subject be thought unnecessary, we may then fall back upon acknowledged usage, and say that the more natural construction of לברם האלהים is that which makes it mean, not

that God should.....them,

but

that they should.....God.

ולראות וג׳] Before assigning a meaning to the root of לברם it may be well to consider the construction of this last clause. The words לראות שהם בהמה המה mean, 'to perceive *that they are beasts,*' or more fully, '*that as for themselves they are beasts,*' according to a very common usage, of which an example is found in Eccl. vii. 26, אשר היא...אסורים ידיה. It remains to determine the application of the final להם; and this may well be taken in the sense 'to themselves,' i. e. so far as their knowledge and observation go. This meaning is not unsuited to the context, for it is added in ver. 19, that 'even one thing befalleth them' (*sc.* men and beasts), and in ver. 21, '*who knoweth* (= no one has any certain knowledge of) that which men assert, viz. that the spirit of man goeth upward, and the spirit of the beast downward to the earth?' What they do know is that there is 'one hap' to man and beast; and so, let them acknowledge that *to themselves* and as far as they can see, they are beasts.

Lastly, what is the meaning of the verb of which לברם is conjectured to be an infinitive? The word לבור, to which I propose to assimilate it, occurs in a strikingly similar context, and is rendered in the Authorized Version, 'to declare.' In transcribing the passage I shall substitute *acknowledge* for *de-*

clare, and shall afterwards try the effect of rendering לברם by the same word. The passage is as follows :

viii. 17. Then I beheld all the work of God, that a man cannot find out the work that is done under the sun: because though a man labour to seek it out, yet he shall not find it; yea farther; though a wise man think to know it, yet shall he not be able to find it.

ix. 1. For all this I considered in my heart[1] even *to acknowledge* all this, that the righteous, and the wise, and their works, are in the hand of God: no man knoweth
2 either love or hatred by all that is before them. All things come alike to all: there is one event to the righteous, and to the wicked: to the good and to the clean, and to the unclean; to him that sacrificeth, and to him that sacrificeth not: as is the good, so is the sinner; and he that sweareth, as he that feareth an oath.

Now on comparing this context with iii. 11 sqq. we observe the following points of resemblance :

(*a*) Man cannot *find out* the *work* which *is wrought* under the sun. (viii. 17.)

Man cannot *find out* the *work* which God *hath wrought*. (iii. 11.)

(*β*) There is *one hap* to the righteous and to the wicked. (ix. 2.)

There are perversions of justice. (iii. 16.)

There is *one hap* to all, *sc.* to men (just or unjust) and beasts. (iii. 19.)

(*γ*) The righteous, and the wise, and their works, are in the hand of God. (ix. 1.)

The righteous and the wicked God shall judge; for there is a time &c. (iii. 17.)

We may complete the comparison between the two contexts

[1] Or thus: 'and *it is to* (=*one must*) *acknowledge* all this,' ולבור את כל זה.

by referring לבור and לברם to the same root or to roots of similar meaning. In ix. 1 it is concluded that man must after all *acknowledge* his own ignorance and the fact that God is the sole disposer of events: in iii. 18 (according to the proposed rendering) it is concluded,

> I said in my heart,
> It is according to the condition of the sons of men
> That they should *acknowledge* God (*sc.* as the sole disposer)
> And perceive that they themselves are to themselves
> (*i. e.* so far as their own knowledge and observation go)
> beasts.

In the preceding verse it had been said, that God would judge &c.; and in this eighteenth verse it is added, that the thing for man to do under the circumstances is to *acknowledge* that the disposition of events is in his hand alone.

This result (1) follows, as we have seen, from the assimilation of the obscure לברם to the לבור of a strikingly similar context; and (2) it is also *a priori* probable, for if all that remained of ver. 18 were the hemistich—

And to see that they themselves are beasts unto themselves—

it would doubtless be conjectured that the first hemistich also described some action of which 'they,' viz. *men,* were the subjects. Thus, the seventeenth verse referring to the fact of God's judgement, the whole of the eighteenth would set forth a corresponding duty of men.

III. Eccl. xii. 11:

דברי חכמים כדרבנות
וכמשמרות נטועים בעלי אספות
נתנו מרעה אחד :

The difficulties of this verse are in the second clause and in the final אחד. The mention of 'goads' in the first clause and of a 'shepherd' in the third suggests that the *whole* of the imagery is taken from pastoral life. The *prima facie* construction of the intermediate clause is perhaps that which makes נטועים a noun (of form חרוץ) with which the preceding word is in construc-

tion. נטוע, if a noun, must mean something *planted* or *fixed*, e. g. a *stake*, or say a *hurdle:* but the general sense will be the same if we take נטועים as a participle agreeing with משמרות, although the latter is feminine in form. (Compare חשבנות רבים, Eccl. vii. 29.) בעלי אספות follows naturally in apposition with נטועים. It means literally 'domini collectionum,' and may be applied to anything which *has the property of holding together.* For a use of this idiom in connexion with an inanimate object, compare בעל פיפיות, as an epithet of the agricultural implement חרוץ (Is. xli. 15). The 'goads,' spoken of in the first clause, stimulate and drive onward: the 'clamps of hurdles,' or 'fixed pegs'—whichever construction we take—hold the flock together at their journey's end and prevent them from straying. The third clause adds that both *goads* and *clamps*—the one a stimulant, the other a restraint—are applied by *one and the same* pastor. For this use of אחד, compare מקרה אחד (Eccl. ii. 14; iii. 19; ix. 2, 3); רוח אחד (iii. 19); מקום אחד (iii. 20; vi. 6). The verse then may be rendered,

> The words of the wise are as the goads that drive the flock onward; and as the fixed pegs [or *hurdle-clamps*] that hold them together; which are applied by one and the same pastor.

The words of the wise, that is, serve the twofold purpose of stimulating or suggesting, and of preserving from discursiveness and error.

The above explanation of Eccl. xii. 11 was devised, but not written out, several years ago; but I am not sure whether I had already seen Mr Ginsburg's note, which gives in great part, though not wholly, the same. For the literature of all the passages above discussed I refer to that commentator's valuable treatise on 'Coheleth.' But his note on Eccl. iii. 18 is one of the least satisfactory in the volume. The words אמרתי לברם are there rendered '*I said* God *hath chosen them.*' For this construction the following references are given, *viz.* Deut. ix. 25; Esth. i. 17; iv. 13; Eccl. viii. 17; but they are not very clearly appropriate; the action being in three of the cases obviously in

the future—'He said *that he would destroy;*' 'He commanded *to bring;*'...'*to answer;*' and even in Eccl. viii. 17 a future sense seems distinctly appropriate: 'Though a man labour to seek it out, yet he shall not find it; though a wise man *think to know it,* yet shall he not be able to find it.' See Ps. lxxiii. 16.

P. S. *On the root* יפה.

This root is not improbably cognate with وفى, in Aph. '*perfecit, consummavit,*' and وفى, '*integer, completus, copiosus fuit;*' the organic root being taken to be וף, as found also in وفر 'copiosus fuit.' The ideas of fulness, completeness, and luxuriance are naturally connected—especially for an Oriental—with that of *beauty.* The thing described as beautiful must be (1) complete in all its parts, and (2) not undersized or meagre, but large and 'fine' of its kind. Some examples are subjoined.

In Ezek. xxxi. 3—9, the Assyrian is described as a fine cedar, the ideas of fulness and luxuriance being dwelt upon throughout; he was 'fair in his *greatness*' &c. In Jer. xi. 16, an olive tree is יפה פרי תאר, fair with shapely *fruit.* In Gen. xli. 2, 4, 18, the 'well-favoured' kine are '*fat-fleshed.*' For the same idea in connexion with human beauty, though not for the word יפה, compare Dan. i. 15: 'fairer and *fatter in flesh* than all the children which did eat the portion of the king's meat.' Fattening food promotes beauty (Ezek. xvi. 13): 'simila, melle, oleo pasta, atque ita formosissima et regno idonea facta.' *Luxuriance* enters into the description of Absalom's beauty: 'he weighed the hair of his head at two hundred shekels' (2 Sam. xiv. 25). In יפה עינים (1 Sam. xvi. 12; Cant. i. 15; iv. 1), *largeness* and *fulness* of eyes would naturally be implied. In יפה כלבנה, Cant. vi. 10, the comparison would be with the *full orb* of the moon, and not only with its brightness: see Freytag, s. v. *badr,* and comp. Sirac. l. 6, ὡς σελήνη πλήρης ἐν ἡμέραις. A beautiful *voice* (Ezek. xxxiii. 32) would be a *full, rich* voice. A 'fine' mountain (יפה נוף, Ps. xlviii. 3) would in general be a comparatively large or *grand* mountain.

Again, יפה implies *attractiveness*[1]. It is used with נעם, Cant. i. 16; vii. 7; with חן, Ps. xlv. 4; Prov. xxxi. 30; with אוה, Ps. xlv. 12; with חמד, Prov. vi. 25. But there is no evidence to shew that it may imply moral fitness, although the transition would not be difficult. In Eccl. v. 17 I have taken יפה to mean *pleasant* or *attractive* in connexion with eating and drinking, &c., יפה לאכול וג׳. For this compare Cant. iv. 10: 'How *fair* is thy love, my sister, ... how much better is thy love than *wine!* and the smell of thine ointments than all spices.' Compare also Zech. ix. 17, where מַה יָּפְיוֹ introduces the enjoyment of plenty: 'Corn shall make the young men cheerful, and new wine the maids.' One doubtful usage of יפה now remains, *sc.* that in Eccl. iii. 11. Here it seems best to take the general meaning *attractive*—for we have seen that יפה may mean pleasant to the several senses of taste, hearing, &c.—and to avoid the unprecedented meaning, 'comely,' *viz.* in a moral sense.

[1] *Plenty* is naturally connected with *satisfaction*. The like meaning might be deduced from '*promissis stetit*' (see Freytag), which however is less likely than '*integer, copiosus fuit*' to be primary.

C. TAYLOR.

ARISTOPHANIS EQUITES. Recensuit Adolphus von Velsen. *Leipsic*, Teubner, 1869.

This is a critical edition of the text based upon a most minute and accurate collation of the principal Italian manuscripts, a collation undertaken and completed by the editor, Mr Adolf von Velsen of Saarbrück, with the energy and conscientiousness of a true German, in spite of feeble health and, at times, of failing eyesight.

The MSS. of Aristophanes are so numerous that it would be the work of a life-time to collate them all, and in many cases so late and unimportant that it would be a waste of time to do so.

I have myself seen in various European libraries a hundred and thirty-nine. Most of these contain either the Plutus alone, or the Plutus and Nubes, or the Plutus, Nubes, and Ranæ, and are transcripts made in Italy in the 15th or 16th centuries. Only one MS., the Ravenna, contains all the eleven extant comedies. The principal Venice MS contains, besides the Plutus, Nubes and Ranæ, the Equites, Aves, Pax and Vespæ. Next to the three plays which were favourite text-books with professors at the revival of Greek learning, the Equites and Aves seem to have been most studied.

Of the Equites there are in the Vatican library four MSS., one containing a fragment only, in the Barberini two, in the Laurentian five, in the Riccardi library at Florence one, in the library of Modena two, at Ravenna one, in the library of St Mark at Venice two, in the Ambrosian at Milan three, and in the Imperial Library at Paris six. Of these twenty-six MSS. Mr von Velsen has collated one at Ravenna, one at

Venice, three at the Laurentian library, one at the Vatican, and one at Milan. For the collation of the most ancient Paris MS. he has depended upon a collation of mine, which is, I trust, accurate as far as it goes, but is less minute than his own work. A recollation of the principal MSS. was absolutely necessary, for Bekker's collation of the two most important, viz. the Ravenna and Venice MSS., adopted by all later editors, was very hasty and imperfect, and the others ostensibly collated by Dindorf were collated by deputy—which is always unsatisfactory. Mr von Velsen adopts the nomenclature used by Dindorf, calling the Ravenna MS. R, the Venice V, the three Laurentian Γ, Θ, and Δ. The Ambrosian he calls M. (Bekker's 'M' is, I have no doubt, the same as that which is now found at Verona, but which does not contain the Equites.)

It is perhaps convenient to retain such designations when only a few MSS. are referred to, but in a complete edition of Aristophanes, embracing the readings of a larger number, it would be well to adopt a different terminology. I should propose to arrange the MSS. of each library as far as possible in chronological order, 1, 2, 3, &c., and prefix to the numeral an initial or abbreviation indicating the city or the library where they respectively are. Thus R. would stand for the solitary Ravenna MS.; P. 1, P. 2, down to P. 25 for the Paris MSS.; L. 1, L. 2, ... L. 13, for the Laurentian; Vat. 1, Vat. 2, ... Vat. 33 for the Vatican MSS.; Ven. 1, Ven. 2, ... Ven. 7 for those of Venice; A. 1, A. 2, ... A. 14, for the Ambrosian; Mod. 1, Mod. 2, ... Mod. 6, for those of Modena.

The selection which Mr von Velsen has made seems a very judicious one and is amply sufficient for all practical purposes. The only MS. which I should have wished to add to the list is one at Modena, which I think he has not seen, marked in the catalogue iii. D. 8, my 'Mod. 1,' a MS. written apparently towards the close of the thirteenth century, nearly coeval with the earliest Paris MS., Dindorf's A., in my list 'Par. 1,' closely akin to it and of equal authority. It has, however, in many places been so carefully corrected that it is impossible to say what the original reading was.

I hope that at some future time Mr Von Velsen will give us

an account of the relationship which exists between the different MSS., and an estimate of their relative importance. The minuteness and thoroughness of his examination will well qualify him for the task and give authority to his judgment.

All the extant MSS. seem to me to be derived from one archetype, perhaps itself a late recension, and full of conjectural emendations to an extent which we have no means of estimating. The more ancient scholia and the quotations of Suidas in a few cases lead us to an earlier and purer text. The Ravenna MS. of the 10th or more probably the 11th century, approaches most nearly to this archetype. It contains three lines not found in any other MS. The Venice MS. (474 in the catalogue), half a century later than the Ravenna, is certainly further removed from the archetype. The Ambrosian (L. 39 in the catalogue) of the 14th century is still further removed, and therefore of inferior authority. It agrees sometimes with the Ravenna, and sometimes with the Venice MS., and is of importance in settling a reading when these differ. In a few cases it differs from both, and may give us, or lead us to, the true text, when the older MSS. are at fault.

The other MSS., though in no case lineally descended from the Venice MS. (except a transcript made by order of Bessarion, also in St Mark's Library, 475 in the catalogue), yet belong to the same family. They rarely therefore give any independent support; and their agreement with the Venice MS. in any particular case is no ground for preferring their text to that of the Ravenna MS. When however the Ambrosian agrees with the Venice MS., the case is different. I should prefer their joint testimony to the unsupported testimony of the Ravenna. Of the others I consider the earliest Laurentian of higher authority than either the earliest Parisian or Modenese. The Vatican MS. (in the catalogue Palatinus, 128) collated by Mr von Velsen and written by νικόλαος ὁ ντραμάρος in the 15th century, is of still inferior merit, as is another MS., marked 'Vaticanus 1294' and said to be written by Domitius Triclinius, which I have myself collated. The two last mentioned MSS. are nearly related to each other and to the MS. from which Aldus printed his text in 1498.

I will now briefly refer to a few pages of the play. In lines 31, 32, Mr von Velsen reads:

θεῶν ἰόντε προσπεσεῖν του πρὸς βρέτας.
ΟΙΚ. Α. ποῖον βρέτας;* ἑτεὸν ἡγεῖ γὰρ θεούς;

In the former the Ravenna MS. has, according to my collation, not του but τοῦ, with the circumflex. Here, I think, we should prefer ποι, in which the Venice and Ambrosian MSS. agree. The other reading is probably due to a corrector who did not understand the meaning of βρέτας θεῶν. It means 'an image of *some* god,' just as κυνίδιον Σεριφίων in the Acharnians 542 means 'a puppy belonging to some Seriphian.' In the next line the reading βρεττέτας preserved in the Venetian and first Laurentian will guide us to what I think the true text, ποῖον βρετετέτας; The slave mimics his comrade, whose trembling lips have hardly been able to enunciate the alliterative line preceding. If this were the original reading it would be sure to be altered as a mistake by some transcriber. Later MSS. have attempted to remedy the metrical defect by reading βρέτας· ποῖον βρέτας; Another suggestion would be ποῖον βρέτας θεῶν; taking θεῶν as a monosyllable.

In 68 I should retain the reading of all MSS. εἰ μή μ' ἀναπείσητ' instead of reading with Dindorf ἀναπείσετ', or with Bergk ἦν for εἰ. Compare Pax 450, κεἴ τις στρατηγεῖν βουλόμενος μὴ ξυλλάβῃ.

In line 73 I should certainly retain the ἐκείνην τὴν μόλωμεν of the MSS., instead of adopting, as Mr von Velsen has done, Bergk's conjecture ἐκείνην ἦν μόλωμεν.

Line 114, τὸν νοῦν ἵν' ἄρδω καὶ λέγω τι δεξιόν. 'Delendum esse vidit Wielandius', von Velsen. It seems to me that it should certainly be retained. There are some jests which gain by repetition, and this is one of them. So also line 436 of the Acharnians should be retained.

In 204 I prefer the αὐτό που λέγει of the MSS. to Mr von Velsen's conjecture which he has inserted in the text, τοῦτό που λέγει. The meaning is 'The thing speaks for itself.'

I see no reason for suspecting, as Bergk does, the genuineness of line 219, ἔχεις ἅπαντα πρὸς πολιτείαν ἃ δεῖ.

In 276 Mr von Velsen adopts Kock's *τήνελλά σοι* for the *τήνελλος εἶ* of all MSS. An editor of Aristophanes should be wary of rejecting *ἅπαξ λεγόμενα* merely because they are such. At all events the MS. reading in such a case should be retained in the text. The word *τήνελλος* may have been a jocose popular abbreviation of *τήνελλα καλλίνικος*. A jest which seems frigid to an Englishman or a German now, may have sounded very comical to an Athenian twenty-three centuries ago.

319. *κἀμὲ τοῦτ' ἔδρασε ταὐτὸν νὴ Δί' ὥστε καὶ γέλων.*

So von Velsen, following Porson. But the transposition of *νὴ Δία* from the commencement of the sentence, its natural place, seems awkward and improbable. The MSS. have *νὴ Δία κἀμὲ* or *καὶ νὴ Δία κἀμὲ κ.τ.λ.* Taking the former, which is the reading of R, I should suppose *Δία* to be pronounced as a monosyllable, the iota having the sound of our y, as *Πύθιος* is a dissyllable in Ion 285, *τιμᾷ σφε Πύθιος ἀστραπαί τε Πύθιαι.* Dindorf, on the authority of Photius and Chæroboscus, here and elsewhere reads *νὴ Δὶ κἀμὲ κ.τ.λ.*

In line 386 *ἦν ἄρ' οὐ φαῦλον ὦδ' * * * ἀλλ' ἔπιθι καὶ στρόβει,* Mr von Velsen conjectures that the lacuna may be filled by *ἀλλὰ καλόν.* I would suggest *οὐδ' ἐλαφρόν.* In the next line R reads *ἔλαττον* for *ὀλίγον.* In the MS. from which R was copied the omitted words *οὐδ' ἐλαφρόν* may have been written above and so caused the mistake.

400. The Editor says 'Conjectura scripsi *ἐν Κρατίνου κῳδίῳ.* Affirmat chorus equitum paratum se esse chori partes in quadam Cratini comoedia agere, *εἰ σὲ μὴ μισῶ.*' But in this sense *γενοίμην* seems hardly the verb required. How strange would seem the phrase *γενοίμην ἐν Ἀριστοφάνους Ἱππεῦσι.* The old scholiast evidently read *γενοίμην ἐν Κρατίνου κῴδιον.* (For *ἐν* the MSS. by a natural mistake substituted *ἓν*). His explanation may be the right one, and some current scandal about the symposia at Cratinus's house may have added point to the jest.

423. *καὶ ταῦτα δρῶν ἐλάνθανόν γ'· εἰ δ' οὖν ἴδοι τις αὐτῶν.*

γ' is a late conjectural addition, not found in the older MSS. Mr von Velsen conjectures

καὶ ταῦτα δρῶν ἐλάνθανον τότ'· εἰ δ' ἴδοι τις αὐτῶν.

To me *εἰ δ' οὖν* seems to be required by the context and *τότε* to be otiose. I would read

καὶ ταῦτα δρῶν ἐλάνθανόν σφ'· εἰ δ' οὖν κ.τ.λ.

555. *καὶ κυανέμβολοι θοαὶ*
μισθοφόροι τριήρεις.

The editor reads, for *μισθοφόροι*, *ἱστοφόροι*. It seems to me that *ἱστοφόροι* would be an anticlimax after the preceding words. Now *μισθοφόροι* is a *παρὰ προσδοκίαν* quite in the manner of Aristophanes, who even in his hymns to the Gods is mindful of his comic character. We have an exactly parallel jest in the following words:

μειρακίων θ' ἅμιλλα λαμ-
πρυνομένων ἐν ἅρμασιν
καὶ—βαρυδαιμονόυντων.

821. The MSS. have *παῦ' ούτοσί*. Mr von Velsen reads conjecturally *νῦν παῦ' οὗτος*. I should propose *παῦ' οὑτωσί*.

1022. *τί γάρ ἐστ' Ἐρεχθεῖ καὶ κολοιοῖς καὶ κυνί;*

So the MSS., and rightly as it seems to me. The mention of Erechtheus refers to the *Ἐρεχθείδης* of the oracle, line 1015: 'What has Erechtheus to do with jackdaws and a dog?' 'What is there in common between them?' Bentley's conjecture *Ἐρεχθείδῃ* for *Ἐρεχθεῖ καὶ* leaves the line without a proper construction, and Mr von Velsen's *Ἐρεχθείδῃ 'ν* scarcely mends the matter.

1036. *ὦ τάν, ἄκουσον, εἶτα διάκρινον τότε.* 'Fortasse scribendum est: *ὦ τάν, ἔτ' ἄκουσον, εἶτα διάκρινον τόδε* (*τόδε* conjecit Meinekius)', von Velsen. If any change be needed we might read ΠΑΦ. *ὦ τάν, ἄκουσον, εἶτα διάκρινον.* ΔΗΜ. *τὸ τί;*

1242. Mr von Velsen gives the whole line to the *Ἀλλαντοπώλης*. I would rather follow the MSS. in making Cleon interrupt him with *καὶ τί*; or I would read ΑΛΛ. *ἠλλαντοπώλουν καί*—ΠΑΦ. *τί καί*;

1324. ΧΟΡ. *πῶς ἂν ἴδοιμεν; ποίαν τιν' ἔχει σκευήν; ποῖος γεγένηται;* 'Spurium esse vidit Bergkius', von Velsen. I do not see why it should be rejected. The emphatic *οἷός περ* of the following line seems to require a preceding question.

1336. For ἐγώ; Mr von Velsen conjectures ἴδου. I would read and punctuate as the Ravenna MS. does, according to my notes, ἐγώ· '*That* have I.' So ἐγὼ is used to emphasize an assertion, not to be translated by an emphatic 'I,' Acharnians 202, and in other passages where its meaning has not generally been understood.

1373. οὐδεὶς ἐν τ' ἀγορᾷ Venice MS. οὐδεὶς ἔν τ' ἀγορᾷ Ambrosian. ἔν τ' ἀγορᾷ οὐδεὶς Ravenna. Mr von Velsen prints οὐδεὶς ἐν * * * and proposes to fill the vacant space with πόλει. I see no objection to read with Bekker and others οὐδεὶς ἐν ἀγορᾷ.

1401. κἀκ τῶν βαλανείων πίεται τὸ λούτριον. So Elmsley. The MSS. have all λοῦτρον or λουτρόν. Mr von Velsen adopts λούτριον. I have not seen the word elsewhere, and would read

> κἀκ τῶν βαλανείων πίεται τὸ λουτρόν. ΔΗΜ. εὖ,
> εὖ γ' ἐπενόησας κ.τ.λ.

In these brief notes I have only mentioned a few points in which I venture to differ from the conclusions of the editor. No doubt in his explanatory notes he will have a great deal to say in defence of them. I have left unnoticed the many points in which I agree with him.

The book is an excellent sample of faithful and conscientious work.

W. G. CLARK.

ON THE ἐν μέσῳ OF REV. V. 6, AND THE ἀνὰ μέσον OF 1 COR. VI. 5.

And I beheld, and lo, in the midst of the throne and of the four beasts, and in the midst of the elders, stood a Lamb as it had been slain. Rev. v. 6, Authorized Version.

So there is not among you any wise man who shall be able to judge between his brother? 1 Cor. vi. 5, literally rendered.

The Greek of these passages in the best MSS. (the variations of which it would be *ab re* to discuss here) stands as follows:

Καὶ εἶδον (+ καὶ ἰδοὺ, ς) ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ θρόνου καὶ τῶν τεσσάρων ζώων καὶ ἐν μέσῳ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ἀρνίον ἑστηκὸς (or ἑστηκὼς א) ὡς ἐσφαγμένον.

And: Οὕτως οὐκ ἔνι (or ἔστιν, ς) ἐν ὑμῖν οὐδεὶς σοφὸς (or σοφὸς οὐδὲ εἷς, ς) ὃς δυνήσεται διακρῖναι ἀνὰ μέσον τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ αὐτοῦ;

Every one who has read even the first few chapters of Genesis in the original, knows how the Hebrew idiom reduplicates the particle which is equivalent to our *between* (בֵּין…וּבֵין) when the *between* governs two objects specified and distinguished. Thus what is rendered in our Version, "I will put enmity between thee and the woman, and between thy seed and her seed" (Gen. iii. 15), is literally "*between* thee *and between* the woman, and *between* thy seed *and between* her seed." In ix. 16, "the everlasting covenant between God and every

living creature of all flesh," is literally "covenant *between* Elohim *and between* every creature." So in c. i. 4, "God divided the light from the darkness" is "*between* the light *and between* the darkness"; and in like manner in v. 14, "*between* the day *and between* the night" (בֵּין הַיּוֹם וּבֵין הַלָּיְלָה).

Now the existence of Hebraisms in the New Testament has been fully and conclusively shown by Winer, Böckel, Webster and others. As an example, noticed by Webster though overlooked by Winer, and not recognized as a Hebraism by Bloomfield or Alford, I may quote the redundant use in several passages of the personal pronoun after the relative. Thus in Acts xv. 17, *ἐφ' οὓς ἐπικέκληται τὸ ὄνομά μου ἐπ' αὐτούς*, which is just the Hebrew אֲשֶׁר.....בָּהֶם. Several instances of this common and familiar Hebrew idiom may be found in the New Testament as in Mark vii. 25, Acts xv. 17, Eph. ii. 10, 1 Pet. ii. 24 (in א and other MSS.), Rev. vii. 2, 9.

But it is especially in the Greek of the Revelation that solecisms of various kinds abound, and it can therefore excite no surprise if the peculiar use of בֵּין.....וּבֵין should be found there; and the object of this brief paper is to suggest that we have it in the passage quoted above from v. 6. I believe the true rendering of this verse to be as follows: *And I saw* BETWEEN *the throne and the four living creatures* (on the one hand) *and the elders* (on the other hand) *a Lamb standing, as one that had been slain.*

I assume that in this vision, as in that described in the first chapter of Ezekiel's prophecies, the four living creatures are intimately associated with the throne itself. This seems implied by the manner in which they are mentioned in iv. 6. (*κύκλῳ τοῦ θρόνου*), v. 11, and xiv. 3.

But in justification of this rendering of *ἐν μέσῳ*, it is important first to observe that it is evidently the same general sense that is conveyed by the *ἀνὰ μέσον* in vii. 17: *τὸ ἀρνίον τὸ ἀνὰ μέσον τοῦ θρόνου ποιμανεῖ αὐτούς*, which all commentators and translators, so far as I am aware, take as nearly or quite equivalent to the *ἐν μέσῳ* before us. What is the *exact* sense of this *ἀνὰ μέσον* in vii. 17 we will consider presently: the point to be

noted now is its being (almost) synonymous with *ἐν μέσῳ*. For a comparison of the two passages seems conclusive on this point.

But *ἀνὰ μέσον* is exactly the expression which the Seventy chose as the Greek rendering for the Hebrew בֵּין, and they habitually repeat it just as בֵּין is repeated. Thus in the LXX. version of Gen. i. 4, we find *καὶ διεχώρισεν ὁ Θεὸς ἀνὰ μέσον τοῦ φωτὸς καὶ ἀνὰ μέσον τοῦ σκότους*. In v. 14 of the same chapter: *τοῦ διαχωρίζειν ἀνὰ μέσον τῆς ἡμέρας καὶ ἀνὰ μέσον τῆς νυκτός*. In Gen. iii. 15: *καὶ ἔχθραν θήσω ἀνὰ μέσον σοῦ καὶ ἀνὰ μέσον τῆς γυναικὸς, καὶ ἀνὰ μέσον τοῦ σπέρματός σου καὶ ἀνὰ μέσον τοῦ σπέρματος αὐτῆς*. And such, so far as I have observed, is the usual rendering of בֵּין……וּבֵין throughout the Septuagint though occasionally the latter בֵּין is left untranslated, as in Gen. xiii. 8: *μὴ ἔστω μάχη ἀνὰ μέσον ἐμοῦ καὶ σοῦ* (בֵּינִי……וּבֵינֶךָ), though the next clause is perfectly literal—*καὶ ἀνὰ μέσον τῶν ποιμένων μου καὶ ἀνὰ μέσον τῶν ποιμένων σου*. Of the reduplicated *ἀνὰ μέσον* other instances will be found in Ex. viii. 23, and xxvi. 33, Judg. iv. 5, 1 Sam. vii. 14, 1 Kin. xxii. 34, Jer. vii. 5, Ezek. xxxiv. 20, Zech. xi. 14. And just so in Latin *inter* is sometimes repeated, as in Hor. *Sat.* I. 7. 11, where see Macleane's note; though this is not a recognized idiom of the Latin language. Bentley calls it "vitiosum sane loquendi genus et *ἰδιωτικόν*."

But an obvious difficulty in the way of the interpretation here suggested is found in the *ἀνὰ μέσον* of vii. 17, which seems intelligible, or possibly intelligible, as commonly rendered—"the Lamb which is *in the midst of* the throne shall be their shepherd,"—while "*between* the throne" seems at the first glance destitute of meaning. Is it possible that the *ἀνὰ μέσον* may indicate the interval between two objects of which one only is specified, and the other is understood? I think this is clearly the case in the verse from 1 Cor. vi. above quoted, "who shall be able to judge between his brother?" As to the reading neither Tregelles nor Alford gives any variant on

MS. authority. And as to the sense, though this is "a harsh method of expression" (Alf.) yet we have a very simple interpretation put upon the words by the Peshito Syriac and Arabic versions, which Alford quotes thus: "*αδελφου κ. του αδελφου*, Syr. arr." And if that passage may be thus taken as elliptical, and rendered, "be able to judge between his brother (and his brother);" this in the Rev. seems to be closely parallel, and to admit as easily the rendering "the Lamb which is between the throne (and us)"—or "between (where we are and) the throne"—for it is one of the four and twenty elders who is speaking; and thus it harmonizes perfectly with v. 6. Possibly the *ἐν μέσῳ* of iv. 6 bears a similar sense—"between the throne (and where I stood):" the expression becomes thus more readily intelligible.

Evidently the argument would be more complete if I could conclusively show that with בֵּין the *terminus ad quem* is sometimes similarly omitted. But there is at least one passage (to which my learned friend Dr Tregelles has kindly called my attention) in which it may possibly be so, viz. Dan. viii. 16; "and I heard a man's voice between (where I stood and) Ulai." That there is *some* ellipse is obvious. Our translators take it as "between (the banks of) Ulai;" and this is supported by the vision of xii. 6, 7; but grammatical analogy in its favour seems to be wholly wanting. There is, so far as I am aware, no similar instance of a singular noun so used.

But rare as the omission of one of the *termini* with a word signifying "between" must be in any language, in our own early literature I have met with one such passage. In Robert of Brunne's *Handlyng Synne* (ed. Furnivall, p. 181) we read,

> Þe clerk lokede euery where,
> And at þe laste he knew where;
> A ryche man, *þat* er hade be
> Specyal knowlych euer *betwe:*

That is to say, "between whom (and the clerk) there had ever been special intimacy."

Now I have above remarked that בֵּין and *ἀνὰ μέσον* are sometimes used as the English *between*, and followed only by

and. Do we ever find similar instances in the New Testament? I think so, at least in one place, Rev. xxii. 2, where I believe the true rendering to be, "*Between* its broadway and the river on both sides was the tree of life."

But is the *ἀνὰ μέσον* of vii. 17 fully and exactly synonymous with *ἐν μέσῳ* of v. 6? In the LXX. indeed *ἀνὰ μέσον* appears continually used just in the sense of the classical *ἐν μέσῳ*: compare for instance, Num. xvi. 48, *καὶ ἔστη ἀνὰ μέσον τῶν τεθνηκότων καὶ τῶν ζώντων*, with Xenophon's *πῦρ ἐν μέσῳ ἑαυτῶν καὶ τῶν πολεμίων ποιησάμενοι.* Yet strictly *ἀνὰ μέσον* signifies *throughout* the intervening space (or spaces, as in Matt. xiii. 25)—much as *κατὰ μέσον* is used in *Il.* E. 8 and I. 87—*ἐν μέσῳ* pointing to some point *in* that space. And it may be that that distinction is intended in these two passages of the Apocalypse; the Lamb in the former appearing simply as *in* this intervening space, while the *ἀνὰ* of the latter intimates moreover that *all* that space is appropriated to Him.

Briefly in conclusion, as to the significance of this position of the Lamb. On the one hand is the infinite Majesty of the Father, around whose throne and closely connected with it are the four living creatures, symbolically representing perhaps the *manifested attributes* of Deity—His power (the lion), His longsuffering (the calf), His wisdom (the man), and the terror and the swiftness of His justice (the flying eagle),—attributes whose ceaseless manifestation in both creation and providence proclaims the glory of the Almighty (c. iv. 8), and has rendered, and ever will render homage to the divine Son (c. v. 8). On the other hand are the four and twenty elders, the interpretation of this twice twelve being aided by the mention in xxi. 12, 14 of the twelve tribes of Israel, and the twelve apostles of the Lamb; so that it is reasonable to conclude, with the majority of commentators, that these twenty-four represent the entire "church of the first-born;" which is yet clearer when we consider the responsive[1] song (for the change in the pronouns

[1] Affirmabant autem [Christiani] hanc fuisse summam vel culpæ suæ vel erroris, quod essent soliti stato die ante lucem convenire, *carmen*que Christo quasi Deo *dicere* SECUM INVICEM, &c. Pliny to Trajan, circ. A.D. 108.

shows it to be such) in v. 9, 10: thus—*τὰ δ' ζ.*, "Thou art worthy to take the book and to open the seals thereof;"—*οἱ κδ' πρ.*, "For thou wast slain, and hast redeemed us to God by thy blood out of every kindred and tongue and people and nation;"—*τὰ δ' ζ.*, "And thou hast made them unto our God a kingdom, priests; and they shall reign on the earth." And *between* the throne with the four living creatures which encircle it, and the twenty-four elders, *between* the Godhead and the redeemed, appears the Lamb—the "one Mediator between God and man."

R. F. WEYMOUTH.

ON THE PHŒNICIAN PASSAGE IN THE PŒNULUS OF PLAUTUS. Act V. Sc. I.

The study of the Punic passages in the Pœnulus has not been resumed since Movers' pamphlet *Die punischen Texte* (Breslau, 1845[1]), yet they are certainly of no less interest for Phœnician philology than the inscription of Eshmon-ezer, the explanation of which called forth fourteen treatises. Even one of our best scholars in this department, Professor Levy, has no mention of them in his excellent work *Phönizische Studien.* But although the same degree of certainty cannot be attained here, which we have in the Phœnician inscriptions, partly on account of the foreign transcription, and partly owing to the condition of the text of Plautus, which, as Movers says, is hopelessly bad, ought we, for such reasons, to shrink from offering an explanation, which may correspond better to the Semitic spirit than previous attempts? We think not. If even a single word is correctly ascertained by our conjectures, it will be a step towards the deciphering of these obscure passages.

We submit here, as an attempt only, our own reading of the passage in the first scene of the fifth act, and though we do not pretend to have found the true interpretation of every line, we may perhaps have divined some words in it. It will be a great satisfaction to us if, by the present essay, we can again direct the attention of scholars to this subject.

We shall not give here a full account of all the various readings of the MSS. This has been done by Movers in the

[1] Gesenius published an interpretation in his celebrated work *Scripturæ linguæque Phœniciæ monumenta.* Professor Ewald, too, gave a highly ingenious one in the *Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes* for 1842. For other attempts, see Movers, pp. 6—15.

above-mentioned pamphlet, and by Ritschl in his edition of Plautus. Still, a few words may not be amiss to describe the three, or more strictly, the two different texts which we possess of the Pœnulus. The first, and less corrupt, is the more recent text, contained in ten lines, and printed in our editions of Plautus. We shall chiefly explain the Punic from this text, for, as we shall see, it agrees best with the Latin translation. The second text (lines 11—16) is the older one; the earliest copy of it exists in a palimpsest at Milan. It is very corrupt, and the copyists, in order to furnish more amusement than Plautus himself intended, changed the Punic words into Latin. Hence it would, in our opinion, be a useless trouble to attempt the deciphering of this text. A few words may still be recognised as Punic, and occasionally agree with the more recent text: this is important, because we learn from it that the Punic text is at any rate not a pure invention.

The reading of some lines, as we shall see, is quite certain, and proves that we have pure Phœnician in the first scene at least, from which we may conclude that the colony of Carthage, at least in the better classes, spoke the language of the mother country. As M. Renan[1] well observes, 'Quand on voit l'espagnol qui se parle en Amérique parfaitement identique de nos jours à celui de la mère patrie, on se persuade que les colonies formées à des époques historiques exercent peu d'influence sur les révolutions du langage.' Besides, when we consider how little difference there is between the Arabic of Egypt, of Syria, and Morocco, and how rarely foreign words are introduced, it will not be an exaggeration to assert that a Semitic language, as long as those who spoke it retained their nationality, could not suffer any great alteration. Before going further, it may be as well to state that the vowels are of no great consequence in our text. And this for two reasons. First, because in Semitic languages the vowels do not play a prominent part, the proof of which is that the signs for them were invented very late, and chiefly for the reading of the sacred books. In Algeria, indeed, the words are pronounced as if they had no vowels. Secondly,

[1] *Histoire des langues Sémitiques*, 3rd ed., p. 197.

because the transcribers introduced vowels *ad libitum*, and even consonants for the sake of the metre. Movers, we think, insisted too much on the vowels, and on the uniform value of certain consonants. Our own belief is that, for example, *ch* may equally represent כ, ח, and ק; for the distinct pronunciation of the gutturals, palatals, and dentals did not exist in the outlying districts, as is evident enough from the ridicule cast by the inhabitants of Judæa on the Galileans.

We now proceed to give (1) the text as it stands in the pamphlet of Movers; (2) the Latin translation; (3) the Punic text amended; (4) the Hebrew transcription of this; (5) an English version; and (6) an explanation of the roots and forms which we adopt in our readings.

I. *The more recent Text*[1].

1. Ythalonim ualonuth sicoratsima comsyth
2. Chym lah chunythmumys thyal mycthibaru imisehi
3. Lipho canethyth binuthu adaedin binuthu
4. Birnarob syllohomalonim uyby mysyrthoho
5. Bythlim mothyn moctothuulechanti dasmachon
6. Yssiddobrim thyfel yth. chyl! ys chon. them liphul
7. Uthbinim ysdibur thinnochutnu agorastocles
8. Ythemaneht ihy chirsae lychot sith naso
9. Bynny id chil luhily gubulim lasi bithym
10. Bodyalit heraym nynuys lymmonchoth lusim.

II. *The Latin translation of Plautus.*

1. Deos Deasque veneror, qui hanc urbem colunt,
2. Ut, quod de mea re huc veni, rite venerim,
3. Measque hic ut gnatas et mei fratris filium
4. Reperire me siritis, Di vostram fidem!
   [quæ mihi surreptæ sunt et fratris filium]
5. Sed hic mihi antehac hospes Antidamas fuit.
6. Eum fecisse aiunt, sibi quod faciundum fuit.
7. Ejus filium esse hic praedicant Agorastoclem:

[1] See for the variations, Movers, op. cit. pp. 17, 18.

8. Ad eum hospitalem hanc tesseram mecum fero
9. Is in hisce habitare monstratum est regionibus.
10. Hos percunctabor, qui hinc egrediuntur foras.

III. *The Punic Text emended.*

1. Ith Alonim ualonoth si corath usi macom syth
2. Chymlah achon sythmum ystalm ythi bar imisehi
3. Lipho caneth yth binuthu ad aedin bin uhi
4. Bimar obsylohom alonim ubimysorthoho
5. Beth 'limoth ynno othi Thuelech Antidamas chon.
6. Yss dobri mthy yfel yth chyl ys chon them liphul
7. Uth binim ys diburth ino ochunu Agorastocles.
8. Yth emanethi hi chirs aelichoth itnaso
9. By ynny idchil luhily gubulim lasibthym
10. Abo odya li theraym ynnu uysl ymm onchot lusim

IV. *The Hebrew transcription.*

1. אית אלנים ואלנות זה קרת וזה מקום זאת
2. חמלה אכון שתמם ישתלם איתי בעיר ומציאתי
3. לפה כאנת אית בנותי יחד הדין בן אחי
4. במר ובשליחים אלונים ובמשרתהו
5. בעת עלמות הנה אתי תהולך אנטידמס כון
6. יש דבר מאתו יפעל אית כל יש כון תם לפעל
7. אית בנם יש דברת הנה יכון אגרסטקלס
8. אית אמנתי היא חרס הליכות אתנשא
9. בי הנה אדכל לאלה גבולים לשבתם
10. אבא הודע לי תרעים הנה אשאל עם הנחת לשם.

V. *English translation of the emended text.*

1. To the gods and goddesses of this city and this place this
2. prayer I make, that fully completed my coming into the town may be, and that I may find

3. here my daughters together with the son of my brother,
4. with [the assistance] of the Master, the envoys of the gods,
and their servants,
5. At a former time I had here a guest-friend Antidamas:
6. it is said of him that he does all that it is possible to do.
7. His son, as it is said, is here, Agorastocles.
8. My testimonial, that is, the journey-tablet, I shall carry
9. with me. Behold, I will enter this district, to his lodging
10. I shall come, [as] it was told to me. There is a door, I will
enquire of the people who are coming out.

VI. *The commentary justifying the emended text.*

1. אלנים or עלנים 'gods:' see Sid. Inscr. I. 9, 16, 21; Movers, op. cit. p. 59.

קרת 'city,' in Hebrew קריה, Phœn. קרת (Müller, II. 74); this word is feminine, and we ought perhaps to restore זאת קרת. A good reading would be סקורת, from the root שקר or סקר 'to see,' that is, 'the providence or protector of this place,' similar to the Pan of the Romans, but this may be too modern a thought. The reading שקראתי interrupts the sentence, and is against Semitic construction. The reading זכרתי is not worth mentioning.

2. חמל is in Hebrew 'to pity,' like חנן; and as this root is employed for 'prayer' (Deut. iv. 23; 1 Kings viii. 54), we may take חמל in the same sense. תמם is here an adverb, like תמים (Movers, op. cit. p. 67), expressing an emphasis, and renders the Latin word *ritè*. איתי from אתא 'to come,' like the Hebrew באי, for the *c*, see Movers, p. 67; מציאהי for מציאתי 'my finding;' it is possible that the ה was not in all Semitic idioms changed into ת, or else that the feminine form was expressed by the sound *é*, as in modern Syriac (see Ewald's *Hebrew Grammar*, 7th ed. p. 447). Perhaps we may supply a *t* in the Latin transcription, and read *imisethi*. Movers' reading, אשהיא, is not Semitic at all.

3. בן אחי, as in the cod. Cam.; see Movers, op. cit. 71.

4. We read *bymarob* with the cod. Cam.; see Movers, p. 72. מר or מרא 'master;' all three expressions refer probably to the theology of the Phœnicians. The Talmud often has the expression מלאכי השרת 'the angels of the service of God,' and the later Agadah mentions also שליח for 'angel.' The מ at the end of the word ובמשרתהם is omitted, or perhaps the הו refers to מר. The line in a parenthesis is in our opinion interpolated.

5. עלמות *nomen abstractum*, from עלם (Sid. Insc. I. 20), and signifies 'eternity.' תהולך as Movers, p. 77.

6. This line has been deciphered by Munk (see Renan, *Hist. des langues Sémitiques*, 3rd ed., p. 198) except the first three words, and proves that the language of Hanno is pure Phœnician. This must guide us in deciphering the other lines.

7. בנם for בנמו, an archaism often found in the Bible (see Ewald's *Hebrew Grammar*, p. 618). דברת *nomen abstractum*, compare Eccles. vii. 14. The word *innochutnu* is difficult to explain; Ewald ingeniously reads הנוך אתנו 'is with us,' but against the Latin translation; besides, Hanno does not yet belong to the inhabitants of the city.

8. This line has been admirably deciphered by Ewald (*Zeitschr. für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, Vol. VI. p. 407), to whom the reader may be referred; we differ only in the last two words. אמנתי and חרם are here in the sense of *tessera hospitalis*. Compare the second scene of the fifth act, when Hanno says, 'Si ita est, me *tesseram* conferre si vis *hospitalem*, eccam! attuli.' Whether חרש, properly 'a sherd,' has the sense of 'clay tablet' (compare the phrase in the older text, לוח הליכות), as Gesenius and Movers suggest, or whether it comes from חרש or חרת 'to engrave, and signifies here 'a mark,' as Ewald supposes (*Zeitschr. für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, Vol. VI. p. 24), we cannot decide; at all events the sense of 'testimonial' is sufficiently clear.

9. הנה in the sense of 'behold.' אדכל from the Arabic *dakhala*, 'to enter.' The last words of this line have been de-

ciphered by Ewald and Movers; (see Renan, loc. cit.) שבתם is again שבתמו, see above, line 7.

10. We here supply an *a*, and read *abo*. תרע was already recognised by Gesenius; Ewald and Movers adopted the same word. עם is to be taken in the sense of אנשים, as in English 'people.' הנחת, Hiphil from נחת 'to descend,' and here in the sense of 'coming,' like ירד in Hebrew. The usage is derived from the custom of building towns on hills.

AD. NEUBAUER.

P.S. The January number of the *Journal Asiatique* for 1869 contains a study on the above passages by the well-known Orientalist, M. J. Derenbourg, of Paris.

A. N.

[Since M. Neubauer's article was written, Dr Paul Schröder has published a discussion of the Punic passages in Plautus in the Appendix to his work *Die Phönizische Sprache*, Halle, 1869. W. A. W.]

TACITUS. ANNALS, XI. 27.

HAUD sum ignarus fabulosum visum iri tantum ullis mortalium securitatis fuisse in civitate omnium gnara et nihil reticente, nedum consulem designatum cum uxore principis, prædicta die, adhibitis qui obsignarent, velut suscipiendorum liberorum causa convenisse, atque illam audisse auspicum verba, *subisse*, sacrificasse apud deos; discubitum inter convivas, oscula complexus, noctem denique actam licentia conjugali.

All the commentators on this passage are dissatisfied with the word *subisse* and busy themselves with conjectural emendations. Thus it has been proposed to insert *templa, ædis, genialem torum,* or *jugum;* or to read, in place of *subisse, nupsisse* or *suffisse.* Not one of these corrections seems to us to carry conviction. We are inclined to keep the text as it stands, and to repeat *verba* mentally from the preceding clause, supposing that *subire verba* may be used as the correlative of the common phrase *præire verba.* The words *audisse auspicum verba, subisse,* will thus refer to the repetition of *concepta verba* in the ceremony of *confarreatio.*

HENRY JACKSON.
W. E. CURREY.

THUCYDIDES II. 90.

Οἱ δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι, ἐπειδὴ αὐτοῖς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐκ ἐπέπλεον ἐς τὸν κόλπον καὶ τὰ στενά, βουλόμενοι ἄκοντας ἔσω προαγαγεῖν αὐτούς, ἀναγόμενοι ἅμα ἕῳ ἔπλεον, ἐπὶ τεσσάρων ταξάμενοι τὰς ναῦς, ἐπὶ τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν ἔσω ἐπὶ τοῦ κόλπου, δεξίῳ κέρᾳ ἡγουμένῳ, ὥσπερ καὶ ὥρμουν· ἐπὶ δ' αὐτῷ εἴκοσιν ἔταξαν τὰς ἄριστα πλεούσας, ὅπως, εἰ ἄρα νομίσας ἐπὶ τὴν Ναύπακτον αὐτοὺς πλεῖν ὁ Φορμίων καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπιβοηθῶν ταύτῃ παραπλέοι, μὴ διαφύγοιεν πλέοντα τὸν ἐπίπλουν σφῶν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἔξω τοῦ ἑαυτῶν κέρως, ἀλλ' αὗται αἱ νῆες περικλήσειαν.

Dr Arnold remarks upon this passage—"The Scholiast says that *ἐπὶ* is here used for *παρά*. It would be better to say that it has a mixed signification of motion towards a place, and neighbourhood to it; expressing that the Peloponnesians sailed *towards* their own land (i. e. towards Corinth, Sicyon, and Pellene, to which places the greater number of the ships belonged; compare chapp. 9, 3 and 85) instead of standing over to the opposite coast, which belonged to their enemies: and at the same time kept close *upon* their own land, in the sense of *ἐπὶ* with a dative case."

Mr Grote rejects this interpretation for the following reasons:

1. Corinth and Sicyon were so far from the scene of the action that Thucydides was not likely to mark direction by reference to them.

2. Only a part of the fleet came from those cities, several of the Peloponnesian ships belonging to Elis and Leucas, and many to towns not lying in the line of the Isthmus.

3. ἐπὶ with an accusative of locality naturally expresses motion *towards* or *against*, not motion *upon*.

4. If the Peloponnesian fleet kept close along the coast of Peloponnesus, there was nothing in its movements to alarm Phormio for the safety of Naupactus or to draw him against his will into the strait.

5. The Peloponnesians did not wish to sail eastward into the open gulf, as they would thus have given Phormio the room necessary for those nautical manœuvres in which he was so much their superior.

These arguments have always seemed to me conclusive against Dr Arnold's interpretation, in which Mr Shilleto apparently acquiesces. On the other hand Mr Grote is clearly wrong in translating τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν "the land of the Athenians," as has been shown by Mr Shilleto in his well known pamphlet.

If then, on the one hand Mr Grote's is the right conception of the Peloponnesian manœuvre, and on the other the words in the text do not bear his interpretation, it is worth while to consider whether they can be emended. Mr Grote's argument seems to indicate that the error is in the word ἑαυτῶν. The only corrections of it which I find proposed by the commentators are αὐτῶν (mentioned by Mr Shilleto), and Ναυπακτίων (Krüger). Either of these makes sense of the passage, but αὐτῶν is bald, and Ναυπακτίων is too wide a deviation from the reading of the manuscripts. I venture to suggest ἐναντίαν. This easy alteration gives the required sense in the form which we should expect Thucydides to use in describing the manœuvre as planned and executed by the Peloponnesians. Moreover the phrase ἐπὶ τὴν ἐναντίαν γῆν is in exact accordance with the phrase ἐπὶ τὴν Ναύπακτον in the succeeding sentence, which describes the effect which the movement was intended to have, and had, upon the operations of Phormio.

HENRY JACKSON.

PROFESSOR CONINGTON.

THE readers and wellwishers of our Journal, while sharing in the universal regret for the death of Professor Conington, have a special cause to lament the loss of one who had been among the ablest and most zealous contributors to the present, as well as to the former series, and who we fondly hoped would long have continued to lend to this work his name and learning and ability. About the very time that the news reached us of his death, there came into our hands two books, his own translation just published of the satires and epistles of Horace, and Nauck's new edition of the Fragments of Euripides. The learned Editor makes honourable mention and no slight use of a paper by Prof. Conington that appeared in the old Journal fifteen years ago. These two productions, so different in kind, are striking examples of the great range and variety of his work, and of its excellence as well. For, backed by the opinion of those on whose taste and judgment he relies, the writer of this notice does not hesitate to say that he believes this Horace to be on the whole perhaps the best and most successful translation of a Classic that exists in the English language. The author in his preface to this his latest work speaks doubtfully of its claims to success, and thinks that Gifford's Juvenal is probably the best version of a classic in our language. We assert our belief that Horace is more difficult to translate than Juvenal, and that his translation is more faithful, more equal, more brilliant even, than Gifford's.

One is almost astounded at Prof. Conington's power and fertility, when one remembers that within the last six or seven years he had begun and completed translations of almost all

Horace, the whole of the Aeneid, and one half of the Iliad, the last a tribute of duty and affection paid to the memory of a lost friend. All these translations, though opinions will differ as to their relative merits, are excellent in their kind, and all are composed in elaborate rhymed verse. Just think of the time it took so ready and practised a writer as Pope to translate the Iliad. Yet, strange to say, we can assert on our own knowledge that Conington looked on these translations almost as 'parerga,' and that they occupied but a small portion even of these six or seven years. For the last fifteen years he had performed the duties of his professorship with a laborious fidelity that would have left an ordinary man time for little else. Yet during that same period he had brought almost to its completion his voluminous edition of Virgil, which displays a minute diligence, as well as a fine taste, a delicate discrimination, and a mastery of language, which (experto credite) it requires long study properly to appreciate. We are greatly mistaken if for years to come it does not leave its mark on all subsequent editions of classical authors, published in this country: a good criterion of genuine power.

He died at the age of 44 and seems always to have been troubled by a certain constitutional inertness which often rendered exertion oppressive. Yet what we have mentioned is but a part of the work which he achieved. While yet a Bachelor, he published a careful edition and verse translation of the Agamemnon, and in 1857 a most elaborate edition of the Choephoroe, which by some caprice of fortune never had the success it merited. He was fond of referring to this, and would assert with the candour which so marked him that he thought this the best of all his works in that kind. And in truth he was always yearning to be again at Aeschylus, his 'primus amor', which he would have liked to be his 'cura recens', his Nemesis, as well as his Delia. But duty sternly forbad.

Yet all these varied literary occupations were insufficient to satisfy his craving for knowledge and improvement. His various reviews and articles, extending over many years, prove what an enlightened sympathy he felt with the literary, political and theological movements of his time, a sympathy ever

accompanied by the moderation of genuine strength. On hearing of his death, a distinguished member of this University, a candid and most competent judge, said to us emphatically, that a true genius had passed from the earth. This is not the place to dwell on those virtues and graces of character, which made it impossible for him to lose a friend or make an enemy.

H. A. J. MUNRO.

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